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A Short History of the 
Great War 



Deahng particularly with its 

Military and Diplomatic Aspects 

and the part played in it by 

The United States 



By 

William L. McPherson 

Military Critic of the New York Tribune, 
Author of " The Strategy of the Great War" 



G. P. Putnam's Sons 

New York and London 

JLhc 1knicftcrbocI?er prees 

1920 



■PUA>> 



J]sij\ 



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Copyright 1920 

BY 

WILLIAM L. Mcpherson 



(0)CU565588 



PREFACE 

The purpose of this volume is to offer the general 
reader an outline story of the War. In another book, 
The Strategy of the Great War, I have endeavoured to 
interpret the struggle in the broader sense — as a singular 
and enormously interesting departure from previous mili- 
tary experience, — due to the revolutionary conditions 
introduced by a sudden reversion to rigid positional, or 
trench warfare. The strategy of the war, determined 
in part by the military policies of the belligerents, but 
in still larger part by conditions over which the general 
staffs had little control, is a study in itself. 

In this book the purely strategical aspects of the 
war are discussed only in so far as it is necessary to 
establish the true relation of battles and campaigns to 
one another and to the ultimate result. The main idea 
is to give a clear and accurate running accounSb of the 
war's origin and progress. 

Full military details are still lacking and many early 
impressions will undoubtedly be corrected after the 
war archives of the belligerent nations begin to be pub- 
lished. Critical studies of the battles and campaigns 
are exceedingly few. I will cite here again, as an ad- 
mirable example of work of this sort, General Palat's 
{Pierre Lehautcourt's) uncompleted series of volumes, 
entitled La Grande Guerre sur le Front Occidental, dealing 
with the 1 91 4 campaign in France and Belgium. Few 
German war records are as yet available. The General 



IV 



Preface 



Staff's series of pamphlets — about thirty in number — 
entitled Kriegsberichte aus dem Grossen Hauptquartier, 
is highly coloured and misleading. It is also lamentably 
short on routine military information. 

In My Thoughts and Actions, which appeared in the 
summer of 1919, General Ludendorff has presented an 
elaborate defence of his conduct of the war. It con- 
tains much interesting information as to the tactics of 
Ludendorff's various campaigns and as to his relations 
with Hindenburg. But since its main purpose is to 
shift responsibility for Germany's defeat to other 
shoulders than his own — particularly to those of Beth- 
mann-HoUweg and the civil bureaucracy — its extreme 
bias must be discounted. Even on his own showing 
Ludendorff was accountable for the fatal blunder of the 
renewal of indiscriminate U-boat warfare in February, 
1917. 

Grand Admiral Tirpitz has written a volume of 
memoirs (suppressed in Germany, but published in 
the United States), in which he, too, exculpates himself 
and accuses practically all the other German leaders — 
military, naval, and civil — of gross incompetency. Beth- 
mann-HoUvveg is bringing out a work, Betrachtungen 
zum Welt-Kriege, in which he attempts a similar exon- 
eration. These writers all disagree as to facts. Beth- 
mann-HoUweg, for instance, minimizes the importance 
of the famous consultation on July 5, 19 14, at Potsdam, 
at which Germany's Serbian policy was shaped. He 
says that on that day, after the receipt through the 
Austro-Hungarian Ambassador of an autograph letter 
from Emperor Francis Joseph, the Kaiser summoned 
him and Zimmermann to Potsdam, and that no others 
were present at the conference which followed. Tirpitz 
says that General Falkenhayn, the Prussian Secretary of 



Preface v 

War, and General Lyncker, the chief of the miHtary 
cabinet, were also present. Most of the current Ger- 
man contributors to the literature of the war are mani- 
festly more interested in domestic polemics than in the 
establishment of the truth. 

Authorities consulted on the Western Front cam- 
paigns include Volumes II and III of General Palat's 
series — Liege-Mulhouse-Sarrebourg-Morhange and Ba- 
tailles des Ardennes et de la Samhre; Louis Madelin's 
The Victory of the Marne (of which there is an English 
translation); Field Marshal Viscount French's igi4; 
General Sir Frederick Maurice's Forty Days in igi4; 
Senor E. Diaz-Retg's The Attack on Verdun (of which 
there is a French translation from the Spanish) ; Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel Paul Azan's The Warfare of To-day; 
General Zurlinden's La Guerre de Liberation; General 
Malleterre's valuable work, Les Campagnes de igi5; 
Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's The British Campaign in 
France and Flanders, 1917; Field Marshal Haig's ex- 
ceptionally clear and dispassionate reports on the Battle 
of the Somme and on the succeeding British cam- 
paigns; General Pershing's report on the operations of 
the American Expeditionary Army, 

For the Dardanelles-Gallipoli operation, Mr. Henry 
W. Nevinson's volume, The Dardanelles Campaign, is a 
model of its kind. Important facts bearing on the 
situation on the Turkish side are contained in Ambassa- 
dor Morgenthau's Story and in Mr. George F. Schreiner's 
From Berlin to Bagdad. 

The best first-hand authority on conditions on the 
Russian front is General Basil Gourko's War and 
Revolution in Russia, igi4-igiy. Mr. Robert Crozier 
Long's Russian Revolution Aspects is also of value. 

Among the authoritative books on the naval opera- 



VI 



Preface 



tions of the war are Admiral Viscount Jellicoe's The 
Grand Fleet, igi4-igi6; Mr. Arthur H. Pollen's The 
British Navy in Battle, and Naval Power in the War, by 
Lieutenant-Commander Charles Clifford Gill, U. S. N. 

Other sources made use of were the Italian General 
Staff's reports on the campaigns of 191 8 ; General Allen- 
by's report on the Palestine campaign; General Milne's 
report on the final Macedonian campaign; Mr. Oman's 
The Outbreak of the War of igi4-igi8; Prince Karl 
Lichnowsky's Memorandum; Dr. Wilhelm Muhlon's 
diary; Lieutenant- General Baron Freytag-Loring- 
hoven's Deductions from the World War and A Nation 
Trained in Arms or a Militia? ; Professor Douglas W. 
Johnson's Topography and Strategy in the War; Professor 
John Bach McMaster's The United States in the World 
War and the International Cyclopedia annuals for 19 14, 
1915, 1916, and 1917. 

The facts about the military participation of the 
United States contained in Chapter XLII, were drawn 
largely from The War with Germany, a statistical sum- 
mary made by Colonel Leonard P. Ayres, U. S. A., and 
published by the Statistics Branch of the General Staff 
of the Army. 



William L. McPherson. 



New York, 

September i, 1919. 



CONTENTS 



I. — The Beginnings of the War. June 

28, 1914-AuGUST 5, 1914 . . I 

II. — Numbers and Strategy . . .13 

III. — Belgium and the Marne. Aug. 3, 

1914-SEPT. 9, 1914 ... 19 

IV. — "The Race for the Sea" — Septem- 
' ber 15, 1914-DECEMBER I, 1914 . 38 

V. — Operations on the Russian Front. 

August i, 1914-DECEMBER 31, 1914 50 

VI. — Austria's Failures in Serbia. 
August 12, 1914 — December 14, 
1914 ...... 60 

VII. — Turkey Enters the War. October 

29, 1914-DECEMBER 31, 1914 . . 63 

VIII. — Germany Loses her Colonies. 
August 25, 1914-DECEMBER 31, 
1914 68 

IX. — Naval Operations in 1914. August 

5, 1914-DECEMBER 31, 1914 . . 72 

X. — The Russian Winter Campaign. 

January i, 1915-MAY i, 1915 . . 80 

XI. — The Dardanelles-Gallipoli Cam- 
paign. February 19, 1915-DECEM- 
BER 31, 1915 .... 87 

vii 



viii Contents 

CHAPTER PAGE 

XII. — The Russian Retreat. May i, 191 5- 

OcTOBER I, 1915 .... 103 

XIII. — Italy Enters the War. May 24, 

1915-DECEMBER, 31, 1915 . .112 

XIV. — The Conquest of Serbia. October 4, 

1915-DECEMBER 25, 1915 . 121 

XV. — "Nibbling" on the Western Front. 
January i, 1915-DECEMBER 31, 

1915 133 

XVI. — Asiatic and Colonial Campaigns. 

January i, 1915-DECEMBER 31, 1915 145 

XVII.— Naval Operations, 1915 . . 152 

XVIII. — Neutral Rights at Sea. The " Lusi- 
tania . ' ' August 3,191 4-December 
31, 1915 . . . . . 156 

XIX. — Verdun. February 21, 1916-DECEM- 

ber 16, 1916 .... 168 

XX. — Russia's Last Real Offensive. 

January i, I9i6-September i, 1916 181 

XXI. — The Somme. July i, 1916-NovEM- 

ber 18, 1916 . . . 191 

XXII. — The Trentino and Gorizia. May 14, 

1916-N0VEMBER 5, 1916 . . 201 

XXIII. — The Sacrifice of Rumania. August 

28, 1916-DECEMBER31, 1916 . 207 

XXIV. — Asiatic and Colonial Campaigns. 
January ii, I9i6-December 31, 
1916 ...... 220 

XXV. — The Battle of Jutland — Other 

Naval Operations of 191 6 . . 226 



Contents ix 

CHAPTER PAGE 

XXVI. — America Drifts Toward War. Janu- 
ary 1, 1916-DECEMBER31, 1916 . 237 

XXVII. — Germany Defies America. January 

31, 1917-JuNE 30, 1917 . . .245 

XXVIII. — Russia in Revolution. March ii, 

1917-DECEMBER 31, 1917 . . 253 

XXIX. — West Front Operations, 1917. Janu- 
ary 5, 1917-DECEMBER 5, 1917 . 262 

XXX. — The Isonzo-Caporetto. May 12, 

1917-DECEMBER 31, 1917 . . 282 

XXXI. — Balkan and Asiatic Campaigns of 

1917. January i, 1917-DECEMBER 

10, 1917 ..... 290 

XXXII. — Submarine and Naval Operations, 

1917 295 

XXXIII. — The Dismemberment of Russia. 

January i, 1918-DECEMBER31, 1918 299 

XXXIV. — Ludendorff's Channel Port Offen- 
sives — St. Quentin, March 21, 1918; 
Lys Valley, April 9, 191 8 . . 309 

XXXV. — Ludendorff's Paris Offensives. 
Aisne-Marne, May 27, 1918. Las- 
siGNY, June 9, 1918 . . . 327 

XXXVI. — The Turn of the Tide. Luden- 
dorff's Fifth Offensive, July 15, 

191 8. Foch's Counter-Offensive, 
July 18, 1918 -334 

XXXVII. — The Decision in the West. August 

8, 1918-N0VEMBER II, 1918 . 342 



X Contents 

CHAPTER PAGE 

XXXVIII. — Italy's Inspiring Recovery, June 15, 

1918-N0VEMBER 5, 1918 . . 359 

XXXIX. — The End in the Balkans. July 7, 

1918-SEPTEMBER 30, 1 91 8 . . 367 

XL. — Turkey Goes to the Wall. Febru- 
ary 28, 1918-OcTOBER 31, 1918 372 



XLI.- 


— Naval Operations, 1918. German 






Naval Losses .... 


378 


XLII.- 


—America's Part in the War . 


382 




Appendix I .... . 


393 




Appendix II 


396 




Appendix III . 


399 




Index ...... 


403 



A Short History of the Great War 



A Short History of 
The Great War 



CHAPTER I 



THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR. JUNE 28, I914- 
AUGUST 5, I914 

The Serajevo assassinations on June 28, 1914, 
ushered in the World War. They were in no sense its 
cause. They merely offered the Austro-Hungarian 
Government a pretext for satisfying a long-standing 
grudge against Serbia. 

The statesmen who ruled at Vienna in the name of 
the senile Francis Joseph had no particular desire to 
avenge the murder of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand 
and his morganatic wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg. 
The heir apparent was cordially disliked by the aged 
Emperor and in Austrian court and military circles. 
The Hungarians hated and feared him. He was de- 
voted to his wife, who was a commoner and a Czech, 
and his fixed idea was to create a Hapsburg Slav state, 
to be admitted into the Empire on equal terms with 
Austria and Hungary. His scheme was known as 
"trialism." It enraged the Magyars, who saw that 
under it Hungary would be stripped of territory and 



2 The Great War [iqui 

prestige and would lose the commanding position 
which she had long held in the councils of the Dual 
Monarchy. Austrian power, as well as Hungarian, was 
based on the exploitation of suppressed races. But 
Hungary was the harsher and more exacting master. 

The ruling classes at Vienna and Budapest welcomed 
Francis Ferdinand's taking off. It has been charged 
since the war that the Serajevo assassinations were 
accelerated by Austrian and Hungarian politicians, 
interested in getting rid of the heir apparent. The 
circumstances of the trial of the assassins and their 
alleged accomplices created much suspicion. The 
principals were let off with light sentences. The pro- 
ceedings were in camera. The testimony adduced by 
the Austro-Hungarian secret service to connect Serbian 
ojEficials or patriotic societies with the crime was practi- 
cally worthless. 

But Vienna and Budapest jumped at the chance to 
lay the murder at the door of the Serbian Government 
and to frame demands on Serbia which were as in- 
sincere as they were provocative. Austria-Hungary 
needed a plausible pretext for attacking her tiny neigh- 
bour. At last she had found one. 

Serbia was a hindrance to the realization of Austro- 
Hungarian ambitions in the Balkans. She blocked the 
way to Salonica. In 1908, when Count Aerenthal 
nullified the Treaty of Berlin by annexing Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Serbia had made a violent protest. She 
would have drawn the sword, if Russia had been ready 
to support her. But Russia was still recovering from 
the effects of her defeat by Japan in 1904-05 and would 
not give the signal. 

The incorporation of 1,250,000 more Southern Slavs 
into the Hapsburg Empire gave new Ufe to the agi- 



[1 914] The Beginnings of the War 3 

tation for Southern Slav unity and independence. 
Austria-Hungary had to contend with this agitation 
in the South, the Czech agitation in Bohemia and 
Moravia, and PoHsh unrest in GaHcia. The suppressed 
Slavic elements constituted an obstructive Hoc in the 
Austrian Reichstag and made life miserable for the 
government, which was forced to rule for the greater 
part of the time without parliamentary sanction. 

The outcome of the Balkan wars increased the irri- 
tation of the ruling classes in the Dual Monarchy. 
Serbia emerged from those wars triumphant over both 
Turkey and Bulgaria, and greatly extended her borders. 
Austria-Hungary was enraged at the partition made in 
the Treaty of Bucharest and wanted to intervene by 
force to prevent Serbia's expansion. She confided to 
Italy in 1913 her wish to attack Serbia. But Italy 
declined to sanction the undertaking. This refusal 
ended the matter, for under the terms of the Triple 
Alliance neither Austria-Hungary nor Italy could 
take aggressive measures against any of the Balkan 
States without first consulting the other and giving 
guarantees of compensation in case the territorial 
status quo in the Balkans should be altered. Germany 
was also probably reluctant to start a European war 
in 1 91 3. That was the year of her special levy on 
capital for war purposes. She was just taking the 
final step in military preparedness. 

But Germany, as well as Austria-Hungary, was 
headed toward war. For the latter war was a necessity 
growing out of domestic politics. The Dual Monarchy 
could not hope to recover stability and tranquillity 
until the Slav agitation was crushed. For Germany 
war was a means of restoring her shrunken international 
prestige. Since the Agadir venture and the Algeciras 



4 The Great War tigu] 

settlement, Germany's position in Europe had steadily- 
grown more and more uncomfortable. Her blustering 
diplomacy had driven Great Britain into the Triple 
Entente. Italy strayed away from the Triple Alliance 
when she made war on Turkey in 191 1. She was no 
longer a dependable ally, but a neutral, drifting back 
into friendly relations with Russia and Prance. Ger- 
many was distrusted on all sides. Her ambitions for 
world power were being inflamed by a sedulous Pan- 
German propaganda. Her leaders felt that it was 
almost time to get results out of her superior military 
resources and organization. 

To Austria-Hungary and Germany the Serajevo 
assassinations were therefore a godsend. The mur- 
derers and their alleged associates were all subjects of 
the Dual Monarchy, and the crime was committed on 
its soil. But it was possible to charge the conspiracy 
to the activities of the Serbian patriotic society, the 
Narodna Odbrana, which for some years had been en- 
gaged in Pan-Serb propaganda. Using this accusa- 
tion as a pretext for excessive demands for reparation, 
Serbia could be forced either to humiliate herself in 
the eyes of the subject Slav peoples or to accept a 
quarrel of Austria's making. 

An indispensable preliminary, from the Austrian 
point of view, was to secure a positive understanding 
with Germany. There is little reason to doubt that 
that was achieved as early as July 5th. Vienna carried 
her case to Berlin and was told there to go as far as she 
liked. Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador to 
London, says in his famous Memorandum: 

Subsequently [that is, after his visit in Berlin early 
in July] I learned that at the decisive conversation 



[I9I4I The Beginnings of the War 5 

at Potsdam on July 5th the inquiry addressed to 
us by Vienna found absolute assent among all per- 
sonages in authority. Indeed, they added that there 
would be no harm if a war with Russia would result. 

Dr. Wilhelm Muhlon testifies in his Diary: 

Immediately before the Kaiser started on his trip 
to Norway there was a conference in Berlin with the 
Austrians. The Kaiser had declared to the Austrians 
that this time he would go with them through thick 
and thin. 

Count Lerchenfeld, the Bavarian Minister to Prussia, 
wrote on July 18, 19 14, to Count Hertling, the Bavarian 
Minister of State : 

The opinion here is general that this is Austria's 
hour of fate. For this reason, in reply to the inquiry 
from Vienna, the declaration was immediately made 
here than any line of action upon which Austria may 
resolve will be agreed to, even at the risk of war with 
Russia. The free hand which was given to Count 
Berchtold's chef de cabinet, Count Hoyos, who arrived 
in Berlin to deliver the detailed memorandum, was 
so extensive that the Austrian Government was 
. authorized to negotiate with Bulgaria regarding 
her joining the Triple Alliance. 

Corroborating all these is Ambassador Morgenthau's 
report of a conversation he had with Baron Wangen- 
heim in Constantinople, in August, 19 14. Wangen- 
heim said that he had himself been present at the 
conference on July 5th. It was attended by several 
other ambassadors, by the heads of the General Staff 



6 The Great War [1914] 

of the Army and the General Staff of the Navy, by 
bankers and industrial chiefs. The Kaiser asked them 
all if they were ready for war and all said "yes," 
except the bankers, who asked for two weeks' time in 
which to adjust their foreign accounts. 

The Austro-Hungarian-German understanding was 
clear-cut and precise. Vienna was to issue an ultima- 
tum to Serbia containing demands so exorbitant that 
Serbia could hardly accept them. In case of non- 
acceptance or qualified acceptance, war was to be de- 
clared. If any Entente Power objected and proposed 
mediation by the European concert, Austria-Hungary 
was to contend that the affair was one concerning only 
herself and Serbia. She was to promise not to annex 
any Serbian territory, as, indeed, she was practically 
compelled to do by her obligations to Italy under 
the secret Triple Alliance Treaty. If Germany were 
asked to take part in a mediation, she would say that 
she could not consent to haling her ally before "a Euro- 
pean areopagus" for pursuing a just grievance against 
Serbia. She would advise moderation and a "localiza- 
tion" of the disturbance. 

If Russia, resenting the attempt to humiliate Serbia, 
should mobilize against Austria-Hungary, Germany 
would hold that such mobilization was a threat directed 
against herself and would also mobilize. And mobiliza- 
tion, from the German point of view, meant war. 

Meanwhile a comedy was to be staged to deceive 
the Entente. The Kaiser was to go on his Norwegian 
cruise; Moltke, the chief of the German General Staff, 
and Jagow, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 
were to leave Berlin for short vacations. The German 
Foreign Office was to plead complete ignorance of the 
terms of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum. Jagow, 



[I9I4] The Beginnings of the War 7 

according to Dr. Miihlon, confided to a friend that he 
"thought he could make a better impression in Paris 
and St. Petersburg with a statement that he never 
knew the contents of the note." 

The presentation of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum 
to Serbia was cunningly timed. It was dispatched 
on July 23d and an answer was required by 6 p.m., 
on July 25th. On July 24th, President Poincare and 
Premier Viviani, who was also the French Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, had just started back to Paris, after a 
visit of courtesy to St. Petersburg. Paris itself was 
absorbed by the Caillaux trial. Great Britain was in 
the thick of the crisis over the enforcement of the Irish 
Home Rule law. Ulster had defied the London Gov- 
ernment and civil war seemed imminent. The Teuton 
plotters evidently calculated that the Entente Powers 
would be unable to interfere diplomatically to protect 
Serbia before war between Serbia and Austria-Hungary 
had become an accomplished fact. 

The Austro-Hungarian ultimatum was, in effect, a 
notice to Serbia that she must stamp out any and all 
Pan-Serbian propaganda and discipline all Serbians 
who might have been in any way engaged in it. Aus- 
trian official collaboration in this work was also insisted 
upon. Serbia was to remove from the military and 
civil services all functionaries guilty of propaganda 
against Austria-Hungary or designated as guilty by 
the Vienna Government. Austria, in brief, demanded 
an abdication of Serbian sovereignty. 

Acting on the advice of the Entente Powers, the 
Serbian Cabinet prepared an extremely conciliatory 
reply. It granted most of the Austro-Hungarian 
demands and made only slight reservations as to the 
others. It asked for a restatement of a few obscure 



8 The Great War 11914] 

points in the note and offered to refer any questions 
left outstanding to the Hague Tribunal. 

No state ever showed more moderation under pro- 
vocation than Serbia did. But the Austrian programme 
had been determined on in advance. Baron Giesl, 
the diplomatic representative of the Dual Monarchy- 
stationed at Belgrade, received the Serbian reply at 
5.45 P.M. on July 25th. Within a few minutes notice 
was given to Premier Pasitch that the communication 
was unsatisfactory. At 6,30 p.m. the Austrian Lega- 
tion Staff left Belgrade. The Minister had not taken 
the trouble to wire the note to Vienna and await in- 
structions. Hostilities began on July 26th. Austria- 
Hungary formally declared war on July 28th. 

The vital question from the beginning had been 
how far Russia would go to protect Serbia. Russia's 
course was open and straightforward. Her people 
had recovered from the depression following the Japan- 
ese War. Defeat in the East had led the government 
to turn its attention again to the Balkans. The Bal- 
kan wars had helped Russia, while injuring Austria- 
Hungary. Popular feeling in the Empire demanded 
a demonstration of some sort on Serbia's behalf. 
Otherwise Russian prestige in the Balkans would be 
shattered. 

About the middle of July, Sazonoff , the Russian Min- 
ister of Foreign Affairs, had told the British Ambas- 
sador to Russia that "anything in the shape of an 
Austrian ultimatum to Belgrade could not leave Russia 
indifferent and she might be forced to take some 
precautionary military measures." With the Austro- 
Hungarian Ambassador, who delivered a copy of the 
ultimatum on July 24th, he was equally outspoken. 
Count Szapary reported to Vienna that Sazonoff's 



[I9I4] The Beginnings of the War 9 

"attitude was throughout unaccommodating and hos- 
tile." Count Pourtales, the German Ambassador to 
St. Petersburg, reported to BerHn that on the same day 
Sazonoff declared to him "most positively that Russia 
could not permit under any circumstances that the 
Serbo-Austrian difficulty should be settled between the 
parties concerned alone." But the latter was the only 
sort of settlement which Berlin and Vienna were willing 
to tolerate. 

Diplomatic efforts between July 26th and August ist 
to head off war by some sort of joint European media- 
tion were predestined to failure. So far as the two 
Teuton Powers were concerned, they were a by-play 
intended chiefly to mystify the British Government. 
France and Russia both distrusted German intentions. 
Sir Edward Grey was more optimistic and his illusions 
were furthered by the fact that the German Ambassa- 
dor at London, Prince Lichnowsky, an honest and high- 
minded diplomat, had been kept in ignorance of what 
was actually going on in Berlin. 

On July 26th Austria-Hungary mobilized twelve 
of her first line army corps — eight completely and four 
partially. On July 29th Russia mobilized in the mili- 
tary districts of Odessa, Kiev, Moscow, and Kazan. 
Berlin had been informed in advance of this move, 
with a notice that there was no intention in it of aggres- 
sion against Germany. On the same day Count Pour- 
tales served notice on Sazonoff that "any further 
development of Russian military preparations would 
compel us to take counter-measures, and that meant 
war." 

Since Russia could not mobilize effectively against 
Austria-Hungary without calling out the troops in 
the Poland district, which faced Germany as well as 



10 The Great War 



[1914] 



Austria-Hungary, a completer mobilization was or- 
dered on July 30th. Germany intended to make this 
an excuse for a mobilization against both Russia and 
France. On July 31st she sent an ultimatum, requir- 
ing Russia to stop within twelve hours "every measure 
of war against us and against Austria-Hungary." The 
next day Germany declared war on Russia. 

The Berlin- Vienna plot had been carried out to the 
last detail. It is interesting to note that, at the last 
moment, Austria-Hungary showed signs of weakening. 
These may have been intended merely as a climax in 
deception. If they were genuine, they reflected the 
eleventh-hour realization of the Austrian General Staff 
that it was hardly prepared to fight Serbia on one front 
and Russia on another. At any rate, Vienna, under 
Entente pressure, began to admit that some discussion 
of the terms of the Serbian note was possible and also 
that Russian mobilization need not be interpreted as 
involving war. But by this time — late on July 31st — 
the German Government had clinched war by declar- 
ing practically that Russian mobilization against either 
Germany or Austria-Hungary constituted a casus belli. 

It didn't suit the German General Staff to mobilize 
against Russia alone. France must be attacked and 
destroyed first. Berlin could never have imagined 
that France would fail to live up to her obligations to 
Russia. Nevertheless, it was desirable to draw France 
in at once. So the German Ambassador at Paris was in- 
structed to inform the French Government, if it exhibited 
a desire to remain neutral, that neutrality could be pur- 
chased by the surrender to Germany, for the period of 
the war, of the frontier fortresses of Verdun and Toul. 

France did not desire to remain neutral. She mobil- 
ized on August ist, but neither declared war nor com- 



[I9I4] The Beginnings of the War n 

mitted any hostile act. The German Government was, 
therefore, forced to invent some fictitious acts of ag- 
gression, and use them as the basis for a declaration of 
war against France. This declaration was made on 
August 3d. Thereafter, Germany was free to develop 
her long elaborated plans for an invasion of France. 

Great Britain's attitude was still undefined. Sir 
Edward Grey had been the most sanguine supporter 
of the futile diplomacy of mediation. On August ist 
he still had some faith in Germany's willingness to 
forego war. After Berlin had taken the final step, he 
began to have questionings as to the extent of Great 
Britain's obligations to France and Russia, particularly 
to France. Self-interest and self-preservation both 
required Great Britain to draw the sword against Ger- 
many. But the Asquith government had strongly 
pacifist tendencies. It had kept Great Britain unready 
for war, and now shrank from facing the consequences 
of unreadiness. 

Fortunately Germany herself resolved British hesita- 
tions. The German General Staff had decided to 
attack France through Belgium. On August 2d the 
German Government demanded free passage across 
Belgian territory for the German armies. The Belgian 
Government refused this unwarranted demand. On 
August 3d Berlin issued an ultimatum to Belgium and 
followed it by violating the Belgian border. 

Sir Edward Grey had now a reason for siding with 
Germany's enemies which coiild not be challenged. 
Great Britain had guaranteed the territorial integrity 
and neutrality of Belgium. Germany — succeeding to 
the diplomatic contracts of Prussia — was a co-guarantor. 
Great Britain was morally bound to defend Belgium. It 
was also to her obvious interest to do so. Having once 



12 The Great War [1914] 

assumed that attitude, war with Germany was sure to 
follow. 

Great Britain protested against the violation of 
Belgian neutrality and asked for assurances that 
Germany would not persist in it. Germany had no 
idea of giving such assurances. The British demand 
hardened on August 4th into an ultimatum, expiring 
at midnight. No assurances having been received from 
Berlin, Great Britain formally declared war against 
Germany on August 5th. 



CHAPTER II 

NUMBERS AND STRATEGY 

When on the evening of August 4, 1914, Sir Edward 
Goschen, the British Ambassador in Berlin, called on 
Bethmann-Hollweg, he found the latter in a tremendous 
state of excitement. The Chancellor expressed the 
greatest astonishment that Great Britain should think 
of going to war just for "a scrap of paper" — meaning 
her engagement to uphold Belgian neutrality. He 
accused Great Britain of "striking a man from behind 
while he was fighting for his life against two assailants." 
And he added with a sneer: "At what price will that 
compact [the Belgian treaty] have been kept? Has 
the British Government thought of that?" 

Bethmann-Hollweg, being only a civilian and living 
in the unreal atmosphere of Continental diplomacy, 
may have been startled by the idea that German policy 
had driven Great Britain into full partnership in the 
Entente. But the German military leaders could have 
had no illusions as to the effect of their adventure in 
Belgium. They had counted the cost. They were 
willing to fight Great Britain rather than forego the 
advantages of access through Belgium to the open 
plain of Northern France. 

At first glance it seemed as if Germany had recklessly 
plunged into a war in which the odds were enormously 
against her. She had created an enemy coalition 

13 



14 The Great War 

comprising three Great Powers — France, Great Brit- 
ain, and Russia — and three smaller states — Belgium, 
Serbia, and Montenegro (for Montenegro was certain 
to act with Serbia). Portugal had a military alliance 
with Great Britain. So had Japan. These two coun- 
tries were to be added to Germany's enemies. Austria- 
Hungary was the only ally Berlin had in sight. Italy 
was uncertain and might not remain "benevolently 
neutral," as the Triple Alliance treaty required her 
to do in case either or both her associates engaged in a 
war of aggression. Rumania, formerly a satellite of 
the Teuton Powers, had drifted away from them in 
recent years almost as far as Italy had. 

The two Teuton empires were greatly outnumbered 
at the start, and remained outnumbered. Turkey 
joined them in the fall of 1914. But Italy joined the 
Entente in May, 191 5. Bulgaria sided with them in 
October, 191 5. Rumania sided with the Entente in 
August, 1916, and Greece in the summer of 1917. 
When Russia dropped out of the war the United States 
came in. 

At the beginning of the war the man-power equation, 
based on population returns for the years immediately 
preceding, was : 

The Teuton Powers 

Germany 68,000,000 

Austria-Hungary 52,000,000 



Total 120,000,000 

The Entente Powers 

France (without her colonies) 39,6oo 000 

The United Kingdom 46,000,000 



Numbers and Strategy 15 

Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and 

South Africa 20,000,000 

Belgium 7,500,000 

Serbia and Montenegro 3,500,000 

Portugal 6,000,000 

Russia 178,000,000 

Total 300,600,000 

Japan entered the war on August 23, 1914. But 
her man power is not included in the Entente total, 
because she confined her operations to Asia. She sent 
no troops to Europe and only a few of the smaller 
units of her navy to the Mediterranean. On the other 
hand, Great Britain was able to recruit more than 
one million men in her Indian possessions. These 
were used chiefly in Mesopotamia and Palestine (many 
of them in the non-combatant services), A few East 
Indian divisions fought in France in the fall of 19 14, 
but the climate was too severe for them. France 
drew on her African colonies for more than five hundred 
thousand first line troops and auxiliaries. The best 
of these were employed regularly on the Western Front. 

In 19 1 5 the numerical equation stood: 

Quadruple Alliance 

Germany and Austria-Hungary 120,000,000 

Turkey 21,000,000 

Bulgaria 4,750,000 

Total 145,750,000 

Entente 

Members in 1914 300,600,000 

Italy 35,000,000 

Total 335,600,000 



i6 The Great War 

Germany and her associates were always outnum- 
bered more than two to one. The defection of Russia 
did not lower the ratio, materially, in view of the acces- 
sion of the United States, Rumania, and Greece and 
the steadily increasing supply of British and French 
colonials. 

Yet the German General Staff had foreseen an enemy 
preponderance in crude man power, and had frankly 
discounted it. The Germans knew that there were 
other factors in modern war more important than 
unorganized numbers. Numbers could count little 
against superior military organization, unified leader- 
ship, better trained troops, heavier guns, and completer 
technical equipment. Germany was thoroughly pre- 
pared for war. No one of the Entente belligerents, 
except France, was even moderately well prepared for it. 

The German General Staff counted on a relatively 
short war. For a European war lasting three years — 
and against the enemies in sight at the beginning of it 
— Germany and Austria-Hungary had ample man 
power. Their strength could be fully developed within 
twelve months. On the other side only France's 
could be. Great Britain could not be ready to fight 
on a large scale until the summer of 1916. Russia, 
owing to her isolated position and her backward condi- 
tion industrially, would never be able to make effective 
use of her vast numbers. Italy, after she entered the 
war, would be held down to the defensive or to inef- 
fectual offensives, because of military difficulties she 
faced on her northern frontier. 

Having her military resources well in hand, Germany 
also expected to fight a war of elimination. She tried 
to crush France in 19 14, and failed. But she extin- 
guished Belgiimi. She overran Serbia and Montenegro 



Numbers and Strategy i7 

in 1915 and Rumania in 1916. She put Russia out of 
the lists in 191 7. Had she not unnecessarily dragged 
the United States into the war at the same time, she 
might have carried the struggle against France, Great 
Britain, and Italy to a draw (which would have meant 
a substantial victory for her) before her military strength 
had been exhausted. 

Her advantages in the way of geographical position, 
rapidity of mobilization, centralized command, pos- 
session of the strategic offensive, larger munitions sup- 
plies, and superiority in heavy artillery and machine 
guns, more than offset the Allied advantage in potential 
man power. Bethmann-Hollweg ludicrously distorted 
the facts when he pictured Germany in 19 14 as 
a man being stabbed in the back by Great Britain 
while he was fighting for life with two other assailants 
— Russia and France. There was never any serious 
shortage of German troops on the Western Front until 
September, 191 8. And Germany always possessed a 
decided military superiority on the Eastern Front. 

The general strategic objectives of the two groups of 
combatants were simple enough, in the broader sense. 
It was Germany's plan to dispose of France first and 
then to turn east and crush Russia. France was not 
disposed of in the great onrush which ended with the 
First Battle of the Marne. But she was pinned down 
for four years to an uncomfortable defensive on her 
own soil. 

After 19 14, it was Germany's natural policy to fight 
a holding battle in the West, to destroy Russia, and 
to bring into being that Mittel-Europa of which the 
Pan-Germans had dreamed. She did create in 19 15 
and 1916 a German Empire extending from the Gulf 
of Riga, on the Baltic, to the mouths of the Dan- 



18 The Great War 

ube and thence to the Caucasus, the lower Tigris, 
and the Sinai Desert. After the Russian collapse she 
added to it Finland, Esthonia, Livonia, Lithuania, the 
Ukraine, the Crimea, and Trans-Caucasia. The way- 
was opened for German penetration to the Urals, to 
Bokhara and Herat. 

But the German military leaders kept turning back 
to the original conception of a war of conquest in the 
West. They could not renounce the idea of capturing 
Paris and bringing Great Britain to her knees. So, 
after finishing Russia, they set out to conquer the 
world. It was a vain and foolish quest. For the sub- 
marine war against Great Britain forced the United 
States in as a belligerent and made a military decision 
against Germany (which before had been extremely 
doubtful) a practical certainty. Overweening ambi- 
tion and unsound strategy cost Germany the war. 

As to the Entente, its primary strategic aim was to 
connect the Western Front with the Eastern Front. 
This was never accomplished. And failure to accom- 
plish it led to the downfall and elimination of Russia. 
The original Franco-Russian plan was to defeat Ger- 
many by a concerted Eastern and Western offensive. 
But Russia was never equal to an offensive against 
Germany. And the French offensive didn't really 
get going until July, 1918. 

The Allies fought the war disjointedly. Without 
unity of command they could hardly hope to get any- 
where. But it took nearly four years of failures and 
disappointments to achieve unity. The Western Allied 
Powers held on, each fighting for itself, while their 
Eastern associates went down singly to disaster. But 
France, Great Britain, and Italy maintained themselves 
until America could arrive. And that was long enough. 



CHAPTER III 

BELGIUM AND THE MARNE. AUG. 3, I914-SEPT. 9, I9I4 

Germany began the war with a crime. Inheriting 
the treaty obligations of Prussia, the German Empire 
had become one of the guarantors of the territorial 
integrity and neutrality of Belgium. But because the 
German General StafE found it more practicable to 
attack France through Belgium than to attempt to 
force the strongly fortified Lorraine front, the German 
Government broke its faith and brutally attacked a 
people to whom it owed protection. 

The invasion of Belgium was a revelation to the 
world of the moral and spiritual corruption with which 
the Germany of William II had been infected. Her 
statesmen and soldiers had lost respect even for ap- 
pearances. The elder Moltke, though cold and im- 
placable, still lived up to the recognized code of 
military honour. He fought cleanly in France in 
1870-71. But events were soon to prove that his 
successors admitted no restraints on military ruthless- 
ness. They adhered unconditionally to Bethmann- 
Hollweg's maxim that military necessity (meaning 
military convenience) "knows no law." After break- 
ing the law of nations they began to disregard the laws 
of war and the humanitarian restrictions thrown 
about war in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
In the massacres of Dinant, Aerschot, and Louvain 

19 



20 The Great War 



[1914! 



they relapsed to the standards of barbarism — standards 
which were to be enforced thereafter by German armies 
wherever they went and in German warfare at sea and 
in the air. Within three weeks after the war began 
German methods had become infamous in the eyes of 
all civilized nations. 

When King Albert was faced with the brutal German 
ultimatum of August 3d, he elected to lose his kingdom 
rather than yield his honour. He was poorly prepared 
to contest the passage of the Kaiser's armies across 
Belgian territory. But, at the least, he could delay 
for a few days the progress of the huge flanking move- 
ment through Northern France on which Moltke the 
Younger counted to envelop the French armies and 
to uncover Paris. 

Liege was the first barrier in the path of the invaders. 
It lay in the lower Meuse Valley and covered the main 
trunk line up that valley to the French border. It 
was surrounded by a circle of modern forts, built by 
Brialmont. It was only lightly garrisoned, however; 
and there were not enough men to defend the spaces 
between the forts. 

Belgium's total available forces in the first days of 
August, 1914, numbered 135,500. Of these 18,500 
were volunteers. The Belgian Government, with a 
scrupulous regard for its obligations as a neutral, had 
mobilized on the French border and on the coast facing 
Great Britain, as well as on the German front. The 
bulk of the troops were in the West. Only the Third 
Division was at Liege and it had to cover the Meuse 
crossings below the city as well as defend the city itself. 

The Belgian plan of campaign did not contemplate 
an engagement in force with the superior German 
masses. Instructions were given to the division com- 



[I9I4] Belgium and the Marne 21 

manders to avoid anything like a pitched battle and to 
elude envelopment, the purpose of the Belgian High 
Command being merely to slow up the Germans and 
to retire gradually, ultimately effecting a junction with 
the expected French and British forces. In pursuance 
of this sound policy, the Third Belgian Division with- 
drew from Liege on August 6th, about a week before 
Fort de Loncin fell, and General Leman, the commander 
of the garrison, was taken prisoner by the Germans. 
The last Liege forts were not reduced until August 
1 6th and 17th. 

German cavalry had crossed into Belgium on the 
morning of August 4th. The same day the attack on 
Liege opened. The Germans attempted to rush the 
fortress without waiting for the siege artillery to come 
up. These efforts failed with serious losses. In a 
night attack on August 5th some German troops suc- 
ceeded in getting through a gap between two of the 
forts and reaching the city. They were thrown out, 
but returned on August 6th, when the Third Belgian 
Division was sent away. 

The forts had been expected to hold out for some time 
although isolated. But after the German and Austrian 
heavy howitzers arrived it was quickly demonstrated 
that even the new girdle fort systems of the Brialmont 
type had become obsolete. The Teuton monster bat- 
teries were emplaced far beyond the range of the fort 
guns and made practice just as if they were on the 
proving grounds. And the projectiles were powerful 
enough to blow Brialmont 's concrete and steel cupola- 
shaped constructions into fragments. It was the first 
surprise of a war which was to be full of surprises. 

Until the forts yielded the enemy could not make use 
of the railroads up the Meuse Valley toward France. 



22 The Great War 



[1914I 



Their gallant resistance delayed the German advance 
^lightly, yet not materially. By August 17th, when 
the last one fell, the Germans had just about completed 
their mobilization and Kluck's and Bulow's armies 
were ready to execute the great wheel into Northern 
France. 

Pushing up the Meuse Valley past Huy the German 
and Austrian heavy batteries invested Namur, on 
August 22d. That second Belgian stronghold, rated 
almost as high as Liege, was reduced in two days. 
The fall of Namur cleared the way for the advance 
of the First and Second German armies west and 
southwest toward the exposed left flank of the Allied 
position in the neighbourhood of Charleroi, Mons, and 
Maubeuge. 

The Belgian army was now cut off from the French 
and British forces. It had been concentrated on the 
line of the Gette River, covering Antwerp and Brussels. 
On August 1 8th Kluck attacked this line, and since 
the Germans had an immense superiority in numbers, 
King Albert, pursuing his original policy, ordered a 
retirement behind the Dyle River. The next day the 
Belgian army, still intact, moved within the outer 
circle of the Antwerp forts. There it awaited events. 

The stage was now completely cleared for the first 
German campaign in France. The German plan of 
operations was one long ago worked out. By striking 
through Belgium it sought to avoid the difficulties in- 
volved in an attack on the Belfort-Nancy-Toul-Verdun 
front. There was another reason. The Germans needed 
room to carry out the ambitious envelopment scheme 
which Count Schlieffen had devised. They could get 
room only by approaching Paris from the north-east, 
down the Valley of the Oise. 



[I9I4] Belgium and the Marne 23 

This plan was advertised more or less before the war. 
But the French General Staff apparently did not take 
it very seriously. Possibly because it involved a 
violation of international good faith and also because 
an exaggerated value was put on the defensive value 
of the fortresses of Liege and Namur, the French strate- 
gists were never inclined to believe that Germany 
would deliver her main attack in the north. 

The French concentration plans provided for an 
assembling of the main strength of the French forces 
on the Alsace-Lorraine and Luxemburg border. In 
the original alignment the five French armies were 
grouped as follows: the First, under Dubail, in the 
Vosges region, from Luneville south ; the Second, under 
de Castelnau, covering Nancy and Toul; the Third, 
under Ruffey, from Verdun north to Montmedy, east 
of the Meuse; the Fifth, under Lanrezac, in the Sedan- 
Mezieres section, opposite the Ardennes; the Fourth, 
under de Langle de Gary, in reserve behind the Third 
Army. 

It was the purpose of the French to seize the offen- 
sive, if possible, before the Germans did, or, at least, 
to meet a German offensive in the north with a counter- 
offensive in the south. All French preconceptions 
were in favour of forcing the issue in the Upper Rhine 
Valley. 

The German concentration aimed at a decision in 
the north. Three armies — the First, under Kluck, 
the Second, under Biilow, and the Third, under Hansen 
— were mobilized on the Belgian border north of Luxem- 
burg. The Fourth Army, under Crown Prince Al- 
brecht of Wurttemberg, covered the northern half of 
Luxemburg; the Fifth, under the Crown Prince of 
Prussia, covered the southern half, extending down to 



24 The Great War [1914! 

Thionville. The Sixth Army, under Crown Prince 
Rupprecht of Bavaria, was behind Metz. The Seventh, 
under Heeringen, was on the Saar, between Metz and 
Strasburg. There was a special contingent, under 
Deimling, in Upper Alsace. The German encirclement 
movement was to pivot on the Fifth Army. The 
First Army was to be the tip of the moving spoke. 

Kluck got well in motion about August i8th. By 
that time Joffre had already attempted to take the 
offensive in the south. The first effort was made on 
August 7th, when the mobilization was only half com- 
pleted. It consisted of a reconnoissance in force from 
Belfort to Altkirch and Mulhouse. The latter city 
was occupied for a day. Then the French columns, 
finding German resistance stronger than they had 
expected, retired to the border. 

The moral effect of this adventure was discouraging. 
So Joffre sent back a new force, called the Army of 
Alsace, under the aged General Pau, to recover 
Altkirch and Mulhouse, The movement began on 
August 15th. Mulhouse was retaken on August 19th. 
But there progress ended. Within a few days the 
French General Staff was occupied with more important 
matters than a sentimental inroad into Alsace, Pau 
was recalled to Belfort and the Army of Alsace was 
disbanded. Most of the troops composing it were 
already needed elsewhere. 

The Lorraine offensive was on a more ambitious 
scale. The First and Second armies participated in it. 
They both moved on August 14th across the French 
border in a north-easterly direction, toward the general 
line of the railroad connecting Metz and Strasburg. 
They faced the German Sixth and Seventh armies, 
which drew back in accordance with a prearranged 



[iQu] Belgium and the Marne 25 

plan. The First Army reached Sarrebourg — on the 
Metz-Strasburg railway, about eighteen miles north- 
east of the frontier — on August i8th. It pushed a 
little north of that town and was checked there on the 
19th, But its position was good and General Dubail 
expected to renew the offensive when he received word 
that the Second Army, on his left, was in trouble. Fol- 
lowing instructions, he withdrew into France. 

The Second Army had more difficult ground to 
march over and fight on. It reached Chateau Salins 
and pushed on toward Morhange, just south of the 
railroad line. There, however, it suffered a serious re- 
verse on August 20th. Some of the French divisions 
were more or less demoralized by the fire of the im- 
mensely superior German heavy artillery, to which the 
French field artillery could make no adequate reply. 
The retreat was somewhat disorderly. But the German 
pursuit was feeble. Dubail and de Castelnau rallied 
the troops and restored their confidence within a few 
days. Three weeks later the First and Second armies 
completely repulsed the southern German offensive, 
directed at Nancy. 

Joffre's Alsace and Lorraine experiments had been 
fruitless and costly. He was wasting strength in a sub- 
sidiary field. It was plain long before August 20th 
that the main German attack was to come through 
Belgium, and that the French lines ought to be ex- 
tended north to meet it. But the French High Com- 
mand remained unconvinced that the Belgian operation 
was anything but a demonstration, which could be 
halted by vigorous French offensives against the Ger- 
man centre and left wing. 

As a halfway measure, however, the French left 
was carried farther north and strengthened. Lanre- 



26 The Great War [1914] 

zac's Fifth Army was ordered on August 15th to move 
across the Belgian frontier and to occupy the angle 
formed by the Meuse and Sambre rivers, from Dinant 
north to Namur and thence west to Charleroi. Two 
corps and three colonial divisions were withdrawn from 
the Second Army and sent north. The gap created 
between the Fifth Army and the Third Army was 
filled by the Fourth Army, hitherto in reserve. Four 
territorial divisions were collected in the region of 
Arras and Lille under General d'Amade, to protect 
French Flanders against German cavalry raids. The 
British Expeditionary Army, about seventy thousand 
strong, was to concentrate at Maubeuge and prolong 
the Allied line west of Charleroi. 

But Joffre still believed that he could derange the 
German plan by attacks on the eastern front. He 
therefore launched a third offensive, this time north 
of Metz. The Fourth Army was ordered to advance 
into the Ardennes Forest and strike at the enemy. 
Meanwhile the Third Army, supported by the special 
Army of Lorraine (a counterpart to Pau's Army of 
Alsace), was dispatched east toward the Luxemburg 
border. They were to defeat the German Fourth and 
Fifth armies, drive them back into Germany, and thus 
dislocate Moltke's pivoting movement. 

This joint operation began on August 21st. The 
battle of the Ardennes was fought on August 226. ; for 
the Germans, on their side, were also advancing. It 
was a confused engagement, in wooded, almost road- 
less country. The French Fourth Army came into 
action in a fragmentary, scattered way and was easily 
beaten. It retreated, in disorder, on August 23d. 
This retirement, lasting several days, carried it to the 
west bank of the Meuse. 



[I9I4] Belgium and the Marne 37 

The Third Army was checked at Virton, but suffered 
less severely than the Fourth did. But the retreat also 
carried it back beyond the Meuse. The special Army 
of Lorraine, under Maunoury, distinguished itself. 
Yet it was now needed elsewhere. It was broken up 
on August 26th. Maunoury took two of its divisions 
with him when he went to Montdidier to organize the 
new Sixth Army, which was to play so important a 
r61e less than two weeks later at the battle of the Marne. 

The sudden collapse of the French offensive north 
of Verdun capped the climax of Joffre's ineffective 
strategy. It was a terrific setback; for the French 
High Command, with four of its armies beaten on 
terrain on which they were supposed to have strength 
enough to force the fighting, now had to face the prob- 
lem of stopping the envelopment movement in which 
three of the seven German armies were fully engaged. 

In a subsequent statement, entitled L'Exposi de Six 
Mois de Guerre, the French General Staff said: 

On August 2 1st our offensive began on the centre 
with ten army corps. On August 2 2d it had failed 
and the reverse seemed to be a serious one. 

The reasons for the failure are complex. There 
were faults, both individual and collective; impru- 
dences committed under the fire of the enemy, divi- 
sions badly engaged, rash deployments, precipitate 
retirements, a premature wastage of men, and, finally, 
shortcomings of certain of our troops, and of their com- 
manders in the employment of artillery and infantry. 

In consequence of these errors the enemy, profiting 
from the difficulty of the terrain, was able to reap 
the maximum of profit and advantage from the 
superiority of his subaltern officers. 



28 The Great War [1914] 

This was a disingenuous judgment. The troops 
which fought in the August offensives acquitted them- 
selves most admirably, a couple of weeks later, in the 
Marne campaign. The French defeats on the east 
front were apparently due more to marked inferiority 
in artillery than to any other single cause. But the 
offensives themselves were wrongly conceived and badly 
managed. They violated the principle that an offen- 
sive should always be able to develop a marked superi- 
ority at the point of attack. 

The British Expeditionary Army completed its 
concentration at Maubeuge on August 20th. The 
next day it marched north into Belgium. The day 
following it was in position about Mons, the right wing 
connecting with the left wing of Lanrezac's Fifth Army, 
to the south-west of Charleroi. Lanrezac had been 
reinforced by one corps and two North African divi- 
sions from the Second Army and three additional 
reserve divisions were on their way to him. Without 
counting these last-named units, there were about 
270,000 French and British troops in the Dinant-Namur- 
Charleroi-Mons angle when the German northern 
offensive opened. 

The three armies participating in it totalled about 
400,000 men. The Third Army was marching across 
Belgium, through the northern part of the Ardennes, 
to attack Lanrezac's right wing, facing east on the 
Meuse. The Second was approaching Namur to at- 
tack Lanrezac's refused left wing. The First, the 
largest of all, was rushing west at top speed with the 
purpose of overlapping and enveloping the exposed 
British flank. Beyond the British left, and quite out 
of touch with it, were a few divisions of French terri- 
torials guarding the approaches to Valenciennes and Lille. 



[I9I4] Belgium and the Marne 29 

Namur fell on August 23d. But on August 21st 
Bulow had begun to attack Lanrezac at Charleroi. 
The battle there lasted two days. Meanwhile Hausen, 
with the German Third Army, had come up to the 
Meuse and captured Dinant, and Lanrezac's connec- 
tions with the Fourth French Army were thus threat- 
ened; and on August 24th, the day Kluck fell on the 
British at Mons, the Fifth French Army had begun 
to retire. The British held out for a day at Mons 
against great odds. Then their position became peril- 
ous and they, too, drew back to recover connection 
with Lanrezac. The retreat to the Marne had begun. 

Joffre had, in fact, no option now but to recoil on 
the whole front — from Verdun to Mons. He had 
misjudged the situation and his entire strategical plan 
was shattered. It is to his credit as a soldier that he 
faced the consequences of his errors coolly and resolutely. 
He decided to retreat, and to keep on retreating until 
a really favourable opportunity offered for turning and 
fighting. What he executed was a genuine strategical 
retirement. The Germans never understood that. 
They thought that he was merely running for safety. 
And that misapprehension accounts largely for their 
defeat at the Marne. 

Joffre still had confidence in himself and his troops. 
His plan was to pivot his retirement on Verdun, as 
the Germans had pivoted their envelopment on Metz. 
The Allied armies were to fall back rapidly enough to 
avoid encirclement on the left. Paris was to be un- 
covered, if necessary. Meanwhile two new armies 
were created to come into line when a battle was to 
be delivered. They were the Sixth Army, assigned to 
Maunoury, and the Ninth, given to Foch, who had 
just shown his quality as a corps commander at Mor- 



30 The Great War [1914] 

hange. With the new formations included in these 
two armies, Joffre's strength in the field was now 
practically equal to Moltke's. 

Joffre lost the garrison of Maubeuge — 40,000 strong 
— when, ignoring the lesson of Liege and Namur, he 
decided to use that fortress as an obstacle to the Ger- 
man advance. It would have been just as much of an 
obstacle if the forts had been left to take care of them- 
selves, as the Liege forts were after the Belgian Third 
Division was sensibly withdrawn. Maubeuge fell on 
September 7th. The ony advantage gained by hold- 
ing it in force was the detention of three or four Ger- 
man reserve divisions, which could not move south 
until after the battle of the Marne had begun. 

Joffre had lost probably more than 100,000 men in 
his eastern offensives. He was now to make a far 
greater sacrifice — the abandonment to the Germans of 
a great part of the rich industrial section of north-east- 
em Prance. This surrender of territory was to weigh 
on the French for the next four years, crippling their 
resources, paralyzing their freedom of movement, and 
injuriously localizing their strategy. It was the one 
irreparable consequence of the French High Command's 
failure to grasp the full meaning of Moltke's invasion 
of Belgium. 

The British Expeditionary Army had to retreat 
farthest, and started last. Its left flank was uncovered 
and it had to fight to frustrate a German envelopment 
as it fell back. On August 26th it was so closely 
pressed that the left wing, under Smith -Dorrien, stood 
fast at Le Gateau, and fought an engagement lasting 
about ten hours. In his book igi4, Field Marshal 
Viscount French sharply criticizes Smith-Dorrien for 
offering battle at Le Gateau. Not even a tacit consent 



II9I4] Belgium and the Marne 31 

was given from British Headquarters, he says, for this 
stand, which played into Kluck's hand by interrupting 
the British retreat and might have resulted in the 
encirclement and capture of the Second Corps. "The 
loss of fourteen thousand men and sixty guns," at 
Le Cateau, he insists, "was felt seriously throughout 
the subsequent battle of the Marne, and during the 
early operations on the Aisne." The guns and machine 
guns captured by the enemy could not be replaced until 
late in September. 

In his Forty Days in IQ14, Major-General Sir Freder- 
ick Maurice, at that time with the British Expedition- 
ary Army and later Director of Military Information 
in London, expresses a contrary view. He commends 
Smith-Dorrien for boldness and cool judgment and 
indicates that a battle was advisable in order to ex- 
tricate the British left wing. He admits, however, 
that the Second Corps escaped on the afternoon of 
August 26th only because Kluck let a great opportunity 
slip through his fingers. General Maurice also says 
that the British losses in the campaign up to the end 
of the battle of Le Cateau were only a little over ten 
thousand. 

French's plan of an uninterrupted retreat was, how- 
ever, essentially sound. After Le Cateau the two Brit- 
ish corps (the First, on the right, being under the com- 
mand of Sir Douglas Haig) retired by forced marches 
until, on the morning of August 28th, French's army 
crossed the Somme River at Ham. After that the 
retreat was practically unmolested. On French's 
right the French Fifth Army bad turned on Biilow and 
defeated him at Guise. On the left Kluck's army was 
edging more and more to the south-west and coming 
into contact with the French units which were being 



32 The Great War [1914] 

consolidated into the new Sixth Army under Maunoury. 
That commander, arriving at Montdidier with a part 
of the disbanded special Army of Lorraine, added to 
it two of d'Amade's territorial divisions and Sor- 
det's cavalry corps. Kluck, still pushing south-west, 
followed Maunoury's only partially organized army 
toward Paris. He moved south on the roads west of 
the Oise, whereas the British moved south on the roads 
east of the Oise. It was not until Kluck changed the 
direction of his march suddenly from south-west to 
south-east that he again found himself in contact with 
the British forces. 

Joffre prolonged his general retirement until Septem- 
ber 5th. But as early as August 25th he had given a 
clear indication of his purpose to halt at the opportune 
moment and take the offensive. On that day he issued 
the following instructions: 

The object of our future operations will be to re- 
constitute on our left flank, with the Fourth and 
Fifth armies, the British army, and new forces drawn 
from our right, a mass capable of resuming the offen- 
sive while the other armies contain the enemy for the 
time necessary. 

The arguments in favour of continuing the retreat 
below the Aisne, the Oise, and the Marne were numer- 
ous. In the first place, time would be given to organ- 
ize the two new armies — the Sixth and the Ninth. 
The haste of the pursuit was carrjdng the Germans 
far ahead of their supply trains and heavy artillery. 
Moreover, the nearer the Allied armies drew to Paris 
the better protected their left wing would be against 
encirclement, since the left wing, more or less exposed 



[X9I4] Belgium and the Mame 33 

all the way down from the Belgian border, would rest 
securely on the Paris fortifications. 

As Kluck approached the capital the chance of a 
successful envelopment of the Allied left wing went 
glimmering. The main Allied army had withdrawn 
to the south-east of Paris. The German High Com- 
mand had now to modify the envelopment plan and to 
decide whether to invest and reduce the capital or to 
pursue the Allied armies toward the Upper Seine, and 
try there to break their connections with Paris and 
double them back against the eastern frontier. 

Kluck did change direction away from Paris about 
August 31st — not very perceptibly at first, but soon 
unmistakably. It was evidently the new plan of the 
German General Staff to dispose of the enemy armies 
first and then return to occupy Paris. But this change 
of direction vitally altered the strategic situation. 
Heretofore the Germans had been seeking to envelop 
the Allied left flank. Now, by abandoning the en- 
velopment project and drawing Kluck's army in closer 
to Billow's, the German High Command carelessly 
exposed its own right flank to envelopment. Through 
overconfidence and a contemptuous undervaluation of 
the strength and morale of the enemy the Germans 
fell headlong into the trap which Joffre had been pre- 
paring to spring. 

It was Moltke's revised plan to concentrate on 
the Allied left centre and effect a break through. The 
Allied line from Verdun west to Paris had taken 
the shape of a curve, dipping gently to the south. 
The armies were stationed in the following order, from 
east to west. The Third, now under Sarrail, stretched 
from Souilly, south-west of Verdun, to Revigny. It 
faced north-west. The Foiuth, facing north, held the 



34 The Great War 



[1914I 



front from S&raiaize to Sompuis. The new Ninth lay- 
south of La Fere-Champenoise, between Camp de 
Mailly and Sezanne. The Fifth, now under Franchet 
d'Esperey, incHned a little to the south-west, and filled 
the gap between Sezanne and the region below the Forest 
of Crecy, where the British Expeditionary Army was 
posted, its left resting on the south-eastern sector of 
the Paris entrenched camp. The Sixth Army, largely 
reinforced, was on the north-eastern outskirts of Paris, 
facing east. 

It was thus already on the flank and rear of Kluck's 
army, which had pushed south-east toward Coulom- 
miers and Esternay, and was confronting both the Fifth 
French Army and the reinforced British army. Only 
one reserve corps had been left behind by Kluck to 
protect his rear from an attack coming out of Paris. 
Biilow was opposite Foch. Hausen was opposite Foch 
and de Langle de Gary. The Duke of Wiirttemberg 
confronted Gary's right and Sarrail's left. The army 
of the Grown Prince of Prussia extended past Sarrail's 
right and encircled the fortress of Verdun. South-east 
of Verdun the Second and First French armies stood 
at bay, defending Nancy. 

The battle of the Marne began on September 5th, 
when Maunoury moved east to attack Kluck's lone 
reserve division, stationed to the north of Meaux. 
Kluck, himself, with his main force, was many miles 
to the south, below Goulommiers, preparing to attack 
the British and d'Esperey. He was quick to grasp the 
situation, however. He didn't know that Joffre had set 
September 6th as the date for the forward movement 
of the whole Allied left wing. But he saw that under 
any circumstances he would have to meet the threat 
to his rear. His tactics in the next few days showed 



[I9I4] Belgium and the Marne 35 

that he expected to turn back with his main force and 
crush Maunoury, screening his southern front with 
cavalry and depending on his left wing divisions, acting 
with Billow and Hausen, to keep the Fifth and Ninth 
French armies occupied. 

Kluck started his infantry north from Coulommiers 
on September 6th, just at the time when Maunoury 's 
attack began to develop. Maunoury had a great 
advantage in numbers in the beginning, and forced 
the single German reserve corps back toward the Ourcq 
River. But Kluck's right wing and centre presently 
furnished supports and the battle of the Ourcq, extend- 
ing to the north to Nanteuil and Betz, continued un- 
certainly all through September 7th and 8th. Kluck 
had almost turned Maunoury's left wing and thrown it 
back on Paris, when he suddenly interrupted the battle 
on September 9th and retreated toward the Aisne. 

The British Expeditionary Army and the Fifth 
French Army had begun a forward movement on Sep- 
tember 6th. They had in front of them only Marwitz's 
cavalry. But their progress was not rapid enough 
to affect the coiu-se of Maunoury's battle before Sep- 
tember 9th. On that day the British were east and 
north-east of La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, in the rear of 
Kluck's battle-line, and Kluck's army had been split 
into two sections, the one facing west and fighting 
Maunoury, the other attached to the right wing of 
Biilow's army and facing south. The connection 
between the two was maintained by cavalry only. 
It was a situation not to the taste of the German High 
Command, which probably decided on September 9th 
to break off the battle, in spite of the apparent pro- 
gress which Billow and Hausen were making against 
the Allied left centre. 



36 The Great War [1914] 

Foch's Ninth Army had borne the brunt of the Ger- 
man eleventh-hour effort to convert the Schlieffen en- 
velopment — which had failed — into a breaking through 
operation after the Napoleonic manner. Billow's left 
and centre and the greater part of Hausen's army were 
used in pounding Foch, who had to give way all along 
his line. His left was driven below the Marshes of 
St. Gond on September 7th. On the 8th his centre was 
pushed back from La Fere-Champenoise. Foch had to 
move his headquarters to the south. 

But the situation was already clearing. Kluck's 
retirement had been pulling Biilow more and more to 
the west, and had also so lightened d'Esperey's task 
that he could lend Foch an army corps. On September 
9th the drag to the right had forced Biilow to leave a 
gap in his line between La Fere-Champenoise and the 
Marshes of St. Gond. Into this gap Foch sent his elite 
Forty-Second Division — between five and six o'clock 
in the afternoon. It smashed the exposed flank of 
Billow's left wing and compelled an immediate German 
retreat in the centre. But several hours before that 
Kluck had started north. 

Technically the Marne represented an Allied counter- 
offensive. But throughout most of the fighting the 
Allies stood on the defensive. Undoubtedly by Sep- 
tember 9th the Germans were ready to draw out be- 
cause they saw that their strategical position had 
become highly unfavourable. They retreated in good 
order, losing few prisoners and little materiel. And 
they were able to hold their own as soon as they settled 
down in new positions from twenty to forty miles back. 

Joffre had saved Paris and restored Allied morale 
by a brilliant victory. And Allied success between 
Verdun and Paris was supplemented by another clean- 



[I9I4] Belgium and the Marne 37 

cut victory on the Nancy front, where de Casteinau 
and Dubail defeated the German Sixth and Seventh 
armies much more decisively than they had themselves 
been defeated a couple of weeks earlier at Saarebourg 
and Morhange. And this was in spite of the fact that 
the Second and First armies had been weakened to 
reinforce the French left. 

The results of Joffre's flanking operation against 
Kluck's army were disappointing, however. Kluck 
faced about too quickly, and the British army and the 
Fifth French Army were held back too long by Mar- 
witz's cavalry screen. Yet all these imperfections in 
execution were forgotten in the emotional exaltation 
which swept France, Great Britain, and most of the 
neutral countries, when it became known that the Ger- 
man invasion had been halted and the supposedly 
invincible German armies were in retreat. The French 
Government came back to Paris, never to leave it again. 

The Marne was hailed as "a miracle" by millions 
who only vaguely understood what had happened. 
It wasn't that. It was a battle thrown away by reck- 
lessness and self-deception on the part of the German 
High Command. It was a retrieval by Joffre, through 
coolness and resolution, of grievous errors of judgment 
made by him in the first weeks of the war. 



CHAPTER IV 

"the race for the sea" — SEPTEMBER I5, I914- 
DECEMBER I, I914 

The battle of the Marne raised great expectations. 
In their reaction from something akin to despair the 
Allied publics imagined for a time that Moltke's repulse 
would lead speedily to a German retirement from France. 
This was an illusion. The German armies had been 
turned back from Paris. But they still retained a 
grip on Northern France which could not be shaken 
loose. Before the year 1914 ended they were to enlarge 
and strengthen their hold. 

The German High Command ignored the battle of 
the Marne. No mention of it was made in the German 
military communiques. Many months later, a pro- 
German Swiss critic, Stegemann, wrote a treatise in 
which the German defeat was neatly explained away. 
It had a limited circulation in Germany. But in 1916 
a German book on the same subject was suppressed 
by the government. It was not until 191 7 that German 
writers were allowed to discuss the causes of the failure 
of Schlieffen's double envelopment plan. 

By the middle of September, 19 14, the German High 
Command in France recovered its balance sufficiently 
to try to justify the assumption that the Marne was 
only an incident, compelling a slight readjustment of 
German offensive strategy. The two westernmost 

38 



[I9I4] 



" The Race for the Sea " 39 



German armies had halted on the north bank of the 
Aisne. Kluck's right rested on Noyon. Bulow was 
north of Rheims. The other armies stretched east 
across Champagne and the Argonne to the neigh- 
bourhood of Verdun. The Allied armies, confidently 
advancing north, were checked on the Aisne after Sep- 
tember 13th. Then the Germans resumed the offensive 
themselves, making progress north of Soissons and 
Rheims and in the Argonne sector. 

A force sent from Metz also reached the Meuse at 
St. Mihiel, reduced Fort Troyon, south of Verdun, to 
ruins, and captured Fort Camp des Romains. Verdun 
was nearly encircled, and its railroad communications 
west and south were cut. The St. Mihiel salient, 
created in the last week of September, 1914, remained 
in German hands until September, 191 8, when it was 
wiped out of existence in a day by an American-French 
offensive. 

But these stirrings of the now moribund idea ot 
pinning down and enveloping the Allied armies to the 
east of Paris came to nothing. Joffre had a counter- 
plan to which German strategy was quickly obliged 
to conform. This was to extend the Maunoury flank- 
ing operation, which had failed on the Ourcq, to the 
region of the Somme and then toward Arras. The 
German left wing was still "in the air." Joffre decided 
to try to overlap it and thus squeeze the German 
forces in the north back against the Belgian border. 

There were other advantages in a movement of this 
sort. It was highly desirable for the Allies to recover 
possession of the industrial section of northern France, 
abandoned in the retreat to the Marne. It was essen- 
tial to secure the Channel ports, which were the most 
convenient British bases in France. And it was high 



40 The Great War [1914I 

time to try to extricate the Belgian army, penned up 
in Antwerp. So Joffre began, in the latter half of 
September, what is known as "the race for the sea." 

French troops at first penetrated the region east and 
south-east of Amiens. They reoccupied Lassigny, 
Roye, and Peronne. But they were soon ejected, fol- 
lowing a prolongation north of Kluck's front. Ba- 
paume, north of the Somme, was also seized by the 
Germans. Joffre brought de Castelnau's Second Army 
around from Lorraine to Picardy. A new army, under 
Maud'huy, was hurried to Arras. Foch was sent north 
to take general command, and the British Expedition- 
ary Army was transferred from the Aisne front to 
Flanders. By the end of September the French had 
pushed their left wing as far north as Bethune, carrying 
the Allied line to within forty miles of the Belgian coast. 

The German line was extended north with equal 
rapidity. Biilow was moved from before Rheims to 
the Arras sector and the Crown Prince of Bavaria's 
Sixth Army was shifted from German Lorraine to the 
Somme sector, and later to Belgium. Two months of 
campaigning had rectified the misapprehensions on 
which the French over-concentration on the eastern 
border were based. Alsace and Lorraine were practi- 
cally abandoned as operative fronts. 

The relief of Antwerp may have been one of Joffre's 
remoter objectives. The Germans in Belgium had 
turned south at the end of August, leaving Antwerp 
under observation by two or three reserve corps. They 
had occupied Brussels and covered their communica- 
tions with the armies east of Paris. But they had not 
penetrated north and west of the Scheldt. The way 
was open from Antwerp west to Bruges and Ostend. 
The German High Command had not troops enough 



[I9I4] " The Race for the Sea " 41 

available in August both to invest Antwerp from the 
south and to cut it off on the west. King Albert had 
annoyed the Germans by making a sortie while the 
Marne campaign was in progress. It was decided by 
Moltke, after the Marne failure, to get rid of a trouble- 
some enemy, entrenched close to the vital German 
arteries of communication through Liege to Aix-la- 
Chapelle. 

Antwerp was rated as one of the strongest fortresses 
in Europe. It was defended by an outer girdle of 
cupola forts, built to withstand the artillery attack of 
its period. But these forts had now become only man 
traps. The Belgian army held a sally-port at Malines. 
This city was reduced on September 27th. The next 
day the German and Austrian giant howitzers opened 
fire on the outer Antwerp forts. Two were destroyed 
on September 29th. The Germans hardly needed to 
use infantry. They brought the big guns up to the 
breaches made in the outer circle of defences and soon 
had the city itself under fire. 

The Belgian field army was helpless. It could easily 
have made good its escape in the first days of October. 
But evacuation was delayed until October 9th, by 
which time the Germans were able to harass the retreat 
west and to force across the Dutch boundary a portion 
of the Belgian army and a unit of British naval reserves, 
sent by Winston Churchill to help defend Antwerp. 
The main body of the Belgian forces was extricated, 
however, by the help of a British infantry division, a 
British cavalry division, and two French infantry 
divisions, under General Rawlinson. 

The British army began to leave the Aisne front on 
October 2d, the cavalry and the Second Infantry Corps 
starting first. The Second Corps detrained at Abbe- 



42 The Great War [1914] 

ville on October 8th and moved north-east toward 
B6thune, connecting there with the left of Maud'huy's 
French army. The Third British corps reached St. 
Omer on October loth, and moved east toward Haze- 
brouck. 

The Lys Valley was held at that time by German 
cavalry, whose outposts were as far west as Bailletd 
and Meteren. The plan agreed upon by Sir John 
French and General Foch, who was in command of the 
French troops north of Noyon, was that the British 
army should pivot on Bethune, marching north-east 
and clearing the Lys region as far as Armentieres and 
Ypres. If "this movement was successful, the British 
and French were to advance east, Lille being the divid- 
ing point between the two Allies. 

The transfer of the British Expeditionary Army was 
completed on October 19th, the last units of the First 
Corps, under Sir Douglas Haig, arriving then and 
detraining at St. Omer. But on October nth and 12th 
General AUenby, commanding the cavalry corps, had 
come in contact with the German cavalry to the north- 
west of Bethune, driving them from the hills north- 
east of Hazebrouck. The Second and Third Infantry 
Corps pushed up the Lys Valley and occupied the line 
from La Bassee north to Armentieres. On October 
1 6th the Belgian army, with Rawlinson's forces and 
French supports, went into position east and north of 
Ypres, the line extending to the North Sea. The 
Seventh Division and the Third Cavalry Division, which 
had been with Rawlinson in Belgium, were now consti- 
tuted the Fourth Corps, another new division from 
England, the Eighth, to be added later. Haig's First 
Corps was used to fill in a gap about Ypres. By orders 
issued by Field Marshal French on October 19th it 



[I9I4] " The Race for the Sea " 43 

was directed to move toward Bruges and drive the 
enemy, if possible, back on Ghent. But the German 
concentration in Belgium was now nearly finished and 
Haig's progress was blocked by greatly superior forces. 

Having failed at the Marne either to destroy the 
Allied armies or to take Paris, the German High Com- 
mand had turned feverishly, but belatedly, to an al- 
ternative scheme. This was to capture Dunkirk and 
Calais, deprive England of her shortest Channel route 
to France, and utilize the Belgian and northern French 
coast as the base for an intensive submarine warfare 
on British shipping. After the fall of Antwerp the 
Germans had taken possession of Bruges, an admirable 
submarine haven, with its twin canals to Zeebrugge 
and Ostend. They had followed the retreating Bel- 
gians to the Yser River and were gathering in huge 
masses for a drive through Ypres and Hazebrouck to 
the Channel coast. 

The German High Command now had large rein- 
forcements at its disposal. The secondary mobiliza- 
tion was completed. The new formations, including 
many volunteers, were somewhat lacking in training, 
but were filled with martial spirit. They were rushed 
into Flanders, where it was thought the weight of 
their numbers would easily wear down a greatly inferior 
enemy. 

On October 21st the Allied line from La Bassee to 
the sea was constituted, from south to north, as fol- 
lows: The British Second Corps, under Smith-Dorrien, 
holding a difficult six-mile front; Conneau's French 
Cavalry Corps, filling a gap of one mile; the British 
Third Army Corps, under Pulteney, with the Nineteenth 
Brigade added, holding a twelve-mile line; the British 
Cavalry Corps, under Allenby, holding a four-mile 



44 The Great War [1914] 

line; the Fourth British Corps, under Rawlinson, occu- 
pying a six-mile front; the First British Corps, under 
Haig, occupying a seven-mile front ; French Territorial 
divisions, de Mitry's French cavalry corps, French 
marines, and the Belgian army, occupying a twenty- 
mile front ending at Nieuport. Some units of the 
Lahore Indian division were with Allenby. The Ninth 
French Corps arrived a day or two later, and on October 
27th was put in north-east of Ypres on Haig's left, thus 
allowing him to shorten his front a little. Later Raw- 
linson's small Fourth Corps was temporarily merged 
with the First Corps. 

There had been constant fighting in the Lys Valley 
region since October 15th. The first phase of the 
struggle for the Channel ports ended with the extrica- 
tion of the Belgian army and the establishment by the 
Allies of a continuous line north from La Bassee to 
the coast. The second phase opened with the enemy's 
determined efforts to break that line. Had Moltke 
turned north more quickly, he could undoubtedly have 
driven a wedge between the Belgians and Rawlinson's 
relief force, on the one side, and the transferred Expedi- 
tionary Army, on the other. He could have compelled 
the former to escape by sea and have seized Dunkirk, 
Calais, and Dieppe. Now he had to sever a front 
which had been at least loosely welded together, if he 
wanted to reach the Channel ports. 

The first powerful German effort was made on the 
sector nearest the sea. Here the Belgians and French 
defended the line of the Yser. The town of Dixmude, 
on this stream, was one of the main centres of resistance. 
After it was finally taken by the Germans the Allies 
flooded the swampy area to the west of the Yser, block- 
ing any further German advance in that direction for 



[I9I4] " The Race for the Sea " 45 

the rest of the war. In the Nieuport sector, on the 
seacoast, the Allied line was protected by the fire of 
British monitors and other light draft warships. 

Farther south the brunt of the attack fell on the 
sector which included the Ypres salient and the line 
down to Armentieres. Here seven British infantry- 
divisions and three cavalry divisions were assailed by 
German forces nearly double theii strength ; foi- on the 
whole northern front there were twelve German corps 
against seven Allied corps. The Germans also had an 
enormous superiority in artillery. The offensive against 
Ypres began on October 28th. Its crisis was reached on 
October 31st and November ist. 

On October 29th the Germans advanced in dense 
masses on both sides of the road from Menin to Ypres, 
centring their effort about Gheluvelt. The First and 
Seventh Divisions of the First Corps were driven back 
some distance, but later in the day more than recovered 
the ground they had lost. On October 30th the enemy's 
attack shifted a little farther south, falling chiefly on 
the British Cavalry Corps, about HoUebeke. HoUebeke 
was captured and, still farther down, the Germans got 
a foothold in Messines village, on the south-eastern side 
of Messines Ridge. The British line here was reinforced 
by a brigade detached from Smith-Dorrien's Second 
Corps. 

On October 31st the Germans renewed the assault 
on the Gheluvelt front. Shortly after noon of that day 
the line of the First Division of the First Corps was 
broken. Big guns, trains, and troops cluttered the road 
back toward Ypres. Field Marshal French tells in 
1914 how he had to abandon his motor car east of Ypres 
and go on foot to Sir Douglas Haig's headquarters at 
the chateau of Hooge. There he found Haig and his 



46 The Great War 



[1914] 



Chief of Staff "poring over maps and evidently much 
disconcerted." The situation was critical, because 
British reserves were lacking and a retreat to Ypres 
under the pressure of the vastly superior numbers of 
the enemy would be extremely difficult and costly. 

' ' It was a dramatic half -hour, the worst I ever spent," 
says the Field Marshal. But the aspect of things sud- 
denly altered. News came at 3 p.m. that the First 
Division had rallied and recovered Gheluvelt. This 
brilliant counter-blow had been organized by Brigadier- 
General FitzClarence of the First Guards Brigade. 
He counter-attacked from the north of Gheluvelt and 
stopped the German advance. He was killed in battle 
east of Ypres about two weeks later. By dark the Bri- 
tish front in the Menin road sector was re-established. 

During the night of October 3ist-November ist 
the Germans broke through the positions held by the 
British cavalry at Messines. Messines Ridge was 
seized early in the morning. So was Wytschaete 
village. By 10 A.M. the exhausted Second Cavalry 
Division, which had been in the front line many days, 
was retiring on Mount Kemmel. But the day was 
saved by the timely arrival of the Sixteenth French 
Army Corps, loaned by Foch. It established a new 
line running through the western edge of Wytschaete 
village. 

Field Marshal French says that the period of the 
greatest danger in the whole Ypres campaign was 
between 2 A.M. and 11 a.m. on November ist. Had 
the Sixteenth French Corps been an hour later, the 
Allied troops, north of an east and west line running 
through Mount Kemmel, would have been isolated 
and hemmed in against the coast. On the 4th and 5th 
of November the Twentieth French Corps arrived at 



[1914] 



" The Race for the Sea " 47 



Ypres, and the distressing shortage of Allied reserves 
was somewhat alleviated. 

The final phase of the battle of Ypres came on 
November nth and I2th. 

The Prussian Guard was moved north from Arras 
to stiffen the new formations which Moltke had been 
using. Another assault was made about Gheluvelt. 
But this time no break was effected in Haig's line. 
The Germans were repulsed with heavy losses. They 
also failed completely against the French on Haig's 
left. But on Haig's right, about HoUebeke, they got 
across the Ypres-Comines canal. 

On the 1 2 th repeated violent attacks on both flanks 
of the British First Corps were brought to a dead stop. 
The fighting then relaxed. Foch arranged to relieve 
the hard- tried British divisions. By November 2ist 
he had taken over with French troops the entire Ypres 
salient. 

The British losses in the operations from October 
15th to November 20th were 2264 officers and 18,610 
men. This refutes the rhetorical exaggeration that 
the British Expeditionary Army "died in its tracks" 
in Flanders. Its losses were probably not heavier 
than twenty per cent. 

After the middle of November, the failure of the 
German campaign for the Channel ports became ap- 
parent. The British were reinforced by another East 
Indian division, by English and Scotch Territorial 
formations, and by the first Canadian units. Trench 
lines had been consolidated on the entire Western Front 
from Nieuport to the Swiss border. The long period 
of trench deadlock began. 

Fighting died away completely in Flanders after 
December ist. The "race for the sea" had ended in 



48 The Great War [1914] 

a draw. The German drive for the Channel ports 
had fallen short of its objectives. Even Ypres was not 
taken. Yet the net result of the Flanders campaign 
showed a certain balance in favour of the Germans. 
They had conquered Belgium, except for the narrow 
strip west of the Yser. They had largely increased 
their holdings in Northern France, At the close of 
the battle of the Marne, Noyon, Lassigny, Roye, 
Chaulnes, Peronne, Bapaume, Arras, Douai, Cambrai, 
Lens, and Lille were in "No Man's Land." Now they 
were in German hands, except Arras, which still lay be- 
tween the lines. This part of France constituted the 
backbone of French industry. With it lost, the French 
armies were tied down to a slow war of liberation. 

In this territory the Germans systematically de- 
stroyed what they couldn't carry away. France was 
deprived of its manufacturing output, its coal, its har- 
vests, and the services of its inhabitants. And when 
she recovered it she found its productiveness crippled 
for years to come. 

Belgium suffered the same fate. Her population 
was impressed to do war work for Germany. Many 
able-bodied Belgians were deported across the Rhine. 
The whole kingdom was subjected to the tyranny of 
satraps like Bissing and Falkenhausen. 

Belgium offered a possibility of political assimilation 
if German policy had been conciliatory, or even humane. 
The Flemings were of Teutonic stock and had a racial 
grievance. They had been agitating for recognition 
of their language. There was a sharp line of antago- 
nism between them and the Walloons. It had doubt- 
less been the German idea, originally, to widen this 
breach and to create inside Belgium a distinct Flemish 
state. But the terrorism practised by the military 



[I9I4] " The Race for the Sea " 49 

authorities in the first months of the war blasted what- 
ever hope there was of erecting a pro-German Flemish 
dependency in Belgian territory. 

The Belgian atrocities were committed with the 
sanction of military leaders who recognized no other 
rule than calculated severity in dealing with conquered 
populations. They slew and maimed civilians and 
burned towns in order to drive fear into the hearts of 
those on whom they intended to impose the burdens 
of military occupation. They were impartial. They 
committed the same crimes in France, in Poland, in 
Russia, in Rumania, and in Serbia. 

But in Belgium they not only earned the execration 
of the civilized world, but they also defeated their own 
political ends. When they got ready to set up their 
independent Flemish state, no Flemings, outside a 
hmited circle of venal place-holders, would accept that 
odious shadow of independence. Belgium remained a 
millstone about Germany's neck. It was, to the end 
of the war, an insuperable bar to any reconciliation 
between the moral sense of the world and the brutal 
manifestations of German KuUur. 



CHAPTER V 

OPERATIONS ON THE RUSSIAN FRONT. AUGUST I, I914- 
DECEMBER 3I, I914 

After war was declared William II denounced 
Nicholas II in unmeasured terms. They had been 
accustomed to address each other as "Willy" and 
' ' Nicky. " But " Willy 's ' ' affection suddenly turned to 
violent personal rancour. Since Germany had delib- 
erately planned to make war on Russia, this exaspera- 
tion seemed unnatural. Yet it was genuine enough. 
It was accounted for by the fact that Russia, rightly 
interpreting the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia, 
had taken the precaution to begin her mobilization 
as early as July 27th. (The mobilization order was 
published on July 29th.) 

Thus Russia, whose concentration would be nor- 
mally very slow, had obtained a three or four days' 
start on Germany. This was what irritated the Kaiser. 
Germany's war plans contemplated a considerable de- 
lay in Russian mobilization, which would allow time 
for the German armies to crush France before having 
to turn east to meet the Russian menace. The French 
also had misgivings about Russia's ability to get into 
the war promptly. But Russia did get in more rapidly 
than any one had expected. 

As things turned out, German calculations were 
not greatly disturbed by the premature Russian inva- 

50 



[I9I4] Operations on the Russian Front 51 

sion of East Prussia. The invaders were routed at 
Tannenberg before the battle of the Marne had begun. 
But Russian forehandedness played havoc with Austria- 
Hungary's military plans. And Austro- Hungarian 
reverses in the fall of 1914 compelled Germany to 
turn to the East Front early in 191 5, without having 
accomplished the main purpose of her offensive against 
France. 

Up to May, 191 5, Russia's successes were the great 
surprise of the war on the Allied side. The Russian 
armies overran thirty-five thousand square miles of 
Austrian territory and took more than three hundred 
thousand prisoners. These achievements were due to 
the fact that the Russians had profited from the lessons 
of the Japanese War, and were able to put in the field 
at the outset large bodies of troops, well equipped, 
amply munitioned, and led, for the most part, by gen- 
erals of more experience and capacity than any Aus- 
tria-Hungary possessed. 

Russia's victories were won, moreover, in spite of 
the handicaps imposed by a defective strategical 
frontier. Poland, jutting out into Teuton territory, 
formed a salient extremely difficult to defend. It 
was surrounded on three sides by Prussia and Austria, 
and was especially open to attack on the southern 
side. The true strategical frontier, and the actual 
Russian zone of mobilization, lay east of the eastern 
border of Poland. It ran north and south through 
Brest-Litovsk. It was covered, in the centre, by the 
Bug River and, farther north, by the Niemen. 

In order to protect Poland the Russians had con- 
structed an outpost line based on the Vistula. It ran 
from Ivangorod, in the south, north to Warsaw and 
thence north-west to the fortress of Novogeoigievsk, 



52 The Great War [19141 

also on the Vistula. Thence it turned north-east, 
through Ostrolenka, Ossowiec, and Augustovo, to 
Kovno, on the Niemen. This line was strong on the 
northern end. But it could easily be turned on the 
southern end by an Austro-Hungarian advance in 
the region east of the Vistula, bringing the invaders 
well to the rear of Ivangorod and Warsaw. 

The original military agreement between France and 
Russia contemplated the employment of the bulk of 
the Russian foices against Germany, the "principal 
enemy," while Austria-Hungary, "the secondary 
enemy," was being contained in Galicia. But this 
agreement could not be lived up to. In the first place, 
Russia was unequal to a sustained offensive against 
Germany. Germany outclassed her in military organi- 
zation, in training and efficiency, and in technical 
equipment. In the second place, Russia's position 
in Poland could not be made secure until she had 
cleared Galicia as far west as Cracow. 

In response, however, to the original understanding 
she rushed two armies into East Prussia early in August. 
This province was hghtly held by the Germans, who 
had thought that the Russians would not be ready to 
fight within a month or six weeks following the declara- 
tion of war. One army, under Rennenkampf, coming 
from Kovno, crossed the eastern boundary of Prussia, 
defeated the Germans at Gumbinnen on August i6th, 
and advanced west along the railroad leading to Konigs- 
berg. This force reached Insterburg, the Germans 
retiring before it into the Konigsberg fortified zone. 

A second army, under Samsonoff, advanced from the 
Narew line in Poland into the southern part of East 
Prussia, aiming at the railroad west of Allenstein, 
where Samsonoff expected to make a junction with 



[I9I41 Operations on the Russian Front 53 

Rennenkampf — the latter coming south-west from 
Insterburg. Samsonoff defeated a small German 
force on his front and assumed that he was dealing 
merely with covering troops. The invasion of East 
Prussia had nearly caused a panic in Berlin. Reserves 
were gathered and two army corps were sent east from 
Belgium. These reinforcements were put under the 
command of Hindenburg, hastily summoned from 
the retired list. He had an intimate knowledge of the 
terrain and used it in baiting a trap for Samsonoff. 

The latter had lost touch with his wings and was 
occupied in driving ahead with his centre, which en- 
countered little opposition. Hindenburg's operation, 
which lasted from August 27th to August 30th, fol- 
lowed the classical Cannae model. He concentrated 
his strength on Samsonoff's flanks, and enveloped the 
Russian right completely, by marching from Allen- 
stein south to Ortelsburg. The Russian left was also 
encircled west of Tannenberg. In the Tannenberg 
pine woods the main body of Samsonoff's army was 
surrounded and captured, Hindenburg reporting 
seventy thousand prisoners. Samsonoff died alone 
in the scrub forest, trying to escape at night. The 
remnants of his forces straggled back into Poland. 

Rennenkampf thereupon retreated to the line of 
the Niemen. Hindenburg followed, on September 7th, 
reaching the Niemen on September 21st. After a week 
spent in trying vainly to break the Niemen line, the 
Germans retreated into East Prussia. 

The Russian campaign which ended with Tannen- 
berg proved that Russia would never be able to take 
the northern route to Berlin. East Prussia was a 
hopeless field to operate in, both because of the difficul- 
ties of the terrain and because of the broad barrier of 



54 The Great War [1914] 

the Vistula, behind which lay a network of German 
strategical railroads. Russia was to make another 
offensive bid later, along the west bank of the Vistula 
toward Posen. But, at her best, she was no match 
for Germany, except on the defensive. Her true theatre 
of operations, while her initial superiority in man- 
power lasted, was in the south, where Francis Joseph's 
generals had undertaken a task much beyond their 
capacity. 

The Austro-Hungarian General Staff had planned 
to open the war with an ambitious offensive. This was 
strategically sound in conception. But it undervalued 
the enemy. The Austrians had two armies in Galicia. 
One, under Dankl, undertook to invade Poland and turn 
the Ivangorod- Warsaw line. The other, under Auffen- 
berg, covered Dankl's right and defended Lemberg. 

Dankl started north on August nth, with Lublin, 
on the Warsaw-Brest-Litovsk railroad, as his objective. 
He encountered inferior Russian forces and won the 
battle of Krasnik on August 23d-26th. But he never 
got much farther than Krasnik. Three Russian armies 
had been formed on the Brest-Litovsk line. The 
northernmost, under Ivanoff, pushed west to cover 
Lublin. The middle one, under Russky, advanced 
from the north-east and east on Lemberg, while the 
southernmost, under Brusiloff, approached Lemberg 
from the south-east. This joint forward movement 
began on August 14th. 

Brusiloff turned Auffenberg's line at its southern 
end, when he forced the crossings of the Zlota Lipa 
and the Gnila Lipa and captured Halicz. The Austro- 
Hungarians evacuated Lemberg on September 2d, 
and fell back to the line of the Grodek Lakes. But 
this line was quickly turned at its northern end by 



[I9I4] Operations on the Russian Front 55 

Russky's army, which broke through at Rawa Russka, 
at the point where Auffenberg's left wing connected 
with Dankl's right. 

Auffenberg fell back in great confusion toward the 
Carpathian Mountains. Dankl's flank was now un- 
covered. Ivanoff was attacking his front, while Russky 
threatened his rear. He retreated rapidly toward the 
San River. Being unable to make a stand there, 
because Auffenberg had already sought shelter on the 
south side of the Carpathian range, he abandoned 
Jaroslav, left a garrison in Przemysl and then withdrew 
into Western Galicia. 

Austria-Hungary was not capable in 19 14 of con- 
ducting campaigns on both the Serbian and the Russian 
fronts. She had at least 400,000 men on the Danube. 
She had to keep some observation corps on the Italian 
frontier and also on the Rumanian frontier. She could 
not have had more than 800,000 men in Galicia and 
Poland, while Russia probably had well over 1,000,000. 
The secondary Austro-Hungarian mobilization was 
slow. It was not until the winter months of 1915 that 
the Austrian military establishment, reorganized by 
the German General Staff,^ could gompete on even 
terms with the Russian, 

The Austrian High Command spent September 
reorganizing its armies behind the Carpathian barrier 
and before Cracow. The Russians occupied Buko- 
wina and Eastern and Middle Galicia, carrying their 
west front forward to the Vistula, from Ivangorod up 
to a point north of Tarnow, and then across Galicia 
to the western Carpathian passes. Thus the weak 
southern face of the Polish salient was covered and 
Warsaw was safeguarded from the south as well as 
the north. 



56 The Great War 



I1914] 



It was important, from the German point-of-view, 
that the new Russian lines protecting Poland should 
not be consolidated. Hindenburg, therefore, shifted 
the bulk of his army from East Prussia to Silesia and 
began, about October ist, an offensive against Ivan- 
gorod and Warsaw. A German army moved east from 
Kalisz and an Austro-Hungarian army moved north- 
east from the neighbourhood of Cracow. The purpose 
of this operation was obscure. After its failure the 
Germans described it as a mere reconnoissance in force. 

There were few Russian troops in Western Poland, 
and Hindenburg got close up to Warsaw, practically 
unopposed. On October 14th he was on the western 
outskirts of the city, near enough for his field artillery 
to shell it. The Grand Duke Nicholas, the Russian 
Commander-in-Chief, called up reinforcements from 
the south. These held the enemy before Warsaw and 
Ivangorod for several days. Then both the German 
and Austrian armies retreated, under a threat of en- 
velopment. The Russians followed them to the 
western frontier of Poland. 

In order to save Warsaw, Nicholas had stripped the 
Galician front. The Russian armies there withdrew 
from the Carpathians and recrossed the San. The 
siege of Przemysl was raised for a few days. But 
Hindenburg's recoil involved a similar recoil in Galicia. 
The Austro-Hungarian forces again retreated quickly 
to the Carpathian ridges and toward Cracow. Hoetzen- 
dorff, the Chief of Staff, committed once more the error 
of leaving a large garrison in Przemysl, where it was 
eventually to be starved into a surrender. Przemysl 
was Austria's prize fortress. The Russians had no 
siege artillery with which to reduce it as the Germans 
had reduced Liege, Namur, Maubeuge, and Antwerp. 



[1914] Operations on the Russian Front 57 

But it was certain to fall to them if they could hold 
Middle Galicia. Hoetzendorff had the absurd idea 
that by clinging to Przemysl he would materially 
hamper Russian operations. He sacrificed to that 
idea a first line army of 130,000 men. 

In November the Russians pushed west to within 
eight miles of Cracow and almost to the border of 
Silesia and Posen. This was the extreme development 
of the Russian approach to Berlin by the southern 
route. It was nipped by another Hindenburg offen- 
sive, just as the approach by the northern route had 
been nipped at Tannenberg. While the Russian armies 
were spread out on a long front in Western Poland, 
Hindenburg concentrated his forces in the region 
about Thorn and moved south-east with the intention 
of breaking through the Russian line and interposing 
between the southern Russian armies and Warsaw. 
Mackensen, Hindenburg's lieutenant, effected a partial 
break-through in the neighbourhood of Lodz. But 
before this operation was completed a Russian force, 
under Rennenkampf, moved south from the Vistula 
River, below Novogeorgievsk, and got on Mackensen's 
left flank. A great deal of confused fighting followed, 
lasting into December. Rennenkampf failed to en- 
velop Mackensen's left wing and on December 6th 
Hindenburg entered Lodz. 

Encouraged by this success he continued, all through 
December, his pounding tactics on the Warsaw front. 
Here he repeated the costly frontal assaults which had 
marked the futile German effort in the West to break 
through in Flanders. The Russians yielded gradually, 
giving up Lowicz and Skierniewice. But when they 
reached the Bzura and Rawa rivers, twenty miles 
west of the Vistula, they held fast. Though he tried 



58 The Great War [1914] 

again and again, Hindenburg was never able to shake 
this line, which the Russians held until August, 191 5, 
when the collapse of the armies in Galicia and the 
Teuton advance to Lemberg compelled the evacuation 
of Warsaw. 

On the whole, Russia met the first tests of the war 
with surprising credit. She had successfully readjusted 
her military frontier. Her armies had advanced from 
the line of the Bug to the line of the Vistula. She had 
defeated Austria-Hungary with ease. Her offensives 
against Germany had failed. But she had held her 
own against Germany on the defensive. Her troops 
were better adapted to trench warfare than they were 
to open or semi-open warfare. And trench warfare 
had now become the rule on the Eastern as well as the 
Western Front. 

But Russia was drawing rapidly on her capital as 
a military power. Industrially she was unequal to 
the demands of modern war. Her transportation 
system was poor. She could not supply herself with 
guns and munitions. She had no heavy field guns, 
such as the Germans were» using. She had no siege 
howitzers. She had to depend on her allies and on 
neutrals for war supplies. And her communications 
with Western Europe were round-about and precarious. 

The wastage of the campaigns of 19 14 was negligible 
so far as raw man-power was concerned. But the loss 
in officers was irreparable. The material from which 
regimental subalterns, or even good non-commissioned 
officers, could be recruited, was limited. Universal 
service, too, produced conscripts of great unevenness 
of quality. Worst of all, the supply of ammunition 
for the artillery had begun to run low. Satisfactory 
as the military situation appeared on the surface at 



[I9I4] Operations on the Russian Front 59 

the end of 19 14, those behind the scenes knew that 
Russia had passed the peak of her effort. Germany 
was gathering strength for an offensive in the East 
and aid from the Western Entente nations was indis- 
pensable, if Russia was to be put in condition to meet 
that attack. On January 2, 191 5, the Russian Govern- 
ment appealed to Great Britain to make a demonstra- 
tion against Constantinople, with a view to opening the 
Dardanelles. Germany, operating on interior lines, 
could strike on either front at will. In order to neu- 
tralize that advantage and to save Russia, it had become 
absolutely necessary for the Allies to link up their 
Eastern and Western fronts. 



CHAPTER VI 

Austria's failures in serbia. august 12, 1914 — 
december i4, i914 

Austria-Hungary's determination to send a "puni- 
tive expedition" into Serbia started the world war. 
But the Austrian High Command had miscalculated 
the difficulties of such an expedition. Serbia possessed 
a veteran army and had emerged victorious from two 
successive Balkan wars. It was beyond Austria- 
Hungary's strength to hold the Russians on one front 
and to discipline the Serbs on another. Serbia was 
not conquered until Germany sent Mackensen's army 
south in September, 1915, and Bulgaria joined the 
Teuton Alliance. 

Vienna was committed, however, in August, 1914, 
to a Serbian offensive. About 400,000 Austro-Hun- 
garians had been mobilized on the Danube and in 
Bosnia. Serbia is protected on the north and west by 
three rivers. The Danube is the northern boundary 
line east of Belgrade. West of that city the Save 
separates Serbia from Slavonia. The Drina, which 
flows north into the Save, divides Serbia from Bosnia. 
But because Northern Serbia formed a salient project- 
ing into Austro-Hungarian territory, it was always diffi- 
cult for the Serbs to defend it against superior numbers. 

On the Danube front the Austrian High Command 
contented itself with bombarding Belgrade from across 
the river. The Serbian Government abandoned the 

60 



[I9I4] Austria's Failures in Serbia 6i 

capital, so dangerously exposed, and retired south to 
Kraguievatz, and then to Nish. But the serious 
Austrian attack was to come, not from the north, 
but from the west and north-west. On August 12, 
19 1 4, strong Austrian forces were pushed across the 
Drina River, at three different points — Liubovia, 
Zvornik, and Losnitza — and across the Save at Shabatz. 
The Austrian colurhns were to move east and south- 
east, converging on Valievo, the main Serbian military 
supply base. If they reached Valievo, they would com- 
pel an evacuation of the whole Belgrade sector. 

Field Marshal Putnik, the experienced and brilliant 
Serbian Commander-in-Chief, hurried his army west 
to break up this converging movement. From August 
i6th to August 23d was fought the battle of the Jadar, 
in the angle formed by the Save and the Drina. It 
was the first large scale engagement of the war. 
Putnik was entirely successful. He defeated the 
separated Austrian columns in detail and drove them 
back into Bosnia and Slavonia. The Austro-Hunga- 
rians lost about forty thousand men, forty-six guns, 
and large quantities of military stores. The Serbian 
losses were less than twenty thousand. 

The battle of the Jadar disclosed the weakness of 
the Austrian military organization. It forecast the 
defeats which the Dual Monarchy was to suffer in 
Poland and Galicia at the hands of the Russians. 
Austria came back to the attack in the second week 
of September, again crossing the Drina. But the 
offensive made little progress and was soon called ofE 
because of the critical condition of the armies in the 
Carpathians. The Serbians, meanwhile, had crossed 
the Danube into Hungary and taken Semlin, holding 
it for a brief period. 



62 The Great War [1914] 

After Hindenburg's October offensive against War- 
saw had relieved the situation in the north, a second 
invasion of Serbia was undertaken. This came again 
from the west. The Serbians were greatly outnum- 
bered and had to retreat rapidly. They abandoned 
Valievo. The Austrian left wing enveloped Belgrade, 
which fell on December 2d. The right wing reached 
Ushitza, and the centre pressed east toward Kraguie- 
vatz, the chief Serbian arsenal, threatening to cut the 
Belgrade-Nish-Constantinople trunk line. 

But at the end of November, the Russians were 
again pushing through the Carpathian passes and 
approaching Cracow. The Austrian advance in Serbia 
halted. Troops were sent north. Putnik grasped 
the situation and began an offensive of his own. Tak- 
ing the hesitating Austro-Hungarians by surprise, 
he broke through their centre and right, recovering 
Ushitza and Valievo, and captured twenty thousand 
prisoners. The Austrian right and centre retreated 
in disorder into Bosnia, where they were further cut 
up by a Montenegrin army in an engagement at 
Vishegrad. By December 14th Serbian territory was 
completely cleared by the enemy and Belgrade was 
reoccupied. 

Hostilities in this theatre now practically ceased 
until the fall of 191 5. But Serbia was left isolated 
and at the mercy of the Central Powers, whenever they 
should choose to fall upon her. The Allies weakly 
entrusted her protection to their Foreign Offices, which 
were wholly unable to cope with the complexities of 
the Near Eastern situation. Within a year Serbia 
was to fall a victim to the abject failure of Allied 
diplomacy in the Balkans. 



CHAPTER VII 

TURKEY ENTERS THE WAR. OCTOBER 29, I914- 
DECEMBER 3I, I914 

Turkey was the first recruit to the Teuton Alliance. 
Her accession was reluctant, so far as the ruling house 
and the great majority of the Turkish population were 
concerned. It was accelerated through the ascendancy 
which Germany had gained in the councils of the little 
group of Young Turk leaders who ruled the Empire. 
The truculent Enver Pasha, almost a dictator in 
Constantinople, was an extreme pro-German and a 
willing tool of Wangenheim, the German Ambassador. 
He and Talaat Pasha were German agents first and 
Turkish statesmen afterwards. 

Yet there were other and impersonal reasons for 
Turkey's choice. The Porte had gradually drifted 
into close political relations with Germany. While 
Great Britain had maintained an isolated position in 
Eiu-ope, Turkey had looked to her as a protector. 
The policy of Palmerston and Disraeli had been to 
oppose Russia; and Russia was Turkey's century-old 
enemy. But when Great Britain was drawn into the 
Entente and began to cultivate friendly relations with 
Russia, Turkey became distrustful. Great Britain 
and France had encouraged Italy to seize Tripoli. 
Germany alone among the major European Powers 
had sympathized with the Osmanli. Germany, too, 

63 



64 The Great War [1914] 

had never taken a foot of territory belonging to the 
Porte or under its suzerainty. Russian designs on 
Constantinople were well known, and in a European 
war in which Great Britain, France, and Russia were 
ranged against Germany, Turkish policy would natu- 
rally incline toward dependence on the friendship of 
Berlin. 

At the outbreak of the war Turkey declared her 
neutrality. But the Goehen and Breslau incident soon 
proved how benevolently inclined toward Germany 
Turkish neutrality was. The Young Turk government 
was under treaty obligations to deny those war vessels, 
fleeing from an Allied squadron, passage through the 
Dardanelles. But Enver and Talaat accepted nominal 
title to them, thus assuring their safety and also ac- 
quiring the means to over-awe Constantinople. 

On September loth the Turkish Government an- 
nulled the Capitulations, which had conferred special 
privileges on the nationals of foreign powers. On 
September 28th the Dardanelles were closed to all 
merchantmen, thus cutting off communications between 
the Western Allies and Russia. It was apparent that 
the Young Turk dictators were only awaiting the word 
from Berlin to throw off the mask of neutrality. The 
signal was given by Berlin late in October. On Octo- 
ber 29th the Breslau bombarded the Black Sea port 
of Theodosia, and Turkish war vessels destroyed some 
Russian merchantmen and a Russian gunboat lying 
off the harbour of Odessa. Russia accepted this raid 
as an act of war, although the Turkish Cabinet tried 
to explain that hostilities were begun without its 
sanction by German officers serving in the Turkish 
navy. Great Britain and France declared war on 
Turkey on November 5th. Great Britain at once an- 



[1914] Turkey Enters the War 65 

nexed Cyprus and announced the complete indepen- 
dence of Egypt. 

Turkey's entrance into the war was of enormous 
benefit to the Teuton AlHes, because it promised to 
isolate Russia. The primary objective of Entente 
strategy was to connect the Eastern and Western fronts. 
Now Turkey interposed a barrier to the use of the 
warm water route through the Dardanelles. So long 
as that barrier held Russian food supplies, which the 
Western Allies needed, could not come out and guns 
and munitions, which Russia needed, could not go in. 

In another way Turkey was expected to be of great 
value to Germany and Austria-Hungary. Constan- 
tinople was the seat of the Sheik-ul-Islam, the head of 
the Moslem faith. Conforming to political instruc- 
tions this dignitary proclaimed a "Holy War" against 
unbelievers. The logic of this document was impaired 
by the fact that it was obliged to distinguish between 
German and Austro-Hungarian unbelievers, as well 
as neutral unbelievers, and the unbelievers who were 
subjects of the Entente Powers. It effected this dis- 
crimination rather lamely by stating : ' ' Know ye that 
the state [the Moslem State] is at war with Russia, 
England, France, and their allies, and that these are 
the enemies of Islam." 

The obvious political character of the "Holy War" 
weakened the appeal made to Moslem fanaticism. It 
did not stir to revolt the populations of India, Egypt, 
Tripoli, Tunis, Algeria, and Morocco. As a matter 
oi fact, the non-Turkish part of Islam ignored it. Ara- 
bia, a Turkish province, containing the Holy Cities 
of Medina and Mecca, allied herself with the infidels 
and presently expelled the Turkish garrisons and 
helped to conquer Syria. 



66 The Great War 



[1914] 



Yet Turkey's appearance as a belligerent greatly 
increased the Entente's military burdens. Russia had 
now an enemy to fight on the Caucasus front and in 
Persia. Great Britain was obliged to defend India 
and her southern Persian oil territory by undertaking 
an expedition up the Tigris. She had also to protect 
Egypt. These new tasks strained Allied resources 
and relieved Germany. 

Turkey at once began to gather an army in Palestine 
with which to threaten the Suez Canal. Enver Pasha 
set off for the Caucasus, with the intention of recap- 
turing Batum and Kars, overrunning Georgia and 
occupying north-western Persia. The Russians, with 
somewhat inferior forces, had anticipated the Turkish 
offensive. On November 30th their left wing crossed 
the Turkish border and took the town of Bayazid, 
near the Persian line. Farther north-west they ap- 
proached Lake Van. In the centre they advanced from 
Kars and took Koprukeui, on the road to Erzerum. 
But in a few days they were driven back toward the 
Russian frontier. 

The Turkish offensive developed first in the Batum 
sector. After some hard fighting the left wing, on 
November 19th, reached a point only thirteen miles 
south of Batum. On the extreme right the Turks 
invaded the north-eastern corner of Persia and turned 
the Russian positions on the Araxes River, on the 
Caspian side of the Ararat range. The Russians, on 
November 14th, retired toward the Koura River. Then 
the Turkish right turned south and occupied the borders 
of Lake Urumiah in Persia. 

The way was now cleared for Enver's attack on the 
Russian centre, east of Erzerum. His plan was the 
familiar Cannae one (German model); for Enver had 



[I9I4] Turkey Enters the War 67 

been a military student in Berlin. He attempted 
to envelop the Russian forces defending Kars by en- 
circling them on both flanks, while standing fast in the 
centre. On November 20th the Turks invaded the 
Olty Valley, north-west of Kars, defeated the Russians, 
and advanced toward Ardahan, on the Koura, south- 
east of Batum and north-east of Kars. They also won 
a victory at Sarykamitch, to the south-east of Kars, 

Enver had turned the Russian flanks. But the 
operation was too complicated for the rugged terrain and 
the weather conditions at that season of the year. A 
blizzard came on, and the Turks suffered severely in 
their flanking marches through the mountains. The 
Russians, in the nick of time, began a counter-offensive. 
This resulted, on January 2, 191 5, in a double victory, 
near Ardahan, on the north, and at Sarykamitch, at 
the south. The Turkish Ninth Corps was badly cut 
up and what was left of it surrendered. The battle of 
Kara-Ourgan completed the rout of Enver's forces, 
v^^hich retreated on Erzerum. The Turkish loss was 
about fifty thousand. 

The British seized Basra, near the mouth of the 
Tigris, on November 2.2, 1914. On April 11, 1915, 
they took Kurna, at the junction of the Tigris and the 
Euphrates, thus paving the way for the expedition to 
Bagdad. 



CHAPTER VIII 

GERMANY LOSES HER COLONIES. AUGUST 25, I914- 
DECEMBER 3I, I914 

The German colonial system, like the German navy, 
was an outgrowth of William II 's illusory fiat: "Ger- 
many's future lies on the sea." The Germany of Bis- 
marck and William I grew great without a navy and 
without colonies. Bismarck, realizing the natural 
limitations of Germany's geographical position and 
military policy, scoffed at overseas possessions. He 
knew that Germany's true future lay on the continent 
of Europe. 

William II reversed the normal processes of empire 
building. Empire follows power. Germany's power 
was on land. Colonies are the fruit of long-developed 
sea power. Yet Germany started in to create a colo- 
nial system at the same time that she was creating a 
navy. Thus she only enlarged her military liabilities. 
For her adventure was a challenge to Great Britain, 
and if she should start a war in which Great Britain 
should be involved on the opposite side, she could 
neither hold her colonies nor send her fleet to sea. 

The folly of the great adventure of William II and 
Tirpitz was demonstrated as soon as the world war 
began. The German colonial edifice fell to pieces. 
The German flag was driven from the ocean. The 
German home fleet interned itself in the Kiel Canal 
and at Wilhelmshaven. 

68 



7^ 



[I9I4] Germany Loses Her Colonies 69 

Tsingtau was the most valuable German colony in 
a military sense, since it provided a strong naval base 
in Eastern Asia. It was acquired in 1897 from China, 
along with the Kiao-chau concessions on the Shantung 
peninsula, as reparation for the murder of two German 
missionaries. It lay across the Yellow Sea from Korea. 
Japan had long regarded Germany as an unwelcome 
neighbour. Her own interests, as well as her obliga- 
tions under her treaty of alliance with Great Britain, 
made her jump at the chance to expel Germany from 
China. 

On August 15, 19 14 the Tokio Government sub- 
mitted an ultimatum to Berlin, requiring the delivery 
of the leased territory of Kiao-chau into Japanese 
custody before September 15th. Eight days were 
allowed for a reply. Receiving none, Japan, on August 
23d, declared war on Germany. Her treaty arrange- 
ments with Great Britain pledged her to police the 
East and protect Great Britain's Asiatic interests, if 
her ally became engaged in war elsewhere. German 
activities in the Far East were a menace to the peace 
of that region. So Japan undertook, as a part of her 
police duty, to reduce Tsingtau and to occupy the 
German islands in the Pacific which lay north of the 
equator. 

On September 2d 10,000 Japanese troops were 
landed on Shantung peninsula, outside the German 
leased territory. This force was soon increased to 
21,000 men. An East Indian contingent of 1360 men 
was contributed by Great Britain. On September 27th 
the Japanese began operations against the Tsingtau 
fortress. The siege lasted until November 7th, when 
the garrison of 4000 men capitulated. The losses of 
the assailants were about 1600. 



70 The Great War 



[1914] 



The Japanese navy seized the CaroHne Archipelago, 
the Marshall Islands and the Marianne Islands in 
October. German Samoa was captured by a New 
Zealand expedition on August 29th. An Australian 
expedition took over the Bismarck Archipelago and 
Solomon Islands on September nth, and Kaiser Wil- 
helmsland (a part of New Guinea) on September 24th. 

Togo, the German African colony on the north shore 
of the Gulf of Guinea, surrendered to French and Brit- 
ish forces on August 25th. Kamerun, on the west 
African coast, north of the Congo, was invaded, at the 
end of August, by two British columns, coming from 
British Nigeria. These were both repulsed by the 
German forces, and the enemy crossed the British Nige- 
rian border at one or two places, seizing British stations. 
On September 27th, however, British and French con- 
tingents occupied Duala, the principal Kamerun port. 
The fight for the possession of this colony continued 
through 1 91 5. The Germans were not finally expelled 
from it until February, 1916. 

Two other colonies remained — German South-west 
Africa and German East Africa. The Union of South 
Africa assumed the burden of reducing these. Union 
forces entered South-west Africa and captured Luderitz 
Bay on Setpember 19th. But the invasion was sud- 
denly halted by a Boer uprising at home. The Germans 
in South-west Africa had maintained secret relations 
with the more irreconcilable Boer elements. The deter- 
mination of the Union government to conquer South- 
west Africa aroused these malcontents to revolt. 

Early in October, Lieutenant-Colonel Maritz started 
an insurrection along the southern border of the South- 
west African colony. He was driven across into enemy 
territory. But General Christian de Wet, one of the 



[I9I4] Germany Loses Her Colonies 71 

heroes of the Boer War, and General Christian T. 
Beyers, a former Transvaal leader and, until a few 
weeks before, Commander-in-Chief of the Union of 
South Africa forces, soon joined the rebellion. They 
operated in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State 
and didn't try to make a junction with the Germans. 

General Botha, however, held the majority of the 
Boers in line. He proceeded vigorously against the 
rebels, who, during November, were defeated in many 
small engagements. De Wet was taken prisoner on 
December ist. Beyers was killed a few days later. By 
the end of December the revolt was practically crushed. 
Of the ring-leaders only Maritz remained at large ; and 
he had retired into the interior of South-west Africa. 
The invasion of that colony was resumed in 191 5. 

German East Africa, a region extremely difficult to 
operate in, was not cleared of German forces until near 
the end of the war. 



CHAPTER IX 

naval operations in i914. august 5, i9i4- 
December 31, 1 914 

Germany spent billions of marks creating a navy, 
which, in 1914, ranked second only to Great Britain's. 
But ranking second in naval power was of little benefit 
to Germany, once Great Britain had entered the war. 
The French fleet, concentrated in the Mediterranean, 
was much superior to the Austro-Hungarian fleet. So 
neither of the Teuton allies was in a position to dispute 
the Entente's mastery of the seas. The German marine, 
naval and merchant, was a precarious investment, so 
long as German policy contemplated the possibility 
of a war in which Great Britain might become the ally 
of France and Russia, Germany's violation of Bel- 
gium's neutrality presented a casus belli, which Great 
Britain couldn't ignore. But the Kaiser and Tirpitz 
had already made Great Britain a potential belligerent 
by their efforts to challenge British supremacy on the 
ocean. 

At the outbreak of the war German merchantmen 
everywhere ran for shelter. Those which didn't fall 
into the hands of the Allies took refuge in neutral har- 
bours. Vessels of more than one million tonnage were 
interned in this way. Shipping laid up in the ports of 
Italy, the United States, Brazil, Peru, Cuba, and China 

72 



Ixpu] Naval Operations in 191 4 73 

was transferred to Allied service after those countries 
entered the war. The High Sea Fleet clung to its home 
stations and avoided battle. For purposes of com- 
merce raiding the Germans turned to the submarine. 

Naval operations in 19 14 consisted chiefly in round- 
ing up the few German warships which were on distant 
service and unable to make for home. The most im- 
portant of these was the battle cruiser Goeben, which 
was in the Mediterranean, with the cruiser Breslau, 
when the war broke out. They bombarded two Alge- 
rian ports in the hope of interrupting the transportation 
of Algerian troops to France. Then they ran for Mes- 
sina, coaling there on August 5th. On the evening of 
August 6th, they started east. A British squadron 
was awaiting them in the Straits of Otranto, its com- 
mander thinking that they would try to reach Pola, 
the Austro-Hungarian naval base. 

But the German Government had no idea of using 
these ships merely to reinforce the Austro-Hungarian 
fleet. They had another mission, of much greater con- 
sequence. That was to run for Constantinople, where 
they would aid Ambassador Wangenheim and his Young 
Turk confederates in forcing Turkey into the war on 
Germany's side. 

The Goeben and the Breslau were both faster than 
any corresponding Allied warships in the Mediterra- 
nean. They made good their escape to the east and 
steamed leisurely for the Dardanelles, which they 
entered on August loth. Under the provisions of the 
Treaty of Paris of 1856 and of the Treaty of London 
of 187 1, warships were not allowed to use the Darda- 
nelles except in time of peace. But Wangenheim got 
around all difficulties by announcing a transfer of title 
to Turkey. The Goeben and the Breslau remained in 



74 The Great War 



[1914] 



the hands of their German officers, dominated Con- 
stantinople and presently, with the connivance of Enver 
Pasha and Talaat Pasha, engaged in the Black Sea 
raid which brought Turkey into collision with Russia. 
The escape of these two vessels was therefore the most 
fruitful exploit of the German surface navy. It had a 
far-reaching effect on the course and progress of the 
war. 

The first naval battle, which was little more than a 
skirmish, took place on August 28, 19 14, off Heligoland 
Bight. Vice- Admiral Sir David Beatty commanded 
the British forces. He sent three submarines close in 
to Heligoland in order to tempt the German destroyers 
and light cruisers stationed there into giving pursuit. 
With the first battle-cruiser squadron and the first light- 
cruiser squadron he lay some distance to the rear. 
Two light cruisers, the Arethusa and the Fearless, were 
assigned to cut in behind the German light warships 
after they got some distance out to sea. 

Beatty 's ruse worked successfully. German destroy- 
ers, supported by the light cruisers Ariadne and Strass- 
hurg, gave chase to the decoys. The two cruisers 
sighted the Arethusa and Fearless and attacked them, 
damaging the A rethusa. Then the A riadne was crippled 
and she and her consort withdrew. Later the Koln and 
Mainz reinforced the Strassburg. The British lighter 
ships were now hard-pressed. But Beatty hurried up 
with the battle cruisers Lion and Queen Mary and ended 
the battle. The Koln and the Mainz were sunk, as 
was also the crippled Ariadne. The Strassburg was 
badly damaged. The British lost no ship, but the 
Arethusa and several destroyers were just able to limp 
home. 

The largest group of German warships in foreign 



[I9I4] Naval Operations In 191 4 75 

waters when the war began was Admiral Spee's Asiatic 
squadron. It was stationed at Kiao-chau, the German 
naval base in China. Spee had with him the armoured 
cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, and four light 
cruisers, the Leipsic, Niirnberg, Karlsruhe, and Emden. 
He sent the Emden south into the Indian Ocean, to 
prey on Allied commerce. The Karlsruhe finally made 
her way across into the South Atlantic, where she dis- 
appeared from sight mysteriously many months later. 

Spee started east across the South Pacific with the 
other four, meeting the light cruiser Dresden on the 
American side. He encountered on November ist, off 
the coast of Chile, a British squadron, under Admiral 
Sir Christopher Craddock. The latter's force consisted 
of the old battleship Canopus, the amoured cruisers Good 
Hope and Monmouth, and the light cruiser Glasgow. 
The Canopus was much slower than the others and at 
the time of the engagement was 250 miles to the south 
of them. The German squadron was therefore some- 
what superior in power. It also had the advantage of 
being better able to fight in a rough seaway, its heavier 
guns being mounted higher than those of the Good 
Hope and Monmouth. 

Omitting the Canopus, which didn't figiu-e in the 
action off Cape Coronel, Craddock had one armoured 
cruiser (the Good Hope) of 14,100 tons displacement, 
carrying two 9.2-inch guns and sixteen 6-inch guns, 
and another (the Monmouth) of 9800 tons displace- 
ment, carrying fourteen 6-inch guns. Spee had the 
twin armoured cruisers, the Gneisenau and the Scharn- 
horst, each of 11,600 tons displacement, and carrying 
eight 8.2-inch guns and six 6-inch guns. The British 
armoured cruisers were half a knot faster than the 
German. 



76 The Great War [1914] 

Craddock was supported by the scout cruiser Glasgow 
of 4800 tons, carrying two 6-inch guns and ten 4-inch 
guns, and the transport Otranto, which was dispatched 
south for safety before the battle started. Spec's two 
scout cruisers, the Nilrnberg and Dresden, and his pro- 
tected cruiser, the Leipsic, ranged in tonnage from 3250 
to 3600. Each carried ten 4-inch guns. But the 
Glasgow was two and a half knots faster than the 
Number g and Dresden and three and a half knots faster 
than the Leipsic. 

The British Admiral was not obliged to fight. He 
could easily have drawn away to the south and made 
a junction with the Canopus, which carried 12 -inch 
guns. But without counting the risks of engagement 
with an opponent slightly superior in tonnage and gun 
power, he sent a wireless to the Canopus: "I am going 
to attack the enemy now." 

The battle began about 6.20 p.m. The German 
squadron was inshore and had the advantage of firing 
at targets outlined against the western sky. Its gun- 
nery was effective from the start. The Good Hope and 
the Monmouth were quickly disabled. The former 
sank at 7.23 p.m., following an explosion. The latter, 
put completely out of action about the same time, was 
dispatched by the Ntirnberg at 8.58 p.m. The Glasgow 
escaped in the dark. The Germans had only two men 
slightly wounded. 

The news of Craddock's defeat caused great chagrin 
in Great Britain. A strong naval detachment, includ- 
ing battle cruisers, was at once hurried into the South 
Atlantic to dispose of the victorious German squadron. 
Spec knew nothing of this, though he should have sus- 
pected it. He passed leisurely into the Atlantic him- 
self, with the intention of destroying the British wireless 



[I9I4] Naval Operations in 19 14 77 

and coaling station at the Falkland Islands. On the 
morning of December 8th he confidently approached 
the islands, taking no precautions whatever. But 
sheltered within the harbour of Port Stanley lay Ad- 
miral Sturdee's powerful squadron, consisting of two 
battle cruisers, the Invincible and Inflexible, with eight 
1 2 -inch guns apiece; three armoured cruisers, the Car- 
narvon, Cornwall, and Kent; the scout cruiser Bristol, 
the Glasgow, and the Canopus. The British ships had a 
tonnage of 87,000, the German ships a tonnage of 35,500. 
The weight of the British broadside was nearly five times 
that of the German. The two British battle cruisers 
were three knots faster than the Scharnhorst and the 
Gneisenau. The British ships had arrived on Decem- 
ber 7th and needed coal ; so that if Spee had quickened 
his schedule a little he could probably have destroyed 
the station, in spite of the Canopus and the Glasgow, and 
still had plenty of time to get away in safety. 

The Kent lay at the entrance of the harbour and the 
Canopus was visible inside. The Gneisenau and Nilrn- 
berg closed in to attack. Then, grasping the situation, 
they turned away to the east. The British squadron 
got under way at 9.45 A.M. Travelling in close forma- 
tion, it could not gain on the Germans. Sturdee 
decided at 11.20 a.m. to press the pursuit with the two 
fast battle cruisers and the Glasgow, all with a speed of 
26 1^ knots. He had closed in by 12.55 P-M. and opened 
fire. The three German light cruisers now turned to 
the south-west, while the Gneisenau and Scharnhorst 
continued east-south-east. The Cornwall and the Kent, 
joined by the Glasgow, pursued the lighter enemy vessels. 
The battle cruisers and the Carnarvon kept on after the 
heavier ones. The Gneisenau and the Scharnhorst had 
no chance. Their batteries were outranged and the 



78 The Great War [1914] 

Invincible and Inflexible easily outpointed them and 
crossed their course. The Scharnhorst was sunk at 
4.17 P.M. and the Gneisenau at 6.00 p.m. The Nurnberg 
and the Leipsic were sunk later in the evening. The 
Dresden escaped and cruised back into the Pacific. 
She was discovered on March 14, 191 5, at anchor off 
JuEin Fernandez (Robinson Crusoe's) Island and was 
destroyed by the Kent and the Glasgow. Great Britain 
afterwards apologized to Chile for an apparent violation 
of Chilean territorial waters. The British lost nine 
men killed and nine wounded in the action of the 
Falkland Islands. 

The Emden had an adventurous career in the Indian 
Ocean. She was at large for three months, destroyed 
twenty-five or more vessels and cost the Allies a mone- 
tary loss of over twenty-five million dollars. At one 
time there were nineteen Allied warships searching for 
her. Her captain, Miiller, showed great daring and 
strictly observed the rules of war. One of the Emden' s 
exploits was to run into the harbour of Penang and 
destroy the small Russian cruiser Jemtchug and the 
French destroyer Mousquet. She cruised in the Bay of 
Bengal, around Ceylon and in the Malay Archipelago. 

Her end came on November 9th, when she attempted 
to destroy the wireless station on South Keeling Island. 
The wireless called for help and the Australian cruiser 
Sydney, employed in convoying Australian troops to 
Egypt, turned aside to engage her. The Sydney had 
heavier guns and was faster. The Emden was soon 
driven in a wrecked condition on a reef off North Keel- 
ing Island. The party which had landed on South Keel- 
ing Island to destroy the station seized the schooner 
Ayesha and sailed for Arabia, landing there safely and 
making their way overland to Constantinople. 



[I9I4] Naval Operations In 19 14 79 

The German light cruiser Konigsherg destroyed the 
British cruiser Pegasus in Zanzibar harbour on Septem- 
ber 20th. Later she took refuge in Rufiji River, in 
German East Africa, where she was sunk on July ii, 
1 91 5. The North German Lloyd liner, Kaiser Wilhelm 
der Grosse, fitted up as a commerce destroyer and 
operating in the Atlantic, was sunk in September. 

One of the most sensational incidents of the first 
phase of German submarine warfare was the sinking 
of the three British cruisers, the Aboukir, the Hogue, 
and the Cressy, by Captain-Lieutenant Otto Weddigen 
of the U-Q. They were destroyed in succession, within 
an hour, while patrolling the coast of Holland early 
in the morning of September 22, 19 14. It was the first 
startling demonstration of the power of the submarine. 
The British Admiralty censured the commanders of 
the Hogue and the Cressy for standing by after the 
Aboukir had been hit. But great laxity had been 
shown in sending three large cruisers out on patrol 
duty without a screen of destroyers. 

On November 2"/, 1914, the Audacious, one of Great 
Britain's newest superdreadnaughts, was sunk in 
Lough Swilly, off the north coast of Ireland. But her 
loss was apparently due to a floating mine. 

Naval operations in 19 14 were largely tentative. 
The British Grand Fleet had sought a base to the north 
of Scotland, at Scapa Flow, where it could be pro- 
tected from submarine attack and whence it could 
issue to meet the German High Sea Fleet if the latter 
should come out. But the German High Sea Fleet 
was not ready to come out. German naval policy 
was defensive. It preferred to wait and to develop 
the submarine. 



CHAPTER X 

THE RUSSIAN WINTER CAMPAIGN. JANUARY I, I915- 
MAY I, 191 5 

The first winter of the war brought operations to a 
standstill on the Western Front, in Serbia, and in the 
Caucasus. It didn't interrupt them on the Eastern 
European Front, where Germany had now definitely 
resolved to break the power of Russia. 

German policy required a continuation of the fight- 
ing in the East despite weather conditions. Russia 
was under-developed industrially. Her munitions sup- 
plies were depleted. To give her a three months' re- 
spite would enable her to stock up again with the aid 
of shipments from Japan, and possibly from Great 
Britain and France. Austria-Hungary was also press- 
ing for relief. The Russian armies in Bukowina were 
up the eastern slopes of the Carpathians, and Cos- 
sacks had made occasional raids into Hungary. The 
Austrian High Command was anxious to quiet Tran- 
sylvania, and to overawe Rumania, where public opin- 
ion had been affected by the westward sweep of the 
Russians. It was also eager to raise the siege of 
Przemysl, where a large army, foolishly left behind 
to hold that fortress, was being slowly starved into 
submission. 

On January i, 191 5, the Russians occupied a line 
about nine hundred miles long, stretching from the 

80 



[I9I5] The Russian Winter Campaign 8i 

Baltic Sea to southern Bukowina. In Bukowina a 
Russian army, under Alexieff, held the Kirlibaba 
Pass and had pushed down to the Rumanian border 
at Kimpolung. A second army, under Brusiloff, was 
stationed along the Carpathians, to the south-west 
and south of Przemysl. A reserve army, under Seli- 
vanoff, was besieging that fortress. Radko Dimitrieff 's 
army faced west toward Cracow, along the Dunajec. 
Evert 's army was on the line bf the Nida, in south- 
western Poland. The Russian centre, under Russky, 
covered the Vistula, up to Novogeorgievsk, and then 
extended north to the East Prussian border, at Mlawa. 
Thence the right, also under Russky, ran north-east 
behind the Mazurian Lakes region to the Niemen 
River. 

Hindenburg commanded in person the German 
armies in East Prussia and Poland. He had also as- 
sumed general direction of all the Teuton forces on the 
Eastern Front. On his extreme left, in the Courland 
sector, was an army under Below. Next to it, in the 
region of the Mazurian Lakes, was the Tenth Army, 
under Eichhorn. The Eighth Army, under Scholz, 
occupied the line between Lomza and Plock. In the 
Bzura sector was the Ninth Army, under Mackensen. 
On Mackensen's right, stretching south to the Carpa- 
thians, were two Austro-Hungarian armies — the First, 
under Dankl, in the Pilica and Nida sector, and the 
Fourth, under the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, in the 
Dunajec sector. The Second Austro-Hungarian Army, 
under Boroevic, defended the Carpathian passes. 
Another army, under Prince Eugene, extended the 
Teuton line down along the western border of Buko- 
wina to the Rumanian frontier. Kusmanek's army 
was shut up in Przemysl. 



82 The Great War [1915] 

Hindenburg still clung to the idea that Warsaw 
could be taken from the west, or, at least, that a de- 
monstration against Warsaw would raise the siege of 
Przemysl, as it had done in the preceding October. On 
February ist he sent Mackensen against the Russian 
centre. The attack came on a seven-mile front, about 
Bolimov. It was made in a heavy snowstorm, which 
masked the assailants. The Germans, in dense mass 
formations, broke through the first Russian trench line 
on the Rawa River. On February 2d they took the 
second and third trench hnes, and advanced in the 
next two days five miles toward Warsaw. But Russky 
brought up reinforcements on February 4th and by 
February 8th he was back on the Rawa. 

In January the Russians had pushed forward into 
East Prussia in the district north of the Mazurian 
Lakes and south of the Niemen. They seized the line 
of the Angerapp River and threatened to outflank the 
four German corps standing on the defensive west of 
the Mazurian Lakes. Hindenburg felt called on to 
check this movement. He reinforced Eichhorn heavily 
and brought a part of Below's army south from the 
Courland front. German forces, marching east from 
Tilsit along the south bank of the Niemen, broke the 
connection between the two northernmost corps of the 
Russian invading army, commanded by Baron Sievers. 
The more southerly corps was then attacked on the 
flank and in the rear, and was driven in disorder across 
the Russian border. Hindenburg claimed forty thou- 
sand prisoners. The isolated northern corps retreated 
to Kovno. The German army under Below, on Eich- 
horn's right, attacked and defeated the Russians east of 
the Mazurian Lakes and pursued them toward Grodno 
and Ossowietz. 



[ipis] The Russian Winter Campaign 83 

East Prussia was again cleared. Eichhorn crossed 
the Niemen, north of Grodno, on February 20th, and 
reached a point only ten miles from the Warsaw-Petro- 
grad railway. Below made an attempt on the fortress 
of Ossowietz. But these operations came to nothing. 
Early in March the German forces engaged in them 
withdrew behind their own frontier. 

Still Hindenburg would not give up the idea of a 
break-through in the north. He tried next to get to 
the rear of the Polish capital and cut its railroad com- 
munications east by striking south from East Prussia 
at the Russian line between Lomza and Plock. Here 
again the Warsaw- Petrogr ad railroad was his objective. 
While Below was trying to invest Ossowietz, Scholz's 
Eighth Army attacked all along the line from the fort- 
ress of Lomza south-west to the Vistula. Plock, on the 
Vistula, north-west of Novogeorgievsk, was taken on Feb- 
ruary 1 8th, and progress was made from Mlawa toward 
Prasnyz. On the German left, north of Lomza, the of- 
fensive was quickly checked. Scholz renewed it in the cen- 
tre. On February 24th, Prasnyz was taken by assault. 

The Grand Duke Nicholas had, however, prepared a 
strategic reserve for use in this sector. He hurried up 
reinforcements toward Prasnyz, south-west of which 
city a single Russian division had stubbornly held on 
and prevented a break-through. On February 26th the 
Russians were in Prasnyz. Scholz tried to retake it the 
next day. But he was now threatened with envelop- 
ment and hurriedly retreated, losing ten thousand 
prisoners. The Germans then retired on the entire 
front of forty miles from Plock east. In March Scholz 
made a third attempt to capture Prasnyz, getting 
within three miles of it on March nth. But he was 
again repulsed. 



84 The Great War [1915] 

The most substantial success of the winter campaign 
on the Teuton side was the recapture of most of Buko- 
wina. The northern half of this Austrian crownland 
was overrun by the Russians in the fall of 1914. Early 
in January, 1915, General Alexieff's left wing pushed 
south to the Rumanian border, and west through the 
Kirlibaba Pass, leading across the Carpathians into 
Hungary. The loss of this pass caused great excite- 
ment in Budapest. Germany was appealed to to quiet 
popular alarm. 

The German General Staff sent several German 
divisions into Hungary — and supervised a general re- 
grouping of the Austro-Hungarian armies. The south- 
ernmost, under Prince Eugene, moved east through 
Transylvania and retook Kirlibaba Pass on January 226.. 
Then it swept on through Bukowina to Czernowitz, 
which was captured on February i8th. Having cleared 
the province, Prince Eugene turned north into Galicia, 
by way of Kolomea. He captured Stanislau, seventy 
miles south-east of Lemberg, and held it until March 
4th. Then he was driven back to Kolomea. 

The Austro-Hungarian push into Galicia was part 
of the Teuton plan to relieve Przemysl. On Prince 
Eugene's left a newly constituted German army, un- 
der Linsingen, had moved north-east from Munkacs 
against the Wyzkow Pass, to the south-east of Przemysl. 
It cleared this passageway, but was held in the foot- 
hills on the northern side of the Carpathian range. 
Farther west the Second Austro-Hungarian Army, now 
under Boehm-Ermolli, vainly tried to free the Dukla 
and Lupkow passes, directly south of Przemysl. It 
got part of the way through Lupkow, but was blocked 
at Dukla. 

The field army left in Przemysl was now beyond help. 



[1915] The Russian Winter Campaign 85 

The Russians lacked the siege guns to reduce the circle 
of forts. They simply sat down and contained the 
garrison. Sorties were futile, for the besieged army 
had no other base than Przemysl, and it would have 
been obliged, in order to escape, to cut its way not 
only through the lines of the besiegers, but also through 
those of the Russian armies on the Carpathian front. 
General Kusmanek had used up his food supplies by 
the middle of March. On March i8th he made a half- 
hearted sortie. On March 226. he surrendered his 
garrison of from 120,000 to 130,000 men. 

The southern Austro-German campaign thus failed 
of its main objective. A secondary objective, the 
recovery of Bukowina, had been attained. Przemysl 
was the most spectacular of Russia's successes in the 
earlier period of the war, although the strategical 
results of the campaign for Lemberg were far more 
important. The capture of the fortress cost the Rus- 
sians practically nothing. The Austrian attempt to 
hold it was an inexcusable blunder. Yet for the Rus- 
sians the circumstances of the capitulation were omi- 
nous. General Gourko testifies in his book. War and 
Revolution in Russia, that the Russians had no guns 
of heavier calibre than 6-inch until the spring of 191 6. 
All through 191 5 the supply of shells was painfully low. 
Yet the Germans and Austrians had already begun to 
use 12-inch guns in field operations. 

Reinforced by the army released by the surrender of 
Przemysl, the Grand Duke Nicholas resumed the offen- 
sive on the Carpathian front. He made some progress 
at the southern end of Dukla Pass. He strengthened 
his hold on Lupkow Pass and captured Rostok Pass, 
between Lupkow and Uszok. 

But he was driven out of Uszok Pass, and farther 



86 The Great War [1915] 

to the south-east the enemy was everywhere on the 
Galician side of the range. 

Fighting died down about the middle of April. By 
May 1st the tide of battle was to begin to flow back 
through Galicia and Poland, wiping out all the sensa- 
tional gains which Russia, astonishing herself as well 
as her allies, had made since September i, 1914. 



CHAPTER XI 

THE DARDANELLES-GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN. FEBRUARY 
19, I915-DECEMBER 31, I915 

Excluding Foch's Victory Offensive, the Dar- 
danelles-Gallipoli campaign was the one bold and ag- 
gressive conception of Entente strategy. It failed not 
because it was not eminently sound in theory, but 
because it was faultily executed. 

The Allies were fighting on isolated fronts. They 
had to operate on exterior lines, their forces scattered 
around the circumference of a vast circle. Their efforts 
could be only feebly co-ordinated. Their great need 
was to join up the western and southern European front 
with the Russian front, so that Russia could be sup- 
plied with guns and munitions and her overplus of man 
power could be utilized to the best possible advantage. 

To force a passage through the Dardanelles would 
create a direct contact between Russia and the Western 
Allies. It would do much more. It would isolate 
Turkey, driving her government and armies into Asia, 
where they would be comparatively harmless. It 
would also solve the troublesome Balkan problem by 
bringing all the Balkan states into the war on the side 
of the Entente. Germany and Austria-Hungary would 
then be closely beleaguered in Central Europe. 

As early as November 25, 19 14, the British War 
Council had discussed the advisability of an attempt 
on the Dardanelles. Such an operation was clearly 

87 



88 The Great War 



[1915] 



in line with British policy, since Egypt and India could 
be protected by carrying the war to the gates of Con- 
stantinople. On January 2, 191 5, the Russian Govern- 
ment, then alarmed by the situation in the Caucasus, 
asked Great Britain to make a demonstration against 
Turkey. Opinion in the British Council originally 
favoured a joint military and naval operation. It was 
estimated that 150,000 men would be needed to support 
the fleet. Had that number been available at the time 
the ships attacked, the chances are that the straits would 
have been cleared and Constantinople taken. 

The obstacles in the way of supplying 150,000 men 
immediately led to consideration of the alternative 
plan of a purely naval attack. On January 3d a tele- 
gram was sent to Vice-Admiral Garden, commanding 
the British naval forces in the Mediterranean, asking 
him whether it was practicable to force the Dardanelles 
by the use of ships alone. He answered that he didn't 
think that the Straits could be "rushed," but that 
they "might be forced by extended operations with a 
large number of ships." On January nth he outHned 
four successive operations: 

(i) The reduction of the entrance forts. 

(2) Clearing the Straits up to the Narrows. 

(3) Destruction of the defences at the Narrows. 

(4) Passage through the mine field up to the Sea of 
Marmora. 

It was estimated that these four operations would 
cover a month. On January 15th Lord Fisher, the 
chief of the Naval War Staff, submitted a memorandum, 
concurring generally in Garden's plans. He suggested, 
however, that unless experience gained in the first two 
operations justified further action, the last two opera- 
tions should be abandoned. 



[I9I5] Dardanelles-Gallipoli Campaign 89 

On February i6th, the Turkish attack on the Suez 
Canal having failed, it was decided to mass troops in 
the Mediterranean for the Dardanelles campaign. 
The Twenty-ninth Division (regulars) was to be sent 
from England to Lemnos and a considerable force was 
to be transferred from Egypt. The sailing of the 
Twenty-ninth Division was fixed for February 226.. 
But Lord Kitchener countermanded this order on his 
own responsibility and without notice to the War 
Council. The Twenty-ninth's start was thus delayed 
three weeks. 

Preparations were meanwhile made for the naval 
offensive. The new superdreadnaught Queen Eliza- 
beth, armed with 15-inch guns, was sent to the ^gean. 
So was the battle cruiser Inflexible, just back from the 
battle of the Falkland Islands. The British navy 
contributed eight pre-dreadnaught battleships, the 
Agamemnon, Irresistible, Vengeance, Triumph, Albion, 
Lord Nelson, Ocean, and Majestic. The French navy 
supplied four pre-dreadnaughts — the Charlemagne, 
Suffren, Gaulois, and Bouvet. An auxiliary fleet of 
light cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and mine sweep- 
ers was also provided. The islands of Tenedos, Lemnos, 
and Mudros were occupied as naval and military bases. 

The Dardanelles passageway is about forty miles 
long. At the ^gean end it is about two miles wide. 
The entrance was defended by four obsolete forts — 
Kum Kale and Orkanieh, on the Asiatic side, and 
Cape Helles battery and Sedd-el-Bahr, on the European. 
The first real defences were encountered about eleven 
miles up, where the passage begins to contract. Here 
the Dardanos Battery had been constructed on the 
Asiatic side, facing south-west and commanding the 
whole lower section of the Straits. On the Narrows 



90 The Great War [1915] 

proper, three to four miles farther up, where the passage 
is only three quarters of a mile wide, were the fortifica- 
tions known as Kilid Bahr, on the European shore, and 
Anadolu Hamidieh battery, on the Asiatic. Kilid 
Bahr was of little value. 

Anadolu Hamidieh battery was armed with Krupp 
guns of the model of 1 885. They had an extreme range 
of about nine miles. The only other relatively modern 
guns were at Dardanos — Krupps of the 1905 model 
and some naval pieces taken from the Goehen. The 
channel below the Narrows was covered by a mine field. 

The entrance forts were bombarded on February 
19th and partially silenced. On February 25th they 
were completely destroyed. The lower strait was 
entered on February 26th and Dardanos was bom- 
barded at long range. Attacks were made again on 
March 6th and 7th. Then operations were suspended, 
pending the arrival of the Allied land forces. The 
British troops, to be assembled at Mudros, together 
with a French contingent, which had mobilized at 
Bizerta, were expected to number about one hundred 
thousand men. 

By this time, the Allied fleet had also been materi- 
ally strengthened. Eight British pre-dreadnaughts were 
added: the Swiftsure, Cornwallis, Queen, Implacable, 
London, Goliath, Canopus (which also had taken part in 
the battle of the Falkland Islands), and Prince George. 
The French sent three more old-type battleships: the 
St. Louis, Henri IV, and JaurSguiberry. A British 
monitor, the Humber, arrived, as did the Askold, a Rus- 
sian cruiser, and some additional British and French 
cruisers. General Sir Ian Hamilton was designated 
to command the land forces. He reached Lemnos on 
March 17th. 



[I9I5] Dardanelles-Gallipoli Campaign 91 

Meanwhile the British Admiralty kept urging an 
attack on the forts in the Straits. Admiral Garden 
suggested on March nth that military operations on 
a large scale should also be undertaken at once. Garden 
now resigned because of ill health and Vice-Admiral 
de Robeck took his place. A conference was held at 
Lemnos on March 17th, attended by Admiral de Ro- 
beck, Rear- Admiral Gueprette, commanding the French 
squadron; General Hamilton, and General d'Amade, 
in command of the French land contingent. 

General Hamilton deprecated immediate co-opera- 
tion on the part of the land forces, because he had 
discovered that the British transports were improperly 
loaded for quick debarkation of materials. He pre- 
ferred to send them back to Egypt to be reloaded. 
This decision, which was concurred in by Kitchener, 
proved disastrous, for it gave the Turks a month's 
time to prepare a defence of the Gallipoli peninsula. 

De Robeck decided to go it alone. On March i8th, 
for the first time, the Allied fleet approached within 
moderate range of the Dardanos battery and the forts 
higher up in the Narrows. At 10.45 a.m., the Queen 
Elizabeth, Inflexible, Agamemnon, Lord Nelson, Triumph, 
and Prince George engaged the Turkish works. Shortly 
after noon the Suffern, Gaulois, Charlemagne, and Bouvet 
steamed closer in. By 1.25 p.m. the forts had ceased 
firing. They were not silenced, however, and renewed 
firing later. 

All the attacking ships had been hit, but none was 
seriously injured. 

The Vengeance, Irresistible, Albion, Ocean, Swiftsure, 
and Majestic now appeared to relieve the French 
battleships, which, with the Triumph and Prince George, 
started back for the lower Straits. The Bouvet struck 



92 The Great War [1915] 

a mine going out and sank in three minutes. Nearly- 
all her crew went down with her. Late in the afternoon 
the Irresistible and the Ocean fell victims to floating 
mines, though few of the men on them were lost. The 
Gaulois, injured by gun fire, but able to move out under 
her own steam, had to be beached on the little island 
of Drepano. The Inflexible, also damaged by shells, 
had to be beached at Tenedos. After these losses the 
battle was broken off. 

Vice-Admiral de Robeck was not discouraged by the 
results of the attack. He reported to London on the 
evening of the i8th: 

The power of the fleet to dominate the fortresses 
by superiority of fire seems to be established. Various 
other dangers and difficulties will have to be encoun- 
tered, but nothing has happened which justifies the 
belief that the cost of the undertaking will exceed 
what always has been expected and provided for. 

General Golz, the German supervisor of the Turk- 
ish military establishment, had told Wangenheim, the 
German Ambassador, that the British could force the 
Straits by sacrificing ten ships. Wangenheim shared 
this belief and so did most of the high Turkish officials. 
De Robeck telegraphed to London on March 19th 
that he purposed renewing the assault and received 
word to go ahead if he thought fit to do so. But 
General Hamilton evidently dissuaded him. For, on 
March 26th, after several conferences with the latter, 
who strongly urged delay until the land forces could 
co-operate, de Robeck telegraphed the Admiralty : 

The check on the i8th is not, in my opinion, 
decisive, but on the 22d of March I met General 



[I9I5] Dardanelles-Gallipoli Campaign 93 

Hamilton and heard his views, and I now think 
that, to obtain important results and to achieve the 
object of the campaign, a combined operation will be 
essential. 

What Hamilton and de Robeck did not take suffi- 
ciently into account was the strong probability that 
the forts in the Narrows were short of ammunition. 
That fact was disclosed later by Ambassador Morgen- 
thau, who visited the Turkish defences just before the 
battle, and by Mr. George A. Schreiner, the correspond- 
ent of the American Associated Press, who was an eye- 
witness of the action of March i8th. Mr. Schreiner 
says that General Mertens, the chief technical officer at 
the Straits, advised him to get up early on the morning 
of March 19th and take to the Anatolian hills, adding: 
"We expect the British will come back early tomorrow 
morning, and if they do, we may be able to hold out 
for a few hours." 

Mr. Morgenthau, in his book of reminiscences, makes 
the unqualified statement that on the evening of March 
1 8th the Anadolu Hamidieh battery, the most powerful 
of the defences on the Asiatic side, had only seventeen 
armour-piercing shells left, and Fort Kilid Bahr, the 
main defence on the European side, only ten. If these 
forts had been abandoned, Constantinople would 
have fallen to the Allied fleet and the whole face of the 
war would have been changed. 

The naval offensive having been dropped, Great 
Britain became committed to a far more difficult and 
costly venture — that of reducing Constantinople by 
land. General Hamilton went to Egypt to oversee 
the reloading of the transports. He wasn't ready to 
begin operations until April 25th. This long delay 



94 The Great War 



[19151 



enabled the Turks to make the most of the unusual 
defensive possibilities of the GaUipoli terrain. 

The peninsula is about forty-five miles long and 
from three to ten miles wide. It consists of a tangle 
of hills and gulches, with few roads and no pronounced 
valleys, either north and south, or east and west. 
Worst of all, the beaches are shallow and exposed. 
Landings could be made only under observation and 
galUng fire. General Hamilton had available on April 
25th about eighty thousand men, including two Anzac 
divisions, a Royal Naval Division, the Twenty-ninth 
Regular Division, recently arrived from England, and 
a French division, 15,000 strong, composed mostly of 
colonials and foreign legionaries. An East Indian 
brigade arrived from Egypt on May ist. The British 
Forty-second Territorial Division, also from Egypt, 
began to debark on May 4th. 

Hamilton's objective was the high ground com- 
manding the defences of the Narrows. He could 
reach it either by pushing north-east from the tip of 
the peninsula or by driving across it from the ^gean 
shore, either above or below Kilid Bahr. Or an army 
could be landed on the Bulair Isthmus, to take the 
Turks in the rear and cut off their land communications 
with Constantinople. 

The British commander chose a combination of two 
plans. On the night of April 24th-25th he landed 
troops at five points about the toe of the peninsula, with 
the intention of working northward to Krithia village 
and Achi Baba peak. At the same time he disem- 
barked the Anzacs on the ^gean side, north of Gaba 
Tepe, facing the rugged elevation known as Sari Bahr. 
A French force of three thousand went ashore at Kum 
Kale, on the Asiatic side. This operation was merely 



[iQis] Dardanelles-Gallipoli Campaign 95 

a demonstration to cover the landings on the opposite 
bank, north of Sedd-el-Bahr. The French troops on 
the Asiatic shore were transferred on April 26th to the 
Gallipoli peninsula, where the united French contin- 
gent thereafter constituted the extreme right of General 
Hamilton's Krithia front. 

Hamilton had expected to march forward to Achi 
Baba, seize it, press on to the neighbourhood of Gaba 
Tepe, join the Anzacs there and then cut across the 
peninsula to Maidos, above the Narrows. It was an 
ambitious plan, far beyond his resources. His greatest 
disability was a lamentable shortage in guns and muni- 
tions with which to prepare infantry attacks. By 
April 28th his entire army was on shore and the tip of 
the Gallipoli boot had been cleared three miles up the 
.^gean coast and about two miles up inside the Straits. 

The landings were made at heavy cost, the one at 
V Beach failing entirely on the first trial. By May ist 
the Allied forces on the tip of the peninsula had ad- 
vanced close to Krithia. On that day the Turks 
counter-attacked fiercely. The first battle of Krithia 
followed, lasting until May 5th. It was a stand-off. Up 
to May 5th, Hamilton's losses were 13,979. -A- second 
battle was fought on May 6th-8th. It represented a 
desperate Allied effort to alter a situation which was 
fast hardening into deadlock. But the Twenty-ninth 
Division, which was in line here, made in all a gain of 
only about one thousand yards. 

The fighting at Krithia, in fact, quickly degenerated 
into the most rigid form of positional warfare. It 
differed in no way from the fighting in Flanders and 
Artois, except that there was far less artillery prepara- 
tion, and the first line enemy trenches were never 
smothered. The Turks had dug in and couldn't be 



96 The Great War 11915] 

dislodged. General Hamilton delivered a third attack 
on June 4th. It also failed. Only scattering efforts 
were made thereafter, up to July 15th, when the British 
commander realized that there was no longer any 
prospect of reaching the Narrows forts by the Krithia- 
Achi Baba route. 

The power of the Allied offensive was materially 
weakened, toward the end of May, by the withdrawal 
of the major part of the fleet. On May 12th the 
British battleship Goliath was torpedoed inside the 
Straits by a Turkish destroyer. The battleship Tri- 
umph was sunk by a German submarine on May 25th, 
off Anzac Cove. The Majestic suffered a similar fate 
on May 27th. The Queen Elizabeth and the newer 
battleships had to seek shelter at Mudros. The joint 
naval and land offensive had practically come to an 
end. 

During the severe struggles at the tip of the penin- 
sula the Anzac divisions, north of Gaba Tepe, had 
maintained and slightly strengthened their shore posi- 
tions. In front of them, and a short distance inland, 
lay the massif of Sari Bahr, from the culminating points 
of which, Chunuk Bahr and Hill 305, the Narrows were 
in plain sight. After discussing other plans — including 
an operation on the Asiatic side, which the French 
had always stood out for — General Hamilton decided in 
favour of a frontal attack on Sari Bahr. It was to be 
supplemented by a turning movement, undertaken by 
a new force, landed a little distance above the Anzac 
positions, at Suvla Bay. This was a far more promising 
venture than the Krithia one. But it called for an ex- 
act co-ordination in action which was somewhat beyond 
the capabilities of General Hamilton's staff and of 
some of his subordinate commanders. 



[1915] Dardanelles-Gallipoli Campaign 97 

The Suvla Bay contingent, consisting of the newly 
arrived Tenth and Eleventh British divisions, was to 
go ashore on the evening of August 6th and push across 
the open beaches of that sector to the Anaf arta ridge, 
rush it and then turn south to the flank and rear of the 
Sari-Bahr positions, which the Anzacs would be pre- 
paring to storm. 

The Anzacs gloriously carried out their part of the 
programme. The offensive began on August 7th, 
with an assault along the whole Anzac Bay front. 
Feinting at the southern end, the Australians took and 
held Lone Pine Hill. They also contained the bulk of 
the Turkish forces in the centre by an attack on Baby 
700. The operation to the north was the serious one. 
Here, on the night of August 6th, General Johnston 
penetrated the Turkish front and by the evening of 
August 7th had arrived at the foot of Chunuk Bahr. 
Through August 8th and 9th Anzac, East Indian, and 
British troops held the slopes of Chunuk and Hill 305 
and even reached the crests, from which they could 
look down on the Narrows. 

The story of the Dardanelles-Gallipoli campaign is 
one long series of tragic mishaps. Success was many 
times within easy reach. Then some fault in organiza- 
tion intervened, to make useless extraordinary sacrifices 
and heroism. During the night of August Sth-Qth a part 
of General Cox's column, the left of General Godley's 
assaulting force (the right column being commanded 
by General Johnston) , pushed up the steep sides of the 
Chunuk ridge, between Chunuk Bahr proper and "Hill 
2." At dawn of August 9th the Sixth Gurkhas and 
two companies of the Sixth South Lancashires stormed 
the summit and drove the Turks down the eastern side. 

In his admirable book, The Dardanelles Campaign, 



98 The Great War [1915] 

Mr. Henry W. Nevinson, an eye-witness of much of 
the later fighting on GallipoH, gives this vivid picture 
of the scene: 

For a moment Major Allanson and his men paused 
to draw breath. They were standing on the saddle 
between Chunuk Bahr and "Hill 2." The dead lay 
thick around them. But below, straight in front, 
lit by the rising sun, like a white serpent sliding be- 
tween the purple shores, ran the sea, the Narrows, 
the Dardanelles, the aim of all these battles and 
sudden deaths. Never since Xenophon's Ten 
Thousand cried "The sea! The sea!" had sight 
been more welcome to a soldier's eyes. There were 
the ships. There were the transports bringing new 
troops over from Asia. There ran the road to Mai- 
dos, though the town of Maidos was just hidden by 
the hill before it. There was the Krithia road. 
Motor lorries moved along it carrying shells and sup- 
plies to Achi Baba. So Sir Ian had been right. 
General Birdwood (who planned the Chunuk 
offensive) had been right. This was the path to 
victory. Only hold that summit and victory is ours. 

The Gurkhas and Lancashire men ran down the far- 
ther slope after the Turks. But they had gone hardly 
a hundred yards when five or six heavy shells, appar- 
ently from the direction of the ^gean, fell among them 
and exploded. There is still a dispute as to where 
these shells came from. The common belief is that 
they were fired by the British naval vessels which had 
bombarded the summit just before the assault. But 
since they fell on a reverse slope, Mr. Nevinson holds 
that they could hardly have been discharged from low 



[iQis] Dardanelles-Gallipoli Campaign 99 

trajectory naval guns. He suggests that they came 
from British howitzers on land, which had been ordered 
to bombard the reverse side of the ridge, on the theory 
that the Turks would be rallying there for a counter- 
attack. 

At any rate the Gurkhas and Lancastrians were dumb- 
founded. They stumbled back to the crest and over it. 
The Turks saw them retreat and again seized the 
summit. Meanwhile the brigade under General Bald- 
win, assigned to support the assault on the ridge, lay 
at the foot of it, on the ^gean side. Baldwin had lost 
his way during the night and had missed the chance of 
ascending while the top was cleared of Turks. 

To the right, the Sixth Lancashires occupied a posi- 
tion near the top of Rhododendron Ridge. But they 
were driven from it by a Turkish counter-offensive on 
August loth, the Turks being enabled to concentrate 
heavily on this front because of the failure of the Suvla 
Bay operation. 

The Anzac army lost 12,000 men in the Sari Bahr 
fighting, from August 6th to August loth. The Thir- 
teenth (New Army) British Division, supporting the 
Anzacs, lost 6,000 men. A great deal of ground was 
gained, the area of the Anzac sector being enlarged from 
three hundred acres to eight square miles. But the 
summits of Sari Bahr were still in the hands of the 
enemy. 

The object of the Suvla Bay operation was to seize 
the ridges north of Sari Bahr and to turn the Turkish 
position on "Hill 2" by emerging into the plain in its 
rear, about the town on Biyuk Anafarta. Lieutenant 
General Sir Frederick Stopford employed for this 
purpose the major part of his own corps, the Ninth. 
One division (the Thirteenth) and one brigade of it 



100 The Great War [1915] 

had been assigned to the Anzac front. He, therefore, 
was left with the Eleventh Division and two brigades 
of the Tenth. All his men belonged to the New Army 
and had never been in action before. He should have 
had 112 guns. But only twelve guns were brought 
along and landed. 

Stopford, however, took the Turks completely by 
surprise. He had an easy, flat coast to land on. He 
had from 25,000 to 28,000 men, and the Turks had only 
about four thousand. The landing was almost unop- 
posed. Yet after getting ashore during the night of 
August 6th-7th, the commands became entangled .and 
fatal delays ensued. Instead of advancing early on 
August 7th to seize the first line of hills, while the 
Turkish defence was still unorganized, Stopford did 
not take the nearest eminence — Chocolate Hill — ^until 
sunset. The next day was wasted in inaction. Sir 
Ian Hamilton was worried and went to Suvla himself. 
He couldn't arouse General Stopford out of his state 
of complacent lethargy and took the unusual step of 
dealing directly with the division commanders. Failure 
of the arrangements to distribute water had demoralized 
the troops to some extent. But one of the battalions 
of the Thirty-second Brigade had pushed east during 
the day, of its own motion, and occupied Scimitar 
Hill, one of the key points of the ridge which the 
Turks had abandoned. 

This fact was not known at division headquarters 
and the division commander designated the battalion 
on Scimitar Hill as one of those to be used in a move- 
ment farther to the north, suggested by Hamilton. 
Scimitar Hill was accordingly evacuated. 

The movement which Sir Ian had ordered for the 
evening of August 8th, toward Tekke Tepe, was not 



[ipisi Dardanelles-Gallipoli Campaign loi 

undertaken until the morning of August 9th. It 
failed because the Turks had rushed up reinforcements 
and reoccupied the crests from which they had fled 
on August 7th. On August 9th an effort was made 
to capture Scimitar Hill and Hill W, south of it, which 
it commanded. But this came to nothing. 

In the night of August loth-iith the Fifty -fourth 
Division was sent to support Stopford. He made no use 
of it for several days. The great opportunity of August 
8th-9th had been frittered away. By August loth the 
Sari Bahr assault on the Anzac front had broken down. 
Any help given from Suvla would now come too late. 
Fighting continued on the Suvla front until August 15th. 
But it had only a local importance. General Stopford 
was removed from command on the evening of August 
15th, Major General De Lisle replacing him. 

Hamilton's losses during the second week of August 
were about thirty thousand on his three fronts. The 
British War Office became discouraged at the paucity 
of the results attained at Gallipoli, and perhaps dis- 
trustful of Hamilton's leadership. It had sent him 
one hundred thousand men since July ist. When he 
asked, on August 15th for forty -five thousand replace- 
ments and fifty thousand additional troops, his request 
was refused. The War Office sent him only one divi- 
sion from Egypt, the Second Mounted, about five thou- 
sand strong. The Second Australian Division arrived, 
however, early in September. 

The Suvla Bay fiasco was practically the last act of 
the Gallipoli tragedy. General De Lisle attempted, on 
August 2 1st, to take Scimitar Hill and Hill W, but was 
repulsed, with a loss of five thousand men. That was 
the last engagement of consequence on Gallipoli. 

By the middle of September the Allied situation in 



I02 The Great War [1915] 

the Balkans had become painful. Serbia was threatened 
with invasion. Bulgaria was on the point of joining the 
Teuton alliance. Greece was drifting away. France was 
finally aroused to the necessity of military action in the 
Near East. Under her agreements with Great Britain 
she was to have command of any Mediterranean expedi- 
tion — a right she waived at the Dardanelles because she 
wante'd to keep her armies in France intact. 

Now — when it was too late — an Army of the Orient 
was organized. It was put under the command of 
General Sarrail, and destined for use in Macedonia 
and Serbia. On October 6th a large part of the French 
division was recalled from Cape Helles for service at 
Salonica. On October nth Lord Kitchener asked 
General Hamilton what losses an evacuation of the 
peninsula would entail. Hamilton replied that an 
evacuation was "unthinkable." He believed that the 
loss entailed would be fifty per cent. A few days later 
he was replaced by General Sir Charles C. Monro. 
Kitchener visited Gallipoli in November to talk over 
the details of the retirement. At that time, with Serbia 
lost and Bulgaria allied with Germany and Turkey, 
there was no strategical justification for holding on 
in Gallipoli. The withdrawal began on December 
2 1 St and was completed, practically without interfer- 
ence, on January 8, 191 6. 

The British losses were shocking, considering the 
results achieved. The casualties were 1 1 2,308. Nearly 
one hundred thousand men had also been incapacitated 
at one time or another by sickness. Gallipoli became a 
synonym for vain and misused effort. It cost Great 
Britain enormous sacrifices in men and prestige. Yet 
it also shattered the Turkish army. For Turkey's mili- 
tary power declined rapidly after the end of 191 5. 



CHAPTER XII 

THE RUSSIAN RETREAT. MAY I, I915-OCTOBER I, I915 

The Russian defeats in Poland and Galicia in 191 5 
were due primarily to Russian inferiority in guns and 
munitions. General Gourko says in his illuminating 
book, War and Revolution in Russia, that for months 
in that year "batteries in action daily did not receive 
more than four shells per gun per day." He also testi- 
fies: "An army corps would receive no more than 
one thousand shells at one delivery and would not 
know the date when another delivery would be made." 

A second cause was the rapidity with which German 
strength on the Eastern Front was increased, once the 
German High Command decided to make its main 
effort against Russia. 

The German winter campaign of 191 5 had been 
marked by ineffectual efforts to break through the 
Russian lines in Poland. The old mass methods of 
attack had been used and had proved futile. The 
German General Staff now sought a more vulnerable 
front and introduced new offensive tactics. 

A breaking-through operation east of Cracow was 
entrusted to Mackensen. He depended for success on 
the greatest artillery concentration the war had seen 
up to that time and on a special follow-up infantry 
formation which came to be known as the Mackensen 
phalanx. 

103 



I04 The Great War 



[1915] 



Mackensen had directed the winter assaults on the 
Russian lines west of Warsaw. He was now put in 
command of a new army, the Eleventh, on the Dunajec 
sector, facing Gorlice. The Russian front, which had 
been drawn back some distance from the direction of 
Cracow, ran on May ist from the Carpathians, west 
of Dukla Pass, north along the Biala River to the 
latter's junction with the Dunajec, near Tarnow, and 
thence up the Dunajec, to the Vistula. Mackensen's 
army of two hundred thousand men was stationed 
opposite the southern section of the Biala line. An 
Austrian army, the Sixth, under the Archduke Joseph- 
Ferdinand, stood opposite the northern section, facing 
Tarnow. The Third Russian Army, under the Bul- 
garian general, Radko Dimitrieff, the victor of Lule 
Burgas, confronted the two Teuton armies. In south- 
ern Poland the Ninth German Army, under Woyrsch, 
adjoined the Archduke Joseph-Ferdinand. On its 
left was the First Austrian Army, under Dankl. On 
Mackensen's right, forming a connection between him 
and Linsingen, was an army or grou^ of armies, vari- 
ously described as under the command of Boroevic, 
Boehm-Ermolli, and Marwitz. To the south-east of 
Linsingen lay Pflanzer's army, formerly Prince Eugene's. 
In northern Poland and East Prussia were the Twelfth, 
Eighth, and Tenth German armies and additional 
forces under Below, which were about to undertake a 
raid into Courland. 

Mackensen began his attack on May ist by concen- 
trating the fire of two thousand heavy guns on a front 
a few miles east of Gorlice. The unexampled severity 
of this bombardment dumbfounded the Russians. 
Their trench lines disappeared. The German shock 
infantry advanced after the artillery preparation and 



[I9I5] The Russian Retreat 105 

encountered little resistance. Dimitrieff had not pre- 
pared secondary lines on the Wisloka River, a few miles 
back, or on the Wistok, still farther east. His disor- 
ganized troops could not prevent Mackensen from 
driving ahead. On May 6th the Germans took Jaslow 
and Zmigrod and cut the road north out of the Dukla 
Pass. 

Brusiloff's Eighth Russian Army found its right flank 
and rear uncovered by Dimitrieff' s retreat. It was 
obliged to retire hastily toward the San, followed by 
Boroevic. A division of this army, under Korniloff, 
was enveloped north of Dukla Pass, and captured. 
Linsingen's army advanced, farther east, on Sambor, 
to the south-east of Przemysl. The Archduke Joseph- 
Ferdinand had taken Tarnow on May 6th and about 
May loth he crossed the Wistok at Frysriak. In ten 
days the whole Dunajec salient had been flattened out 
and the Russians thrown back to the line of the San, 
with the loss of about one hundred thousand prisoners. 
A Russian success at this juncture on the extreme 
southern front did little to alleviate the situation. 

Could the retreating Russians hold the line of the 
San? If they couldn't, the entire Polish salient would 
again be threatened on its weak southern face. Prze- 
mysl was now Mackensen's immediate objective. 
While the Austrian army on his left was being held 
up on the San, north of Jaroslav, he forced a passage 
on that stream between Jaroslav and Przemysl. On 
the same day, May 25th, he occupied Jaroslav and then 
moved south-east with the idea of enveloping Przemysl. 
He was halted only five miles north-east of the city. 

Meanwhile Boroevic had been approaching the fort- 
ress from the south. On May 27th he was within 
seven miles of it. On May 31st three of the half 



io6 The Great War 



[1915] 



demolished northern forts were stormed by Bavarian 
troops. On June 3d, fearing to be surrounded, the 
Russians evacuated the place, escaping to the south- 
east. Its fall cleared the upper San front, the Russians 
falling back to the Grodek Lakes line, which covered 
Lemberg. 

The Grodek Lakes positions were formidable in the 
centre and on the southern end, but weak at the north. 
Mackensen therefore struck north-east for Rawa- 
Russka, reversing the manoeuvre by which Russky 
had taken Lemberg in September, 191 4. On June 19th 
he delivered a powerful attack on the Russians bar- 
ring the way to his objective. Their front was broken 
through. The Russian line was now outflanked on the 
north and Lemberg had become untenable. It was 
evacuated on June 22d. All Galicia had been lost, 
except a narrow strip along the Russian frontier. And 
there was no vsign of stabilization anywhere. 

With the fall of Lemberg the German campaign 
entered its second and major phase. Mackensen had 
broken the Russian left centre and had uncovered the 
southern side of the Warsaw salient. That salient could 
now be attacked on three sides. The Russian armies 
in it were threatened with envelopment. An oppor- 
tunity was offered to the German General Staff to 
work out on a grand scale Count Schieffen's favourite 
Cann'ae theory. 

The Russians were back in nearly the same awkward 
situation in which they were when their mobilization 
began in August, 1914. Poland jutted out again dan- 
gerously into enemy territory. Then the Warsaw 
bulge was menaced from the south by only two Austro- 
Hungarian armies. Now it was under pressure on 
the south, west, and north from two Austro-Hungarian 



[1915] The Russian Retreat 107 

and seven German armies, German strategy contem- 
plated a break-through on either the southern or the 
northern side, or on both, and the closing of the mouth 
of the sack on the Russian forces retreating from the 
Vistula. 

A slight rearrangement of the Teuton forces was 
effected at the end of June, Hindenburg retained 
command of the northern group of armies — Below's, 
the Tenth, the Eighth, and the Twelfth. Prince Leo- 
pold of Bavaria brought a new army east, which re- 
placed Dankl's, transferred to the Italian front. He 
also assumed command of Woyrsch's Ninth Army, 
facing the Vistula, from Warsaw up to Sandomir. 
Mackensen continued in command of his own Eleventh 
Army and of the Fourth Austrian Army, operating 
between the Vistula and the Bug, The Second Austro- 
Hungarian Army protected Mackensen's right and 
Linsingen and Pflanzer prolonged the line south into 
Bukowina. Hindenburg's task in the north was to 
force the Niemen and Narew rivers and cut the con- 
nections of the Warsaw salient with Petrograd, Mac- 
kensen was to move north-east, cutting Warsaw's 
connections with Kiev, and Brest-Litovsk, 

The Archduke Joseph-Ferdinand, following Dankl's 
trail of August, 1914, moved forward on July 5th to 
Krasnik, aiming at Lublin. He was checked there for 
a time, Mackensen, on his right, started for Cholm. 
Slow progress was made at first. But on July i8th the 
Russians were beaten at Krasnotow and the whole 
southern Polish front recoiled. The Archduke entered 
Lublin on July 30th. Mackensen reached Cholm on 
July 31st. 

Mackensen, however, had delayed too long. In 
Northern Poland the Eighth and Twelfth German 



io8 The Great War [1915] 

armies forced a passage of the Narew on July 19th, 
above and below Ostrolenka. The Russians retired 
south-east to the Bug. The German Ninth Army, on 
the Vistula front, took Radom, south-west of Ivangorod 
on July 20th. On July 29th it crossed the Vistula. 
The Russians evacuated Ivangorod on August 2d. 
This was the signal for the evacuation of Warsaw, 
which Prince Leopold entered on August 5th. 

The Russian armies in Poland now fell back rapidly 
toward the line running north and south through 
Brest-Litovsk, on which they had mobilized. Mean- 
while Hindenburg had sent Below into Courland. The 
latter advanced rapidly, defeated the Russians at 
Schadovon July 21st and occupied Mitau on July 30th. 
The Tenth Army advanced at the same time on the 
line between Kovno and Ossowietz. 

The German centre was held up for a week or two 
by the resistance of the fortress of Novogeorgievsk. 
on the Vistula north of Warsaw. This stronghold fell 
on August 19th. Mackensen was still struggling to 
reach his objective of Brest-Litovsk. But he didn't 
arrive there until August 25th, when the Russian armies 
of the centre had made good their retreat toward 
Pinsk. Kovel, south-east of Brest-Litovsk, was cap- 
tured a few days later. But long before this the 
hope of an envelopment on the southern front had 
vanished. 

A chance still remained on the northern front. After 
the war General Hoffmann, one of Ludendorff's ablest 
lieutenants, severely criticized Falkenhayn for letting 
it slip through his fingers. Hoffmann held that a real 
envelopment, involving the destruction of the Russian 
armies, could have been obtained in 1 916 by directing 
the main attack against Kovno, instead of trying to 



[iQis] The Russian Retreat 109 

envelop Warsaw from the south. Kovno was the key 
to the northern Russian front. Below's operation in 
Courland showed how easily it could have been turned 
from that direction. Even when Hindenburg began 
to press his belated attack in the north, he nearly 
entrapped a Russian army in Vilna. 

Ossowietz, a bulwark of the northern line, fell on 
August 226.. Kovno had been surrendered, under 
suspicious circumstances, on August 1 7th. Only Grod- 
no remained of the strongholds on the Russian secon- 
dary line of defence. This fortress was captured on 
September 20th. Then the Germans moved rapidly 
east of it as far as Nida, directly south of Vilna. 

The Czar took personal command of the Russian 
Western armies on September 6th, relieving the Grand 
Duke Nicholas. His first impulse was to stop the 
retreat and to strike back. He was reluctant to 
abandon Vilna and the Russians waited on there until 
they were nearly surrounded on three sides and German 
cavalry had appeared in their rear. 

Vilna was evacuated on September i8th. The re- 
treating army dispersed the cavalry blocking its retreat 
and extricated itself from the trap, bringing up on the 
Pinsk-Dvina line, which now ran north and south 
from Riga to Czernowitz. In Volhynia the Russians 
lost Lutsk and Dubno— two of the three fortresses of 
the Lutsk-Dubno-Rovno triangle, protecting the ap- 
proaches to Kiev. But by October ist the battle on 
the East Front died down. The Czar had brought the 
Russian retreat to an end and infused a certain amount 
of new energy into the troops. On the other hand, the 
German High Command, realizing the failure of its 
grandiose Cannae conception, yet measurably satisfied 
with the immense results attained, was ready to call a 



no The Great War ii^isi 

halt on the Russian front in order to turn its attention 
to the Balkans. 

Mackensen had started before the end of September 
for the Danube front. The Eleventh, Ninth, and 
Twelfth German armies were withdrawn entirely from 
Russia. So was the Fourth Austrian Army. The 
Second Austrian Army was reduced in size. So was 
Hindenburg's right wing, opposite Minsk. The Ger- 
mans and Austro-Hungarians dug in everywhere in 
order to offset these reductions. Four army groups 
were established: one, under Hindenburg, from Riga 
to the Niemen; one, under Leopold of Bavaria, from 
the Niemen to Pinsk; one, under Linsingen, from Pinsk 
to Rovno; and one, under the Archduke Frederick, 
from Rovno to Bukowina. Two masses of manoeuvre 
were established — one before Riga and the other on 
the Styr. 

The great retreat of 191 5 cost Russia approximately 
350,000 killed and wounded and 1,250,000 prisoners. 
It was the beginning of the end for Russia as a military 
power. The Teuton losses were probably well under 
300,000; for the German victories were won largely 
by superiority in artillery. 

The German territorial gains were enormous. Thirty- 
five thousand square miles in Galicia were recovered. 
On October i st the German lines included all of Poland, 
Courland, the Russian governments of Grodno, Kovno, 
and Vilna, and parts of the governments of Minsk and 
Volhynia. The Russians retained a small piece of 
eastern Galicia, below Tarnopol. The territory ac- 
quired by Germany aggregated more than one hundred 
thousand square miles. This was nearly half the area 
of the German Empire. The population of the con- 
quered regions was over twenty millions, nearly one 



[I9I5] The Russian Retreat m 

third of Germany's population. The Mittel-Europa 
which the Pan-Germans had visuaHzed had sprung 
into being, almost overnight, on the Galician and Polish 
battlefields. 



CHAPTER XIII 

ITALY ENTERS THE WAR. MAY 24, I915 — DECEMBER, 

31, I9I5 

Italy entered the war on May 24, 191 5. In break- 
ing away from an alliance with Austria-Hungary and 
Germany, which had lasted thirty- three years, and 
associating themselves with the Entente Powers, the 
Italian people obeyed a sound and deep-seated instinct. 
They returned to the normal policy of the statesmen 
who created modern Italy. 

The Teuton alliance was an unnatural expedient. 
It was entered into in 1882 by Crispi at a time when 
Italy was incensed by the French annexation of Tunis. 
Bismarck had encouraged this move on France's part 
and knew how to profit by it. He promptly attached 
Italy to his Central European hloc and thereby made 
himself independent of Russia. 

Italy's position in the early eighties had become 
highly uncomfortable. At odds with France, she was 
compelled to turn somewhere for support. Austria- 
Hungary was her ancient enemy and oppressor and her 
obvious rival in the Adriatic and the Balkans. After 
Solferino and Sadowa Francis Joseph had yielded up 
Lombardy and Venetia. But he still held on to the 
Trentino and Istria. Their Italian-speaking popula- 
tions were treated with the severity which the Haps- 
burgs had always shown to subject races. Italy could 

112 



[I9I5] Italy Enters the War 113 

not wholly close her ears to the appeal of these two 
provinces for liberation. 

In a military sense, too, Austria-Hungary retained 
the mastery of northern Italy. She held all the moun- 
tain passes. In the Trentino she possessed a bastion 
jutting down into the plains of Venetia and Lombardy. 
On the Adriatic she held all the available naval bases. 
The western coast of that sea is almost bare of har- 
bours. The eastern coast, on the contrary, is bounti- 
fully supplied with them. At Pola, Austria was in a 
position to dominate the Adriatic. 

Lacking a defensible military frontier, Italy was at 
the mercy of her powerful and at the same time un- 
friendly neighbour. The alliance with the Dual Mon- 
archy, unpalatable as it was, had at least the merit, 
in Crispi's time, of safeguarding Italy on the north and 
giving her a chance to devote herself to internal devel- 
opment. Germany, growing more and more prosper- 
ous, was willing to contribute a large part of the capital 
needed for that development. 

So Rome tried to forget Italia Irredenta and culti- 
vated as amicable relations as she could with her mis- 
mated Hapsburg ally. The Triple Alliance was re- 
newed in 1887, 1 891, 1903, and 1912. But even before 
1 91 2 Italy had begun to draw away in sympathy and 
policy from her associates. Rome accepted advances 
made to her by France and Great Britain. Prince 
Billow, when he was German Imperial Chancellor, 
scandalized Berlin by referring to these manifestations 
of something more than platonic interest as "little spins 
taken by Italy with rival suitors. " But there was more 
danger in the flirtation than he thought. 

The Italian sense of nationality had been intensified. 
Italy was ambitious for territorial expansion. Austria- 



114 The Great War [19151 

Hungary's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
annoyed her. She wanted to extend her influence in 
the Mediterranean and the Near East, and Vienna 
stood squarely in her way. 

Her occupation of TripoH, leading to war with Tur- 
key, was a shock to her allies, since Germany had be- 
come Turkey's chief European backer and Austria- 
Hungary resented the prospect of any change in the 
balance of power in the eastern Mediterranean to 
Italy's profit. It was also evident that Italy had 
seized Tripoli with the full approval of Great Britain 
and France. The Balkan wars and the scramble for 
Albania had further estranged Italy and Austria- 
Hungary. The Dual Monarchy was anxious to attack 
Serbia in 1913, after the Bucharest partition, but Italy 
refused her assent. 

When Austria- Hungary did attack Serbia in 1914, 
Italy was, therefore, a decidedly unsympathetic specta- 
tor. The Triple Alliance compact permitted her a 
great deal of latitude. She was not bound to go to the 
aid of her associates unless one of them, without provo- 
cation on its part, should be attacked by some out- 
side Power. Austria-Hungary forced a quarrel on 
Serbia and then declared war. Germany forced a 
quarrel on Russia and France and also took the initia- 
tive in declaring war. Italy was, therefore, released 
from her bond. Neither Vienna nor Berlin claimed 
that she was not living up to her obligations. All that 
she was required to do under the circumstances was 
to maintain a "benevolent neutrality," toward her late 
partners. 

But there were other complications in the Triple 
Alliance agreement. Italy and Austria-Hungary had 
pledged each other not to disturb the territorial status 



[ipis] Italy Enters the War 115 

quo in the Near East without consultation and provision 
for ' ' reciprocal compensation. ' ' The text of Clause VII 
of the treaty read : 

Should, however, the case arise that, in the course 
of events, the maintenance of the status quo in the 
territory of the Balkans, or of the Ottoman coasts 
and islands in the Adriatic, or the ^gean Sea, be- 
comes impossible, and that, either in consequence of 
the action of a third Power, or for any other reason, 
Austria-Hungary or Italy should be obliged to change 
the status quo for their part by a temporary or per- 
manent occupation, such occupation would take 
place only after previous agreement between the two 
Powers, which would have to be based upon the 
principle of a reciprocal compensation for all territorial 
or other advantages that either of them might acquire 
over and above the existing status quo, and would 
have to satisfy the interests and rightful claims of 
both parties. 

This clause had been made use of by Austria-Hungary 
to limit Italy's operations against Turkey. It now 
became a weapon in Italy's hands. Austria-Hungary 
twice invaded Serbia and temporarily occupied Serbian 
territory, yet without previous agreement or hint of 
compensations. The Italian Government, on Decem- 
ber 9, 1 914, opened negotiations looking toward an 
understanding with Vienna on the compensation issue. 

On November ist Italian forces had occupied the har- 
bour of Avlona, in Albania. Two weeks before that the 
Marquis di San Giuliano, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
and inclined to a colourless foreign policy, had died and 
been succeeded in the Salandra Cabinet by Sydney 
Sonnino, an ardent and uncompromising nationalist. 



ii6 The Great War [191s] 

Austria-Hungary did not dispute Italy's right to 
compensation. Neither did Germany. The latter 
undertook to act as mediator. Prince Bulow, a familiar 
figure in Roman society and connected by marriage 
with the Italian aristocracy, was chosen to put through 
a compromise which would insure the continuance of 
Italian neutrality. He made concessions which Ger- 
many considered liberal and which Vienna considered 
humiliating. 

The Italian demands, as finally formulated, comprised 
the cession of the Trentino, including the towns of 
Rovereto, Trent, and Bozen ; the extension of the Italian 
frontier in the Isonzo region so as to take in Gorizia, 
Tolmino, Gradisca, Monfalcone, and other towns; the 
conversion of Trieste into an independent state; the 
transfer of various Dalmatian islands, and the recogni- 
tion of Italian sovereignty over Avlona. 

Toward the end of the negotiations, in April, 191 5, 
Vienna offered, through Biilow, the Trentino, the west- 
ern bank of the Isonzo (in so far as the population was 
purely Italian), and Gradisca; sovereignty over Avlona, 
and special privileges to Italian nationals residing with- 
in the Dual Monarchy. Trieste was to be made an im- 
perial free city and to have an Italian university. 

These terms were rejected by Salandra and Sonnino 
as inadequate. Italian patriots of all groups now saw 
a chance to complete the unification of Italy, to obtain 
a genuine military frontier in the Alps and on the 
Adriatic, and to end for ever the Austrian menace. 
The government had been steadily preparing for war. 
It had entered into close relations with Great Britain, 
France, and Russia. It concluded on April 26th a secret 
compact, known as the Treaty of London, by which 
Italy was to obtain southern Tyrol, as well as the Tren- 



[I9I5] Italy Enters the War 117 

tino, all of Istria, and part of Dalmatia. This treaty 
bound Italy to declare war within thirty days. On 
May 3d the treaty of alliance with Austria-Hungary 
was denounced. 

One obstacle had yet to be overcome before Italy 
could enter the war unitedly. Giolitti, former Premier 
and the most powerful politician in Italy, controlled 
the lower branch of the legislature. He was a neutral- 
ist and on friendly terms with Bulow. He appeared 
in Rome on May loth to protest against war with 
Austria-Hungary. His majority in the assembly 
seemed ready to back him up. Salandra resigned. 
But at this stage the masses took control of the situa- 
tion. Popular demonstrations overawed the Giolittists. 
On May 15th the King asked Salandra to resume 
office, and on May 20th Giolitti' s followers helped to 
pass a vote of confidence in the ministry, the count 
standing 407 to 72. Italy, recalling the long history 
of Austrian oppressions and imbued with hopes of 
completer nationalization, enthusiastically indorsed 
the war which the Salandra Cabinet had foreseen and 
prepared for. On May 23d notice was given of the 
existence of a state of war against Austria-Hungary. 
Diplomatic relations with Germany were broken off. 
But war with Germany was not declared until several 
months later. 

Italy's political aims determined her military policy. 
She entered the war for a definite purpose and was not 
to be moved from that purpose. She committed her- 
self to an effort to expel the Austro-Hungarians from 
the Trentino and Istria. She hoped to occupy southern 
Tyrol, to capture Trieste and Laibach, and to march 
victoriously on Vienna. But the handicaps imposed by 
her lack of a true military frontier were insuperable. 



ii8 The Great War 



[1915] 



She was never able to force the northern mountain 
barrier. Eventually her own territory was invaded. 
When the armistice was signed, Austro-Hungarian 
armies were still in Venetia and Friuli. 

Italy's participation in the war was of great value 
indirectly to the Entente. She contained Austro- 
Hungarian forces amounting on the average to about 
750,000. As Ludendorff has pointed out, she pre- 
vented him from drawing heavily on Austria for rein- 
forcements in 1 91 8, after Russia had been disposed of. 
But, on the other hand, Italy's absorption in a military 
enterprise, local in character and without promise, 
accentuated the unfortunate lack of co-ordination in 
Allied strategy and contributed further to that un- 
economic dispersion of energy which was the besetting 
sin of Allied military policy. 

The Italian campaign began on May 25th. Troops 
crossed the northern boundary at many points. The 
main movement was toward Gorizia, on the Isonzo. 
A secondary effort was made in the Trentino section. 
From the offensive point of view the Isonzo campaign 
bulked larger. That way lay the road to Trieste and 
to Vienna. But from the defensive point of view 
possession of the Adige Valley, from Trent northward, 
was more essential, since as long as the Austrians 
controlled this highway they would be able to hold a 
dagger at the heart of northern Italy. 

General Cadorna's idea was to seize some advantage- 
ous positions on the Adige front and in the Carnic Alps, 
in order to protect his flank and rear, while he forced 
the Austrian defences on the Isonzo. Italian mountain 
troops invaded the Trentino from the south and south- 
east, pushing up the Adige Valley to the neighbourhood 
of Rovereto. Others advanced, farther east, from the 



[iQis] Italy Enters the War 119 

Sette Comuni Plateau and occupied Borgo, in the Val 
Sugana, through which a branch railroad ran west to 
Trent. The Italian advance was halted there in June 
by Austrian counter-attacks and the difficulties of 
mountain warfare. It had not gone far enough to 
make the Trentino front secure, as was demonstrated 
the following spring by Hoetzendorff 's offensive in this 
region. 

On the Isonzo front Cadorna had some encouraging 
successes at first. Here the bridgehead opposite Gori- 
zia was the chief obstacle. The Italian Commander-in- 
Chief sought to turn it from the south, and also from 
the north. Early in the summer he broke through 
the enemy line to the north of Gorizia and captured 
Monte Nero. Tolmino and Plava, south of Monte 
Nero, were also captured. Below Gorizia, Monfalcone 
was taken on June loth. But the bridgehead held out. 
The envelopment movement on the south was halted 
by the natural fortress of the Carso. That from the 
north flattened out against the equally strong defences 
of Monte Santo, an outlying spur of the Bainsizza 
Plateau. The Italians were reduced to siege operations 
against the bridgehead, which was not stormed until 
August, 191 6. 

In October, 191 5, Cadorna made a fresh and costly 
effort to get a foothold on the Carso. It yielded slight 
gains. But the Carso was virtually impregnable. 
This curious plateau, furnished by nature with pitted 
surfaces, underground passages, hidden gun platforms, 
shelter caves for troops and munitions, had been forti- 
fied with extreme ingenuity by Austrian engineers. 
It was a bomb-proof labyrinth in which an army could 
hide and fight, and at the same time live in comfort. 
The Italian armies beat against it again and again. 



I20 The Great War [1915] 

But it always performed its mission. So long as the 
Austrians held it Trieste was safe. 

The Italian campaign of 191 5 was conducted with 
admirable energy and courage. But its results were 
meagre. That was because Italy had to fight nature 
as well as the Austrians. And, of the two, nature was 
the more formidable antagonist. 



CHAPTER XIV 

THE CONQUEST OF SERBIA. OCTOBER 4, I915-DECEM- 
BER 25, I915 

Allied strategy failed signally in the Near East 
when it didn't push home the opportunity offered it 
to force the Dardanelles and seize Constantinople. 
The naval attack on the Straits was within a hair's 
breadth of success when it was abandoned. The Galli- 
poli expedition could have reached its goal, if it had 
been properly planned and directed. 

But if Allied strategy failed, Allied diplomacy piti- 
fully aggravated the failure. Its obtuseness and over- 
confidence were unpardonable. They produced tragic 
results. In the spring of 191 5, when the Russians were 
on the crests of the Carpathians, and Turkey was 
fighting for existence on the Gallipoli peninsula, the 
way seemed cleared for a re-constitution of the Balkan 
Alliance and its entry into the war on the side of the 
Entente. 

Serbia and Montenegro were already belligerents. 
Greece was pro-Ally and was bound by treaty to aid 
Serbia, if the latter were attacked by any other Balkan 
state. Rumania had broken away entirely from her 
old association with the Central Powers, and was 
looking forward to acquiring Transylvania — the Ruma- 
nian Irredenta. Only Bulgaria remained aloof. And 
though she still cherished a bitter grudge against Serbia, 
Greece, and Rumania, it was a fair assumption that 

121 



122 The Great War [1915] 

her cynical and wily Czar — Ferdinand the Auctioneer — 
would swallow his revenge if he were made to see that 
it was profitable to do so. According to the Entente 
programme both Turkey and Austria- Hungary were 
to be partitioned. Those partitions would guarantee 
ample territorial compensations for all. 

The Allies lacked unity of military command. They 
had also failed to achieve unity in the field of diplomacy. 
Each Foreign Office pursued its own policy and was 
governed by its own prepossessions. Great Britain 
was pro-Bulgar. France was pro-Greek. Italy was 
anti-Greek. Russia was cold toward Rumania. 

Greece, under Venizelos, her greatest statesman of 
the modern period, had shown every disposition to aid 
the Allies. Venizelos allowed them to use Greek islands 
as bases for the attack on the Dardanelles. He invited 
them later to occupy Salonica and the territory in 
Macedonia which they needed to create an intrenched 
camp. 

King Constantine, a brother-in-law of William II, 
and a Hohenzollem by predilection, did not venture 
in the spring of 1 915 to oppose Venizelos's programme. 
He secretly hoped to bargain his services in return for 
Constantinople — a hope which Ferdinand of Bulgaria 
may also have entertained. But when the Allies in- 
discreetly proclaimed the existence of a compact by 
which Constantinople was to go to Russia, Greece, 
Bulgaria, and Rumania were all chagrined. They 
became more critical of Allied suggestions and Con- 
stantine and Ferdinand, at least, began to look toward 
Berlin for counter terms. 

Owing to her geographical position and exposed 
coast line, Greece could not well enter the war on 
Germany's side, whatever Constantine's wishes. But 



[I9I5] The Conquest of Serbia 123 

Bulgaria could. Allied diplomacy, therefore, centred 
its attentions on Bulgaria. By her agreement with 
the other members of the First Balkan League, Bul- 
garia was to receive, after the victory over Turkey, a 
large section of Macedonia. The London Conference 
upset the Balkan League compact, forcing Serbia to 
surrender the Adriatic territory allotted to her and to 
claim part of Macedonia instead. Bulgaria contested 
the claim, attacked Serbia and Greece, and was de- 
feated. The Treaty of Bucharest divided Macedonia 
between Serbia and Greece. Bulgaria, the Allied diplo- 
mats thought, might be appeased by an offer to return 
certain portions of Macedonia, thus purchasing her 
adherence at the expense of Greece and Serbia — mostly 
at the expense of the latter. 

It was a cruel sacrifice to impose on the Serbians. 
But they couldn't well resist the pressure of the 
greater Powers. On August 24th the Assembly at 
Nish reluctantly voted to alienate a part of the Serbian 
kingdom to the hated Bulgars. As for Greece, although 
Venizelos magnanimously recommended yielding 
Kavala, Seres, and Drama, King Constantine vetoed 
the project. The Allied diplomats appeared in Sofia 
on September 14th with an offer of Serbian Macedonia 
and of what was left of Turkish Thrace outside Con- 
stantinople. But they were then many weeks too late. 
Ferdinand had made other arrangements. 

The failure of the Gallipoli campaign and the great 
Russian retreat had completely changed the aspect of 
the diplomatic and military situation. German agents 
had been active in the Balkans. They obtained Tur- 
key's consent to a rectification of the Bulgarian frontier, 
giving Bulgaria all the territory on the right bank of 
the Maritza River and direct access by railroad to 



124 The Great War iipisi 

Dedeagatch, on the ^Egean Sea. Berlin promised Fer- 
dinand both Serbian Macedonia and a part of Old 
Serbia. These compensations were also to be imme- 
diate; for Mackensen was soon to invade Serbia from 
the north and west with an overwhelming force, and 
all Bulgaria would have to do would be to march in 
from the east and take possession, 

Ferdinand duped the Allied diplomats completely. 
On September 20th M. Radoslavov submitted the 
German proposals to a secret meeting of the majority 
members of the Sobranje. They were enthusiastically 
approved. On September 21st the Turkish boundary 
agreement was published and mobilization was ordered. 
To soothe the credulous Allied representatives in Sofia, 
M. Radoslavov announced, on September 24th, that 
the Bulgarian mobilization was not a threat to anybody 
and that Bulgaria simply intended to maintain an 
attitude of armed neutrality. 

Only Serbia seems to have grasped the real meaning 
of Ferdinand's manoeuvres. Her government asked 
permission to attack Bulgaria while the process of 
mobilization was still incomplete. That would have 
been a saving- move for the Serbs, since it would 
have concentrated their forces in Middle Serbia, 
and thus kept open a way of communication south 
to Salonica. But the Allied chancelleries forbade 
this manoeuvre. They still had hopes of winning over 
Bulgaria. 

On October 3d, however, the light began to break. 
The Allies united in an ultimatum to Bulgaria, requir- 
ing her to expel the German officers who were helping 
to conduct the mobilization. Ferdinand could afford 
to laugh at this. On October 4th diplomatic relations 
between the Allied Powers and Bulgaria were severed. 



[iQis] The Conquest of Serbia 125 

War was not declared on either side until October 13th, 
several days after hostilities had begun. 

Meanwhile things had gone steadity against the 
Allies in Greece. Constantine had used the Entente's 
request that Greece cede Kavala, Seres, and Drama to 
Bulgaria, to damage Venizelos's prestige. The latter 
had resigned on March 6th, after a quarrel with the 
King over Greece's attitude toward the Entente. He 
was restored to power, however, by the June elections. 
When Bulgaria mobilized on September 21st, Venizelos 
held that his government's obligations to Serbia com- 
pelled a Greek mobilization. This was ordered on 
September 23d. 

The military authorities in France and Great Britain 
had now begun to sense the crisis in the Balkans. They 
decided to create an Army of the Orient, under French 
command, and to use it to protect Serbia. The Allied 
Powers served notice at Athens, on October 2d, that 
an Anglo-French expedition would be landed at Salonica 
and would use, in traversing Macedonia, the railroad 
line reserved by treaty to Serbia, as an outlet to the 
.^gean. Venizelos was in sympathy with this project. 
But, in order to preserve appearances, he entered a 
formal protest against it. 

On October 4th he made a speech in the lower house 
of Parliament, advocating a fulfilment of Greece's 
treaty pledges to Serbia. The lower house approved 
his policy by a vote of 142 to 102. But the next day 
Constantine dismissed him as Prime Minister, refused 
to sanction armed intervention in Serbia's favour, and 
appointed a neutralist and anti-Entente Cabinet, 
headed by Zaimis. 

When Serbia was invaded, Zaimis, adopting the 
specious logic of Constantine, announced that Greece 



126 The Great War [igisi 

woiild not help Serbia against Bulgaria, because the 
defensive alliance between the two countries had con- 
templated a war in which Balkan states alone should 
be engaged. 

Entente diplomacy had made the mistake of dealing 
nonchalantly and condescendingly with the Balkan 
powers. Now it began to pay court to them. On 
October 226., when the Serbian military situation had 
become highly critical, Great Britain offered to give 
Cyprus to-Greece, if the latter would agree to intervene 
in Macedonia. Zaimis brusquely declined the offer. 
He was defeated in the low^er house on November 
4th and went out of office. But Constantine re- 
organized the ministry, making it still more neutral- 
ist. A week after Zaimis's fall the King dissolved the 
Parliament. 

Irritated by the growing hostility of the government 
at Athens, Great Britain clapped down a partial block- 
ade on Greek shipping. The new ministry then un- 
willingly gave guarantees for the security of the Salonica 
expedition. On December 19th a new lower house 
was elected, with a government majority, Venizelos 
and his followers having abstained from voting. Thus, 
within six months, through Constantine's malign ac- 
tivities, Greece had been converted from a pro-Ally 
into an anti-Ally state. German influence prevailed at 
the capital. The mobilized Greek army threatened the 
rear of the Allied forces at Salonica and contributed 
for nearly two years to render that army_ inactive. 
The tolerance shown Constantine by France, Great 
Britain, and Russia, the constitutional guardians of 
the Greek kingdom and people, is one of the enigmas 
of Allied policy. They had the power and the right 
to dethrone him. Why should they not have exercised 



[I9I5J The Conquest of Serbia 127 

that option in the fall of 191 5, instead of two years 
later? 

Rumania, after the attack on Serbia developed, 
was left dangerously isolated. She shut herself up in 
her shell. Though still strongly pro-Ally, she wisely 
determined to remain neutral until, in her judgment, 
the tide of the war had turned. 

The utter collapse of Entente diplomacy in the 
Balkans caused the retirement of Delcasse, the French 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. He resigned on October 
13th. The Viviani Cabinet fell a few days later. 
Briand became Premier. France was no more to blame 
for the Balkan fiasco than any other of the major Allies. 
But she had, at least, the grace to make open acknow- 
ledgment of responsibility for a series of lamentable 
diplomatic blunders. 

Serbia, which the Entente statesmen had intended 
to partition in order to satisfy Bulgarian demands, 
was now to be the victim of the shortsightedness and 
miscalculations of her Allies. This gallant little nation 
was left to face the concentric attack of German, Aus- 
trian, and Bulgarian armies, vastly superior to her own. 
Serbia had, at most, 250,000 soldiers. The Germans, 
Austro-Hungarians, and Bulgarians operating against 
her numbered more than five hundred thousand. The 
general plan of the enemy was to clear the railroad 
trunk line running from Belgrade to Nish and thence 
to Sofia and Constantinople. This was the main 
artery of communication between the Teuton Powers 
and Turkey. The Serbs were to be cut off from their 
natural path of retreat, south through Nish and Uskub 
to Salonica, and herded back into the mountainous 
interior, there to be enveloped or dispersed. 

Mackensen was put in command of the Teuton 



128 The Great War [1915] 

forces, which were to invade Serbia from the north 
and west. He was ready to start on October 6th. He 
had under him a German army, Gallwitz's, and an 
Austro-Hungarian army, Koevess's. The first com- 
prised five divisions brought from the Russian front. 
It was concentrated on the Danube. The second was 
composed of two divisions from the ItaHan front, three 
from the Russian front, and the various elements which 
had been held in observation on the Serbian frontier 
since January, 191 5. This army was concentrated in 
Bosnia and was to attack Serbia from the west. In 
reserve behind the two groups was a German corps, 
transferred from France. The strength of the Teuton 
contribution was nearly three hundred thousand. In 
artillery Mackensen completely outclassed the Serbians. 

The Bulgarians put two armies in the field. The 
northern one, under Bojadeff, was to operate on the 
eastern border of Serbia, south of the Danube, and to 
effect a junction with the Germans coming down from 
Belgrade and the Iron Gates. The second, under 
Theodoroff, was to seize Uskub and the Vardar Valley, 
cutting Serbian communications down that valley with 
Salonica. A third army, in reserve, was stationed along 
the Rumanian frontier. 

The' Serbs divided their forces into five groups. One 
in the west, supported by the Montenegrins, held the 
line of the Drina. One faced north on the Danube. 
Two tried to hold the Bulgarian frontier. A fifth was 
in the extreme south, in the region of Monastir. The 
Anglo-French expeditionary army, intended to relieve 
Serbia, comprised one British and three French divi- 
sions, about sixty thousand men. It never got far 
enough north, however, to form a junction with any 
Serbian forces except those about Monastir. 



[I9I5] The Conquest of Serbia 129 

Gallwitz's army crossed the Danube on October 6th, 
occupying Belgrade on October 8th, and Semendria 
on October nth. The extreme left crossed at Orsova. 
Koevess crossed the Save and the Drina. His extreme 
right wing marched from Visegrad, in Southern Bosnia, 
south-east into the Sanjak of Novi-Bazar, which had 
been incorporated into Serbia after the Balkan wars. 
Gallwitz's centre pushed up the Morava Valley, fol- 
lowing the line of the Belgrade-Constantinople rail- 
road. Koevess carried the line of the Kolubara River 
after an obstinate defence by the Serbian First Army, 
under Michitch, and pressed on east to join Gallwitz 
in the Morava region. By the end of October one divi- 
sion of the northern Bulgarian army, operating in the 
Timok Valley sector, had reached Negotin, on the 
Danube, below Orsova, and there joined Gallwitz's 
left wing. The two columns then turned south-west 
and entered Nish on November 6th, thus cutting the 
Serbian line of retreat toward Macedonia. From 
Nish these forces marched north-west, down the 
Morava Valley to join the main body of Gallwitz's 
army. 

The Serbs in the north were now forced to retreat 
through the mountains to the west of the Morava. 
Kraguievatz, the chief Serbian arsenal, half-way be- 
tween Belgrade and Nish, was taken by Mackensen on 
November ist. Paracin, farther south, fell on Novem- 
ber 4th. Krushevats, north-west of Nish, fell on Nov- 
ember 7th. The Serbs of the north had no avenue of 
escape left them except west through Montenegro and 
Albania to the Adriatic. 

In the south things had gone even worse. The 
Bulgarian army, under Theodoroff, aiming at Uskub, 
had penetrated to the valley of the Vardar by October 



130 The Great War [1915] 

19th. After hard fighting it occupied Kumanova and 
Vrania, north of Uskub; Uskub itself and Veles, farther 
down the Vardar. The Serbs recaptured Veles, but 
lost it again on October 30th. The Serbs now tried 
to hold Babuna Pass, in order to cover Prilep and 
Monastir. But on November i8th, the Bulgarians 
turned this pass from the west and entered Prilep. 
The Serbian forces in Monastir then withdrew into 
Greece. But the bulk of the Serbian Second Army had 
been thrust back into the Albanian mountains. 

The Second Army covered the retreat across the 
inhospitable fastnesses of Albania. That terrible ex- 
perience could not but disorganize troops even of as 
high quality as King Peter's. The Serbian forces which 
reached the coast — probably about one hundred thous- 
and strong — were the shadow of an army. They were 
conveyed to the Island of Corfu for a long period of re- 
cuperation. The Bulgarians pursued the Serbian rear 
guards as far as Elbasan. There, on December 24th, 
the chase was broken off. 

The Allied expedition from Salonica, under Sarrail, 
started too late. And it was too weak to accomplish 
anything. One French and one British division (both 
recalled from Gallipoli) moved north about the middle 
of October. On the 21st they invaded the south- 
western corner of Bulgaria and seized Strumnitza. 
They then pushed up the Vardar Valley toward Veles 
and extended their left toward Prilep and Monastir. 
Two more French divisions arrived in Salonica at 
the end of October and were sent to the front. By 
the middle of November the British were holding the 
region about Lake Doiran and the French had crossed 
the Cerna River, to the west of the Vardar, in an effort 
to relieve the Serbians about Prilep and Monastir. 



[I9I5] The Conquest of Serbia 131 

But on November i8th Prilep was lost and Monastir 
became untenable. The latter city fell to the Bulga- 
rians on December ist. 

The Allied expedition was now left without any 
mission to perform. Moreover, it was exposed to at- 
tack by much stronger Bulgarian and Teuton forces. 
The French withdrew to the east of the Cerna on 
November 25th. Between December 6th and 13th, 
under constant enemy pressure, the Allies retired down 
the Vardar, into Greek territory. They had held a 
triangular position, with the apex at the confluence of 
the Cerna and the Vardar, the left leg extending south- 
west along the Cerna and the right leg running from the 
junction of the two rivers south-east to Lake Doiran. 
This was the scene of Franchet d'Esperey's victorious 
offensive in the fall of 191 8. But the eastern side was 
weak and had yielded to Bulgarian attacks. 

Sarrail's retreat was unmolested after the Greek 
border was reached. The Bulgarians hesitated to 
violate Greek neutrality, fearing the effect of such a 
challenge on the Greek people, who, whatever else 
they were, were strongly anti-Bulgar. Sarrail had ex- 
ceptional talent and experience as a military engineer. 
He began at once to create the great entrenched camp 
of Salonica, in which an Allied army was to be immured 
almost up to the close of the war. The Teuton forces 
never disturbed him. It was essential that the Entente 
should maintain a foothold in the Balkans, if only to 
contain Bulgaria, save Greece, and leave the way open 
for military co-operation with Rumania, should the 
latter enter the war. Sarrail's work proved valueless 
in 1 91 6, when Rumania came in. But it justified itself 
in the end. 

Serbia, Montenegro, and Albania were now lost, 



132 The Great War iiqisI 

however. One Allied blunder had succeeded another. 
The Serbian situation might have been relieved a little, 
if King Peter's armies had hurriedly abandoned northern 
Serbia and made their fight against the Bulgarians in 
the Vardar Valley. Then the horrors of the Albanian 
retreat would have been avoided. But it would have 
been expecting much of a warlike people like the Ser- 
bians not to make at least a show of defending their 
homes. 

German strategy in the Balkan campaign stood out 
brilliantly in contrast with Allied blunders and short- 
comings. With very little effort Germany had opened 
up the corridor she needed to the Bosporus and Asia 
Minor. She had incorporated Serbia, Montenegro, 
Albania, Bulgaria, and Turkey in that Middle Empire 
of which she expected to become master after the war. 
A six months' campaign on the Eastern Front had 
added over 100,000 square miles of enemy territory 
to its area and over 20,000,000 to its population. A 
three months' campaign in the Balkans added 94,000 
square miles and 13,000,000 population, besides firm- 
ly attaching Turkey, with 700,000 square miles and 
21,000,000 population, to the future German state. 
As a purely military operation the Serbian campaign 
was child's play to the German General Staff. But 
it represented a singularly effective combination of 
military skill with far-reaching political strategy. 



CHAPTER XV 

"nibbling" on the western front. JANUARY I, 
I915-DECEMBER 31, I915 

While a war of movement was in full swing on the 
Eastern Front all through 191 5, and vast stretches of 
territory were overrun by the victorious German armies, 
war on the Western Front never escaped the limita- 
tions of trench deadlock. The reason for this was 
simple. On the Eastern Front Germany had an enor- 
mous superiority in artillery and technical equipment. 
Her armies could break through enemy positions and 
exploit the break-through strategically. In the West, 
where the Allies had assumed the offensive, they were 
somewhat superior to the Germans in numbers, but 
decidedly weaker in artillery. The Germans, more- 
over, had developed a defence of fixed positions which 
the Russians, with their shortage of guns, munitions, 
aircraft, and mechanical appliances, could not hope 
to equal. 

On the Western Front in 191 5 the Allies matched the 
splendid courage of their infantry against the strength 
of the German trench lines — living material against 
dead material. It was a costly and fruitless experiment. 
At the stage which positional warfare had reached in 
1 91 5 such tactics were inappropriate. Artillery had 
displaced infantry as the primary offensive arm. As 
General Mallterre has well said in his Campaigns of 

133 



134 The Great War 



[1915] 



IQ15, the warfare of attrition in rigidly fixed positions 
had developed a new formula: "The artillery conquers, 
the infantry occupies." Allied offensives in the West 
could have no real chance of success until an Allied 
superiority in artillery had been established. 

Joffre aimed at break-throughs in France, just as 
Falkenhayn did in Galicia and Poland. But since the 
former never effected any, his method came to be 
described, somewhat disparagingly, as "nibbling." 
It amounted, at best, only to a grand scale series 
of ventures in what the French call the "war of 
usury." 

The year 191 5 began with the opposing armies 
grouped as follows on the long trench line from the 
Swiss border to Nieuport. The Belgian army and the 
Eighth French Army (the latter under d'Urbal) held 
the North Sea coast sector, south to Ypres. The 
Second and First British armies, under Field Marshal 
French, were stationed between Ypres and Lens. 
Smith-Dorrien commanded the Second, in the region 
of Armentieres, and Haig the First, in the section about 
La Bassee. The Tenth French Army, under Maud'- 
huy, held the Arras sector. The Second French Army, 
under de Castelnau, was in the Somme region. These 
northern armies, except the British and Belgian, were 
under the general direction of Foch. 

The Sixth French Army, under Maunoury, was on 
the Aisne front; the Fifth, under Franchet d'Esperey, 
was on the Rheims front ; the Fourth, under de Langle 
de Gary, was on the Champagne front, east of Rheims; 
the Third, under Sarrail, was in the Argonne. These 
armies were under direct control from general head- 
quarters. Dubail commanded the eastern group, 
below Verdun. It comprised the First Army, under 



[I9I5] " Nibbling " on the Western Front 135 

Roques, and two detachments, under Humbert and 
Putz, the first in Lorraine and the second in Alsace. 

On the German side the armies were from north to 
south: Fourth, under the Grand Duke of Wurttem- 
berg; Sixth, under the Crown Prince Rupprecht of 
Bavaria; Second, under Biilow; First, under Kluck; 
Seventh, under Heeringen; Third, under Einem; Fifth, 
under the Crown Prince of Prussia, On the upper 
Meuse, in Lorraine and in Alsace, were three detach- 
ments under Stranz, Falkenhausen, and Gaede, re- 
spectively. 

The first battle on the Western Front was that of 
Soissons, lasting from the 8th to the 15th of January. 
The French held the north bank of the Aisne from 
Soissons to Missy. In order to relieve the city from 
bombardment the French High Command ordered an 
advance toward Crouy, north-east of Soissons. This 
village was taken on January 12th. Then the Germans 
hurried up large reinforcements and began a counter- 
attack on the entire French line north of the river. 
On the 12th the Aisne rose and carried away the 
bridges east of Soissons. This gave Kluck an oppor- 
tunity to push home his counter-attack. The French, 
cut off from support, held fast until January 14th, 
v/hen they retreated to the river bank. Kluck had 
cleverly taken advantage of an accidental situation 
and won a substantial local success. He claimed to 
have taken three thousand prisoners and eight guns. 
On the Kaiser's birthday, January 27th, Kluck at- 
tacked and captured Hurtebise Farm, on the Craonne 
Plateau. 

In February, Joffre launched a minor offensive in 
Champagne. The operation continued intermittently 
from February 15th until March i8th. An advance 



136 The Great War [1915] 

of two miles was made on a front of about five miles, 
from Souain east to Beausejour. The artillery prepara- 
tion was insufficient to reduce the German defences 
and the infantry found progress difficult, after the 
first two days. The battle died down to local trench 
fighting, with severe losses on both sides. The French 
took over two thousand prisoners. But from the 
strategical point of view the effort was futile. A purely 
local operation in the Argonne — February 17th to 
March 6th — resulted in the capture of the fortified 
position of Vauquois, south of Varennes. 

A more ambitious minor offensive in the Meuse 
sector, lasting from February 17th to April 12th, had 
for its object the squeezing out of the German salient 
at St. Mihiel. The French tried to force the north 
side of the salient by taking the strongly fortified hill 
known as Les Eparges, on the heights of the Meuse. 
Three attempts were made — one in February, one in 
March, and one in April. The first two were partially 
successful, the French gaining a foothold on the slopes. 
The last wrested the summit from the enemy. The 
First Army attacked the south side of the salient in 
April and gained a little ground. But St. Mihiel re- 
mained in German hands until September, 191 8. 

The French lost Hartmansweiler Kopf, a mountain 
in Alsace, north of Thann, in January, and recovered 
it by a series of operations, lasting from February 25th 
to March 26th. 

The first British attempt to break through the Ger- 
man West Front barrier was made at Neuve Chapelle — 
March loth to 12th. Neuve Chapelle lay about twelve 
miles west of Lille and about five miles north of La 
Bassee. Field Marshal Sir John French gathered three 
hundred heavy guns on a front of little over a mile 



[I9I5] " Nibbling " on the Western Front i37 

and subjected the German line to a "drum fire," un- 
precedented in severity. It was the beginning of the 
evolution which was to make artillery the predomi- 
nant factor in fixed positional fighting. The German 
first line trenches were demolished and their occu- 
pants stunned. The British infantry occupied the 
village of Neuve Chapelle with little resistance. A 
narrow breach was made in the enemy front. But to 
the north of the village, where the Germans held the 
Aubers Ridge, one of the keys to Lille, the artillery pre- 
paration had not been equally effective. Endeavour- 
ing to open out the breach on that side, the British 
were checked. 

Delays in sending up reserves and disappointing 
staff work, due in part to the destruction of telephone 
wires, paralysed the offensive. The Germans rallied 
and counter-attacked. After two days of disconnected 
fighting, French suspended the operation. He had 
lost thirteen thousand men for the sake of advancing 
a mile on a three-mile front. The British took three 
thousand prisoners. They also learned that their 
munitions supply was inadequate to meet the demands 
of the new style of positional warfare, and that the 
shrapnel with which they had been supplied would 
have to be replaced by high explosive shells, if trench 
systems were to be made thoroughly ripe for storming. 
Neuve Chapelle was a depressing failure. But it 
helped to dispel the military illusions which the British 
Government and public still cherished. 

Germany had elected to stand on the defensive in 
France and Belgium. She made one notable departure 
from that policy in April, when the Grand Duke of 
Wiirttemberg made a partially successful attempt to 
squeeze out the Allied salient east of Ypres. The 



138 The Great War [1915] 

British Second Army had captured Hill 60, south-east 
of Ypres, on April 17th. German counter-attacks 
there failed and, as if in retaliation, the Grand Duke on 
April 226., savagely assaulted the north-eastern face 
of the salient. 

This operation is known as the Second Battle of 
Ypres. It attracted world-wide attention from the 
fact that the infantry attack was prepared not by artil- 
lery fire, but by the use of chlorine gas fumes. The 
Allied troops were taken completely by surprise when 
a greenish vapour was carried by the north wind across 
their trenches. It had an asphyxiating and torturing 
effect. The Colonial divisions of the French Eighth 
Army, holding the line east from Steenstraate to Lan- 
gemarck, broke for safety. The German infantry, 
equipped with gas masks, seized the French front and 
extended their right wing across the Yser Canal to 
Lizerne, Zuydschoote, and Boesinghe. 

The retreat of the French uncovered the left wing of 
a Canadian division, holding the line from Langemarck 
to the apex of the salient. The Canadians refused 
their left and continued to resist the German advance. 
The situation of the Allied forces east of Ypres became 
critical. For if the Germans pushed south along the 
Yser Canal to Ypres all these troops would be pocketed. 
But on April 24th the French and Belgians recap- 
tured Lizerne. The Canadian left was covered by 
British reinforcements and a new line was established 
west to the canal. The Germans tried their new gas 
weapon again, on the east face of the salient, and the 
Canadians and British were forced to surrender nearly 
half of the area which they occupied to the east of 
Ypres. After May 9th the battle died down, the AlHed 
offensive in Artois having intervened. 



[I9I5] ** Nibbling '* on the Western Front 139 

On the German side the Second Battle of Ypres was 
probably intended only as a diversion. The gas attack 
succeeded beyond expectation. But when the front 
northeast of Ypres was cleared and an opportunity was 
offered to drive west toward Poperinghe and to envelop 
the British and Canadians in the apex of the salient, 
the Grand Duke of Wiirttemberg had no reserves in 
readiness to exploit his surprise. Possibly the chief pur- 
pose of the operation was to try out the chlorine gas. 

Joffre was now ready to put the "nibbling" policy 
to a sharper test. The idea behind his "nibbles" was 
always to make a breach in the German line, by widen- 
ing out which a considerable enemy retirement would 
be necessitated. He confided the new venture to 
Foch, whose mission was to be to push the Germans off 
the heights to the west of Lens and then drive them 
across the Artois plain toward Douai. 

Foch had assembled in the North a special "mass of 
manoeuvre," consisting of ten divisions. These, with 
his other troops, were distributed on a semicircular 
front extending from a point west of Arras around 
toward Bethune. His first task was to eject the Ger- 
mans from their powerful trench systems in the ridges 
covering Lens from the south and west, including Vimy 
Ridge and Notre Dame de Lorette. Seven army 
corps and three separate divisions (about 280,000 men) 
were used in the operation, which is known as the 
Battle of Artois and lasted from May 9th until June 
19th. 

After a violent bombardment the French troops 
dashed forward on May 9th and seized the enemy's 
first line trenches. The Thirty-third Corps, under 
General Petain, specially distinguished itself in the 
initial assault. It conquered all the slopes of N6tre 



140 The Great War [19x51 

Dame de Lorette, to the west of Lens. The villages 
of Ablain-St. Nazaire and Neuville-St. Vaast, to the 
south-east of Ndtre Dame, were also taken. A real 
break-through seemed on the point of being accom- 
plished. But no supports were at hand to follow up 
this success. Possibly Petain's advance had outrun all 
calculations, just as ^Byng's did at Cambrai two years 
and a half later. At all events, the golden moments 
slipped away on the afternoon and evening of May 
9th. 

The breach was closed during the night by German 
reserves. They halted the French attack on May 
loth and after that date reduced the Artois battle to 
an interminable siege operation. On May 12th the 
French took Carency . By June i st they had conquered 
the Souchez sugar factory. To the south-west of Vimy 
lay a formidable network of trenches known as the 
Labyrinth. This was attacked on May 30th and was 
finally cleared, after an incessant struggle, on June 
17th. Vimy Ridge still protected Lens from the south. 
It was not taken by the Allies until the spring of 191 7. 
Foch captured five thousand prisoners in the first as- 
sault. But the battle, as a whole, was fruitless. It 
was the kind of attrition which got nowhere. 

To support the operation about Lens the British 
First Army made an assault on May 9th on Aubers 
Ridge. It failed because of inadequate artillery prepa- 
ration. A second assault was delivered on May i6th, 
at a point east of Festubert. The battle of Festubert 
lasted ten days. The British captured the German 
first line trenches on a front of 3200 yards and also 
some second line trenches. Marshal French reported 
a moderate local success. But the cost was dispropor- 
tionate to the results. 



[I9I5] '* Nibbling" on the Western Front 141 

Throughout the summer the French and British 
worked feverishly to enlarge their munitions stocks 
and to repair their shortage in large calibre artillery. 
"Nibbling" was not renewed until September, when 
Joffre started an attack in Champagne which had as 
its objective a break-through to Vouziers. Simultane- 
ously another attempt — in the nature of a diversion — 
was made to recover Lens. 

The Allied line had been reconstituted to some extent 
since January. The French Eighth Army had been 
withdrawn from Flanders. The British Second Army 
extended its left wing north to connect with the Bel- 
gians on the Yser. The newly created British Third 
Army, under General Allenby, replaced the French 
Second Army on the Somme front. The latter, now 
under Petain, was shifted to Champagne. General 
Humbert had been appointed to command the Third 
Army, in the Argonne sector, succeeding Sarrail, who 
was ordered to Salonica. The French Seventh Army, 
imder Maud'huy, was assigned to the extreme right 
in Alsace. The front of the French Sixth Army had 
been extended somewhat to the north in Picardy to 
connect with the British Third Army. 

The Second Army, supported by the right wing of 
the Fourth, bore the burden of the attack in Cham- 
pagne. It was made on a line running east from 
Moronvillers through Auberive-sur-Suippes, Souain, 
Perthes-les-Hurlus, and Mesnil-les-Hurlus to Massiges. 
The operating front was about sixteen miles long. 
The eastern half of it had been the scene of the Cham- 
pagne offensive of February and March. 

The artillery preparation lasted three days. The 
German first line defences were battered down. The 
infantry advanced rapidly on the morning of September 



142 The Great War [19151 

25tli. By evening they had penetrated the German 
front to the depth of about two miles, where the second 
German defence Hne was reached. On the first day 
25,000 prisoners were taken and 150 guns — these totals 
including the captures made in Artois. 

On September 26th and 27th contact was established 
with the second German position and a halt was called 
until the heavy artillery could be brought up. On 
October 6th the second German line was broken at 
several points. But the Germans threw in reinforce- 
ments and French progress became exceedingly costly. 
The artillery was unable to destroy the defences of the 
third German line. The infantry assaults failed and 
the offensive had to be broken off. The French losses 
were estimated at about 120,000. The German loss 
was probably about the same. De Castelnau, who 
now commanded the central group of armies, had made 
a slight dent in the German positions. But he was 
still a long way from Vouziers, his objective. He hadn't 
even reached the lateral railroad behind the German 
tront, running east and west through Somme-Py. 

In Artois the French Tenth Army captured Souchez, 
west of Lens, on September 25th, and made progress 
toward the village of Vimy. But it could make no 
impression on Vimy Ridge. The British First Army 
attacked toward Loos, on the north side of the heights 
system covering Lens. Considerable gains were made 
on the first day. The German first trench line was 
carried from Grenay, north-west of Lens, to and beyond 
the HohenzoUern Redoubt — four miles farther north. 
The British took Loos and, advancing east, crossed 
the Lens-La Bassee road at Hulloch The second Ger- 
man line was overrun. Hill 70 was captured and 
some British units penet-rated as far as the third Ger- 



riQis] ** Nibbling " on the Western Front 143 

man line. Lens was now almost enveloped from the 
north, and a little stronger push would have compelled 
its evacuation. 

But, as at Neuve Chapelle, the attack was not 
promptly supported. The Germans counter-attacked 
on September 26th, retook Hill 70, and recrossed the 
Lens-La Bassee road. By September 27th they were 
nearly back in their old positions. 

Field Marshal French took three thousand prisoners 
and twenty -five guns. But his own losses were about 
sixty thousand. His failure was bitterly criticized 
at home. On December 15th he was relieved and the 
command of the British armies in France was given 
to Sir Douglas Haig, who remained in charge of them 
until the end of the war. A few days before French's 
recall General Joffre was raised to the command of all 
the French armies — in the Near East as well as in the 
West — the forces in the colonies alone being excepted. 

After the Champagne and Artois offensives fighting 
slackened in the West. The Allies had shown them- 
selves powerless to break the deadlock of rigid positional 
(trench) warfare. The Germans had developed the 
trench system enormously, building everywhere elabo- 
rate second and third lines. The dugouts had been 
deepened into underground forts. The front was 
heavily manned everywhere and reserves were close 
at hand to repair any breach. 

In The Strategy of the Great War, I have discussed 
at length the development of field tactics on the West- 
ern Front. Warfare ran in a cycle. First the vast 
increase in the range and power of gun fire drove the 
combatants underground. Then there was a sudden 
reversion to ancient hand-to-hand methods of fighting. 
The opposing battle lines ran within earshot of each 



144 The Great War [19151 

other. Warfare of movement disappeared. Artillery 
caused this recession. It alone could undo its own 
work. It was the mission of the artillery arm to make 
the deep permanent trench fortification untenable. 
So the destructive power of artillery was fabulously 
expanded. By the end of 191 5 and the beginning of 
1 91 6 it had begun to master the field fortress. Deep, 
permanent, and strongly held fore-front works gradu- 
ally had to be abandoned, because they had become 
traps. Then the rigid trench system gave way to the 
more elastic zone systems, in which the front lines were 
lightly held and the main defence was made in battle 
positions farther back. The "pill box" replaced the 
deep dugout in the forward zones. "Drum fire" was 
wasted on "pill boxes." Any line could now be broken 
through with a sufficient effort. Attacks which got 
through were met by counter-attacks. Finally the 
tank was developed as a "pill box" destroyer and the 
fixed positions of 1915 and 1916 became fluid. The 
trench deadlock ended definitely with the Battle of 
Cambrai, in November, 1917. Thereafter open or 
semi-open warfare became the rule. 

This cycle of tactical development must be kept 
in mind in order to understand clearly the conditions 
of the offensives in the West from 1915 to 1918, so 
different in scope and results from the German offensives 
in Galicia, Poland, Serbia, and Rumania. In the West 
neither antagonist could hope for a strategical decision 
until the stalemate of rigid positional warfare had 
come to an end. 



CHAPTER XVI 

ASIATIC AND COLONIAL CAMPAIGNS. JANUARY I, 
I915-DECEMBER 31, 1 91 5 

Former Ambassador Morgenthau tells us, in his 
valuable book of reminiscences, that when Djemal 
Pasha, Turkish Minister of Marine and one of the 
Young Turk triumvirs, left Constantinople in Novem- 
ber, 1914, to take command of the army in Syria, a 
remarkable demonstration occurred in his honour. At 
the railroad station, just before his train started, he 
said magniloquently : "I shall not return to Constan- 
tinople until I have conquered Egypt." 

Djemal was a politician rather than a soldier. He 
didn't understand the difficulties presented by an in- 
vasion of Egypt. Egypt is cut off from Syria by the 
Desert of Sinai. On the one-hundred-mile land front 
between Port Said and Suez there is only one practicable 
route across the desert for an army of considerable 
size. That is the route, near the Mediterranean coast, 
from Gaza through El Arish and Katie to El Kantara. 
There are two caravan trails farther south, one ending 
at Ismalia, the midway point on the Suez Canal; the 
other, used by pilgrims going from Cairo to Mecca, 
crossing from Akaba to Suez. These trails, owing to 
scarcity of water, are fit only for reconnoissances. 

The Turks lacked in 191 5 the mechanical appliances 
10 145 



146 The Great War [191s] 

with which to transport an adequate force across the 
Sinai wastes. They could threaten the Suez Canal. 
But they could hardly hope to destroy that vital artery 
of communication between Great Britain and India. 
German policy, however, required an attempt on Egypt, 
which would, at least, compel Great Britain to maintain 
a large army of occupation there. 

In November, 19 14, a small Turkish column cap- 
tured the fort of El Arish, just across the Egyptian 
boundary, defeated a native Egyptian force at Kartaba, 
and pushed west as far as El Kantara. Another small 
party, starting from Akaba, on the southernmost route, 
got half way across the desert toward Suez. 

Turkish preparations for a descent on the canal 
continued through December and January. It was 
announced through Beirut on January 28th, that 
48,000 Turks and Germans were concentrated at El 
Arish and 32,000 near Akaba. These figures were 
probably exaggerated. On February 3d, however, 
three Turkish columns appeared in the neighbourhood 
of the canal. One made a feint at El Kantara. An- 
other, twelve miles farther south, bombarded Ismalia. 
The only serious attempt to cross the waterway was 
made at Toussoun, twelve miles below Ismalia. 

About ten thousand Turks pushed up to the east 
bank and tried to lay pontoon bridges. Allied war- 
ships interfered with this operation. British troops 
crossed the water-way at Serapeum and came up on 
the left flank of the Turkish division. The engagement 
lasted twelve hours. Then the Turks retreated, losing 
five hundred prisoners. By February loth the Sinai 
peninsula was cleared of the enemy. Djemal's en- 
terprise was fantastic. There were 150,000 British, 
Australian, and East Indian troops in Egypt, beside 



[I9I5] Asiatic and Colonial Campaigns 147 

the native army. In March Great Britain decided to 
defend Egypt at GallipoH. Djemal's best divisions 
were recalled to Constantinople and the Sinai front 
became inactive for more than a year. 

In answer to Turkey's declaration of war, Great 
Britain had abolished Turkish suzerainty over Egypt 
(December 17, 19 14), and declared a British protector- 
ate. Late in 191 5, Southern Arabia threw off the 
Turkish yoke. The Sheriff of Mecca, Hussein Ibn 
Ali, was encouraged by the British Government to 
set up the independent kingdom of Hedjaz. This 
chief occupied most of the territory south of Medina, 
the terminus of the Hedjaz railroad. Later he con- 
tributed substantial aid in the Palestine campaigns. 

On the Caucasus front the Russians had won an 
important victory over Enver Pasha's army in the first 
weeks of January. The Turkish offensive for Kars and 
Batum was abandoned. The defence of Constanti- 
nople absorbed Turkish energies. The Russians con- 
sequently were able to dislodge the Turks from the 
Black Sea coast districts, south-west of Batum, which 
they had overrun in 1914. The Czar's forces captured 
Hoppa on March 2d and Archavi on March 15th. The 
Turks also evacuated Artivin, across the Caucasian 
border. They maintained their hold, however, through 
191 5, on the City Valley, north-west of Kars. 

Greater activity was shown farther south — in the 
Lake Van region and in north-western Persia. The 
Turks occupied Tabriz on January'- 15th, but were driven 
out on January 28th. Their hold on this part of Persia, 
which they had invaded in the fall of 1914, was gradu- 
ally broken. On May 2d Khabil Bey, the Turkish 
commander, was defeated near Lake Urumiah and on 
May 24th he withdrew into Kurdistan. 



148 The Great War [1915] 

Another Russian column penetrated through the 
Ararat range into Southern Armenia. On May 20th it 
captured Van and pushed along the southern border of 
Lake Van toward Bitlis. The Turks began a counter- 
offensive in this region in the fall, but recovered very- 
little ground. 

The most spectacular operation on the Asian front 
was the British offensive up the Tigris toward Bagdad. 
This was conducted by General C. F. V. Townshend, 
with great boldness and energy. But the forces at 
his disposal were too small. He got to Ctesiphon, 
eighteen miles below Bagdad. But there he found 
himself facing a reinforced Turkish army, much stronger 
than his own. He then retreated, but not quickly 
enough to extricate himself. The pursuing Turks 
penned him up in Kut-el-Amara, where he was forced 
to capitulate on April 29, 191 6. 

In November, 19 14, the British had seized Basra, 
below the confluence of the Tigris and the Euphrates. 
On April 11, 191 5, they occupied Kurna, at the junction 
of the two rivers. The Tigris offered the only practi- 
cable route of invasion into Upper Mesopotamia, for 
it was navigable up as far as Bagdad, and the terrain 
on both banks was fit to march and fight over. The 
Euphrates, on the contrary, spread its waters over 
a marshy country and had no fixed and dependable 
channel. Before Townshend started north from Kurna 
he sent a British column east to the Persian border 
to dispose of a Turkish force which had gathered there. 
On May 19th this British-Indian contingent won a 
complete victory on the bank of the Kerkla River, 
an affluent of the Tigris, thus ending all danger of a 
Turkish flank attack from the east. 

A similar operation was necessary to protect the 



[iQisi Asiatic and Colonial Campaigns 149 

British left flank. Another column, under General 
Goringe, was dispatched up the Euphrates to scatter 
the Turks and nomad tribes who had established a 
base in that region. Goringe reached Sukesh Sheyuk, 
about seventy miles up the river, on July 4th. Then 
he advanced toward Nasiriyeh. Near that place he 
fought an indecisive battle on July 14th. A second 
battle, on July 24th, routed the enemy. Most of the 
Turkish guns and supplies were captured. The diffi- 
culties of navigation on the Euphrates prevented the 
Turks from re-establishing another base in this part of 
Mesopotamia. 

The main Tigris expedition (about fifteen thousand 
men, mostly East Indians) left Kurna in May. On 
May 31st a battle was fought south of Amara. The 
Turks were defeated and retreated in haste. Amara 
was occupied by General Townshend on June 3d. The 
hot season intervened. Active campaigning is limited 
in Mesopotamia by climatic conditions to five months 
of the year — May, June, September, October, and Nov- 
ember. Townshend resumed his advance in Septem- 
ber and on the 25th of that month brought up against 
powerful Turkish positions, organized on both sides of 
the Tigris seven miles south of Kut-el- Amara. 

The British commander made a demonstration on 
September 27th on the right bank. During the night 
the Turks transferred most of their forces to that side 
of the river. On the 28th the main British attack was 
delivered on the left bank. After hard fighting the 
Turkish positions were carried. On the 29th the Turks 
retreated beyond Kut. 

A few weeks later the British advance was resumed. 
By slow stages Ctesiphon, within two days' march 
of Bagdad, was reached. Here the Turks stood and 



150 The Great War [1915] 

fought on November 226., but were again defeated. 
The failure of the Gallipoli campaign, however, had 
enabled the Turkish Government to send reinforce- 
ments to the Mesopotamian front. These were brought 
into line on November 25th and in a second engage- 
ment at Ctesiphon Townshend's progress was stopped. 
His losses compelled him to fall back toward his base; 
for he had outrun his supports. He retired to Kut, 
which he entered on December 3d. The Turks pursued 
him closely and with the aid of nomad Arabs succeeded, 
on December 7th, in cutting his line of retreat. 

Townshend had now lost one third of his original 
force. He decided to try to hold Kut until a British 
relief expedition could arrive. The Turks fortified the 
banks of the Tigris below Kut and waited. The Brit- 
ish and Indian governments sent an army to raise the 
siege. But it failed to disturb the Turkish investment. 
Kut and Townshend's army were left to their fate. 

Forces of the Union of South Africa had undertaken 
the conquest of South-west Africa in the fall of 1914. 
The Boer revolt interrupted this operation. It was 
not resumed seriously until February, 191 5. Two 
columns landed on the Atlantic coast, at Luderitz Bay 
and Walfisch Bay. A third advanced north from the 
Cape Colony border. General Louis Botha was in 
command of the expedition. The Germans were out- 
numbered and fell back under pressure. Windhoek, 
the capital of the colony, was reached on May 12th 
by the converging columns. The Germans retreated 
north, maintaining a hopeless fight. After losing 
several small engagements they capitulated on July 
9th. The forces which surrendered included 204 officers 
and 3293 men. 

Kamerun did not yield as easily as German South- 



[I9I5] Asiatic and Colonial Campaigns 151 

west Africa. In 1914 the Germans not only fairly held 
their own, but also occupied some stations in British 
Nigeria. In May and June, 191 5, French and British 
contingents conquered the north-west section of the 
colony. The Germans, with about 3250 troops, suc- 
cessfully held the rest. In October, the Allies col- 
lected about ten thousand men — British, French, 
Belgians, and East Indian natives — and attacked 
Kamerun from all sides. Yaunde, the capital, capitu- 
lated on January i, 191 6. The governor and most of 
the German officers fled to Spanish New Guinea, On 
February 18, 191 6, the last German post surrendered. 

German East Africa held out much longer than any 
other of the German colonies. It was an immense 
region, difficult to penetrate, and was defended with 
skill by well- trained African troops. No progress to- 
ward reducing it was made in 19 14. East Indian 
troops landed on the coast near Tanga in November, 

1914, but were repulsed with heavy loss. In January, 

1 91 5, some Hindu units made a second landing and 
captured the fortified post of Jassin. But the garrison 
left behind at this post soon had to surrender to the 
Germans. 

In the spring and summer there was some fighting 
in the Victoria-Nyanza and Tanganyika regions. Lit- 
tle progress was made by the Allies, however, in 191 5. 
At the end of the year the Union of South Africa 
agreed to raise an army of twenty-five thousand men for 
use in German East Africa. It was only after the 
South Africans arrived that the German hold on the 
colony began to weaken. 



CHAPTER XVII 

NAVAL OPERATIONS, I915 

Apart from the Allied attempt to force the Darda- 
nelles (dealt with in Chapter XI, in connection with 
the Gallipoli campaign) naval operations in 191 5 were 
of minor consequence. The only high sea encounter 
was that off Dogger Bank, on January 24th. Five 
British battle cruisers were engaged there with three 
German battle cruisers and one armoured cruiser. 
The German armoured cruiser, the Bliicher, was sunk. 
Dogger Bank was the first real test of modern big 
gun ships in action. It threw little light, however, 
on the relative fighting power of the British and 
German navies, because the action was broken off too 
early. 

In a spirit of bravado, the Germans had bombarded 
the undefended English east coast towns of Scarboro, 
Hartlepool, and Whitby, on December 16, 1914. The 
German public applauded this illegitimate method of 
punishing the English. So a second raid was planned 
for January 24th. The British navy was on the look- 
out for the raiders. Sir David Beatty's battle cruiser 
squadron was patrolling off the Dogger Bank, in com- 
pany with four light cruisers. Three light cruisers and 
some destroyers were thrown out in advance. About 
daylight the Aurora, an outpost light cruiser, became 

152 



[X9I5] Naval Operations 153 

engaged with an enemy light cruiser. The five battle 
cruisers, coming up, found themselves in sight ot the 
German raiding squadron, under Rear-Admiral Hipper. 
The Germans turned toward home and a stern chase 
ensued. 

In tonnage the British squadron had a great advan- 
tage. The displacements of the ships were as follows: 
British: Lion, 26,350; Tiger, 28,000; Princess Royal, 
26,2,50; New Zealand, 18,800; Indomitable, 17,250. Ger- 
man : Derfflinger, 28,000 ; Seydlitz, 24,640 ; Moltke, 22,640 ; 
Bliicher, 15,550. Hipper was also outclassed in weight 
of metal. His best ship, the Derfflinger, carried eight 
12-inch guns. The two smaller battle cruisers, the 
Seydlitz and the Moltke, carried ten i i-inch guns apiece. 
The Bliicher, an old-style armoured cruiser, carried 
twelve 8.2-inch guns. Beatty's three best ships, the 
Lion, the Tiger, and the Princess Royal, were armed 
with eight 13.5-inch guns apiece. The two smaller 
battle cruisers, the Neiv Zealand and the Indomitable, 
had batteries of eight 12-inch guns. 

In speed the two squadrons were more evenly matched 
— 29.2 knots for the Seydlitz, 28.4 for the Moltke, and 
27 for the Derfflinger, against 28.5 for the Lion and 
the Princess Royal, and 28 for the Tiger. The New 
Zealand's capacity was 25 knots and the Indomitable' s 
26. The Bliicher' s was 25.3. Hipper was handicapped 
by the fact that the Bliicher, his smallest and slowest 
ship, was the last in the column and was bound to be 
overtaken in a runaway fight by the faster and stronger 
British units. The three German battle cruisers were 
more heavily armoured than their antagonists. The 
Bliicher, on the contrary, had lighter armour than any 
other of the major units. 

Hipper could escape only by sacrificing the Bliicher. 



154 The Great War [1915] 

This he did. His battle cruisers kept up a long range 
fight and drew off toward Heligoland. The Blucher 
was gradually overhauled. She was badly punished by 
shell fire from the British battle cruisers and fell out 
of line at 10.48 a.m. She was sunk by a torpedo at 
12.37 P.M. The Lion, which had been leading the pur- 
suit, was disabled at 11.03 a.m. and dropped out, Ad- 
miral Beatty transferring his flag to a destroyer. The 
British squadron ceased pursuit about noon, fearing a 
submarine attack. It was then about seventy miles 
from Heligoland. 

The German fleet attempted in August, 191 5, an 
operation somewhat similar to that of the Allied fleet 
at the Dardanelles. It tried to force an entrance into 
the Bay of Riga, which was defended not only by 
Russian warships but by fixed mines. Three cruisers 
and eight destroyers were lost on August 19th and 
20th. The fleet retired on August 21st. On August 
20th a British submarine operating in the Baltic 
damaged the battle cruiser Moltke and a little later 
another submarine injured the Pommern. 

The Allied navies also suffered numerous losses from 
submarines or mines. The British pre-dreadnaught 
Formidable was sunk on January 2d. The French 
cruiser Leon Gamhetta was torpedoed in the Adriatic, 
on April 26th. The Italian cruiser Amalfi was sunk 
in the Adriatic on July 7th. The Italian cruiser, 
Giuseppe Garibaldi, was destroyed off Cattaro on July 
l8th. 

Two German commerce destroyers were forced to 
take refuge in American waters in the spring of 191 5. 
On March loth the Prinz Eitel Friedrich entered New- 
port News, and on April nth, the Kronprinz Wilhelm 
entered the same port. Both were interned. After 



[IQIS] 



Naval Operations i55 



the summer of 1915 only stray commerce raiders, 
escaping in disguise from German ports, were left to 
prey on Allied shipping beyond the range of the German 
submarines. 



CHAPTER XVIII 

NEUTRAL RIGHTS AT SEA. THE "LUSITANIA." AUGUST 

3, 1914-DECEMBER 31, 1915 

What Germany could not accomplish through her 
surface navy or auxiliary commerce destroyers she be- 
gan to think of accomplishing through her submarines. 
That thought was her undoing. The theory of sub- 
marine blockade which she developed became event- 
ually the keystone of her naval and military policy. 
It clouded her vision and perverted her true military 
aims. It forced the United States into the war. More 
than anything else — more than everything else — it 
dragged Germany down to defeat. 

Early in the war Great Britain proclaimed a block- 
ade of the German coasts and disclosed an intention 
of cutting off the flow of foreign merchandise into 
Germany. The United States, as the neutral whose 
commerce would be most restricted by belligerent op- 
erations, asked the powers at war whether they would 
agree to respect the laws of naval warfare " as laid down 
by the Declaration of London of 1909." Germany 
and Austria-Hungary made a favourable response. 
Great Britain insisted on various modifications. The 
United States then withdrew its suggestion. Block- 
ade and naval warfare were left to be conducted accord- 
ing to the rules of international law in force prior to 
the London Declaration. 

156 



[I9I5] Neutral Rights at Sea 157 

These were elastic and capable of a wide expansion. 
The British Government, through Orders in Council, 
extended the principle of ultimate destination invoked, 
by the United States in the Civil War. It established 
a long range "cruiser cordon" blockade of German 
North Sea and Baltic Sea ports. It also held that 
neutral commerce to neutral countries adjacent to Ger- 
many, like Holland, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden, 
should be subject to blockade and contraband regula- 
tion, if there was any reason to suspect transshipment 
across the German border. Foodstuffs were included 
among the articles which could not be delivered to neu- 
tral countries — even foodstuffs intended for the use of 
the civilian population. Under earlier practice food- 
stuffs were conditionally contraband, only if destined 
for the use of a government or its military forces. In 
modern war, however, such a distinction has become 
fanciful, since all food stocks are now pooled and 
disposed of under governmental regulation. 

The Germans complained bitterly of the British ban 
on the importation of foodstuffs. They said it implied 
a purpose to starve Germany's non-combatant popula- 
tion. Attacking it as violation of international law, 
they claimed the right to retaliate by declaring a 
"war zone" about the British Isles and sinking at 
sight enemy merchantmen trying to leave or enter 
British harbours. 

The famous German "war zone" order was issued on 
February 4, 19 15. It not only gave notice that Ger- 
man submarines would sink enemy merchantmen 
found in the zone, even if it were found impossible to 
save passengers and crews, but also warned neutral 
merchantmen out of the "blockaded" waters because, 
owing to " the hazards of naval warfare, neutral vessels 



158 The Great War 



[1915] 



cannot always be prevented from suffering from the 
attacks meant for enemy ships." 

Up to the appearance of this proclamation the fric- 
tion arising from the blockade operations had been 
almost exclusively between neutrals and the Allies. 
The United States Government had vigorously pro- 
tested against the extreme doctrines asserted in the 
Orders in Council and against the hardships imposed 
by them on neutral commerce. Now Germany as- 
sumed Britain's burden. For if the British orders 
subjected neutral carriers to annoyance and loss, the 
German proclamation threatened them with destruc- 
tion of life as well as property. 

Germany never claimed that submarine warfare on 
merchantmen, carried to the point of sacrificing the 
lives of crews and passengers, was legal. She merely 
pleaded that as a violation of law it was excused by 
British violations of a different character. But this 
was an excuse which could hardly be accepted by neutral % 
governments, disposed to stand on their rights to a 
lawful use of the high seas. 

The American Government took notice of the German 
"war zone" order in a note, made public on February 
loth. It was firm and to the point. Secretary Bryan 
asked the German Government to consider, before the 
order was carried into effect, ' ' the critical situation which 
might arise were the German naval forces, in carrying 
out the policy foreshadowed in the Admiralty's pro- 
clamation, to destroy any merchant vessel of the United 
States or cause the death of American citizens." The 
Secretary then laid down two propositions : 

(i) If the commanders of German vessels of war 
. . . should destroy on the high seas an American 



[I9IS] Neutral Rights at Sea 159 

vessel or the lives of American citizens, it would be 
difficult for the Government of the United States 
to view the act in any other light than as an inde- 
fensible violation of neutral rights, which it would 
be very hard indeed to reconcile with the friendly 
relations now so happily subsisting between the 
two governments. 

(2) If such a deplorable situation should arise . . . 
the Government of the United States would be con- 
strained to hold the Imperial German Government 
to a strict accountability for such acts of their naval 
authorities and to take any steps it might be neces- 
sary to take to safeguard American lives and property 
and to secure to American citizens the full enjoy- 
ment of their acknowledged rights on the high seas. 

The "war zone" proclamation went into effect on 
February i8th. Meantime Germany had hinted that 
she would withdraw it if Great Britain would agree to 
observe the Declaration of London, without modifica- 
tion, or the Treaty of Paris, under either of which it 
was permissible to ship food into Germany for the use 
of the civilian population. 

On February 20th the United States Government 
addressed identical notes to Great Britain and Germany 
suggesting a compromise which would make the situa- 
tion of neutrals more tolerable. It was proposed to 
prohibit the sowing of floating mines, to forbid sub- 
marines to attack merchantmen except in pursuance 
of the rules of visit and search, and to bar the use of 
neutral flags by belligerent merchant ships. Germany 
was asked to agree that all foodstuffs sent her from 
the United States should be distributed by agencies 
designated by the United States and in no case should 



i6o The Great War 



[1915] 



be requisitioned by the German Government. Great 
Britain was to agree that foodstuffs should not be 
made absolute contraband or detained, if consigned to 
American agencies in Germany. 

Berlin responded favourably, in the main, to these 
proposals, which would have been highly advanta- 
geous to Germany. Great Britain, unwilling to forego 
the food blockade, was much less sympathetic. The 
effort to arrange a modus vivendi came to nothing. 

A new Order in Council was issued on March 15th, 
absolutely stopping the sailing of merchant vessels to 
or from German ports and taking jurisdiction of all 
merchant vessels sailing to or from a neutral port, 
which carried goods with an enemy destination or of 
enemy origin, or goods classifiable as enemy property. 
This order was certain to evoke a spirited protest from 
the United States. But meanwhile causes of friction 
with Germany were arising which completely over- 
shadowed American grievances against Great Britain 
and France. 

On March 28th a German submarine torpedoed the 
Falaha, a British merchant ship bound for Africa. An 
American citizen, Leon Thrasher, who was a passenger 
on it, was lost. The German Government expressed 
regret at this incident, but tried to shift responsibility 
for it on the British policy of arming merchantmen, 
thus making it difficult for a submarine to approach 
them for purposes of search. On April 28th a Ger- 
man aeroplane dropped three bombs on the American 
steamer Gushing. One of them hit the mark. Nobody 
was killed. On May ist the American oil steamship 
Gulflight was torpedoed off the Scilly Islands. The cap- 
tain died from shock and ten of the crew, who jumped 
overboard, were drowned. 



[ipisl 



The " Lusitania " i6i 



That same day an advertisement was inserted in 
various American newspapers warning Americans not 
to travel through the "war zone" on ships of Great 
Britain or her alHes. It bore the signature of the Im- 
perial German Embassy. The occasion of the warning 
was disclosed on May 7th when a German submarine 
sank the British passenger liner Lusitania off the south 
coast of Ireland. The Lusitania carried 1251 passen- 
gers and a crew of 667. Of these 11 53 were drowned. 
The American p assenger s numbered 188. One hundred 
and fourteen of them, including women and children, 
lost their lives. 

The reaction in the United States to this cold-blooded 
massacre was vehement and intense. It was Germany's 
answer to our Government's notification of February 
loth that it would hold Germany to " strict accountabil- 
ity" for the destruction of "an American vessel or the 
lives of American citizens" and its further warning 
that it would "take any steps it might be necessary 
to take to safeguard American lives and property and 
to secure to American citizens the full enjoyment of 
their acknowledged rights on the high seas." 

What steps were to be taken was gradually disclosed 
in the Lusitania correspondence, which continued un- 
til September ist in the form of open exchanges and 
then lapsed, so far as the Lusitania case itself was 
concerned, into a silent deadlock. The first American 
note was made public on May 13th. Two days before 
the German Foreign Office had handed Ambassador 
Gerard a memorandum which apparently disposed of 
the issue raised by the Gushing and Gulflight cases. 
It characterized the attacks on the two vessels as 
"mistakes" and announced that if a neutral ship 
came to harm through German submarines or aircraft 



i62 The Great War [19151 

in the zone of naval warfare, "the German Govern- 
ment would unreservedly recognize its responsibility 
therefor. In such a case it would express its regrets 
and afford damages without first instituting a prize 
court action." If there was any question whether or 
not the damage was done by a German U-boat or air- 
ship, recourse would be had to a commission appointed 
under the provisions of the Hague conventions. 

This left open only the question of attacks on 
enemy merchantmen through which Ameiican passen- 
gers had lost their lives. The first American note, 
though mentioning the Gushing and the Gulflight, was 
really addressed to the Falaha and Lusitania cases. It 
emphasized the fact that Americans were entitled 
under the rules of international law to travel on the 
high seas in full confidence that their lives would "not 
be endangered by acts done in clear violation of uni- 
versally acknowledged international obHgations." 

The satisfaction due to the United States was thus 
defined : 

It confidently expects, therefore, that the Imperial 
German Government will disavow the acts of which 
the Government of the United States complains, 
that they will make reparation so far as reparation 
is possible for injuries without measure, and that they 
will take immediate steps to prevent the recurrence 
of anything so obviously subversive of the principles 
of warfare for which the Imperial German Govern- 
ment have in the past so wisely and so firmly con- 
tended. 

On May 25th the American steamer Nebraskan had 
a hole blown in her bow off Fastnet Rock. The cap- 



[iQiSl 



The "Lusitania" 163 



tain thought he was the victim of a submarine attack, 
though no submarine was seen. No lives were lost 
and the vessel reached port. 

Jagow, the German Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, sent a reply to Washington on May 28th. It 
was published on May 31st. It repeated the assur- 
ances as to neutral vessels contained in his earlier 
memorandum of May nth. It tried to exculpate the 
commander of the U-boat which sank the Falaba. But 
it justified the attack without warning on the Lusitania 
by imputing a semi-military character to that vessel. 
The answer was absolutely evasive. 

Secretary Bryan had signed the note of February loth 
and the first Lusitania note. But his ideas of holding 
Germany to "strict accountability" for the invasion 
of neutral rights were coloured by his ardent pacifistic 
predilections. He wanted to forbid Americans to 
take passage on the ships of belligerent nations or on 
neutral vessels, carrying cargoes of ammunition. He 
also wanted the Lusitania dispute referred to an inter- 
national commission, telling Germany in advance that 
the United States would be bound by the principle of 
no warlike action within a year, contained in the ar- 
bitration treaties which our State Department had 
negotiated with various other countries. 

In Mr. Bryan's philosophy "strict accountability" 
was a purely platonic phrase. He didn't want to seem 
to pretend that it was anything else. So he resigned 
on June 8th, on the eve of the transmission of the second 
Lusitania note. This refuted the German claims as 
to the semi-military character of the torpedoed liner 
and then "very earnestly and very solemnly" renewed 
the representations and demands of the first note. 

The answer from Berlin, dated July 8th, was made 



1 64 The Great War [iqisI 

public on July loth. It defended German naval policy 
and suggested that American passengers to Europe 
should use American liners or neutral liners under the 
American flag. These would receive a safe conduct 
through the German "war zone," provided they carried 
no contraband. As a further concession, Germany 
would allow four enemy liners to sail under the American 
flag and guarantee them similar protection. Nothing 
was said, naturally, about a disavowal of the Lusitania 
crime. 

The third Lusitania note, dated July 21st, described 
Jagow's reply as "very unsatisfactory." The demand 
for disavowal was made for a third time in this language : 

The Government of the United States cannot be- 
lieve that the Imperial Government will longer refrain 
from disavowing the wanton act of its naval com- 
mander in sinking the Lusitania or from offering re- 
paration for American lives lost, so far as reparation 
can be made for a needless destruction of human life 
by an illegal act. 

This communication produced no formal reply. On 
July 12th the German Foreign Office delivered a memo- 
randum to Ambassador Gerard admitting that the 
Nebraskan had been torpedoed by a German submarine, 
apologizing for the "unfortunate accident" and offering 
to pay damages. Other incidents continued to show 
Germany's slight regard for the American contentions. 
The Orduna, with twenty-one American passengers 
aboard, was attacked by a U-boat on July 9th. A 
torpedo narrowly missed her and she was then chased 
and shelled. The Leelanaw, an American freighter, 
was sunk on July 25th, off the Orkney Islands. She 



[I9I5] The *'Lusitania" 165 

carried a contraband foreign-owned cargo. But the 
destruction of the ship was, Hke the destruction of 
the William P. Frye in the Pacific Ocean on January 
28, 1915, a violation of a still valid treaty of commerce 
and amity with Prussia. 

The climax of German effrontery came on August 
20th. The White Star liner Arabic, bound from 
Liverpool to New York, was sunk off the coast of Ire- 
land. Forty-four passengers, of whom two were Ameri- 
can citizens, lost their lives. 

Ambassador Bemstorff made a public statement on 
August 24th, serving notice that he had asked the 
American Government to withhold judgment on this 
case. "If Americans should actually have lost their 
lives," he said, "this would naturally be contrary to our 
intentions." 

The sinking of the Arabic raised a storm of indigna- 
tion in the United States. It was partly allayed when 
Count Bernstorff appeared at the State Department 
and submitted a memorandum, conveying the informa- 
tion that his instructions in regard to the third Lusitania 
note contained this passage: 

Liners will not be sunk by our submarines without 
warning and without safety of the lives of non- 
combatants, provided that the liners do not try to 
escape or offer resistance. 

This was a partial recognition of the principle for 
which the United States was contending. In fact, the 
German Government seemed disposed to use the Arabic 
case as a means of squaring the Lusitania account. 
On September 7th the Foreign Office delivered a memo- 
randum to Ambassador Gerard which said: "Accord- 



1 66 The Great War 



[1915] 



ing to his instructions the commander was not allowed 
to attack the Arabic without warning and without 
saving lives, unless the ship attempted to escape or 
offered resistance." It argued, however, that the 
commander might not have exceeded his orders, since 
he was convinced that the Arabic intended to ram him. 
Regret was expressed for the loss of American lives and 
an offer was made to send the question of indemnity 
to The Hague tribunal. On October 5th, however, 
Count Bernstorff announced that his government ad- 
mitted a departure from instructions and disavowed 
the act of the U-boat commander. 

It refused, however, to disavow the act of the com- 
mander who sank the Lusitania. Secret negotiations 
for the settlement of the Lusitania case continued into 
191 6. Various evasive adjustments were discussed. 
But Germany would not yield on the essential point — 
the thrice-repeated American demand for a disavowal. 
After February, 191 6, Germany remaining obdurate, 
the Lusitania controversy was allowed to lapse into 
oblivion. 

Late in 1 91 5 an issue arose with Austria-Hungary 
over the Ancona case. On November 7th this Italian 
liner was attacked in the Mediterranean by an Austro- 
Hungarian submarine. She tried to escape, and was 
halted. Later she was sunk and the boats to which 
the crew and passengers took were fired on. Nine 
American passengers were drowned. Ambassador 
Penfield was instructed to ask for an explanation. 
On November 14th the Austro-Hungarian Admiralty 
issued a statement exculpating itself. The United 
States was not satisfied with this ex parte justifica- 
tion and on December 6th demanded that the govern- 
ment of the Dual Monarchy "denounce the sinking 



[I9I5] The "Lusitania" 167 

as an illegal and indefensible act," punish the U-boat 
commander, and offer reparation. 

Vienna assumed a haughty tone at first, barely notic- 
ing the suggestions of the American note. On Decem- 
ber 19th our State Department renewed its demands. 
Germany didn't want the submarine issue reopened in 
an aggravated form. She brought pressure to bear on 
her ally. The government at Vienna then reversed 
itself. On December 29th a note was sent to the 
United States, agreeing that the obligations of human- 
ity must be lived up to, even in war; accepting the prin- 
ciple that "hostile private vessels, in so far as they 
do not flee or offer resistance, may not be destroyed 
without the persons on board having been placed in 
safety"; announcing the punishment of the U-boat 
commander, and promising reparation. 

The year ended, therefore, with a partial renuncia- 
tion by both Germany and Austria-Hungary of the illegal 
practices against which the United States had protested. 
This renunciation was insincere, however, and only 
temporary, Germany was building bigger U-boats 
and biding her time. She intended to repudiate all 
her promises to the United States when she got ready 
for a real campaign of submarine frightfulness. 



CHAPTER XIX 

VERDUN. FEBRUARY 21, I916-DECEMBER I6, I916 

Throughout 191 5 German strategy had been 
crowned with complete success. It had overthrown 
the military power of Russia and extinguished Serbia 
and Montenegro. It had created a Teuton Middle 
Europe, stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea, 
and the Bosporus. It had stripped Russia of Poland, 
Courland, Lithuania, and a part of Volhynia. It could 
have annexed Riga and Petrograd, Salonica and Athens, 
in 1 91 6, if it had cared to do so. 

On the Western Front it had conducted a wary and 
impenetrable defensive. Why did it drop its easy and 
profitable campaigns in the East and turn West in 
the winter and spring of 19 16 to experiment with the 
disastrous offensive against Verdun? 

Falkenhayn may have been unduly puffed up by his 
victories in Galicia, Poland, and the Balkans. These 
were won against opponents weak in artillery and tech- 
nical appliances and inferior — at least so far as Russia 
was concerned — in fighting quality to the Allied forces 
on the Western Front. Did Falkenhayn think he 
could stage another Dunajec at Verdun? He repro- 
duced there all the tactical features of Mackensen's 
triumph over Radko Dimitrieff. The French, too, 
were in a more hazardous position than Dimitrieff's 

168 



Ii9t6] Verdun 169 

army was, for they had the gorge of the Meuse at their 
backs. But at Verdun Palkenhayn met an antagonist 
nearly as well supplied with artillery as he was. The 
picked German infantry encountered an infantry with 
an endurance and tenacity superior to its own. 

Verdun was the most intensive battle of the war. 
It was fought on a narrowly restricted area, the struggle 
for minute portions of which was renewed again and 
again. It was a soldiers' battle — a pure test of individ- 
ual grit and staying power. When it ended France 
had been glorified and the indefinable prestige of Ger- 
man arms — a legacy of Sedan and Sadowa — had been 
eclipsed. 

Falkenhayn attempted a break-through on the 
Meuse front. Because he failed the German General 
Staff minimized his strategical objectives, saying that 
he merely wanted to destroy the French sally-port 
at Verdun and thus strengthen the German defensive 
positions in France. This was plainly an afterthought. 
No German commander-in-chief but Falkenhayn ever 
worried about the existence of the Verdun sally-port. 

The battle of Verdun was fought on both sides of 
the Meuse, in the region north-east, north, and north- 
west of the fortress. Verdun lies in a bowl. The 
heights of the Meuse rise abruptly on the east and 
cut off the river from the plain of the Woevre. On 
the opposite bank are hills and ridges which stretch 
west and north-west toward the Argonne. East of 
the Meuse the French line described a semicircle, 
running from Brabant, on the river, about eleven miles 
north of Verdun, eight miles east to Herbebois, where 
it bent to the south to reach the edge of the plain at 
Ornes. It then curved through the plain until it 
touched the Heights of the Meuse again to the south- 



I70 The Great War [1916] 

east of Verdun. The fighting on the €ast bank was 
all in the northern sector of the semicircle. The Ger- 
mans carried their attack across the Meuse after their 
first check on the east bank. On the west side the 
fighting front extended from the mouth of Forges 
Brook, opposite Brabant, about ten miles south-west 
to Malancourt and Avocourt. All this area, on both 
sides of the river, had been converted into a powerful 
entrenched camp by General Sarrail while he had com- 
mand of the French Third Army in the Meuse- Argonne 
sector. 

The French High Command expected a German 
offensive in the spring of 191 6. It guessed that Fal- 
kenhayn would try to repeat the younger Moltke's 
experiment, just as Ludendorff was to try to repeat it 
in 1 91 8. The lure of Paris was too strong to be re- 
sisted by any of the German chiefs of staff except 
Hindenburg, who was the one consistent Easterner at 
German Grand Headquarters. So during the winter 
the Allied lines in France were reorganized to meet the 
anticipated German attack. 

The front from Dixmude down to the Somme was 
assigned exclusively to the British armies, now increased 
in number to four. Above Dixmude, connecting with 
the right wing of the Belgian army, was one French 
corps, under General d'Oissel. South of the Somme the 
Sixth French Army, now under Fayolle, prolonged the 
British front. The northern French forces remained 
under Foch. The central group of armies stretched 
from the Oise to the Meuse. De Castelnau, on be- 
coming Chief of Staff, had turned over the command 
of this group to de Langle de Cary. The armies were 
arranged from west to east in this order: the Fifth, 
under Micheler, about Compiegne; the Fourth, under 



[i9i6] Verdun 171 

Mazel, from Soissons to Rheims; the Second, under 
Gouraud, in Champagne; the Third, under Humbert, 
in the Argonne. General Herr commanded the troops 
in the entrenched camp of Verdun. 

Franchet d'Esperey had succeeded Dubail at the 
head of the Eastern group. This comprised the First 
Army, under Gerard, below Verdun; a detachment on 
the Nancy front, under Deprez; a detachment in the 
Vosges, under Villaret, and a detachment in the Belfort 
sector, under Demange. 

But behind the first line a strategic reserve of picked 
troops had been collected. The celebrated Twentieth 
Corps, the "Iron Corps" of the French army, was held 
in camp at Mailly. An army of four corps, all shock 
units, was constituted under the command of Petain 
and stationed at Beauvais. These forces awaited the 
development of the German offensive. 

Falkenhayn decided early in the winter to make his 
main attempt at Verdun. He gathered there, during 
December and January, enormous parks of heavy artil- 
lery. His heavy pieces numbered over two thousand. 
They included guns of 210, 280, 305, 380, and 420 
calibre (French measure). The front chosen for attack 
was the six-mile sector north of Verdun from the 
Meuse, at Brabant, east to Herbebois. 

Here the offensive had obvious advantages. For 
while the line to be broken was short, permitting the 
massing of shock infantry, it was also subject to con- 
centric artillery fire from a front of more than twenty- 
five miles. German batteries could enfilade it from the 
west side of the Meuse, as well as from Spincourt Forest, 
to the east and north-east of Herbebois. Although 
the Verdun camp was one of the strongest bastions of 
the Allied positions in France, its outer trench line, 



172 The Great War [19x6] 

north-east of the city, was as exposed a stretch as could 
be found anywhere from Switzerland to the North Sea. 

The German attack began on February 21, 1916, 
with a stupendous artillery preparation, lasting twenty- 
four hours. The German shells razed woods and 
villages and ploughed up the surface of the whole 
sector under bombardment. The French trench 
systems were demolished. The troops who were 
unhurt remained under what cover they could find, 
dazed and stunned. But their resistance had not been 
broken. When the German shock waves advanced, 
on February 22d, expecting to find the front line de- 
serted, they met stout opposition from units all along 
the front. Fortunately the French first line had not 
been heavily manned, General Herr having only a 
force of one hundred thousand with which to garrison 
the entire camp. The losses from the bombardment 
itself and from the follow-up infantry attack on the 
northern sector were therefore comparatively light. 
Falkenhayn had about three hundred thousand men. 
But he could not use a very large proportion of them 
on the extremely short operating front which he had 
selected. 

On February 22d the German infantry occupied 
Haumont, in the centre of the French line; Ville Wood, 
a little farther east ; a part of Herbebois and a part of 
the village of La Wavrille, at the southern edge of Ville 
Wood. On February 23d, they took Brabant; Samo- 
gneux, on the Meuse, about two miles south of Brabant ; 
La Wavrille and Hill 344, the latter a mile south-east 
of Samogneux. This represented a considerable break- 
through in the sector along the Meuse. On February 
24th, the French lost Caures Wood, east of Ville Wood, 
to which they had held on stubbornly for two days; 



Ii9i6i Verdun 173 

the Bois des Fosses, a mile south of Caures Wood ; and 
the village of Omes, on the edge of the Woevre. To the 
south of Ornes the French advanced lines were with- 
drawn everywhere from the plain to the Heights of the 
Meuse. 

The salient east of Verdun was shrinking rapidly. 
The French had the river behind them, whose crossings 
would be exposed to direct artillery fire, were the Ger- 
mans to make a little more progress from the north and 
north-east. On the 25th the Germans were held up 
on the river sector at Champneuville, south of Samo- 
gneux. But in the centre, after a day of bitter hand- 
to-hand fighting, they reached the village of Douau- 
mont and penetrated into the old Fort de Douaumont, 
one of the principal links in the girdle of fortifications 
on the Heights of the Meuse. 

The fort had been evacuated by the French. It 
was occupied by a Brandenburg regiment, which soon 
found itself practically marooned there. But its capture 
was made the occasion of triumphant announcement 
by the Kaiser, that the corner-stone of the permanent 
defence system of Verdun had been shattered by his 
faithful Brandenburgers. 

This telegram was a rash anticipation of a victory 
which never materialized. The situation looked dark 
for the French on the evening of February 24th. Up to 
that time the garrison on the right bank had been left 
to its own resources. It remains an open question 
whether or not General de Langle de Gary had or had 
not actually made preparations for abandoning Verdun 
and withdrawing all his forces to the left bank of the 
Meuse. However that may have been, a final decision 
to stay and fight it out on the east bank was reached 
by the 24th. 



174 The Great War [1916] 

General de Castelnau, the French Chief of Staff, ar- 
rived in Verdun on February 25th. He brought with 
him much needed reinforcements. The Twentieth 
Corps left its camp at Mailly on the 24th and on the 
25th , was thrown into the fight about Douaumont. 
A little later the First Army Corps, under General 
Guillaumat, arrived and was put in, on February 26th, 
on the left of the Twentieth Corps, barring the German 
advance in the sector between the Meuse and the 
Haudromont Farm, north-west of Douaumont. In 
the next two days there was a continuous struggle for 
footing on the Douaumont front. Every German 
attack was met by a French counter-attack. Neither 
side gained ground. The dismantled Fort de Douau- 
mont was left in German hands. The village of 
Douaumont, west of the fort, was abandoned by both 
combatants. 

De Castelnau had brought with him on February 
25th General Petain, who at once displaced General 
Herr as commander of the Verdun garrison. This 
extraordinary soldier infused new vigour into the de- 
fence. He introduced the policy of relentless counter- 
attack, under which the Germans were held down to 
local gains, made at a huge cost and, as a rule, quickly 
nullified. With his and de Castelnau's arrival the 
crisis of the first stage of the battle passed. 

The Germans had gained considerable ground in the 
northern half of the Verdun salient, east of the Meuse. 
They had taken ten thousand prisoners and eighty 
guns. They had made a barren prize of Fort de 
Douaumont, But they were still far from their primary 
objective, which was the French second line of defence 
on the Heights of the Meuse, Petain had stopped their 
first and most dangerous rush. It was now only a 



[i9i6] Verdun 175 

question of wearing out an offensive which had lost 
its surprise character and its initial chance of success. 

There was a lull in the fighting on February 29th 
and March ist. On March 2d a new effort was made 
by the Germans on the front from Douaumont south- 
east to Vaux. The assaults were continued until 
March 4th and spread around to the west of Douaumont. 
But the results were barren. The offensive on the 
east bank of the Meuse had been definitely halted. 
Falkenhayn now decided to turn his attention to the 
west bank. 

A German advance on that side was made necessary 
by the fact that the French artillery on Goose Hill and 
other elevations west of the Meuse was now able to 
enfilade the advanced German lines on the east side, 
thus seriously hindering operations against the C6te 
de Talou and Pepper Hill, which guarded the ap- 
proaches to Douaumont from the north-west. On 
the west bank the original French position stretched 
west along Forges Brook to Bethincourt and then 
south-west to Malancourt, Avocourt, and the Forest 
of Hesse. 

On March 2d the Germans began to bombard the 
French lines on the west bank of the river. The artil- 
lery preparation lasted four days. The infantry attack 
opened in a snow-storm, on the morning of March 6th. 
The French front line was lightly held and the troops 
could only hope to delay the progress of the heavy 
German storming columns. Two German divisions 
took Forges village and pushed south to seize Goose 
Hill Ridge. At the eastern end of the ridge Regneville 
was captured. The Germans also penetrated to the 
Bois des Corbeaux (Crow Wood) before sundown on 
the 6th. 



176 The Great War 



[1916] 



Hill 265, an outpost north of Goose Hill Ridge, was 
taken on the afternoon of March 7th. The Crow Wood 
and Cumieres Wood were cleared later in the evening. 
Then Petain resorted to his favourite method of counter- 
attack. Cumieres Wood was retaken on March 8th, 
with a part of Crow Wood. The latter was recaptured 
in its entirety on March 9th. The next day the Ger- 
mans re-ejected the French from Crow Wood and failed 
in an attack south of Bethincourt. Then the battle 
on the west bank died down. The Germans had pushed 
the French back west of the Meuse, so that their lines 
on both sides of the river now ran on the same level. 
Up to the end of this phase of the battle the German 
communiques claimed the capture of about twenty-five 
thousand French prisoners. 

Prudence would have counselled Falkenhayn to drop 
his offensive at this point. He had won a considerable 
local success — equal to the French success in Cham- 
pagne in September and October, 191 5. And he had 
nearly exhausted the possibilities of an operation 
against Verdun; for the French had concentrated 
ample reserves there and were nearly as strong in 
artillery as he was. But he had risked his personal 
reputation and his future as chief of the General Staff 
on a grandiose break-through like that at the Dunajec. 
He therefore decided to go on with a venture which, 
in a military sense, had lost its promise. 

The battle of Verdun from March nth on was a 
series of deadly local engagements for hills, woods, 
villages, and scraps of ground, where progress or reces- 
sion was measured in yards. It marked a final stage 
in the warfare of mere attrition. It was a gruelling 
and ghastly test of morale in which the element of 
military science was reduced to a minimum. And 



[1016] Verdun 177 

from that test, so cruel and so searching, Germany 
emerged an unqualified loser. 

On the left bank of the Meuse the struggle spread 
farther and farther to the west. Unable to take 
Goose Ridge, Falkenhayn directed his attack on March 
14th against Hill 265, south of Bethincourt. This 
was the northern crest of the famous Dead Man's Hill, 
the southern one being marked on the maps as 295. 
It fell. But 295 still commanded it. On March 20th 
the Germans, coming south-east from the direction of 
Montfaucon, penetrated the Avocourt Wood, trying 
to reach from the west Hill 304, which commanded 
Dead Man's Hill proper. The French then evacuated 
Malancourt, which was becoming isolated. Early in 
April the French lost Haucourt. But they held on to 
Hill 304. On April 9th, loth, and i ith a general attack 
was delivered on the whole French front west of the 
Meuse, from Goose Hill to Avocourt. It failed with 
enormous losses. 

On April 30th Petain was promoted to command the 
central group of armies, replacing de Langle de Gary. 
General Nivelle assumed command in the Verdun 
sector. 

In May the operations on the west bank reached 
their climax. Four separate assaults were made on the 
French positions — on May 7th-8th, May 20th, May 
23d-May 25th, and May 29th. The net result of these' 
was that the French lost Cumieres Wood, Caurettes 
Wood, part of Hill 304, and all but the southern slope of 
Dead Man's Hill. Thereafter fighting on the west bank 
lapsed back to the customary inertia of trench warfare. 

On the east bank Falkenhayn' s efforts had been 
equally violent and, in the large sense, equally fruitless. 
Early in March, the Germans had extended the front 



178 The Great War [1916] 

of their attack south-east from Douaumont to Vaux 
Village and Fort de Vaux. The village lay in a ravine, 
running east and west, and the fort on a hill to the 
south of it. They were a little more than a mile dis- 
tant from Fort de Douaumont. On March 8th German 
infantry entered the village, but were expelled by a 
counter-attack. On March loth they regained a foot- 
ing in the village and tried vainly to storm the fort. 
Another unsuccessful attack was made on the fort 
on March i6th. On March 30th the Germans in 
great force drove past Vaux Village into and through 
Caillette Wood, which lies just south of Fort de Douau- 
mont. They were expelled without delay by the French. 
On April i8th a formidable assault was launched against 
Pepper Ridge, at the other end of the line, close to the 
Meuse. It was repelled with great slaughter. 

General Nivelle undertook his first counter-offensive 
on May 22d. It was preceded by a two days' bombard- 
ment of the Douaumont front. Six divisions parti- 
cipated in it. The infantry reached and penetrated 
Fort de Douaumont, but did not succeed in expelling 
all the garrison. After two days the Germans struck 
back and recovered the fort. Then the German of- 
fensive was resumed. Fort de Vaux was its objective. 
This work was cut off on the north and west by the 
recapture of Vaux Village and was approached from 
the south-east through the village of Damloup, taken 
early in June. On June 7th the garrison surrendered, 
after a magnificent defence. 

Falkenhayn had now opened a breach in the main 
girdle of forts, north-east of Verdun. His next objec- 
tive was Fort de Souville, two miles south-west of Fort 
de Vaux and about three miles directly south of Fort 
de Douaumont. The approach to it from the north 



[i9i6] Verdun 179 

was through Thiaumont Redoubt and Fleury Village 
and from the north-east across Damloup Redoubt 
and Le Chenois and La Laufee Woods. Thiaumont 
Redoubt and Fleury were taken by the Germans in 
June but were subsequently lost again to the French. 
The fighting on this narrow sector continued through 
July and August, with changing fortunes. But with 
the beginning of the Battle of the Somme, on July ist, 
all serious thought of pressing the campaign for Verdun 
was abandoned. 

From February to July Falkenhayn had gained about 
130 miles of nearly valueless territory. He had lost 
from 250,000 to 300,000 men, had failed utterly to 
break the French front, or even to close the "sally- 
port" of Verdun. He had made his own deposition 
as Chief of Staff inevitable. 

The trifling value of the territorial gains he had put 
to his credit was soon to be demonstrated. On October 
24th General Nivelle launched his second counter- 
offensive on the east bank of the Meuse. It was pre- 
ceded by slight artillery preparation and was strikingly 
successful. Nivelle broke through the German lines on 
a four-mile front to a depth of two miles. He retook 
Douaumont village. Fort de Douaumont, Thiaumont 
Redoubt, and Haudromont quarries. Six thousand 
Germans were made prisoners. Fort de Vaux, which 
had been enveloped, was evacuated by the enemy. On 
November 5th Vaux and Damloup villages were retaken. 

On December nth Nivelle was appointed Com- 
mander-in-Chief of all the French armies on the West- 
ern Front. On December I5th-i6th General Mangin, 
who succeeded to the command in the Verdun sector, 
enlarged Nivelle' s success. After an intense artillery 
preparation he carried the German first-line trenches, 



i8o The Great War [1916] 

on a front of six miles and a quarter, advancing 
nearly two miles. Eighty guns were captured and 
11,400 prisoners. Vacherauville, Louvemont, Bezon- 
vaux, and apart of Caurieres Wood were recovered and 
the Germans were pushed well back toward the French 
positions two days after the battle began. Later the 
old lines were restored in their entirety. 

Long before this, however, Falkenhayn had paid 
the penalty of the colossal fiasco on the Meuse. On 
August 28, 1916, he was demoted as Chief of the German 
General Staff, Hindenburg taking his place. 



CHAPTER XX 

RUSSIA'S LAST REAL OFFENSIVE. JANUARY I, I916- 
SEPTEMBER I, I916 

Russia never recovered from the defeats of 191 5. 
They shattered the miHtary power of the Empire. 
But their effects were for a long time hidden. Russia 
remained a factor in the war all through 1916. The 
armies seemed to recover their morale. The Russian 
military leaders had lost none of their zeal and con- 
fidence and continued to work in co-ordination — in the 
slight degree to which that was possible — with the 
general staffs of the Western Entente states. 

In the winter months of 1 916 the Grand Duke Nicho- 
las won some notable victories in the Caucasus. The 
greater part of Armenia was wrested from Turkey. 
General Brusiloff 's summer campaign repeated to some 
extent the successes achieved in 19 14 against the Austro- 
Hungarians. But when these two operations were over 
Russia had shot her bolt. 

The war had been brought closer to the people in 
1915 and 1916. This was because the interior ad- 
ministration had broken down and war activities — the 
care of the wounded, the provisioning and clothing of 
the troops, and the direction of war industries — ^had 
to be taken over by volunteer organizations, and local 
political bodies, like the zemstvos. This democratiza- 

181 



1 82 The Great War [1916] 

tion of the war undermined the old imperial system. It 
aroused revolutionary sentiment. The Duma, hitherto 
a debating society, began to look ahead to assuming 
real power. 

Nicholas II was personally strongly pro-Ally and 
pro-war. But he was not his own master in matters 
of domestic politics. His wife, a German princess 
by birth and intensely interested in the preservation 
of the Romanoff dynasty, saw safety for it only in the 
early conclusion of a separate peace with Germany. 
Her fears were played on by reactionary politicians 
and her superstitions made her an easy victim of 
mystical impostors like Rasputin, who was a tool of 
the reactionaries and the strong pro-German elements 
at the Russian court. 

The Czarina was responsible for the appointment 
of Stiinner, the anti-Entente Premier, and of Protopo- 
poff, an enemy of the Duma and of liberalism of any 
sort. 

If Russia had been successful in the field, the mon- 
archy could have maintained itself with the masses. 
But the great retreat of 1915 and the enormous losses 
of the armies had shaken its prestige. Russia was 
therefore drifting toward a crisis in domestic politics. 
And the imperial administration was becoming more 
and more associated in the public mind with a policy 
of internal repression and of peace at any price with 
Germany. 

This attitude could not be long persisted in without 
destroying popular faith in the government and the 
dynasty and provoking revolution. Yet the military 
power of the Empire was wrapped up in the survival 
of the old regime. It was the only regime which could 
control the armies and maintain the Entente Alliance. 



[i9i6] Russia's Last Real Offensive 183 

When the Empire fell the armies became at first de- 
moralized and then uncontrollable. But even toward 
the end of 1916 the Russian military machine had 
begun to run down. 

In January the Russian western front was reorgan- 
ized. The Czar remained Commander-in-Chief, with 
General Alexieff as Chief of Staff. The armies were 
divided into three groups. Those on the northern 
sector, from Riga to Dvinsk, were put under Kuropat- 
kin, Commander-in-Chief in the war with Japan. The 
second group, from Dvinsk to the Pripet, was entrusted 
to General Evert. The third, from the Pripet to the 
Dniester, was given to Brusiloff, perhaps the most 
aggressive of all the Russian commanders. An in- 
dependent army, under Lechitsky, faced the Bukowina 
border. 

The German forces were also divided into three 
groups: the northern, under Hindenburg; the central, 
under Prince Leopold of Bavaria, and the southern 
under the Archduke Joseph-Ferdinand. The last group 
alone contained Austro-Hungarian contingents. 

On December 28, 1915, Lechitsky had begun an 
offensive against Czemowitz, the capital of Bukowina. 
He got within gun range of the city, but was held up 
there by the Austro-Hungarians. After three weeks 
of stubborn fighting, he broke off the attack. His 
losses amounted to sixty thousand men. 

Another winter operation — more ambitious in scope 
— ^was attempted on the northern front in March. It 
was in the nature of a demonstration to relieve German 
pressure at Verdun. 

General Gourko says that the Russians had available 
for artillery preparation not more than one hundred guns, 
mostly 6-inch types taken from the fortresses of Kovno 



1 84 The Great War [1916] 

and Grodno. There were munitions enough for only a 
short day's bombardment. The sector chosen for the 
attack was on the left bank of the Dvina River, south 
of Dvinsk. In the region between Lake Driswiaty and 
Lake Naroch, Kuropatkin expended his ammunition 
on March 1 7th without destroying the German machine- 
gun shelters. The infantry advanced on the i8th and 
was cut to pieces. Other engagements were fought 
along the Dvina front, both above and below Dvinsk. 
The Germans were everywhere superior in artillery 
and machine guns and Kuropatkin paid excessively 
for immaterial territorial gains on a lOO-mile line. 
An -early thaw also interfered with his operations. 
On March 28th the offensive ended with a loss of about 
140,000 men. 

Undiscouraged by these early set-backs, the Russian 
General Staff went ahead with preparations for a 
summer offensive, to be opened about July ist, con- 
jointly with Anglo-French offensive on the Somme. 
The main attack was to be made on the Vilna sector, 
with secondary demonstrations on the northern and 
southern fronts. But in May, the Austro-Hungarian 
offensive in the Trentino seemed to be sweeping the 
Italians back into the plain of Venetia, and Italy 
urgently requested Russia to come to her rescue by 
making an attack on the Austro-Hungarian forces in 
Galicia and Bukowina. To meet this emergency ap- 
peal, the Russian General Staff recast its offensive 
plans. The date of the opening of the summer offensive 
was advanced a month and the projected Brusiloff 
demonstration on the south front was converted into 
a major offensive. Supplies concentrated behind Vilna 
had to be transferred to Volhynia and an army — that of 
Lesh — was shifted from Evert's group to Brusiloff's. 



II9I6J Russia's Last Real Offensive 185 

Brusilofif then had four armies directly under him 
■ — Lesh's, Kaledin's, Sakharoff's, and Scherbatcheff's — 
with Lechitsky's co-operating on the extreme left 
wing. These five armies were over one million strong, 
while Archduke Joseph-Ferdinand's armies numbered 
probably less than eight hundred thousand. The 
situation was almost an exact counterpart of that in 
August-September, 1 9 14, before Lemberg. 

Brusiloff's front stretched for two hundred and fifty 
miles south from the Pripet Marshes to the Pruth River, 
east of Czemowitz. He was moderately well supplied 
with munitions and had large reserves of men. He 
also profited enormously from the fact that the depleted 
Austro-Hungarian armies facing him were unprepared 
for an attack. 

The offensive started on June 3d, with a preparatory 
bombardment. It had its greatest initial success in 
the Volhynian sector, west of Rovno. Rovno stood at 
the apex of the triangle of fortresses — Rovno, Dubno, 
and Lutsk — which guarded Kiev from an invasion 
coming north-east out of Galicia. The two western 
anchor points of the triangle had fallen to the Germans 
in the last days of the retreat of 191 5. From Rovno 
a railroad ran south-west through Dubno to Lemberg. 
Another railroad, running north-west to Kovel and 
Brest-Litovsk, passed close to Lutsk. Kovel and 
Lemberg were Brusiloff's two objectives. They were 
joined by a north and south railroad which it was his 
purpose to cut. 

The advance west from Kovno carried everything 
before it. Two Austro-Hungarian divisions, composed 
mostly of Czechs and other Slavic elements, were 
encountered on the enemy's first line. They cheer- 
fully surrendered and a wide gap was opened through 



1 86 The Great War iiqiS] 

which Kaledin's Eighth Army poured. On the first 
two days the advance covered twenty rniles. On June 
6th the Russians entered Lutsk, which the Archduke 
Joseph-Ferdinand had hastily abandoned, leaving 
behind him valuable stores and thousands of wounded 
soldiers. Dubno was now threatened with envelop- 
ment from the north. The Austrians evacuated it on 
June loth. 

The Russian armies spread out to the west of the 
triangle of fortresses. North-west of Rovno the town 
of Kolki, on the Styr River, was reached and, a little 
farther south and west, the town of Svidniki, on the 
Stokhod River, about fifteen miles south-east of Kovel. 
Directly west of Lutsk the Russians advanced twenty- 
five miles, to Zaturtsy, a little more than twenty miles 
from Vladimir- Volynski, on the Kovel-Lemberg rail- 
road. Farther south they reached a point less than 
fifteen miles from the railway. These gains were 
made between June 17th and 23d. Pushing south- 
west from Dubno, Kaledin's troops covered thirty 
miles in six days, reaching the Galician frontier on June 
1 6th. The Eighth Army had driven a wedge fifty 
miles deep into the Austrian lines and had captured 
seventy thousand prisoners and eighty-three guns. 

Sakharoff's Eleventh Army, on Kaledin's left, was 
much less successful. It failed to break the lines held 
by the Bavarian army, under General Count Bothmer, 
west of Tamopol. Scherbatcheff's Seventh Army, on 
Sakharoff's left, advanced into south-eastern Galicia, 
carried the Austrian positions, and on June 8th captured 
Buczacz, on the Strypa River. 

To Lechitsky's Ninth Army, on the extreme left, 
was assigned the task of recovering Bukowina. This 
it accomplished in a brilliant manner. A passage of 



ti9i6] Russia's Last Real Offensive 187 

the Dniester was forced on June 4th and the Austro- 
Hungarians were badly defeated on June nth at 
Dobronovtse, between the Dniester and the Pruth, 
eighteen thousand prisoners being captured. Sniatyn 
fell on June 13th and on the same day Lechitsky 
arrived on the Pruth, opposite Czernowitz. On June 
1 6th the Pruth was crossed. Czernowitz fell the next 
day. Lechitsky had captured up to that date 37,832 
men and 49 guns. 

The Austro-Hungarians in Bukowina were now in 
full retreat toward the Carpathian passes. Cossack 
cavalry overran the crownland between June i8th 
and 26th. On June 23d they reached Kimpolung, on 
the Rumanian border, and then spread west toward 
the Transylvanian passes. 

Bukowina having been cleared, Lechitsky turned 
north-west into Galicia, aiming at the Jablonitsa Pass, 
through which a railroad runs from the Hungarian 
plain to Kolomea, and thence north to Lemberg. The 
retreating Austro-Hungarians tried to make a stand 
before Kolomea, but were routed, with a loss of 10,500 
prisoners. The Russians entered Kolomea on June 
28th. On July 8th Delatyn, in the foothills just north 
of the Jablonitsa Pass, was seized and the approaches 
from the Galician side were secured. This pass and 
the other Carpathian passes to the south were intended 
to be used by the Russians to invade Hungary and 
Transylvania in co-operation with the Rumanians, 
after Rumania should enter the war. Lechitsky now 
suspended operations. He had taken, since June 4th, 
69,000 prisoners and sixty-seven guns. 

The Brusiloff offensive was a staggering blow to 
Austria-Hungary. It compelled an abandonment of 
the campaign against Italy. Men and big guns began 



1 88 The Great War [ipiei 

to flow back from the Tyrol to Galicia. German aid 
was also summoned. Hindenburg sent several divi- 
sions down from the north and four were shifted to 
the Eastern Front from France. The Austrian High 
Command had made the mistake of thinking that 
Russia was incapable of another real offensive. It 
had stripped the Galician and Bukowina fronts in 
order to conquer Northern Italy. Now it had to 
pay in men, territory, and prestige for a glaring 
error of judgment. 

Reinforcements in the Lutsk sector enabled the 
Germans to turn after June i6th and recover a few 
miles of territory. But on July 4th Lesh's army, on 
Kaledin's right, began a movement west toward the 
Stokhod River line. In three days it reached the 
river — an advance of thirty miles. There the Rus- 
sians were held up by German troops and suffered 
heavy losses trying to clear the Stokhod barrier. 
Between June 28th and August 3d, Lesh, with Kale- 
din's assistance, got across the river at several 
points. But the German line held. Kovel, the main 
Russian objective in this region, was never seriously 
threatened. 

South of Lutsk, however, Sakharoff's army got in 
motion again on July i6th. It stormed the Austro- 
Hungarian trenches at Shklin (eighteen miles south- 
west of Lutsk), capturing 13,000 prisoners. The 
Austro-Hungarians fell back to the Lipa River. There 
Sakharoff, on July 20th-22d, again defeated the disor- 
ganized enemy and took 12,000 prisoners. A third 
engagement gave him the town of Brody, and 14,000 
prisoners. Turning south, the Eleventh Russian Army 
now brought up on the flank of Bothmer's Bavarians, 
who had been holding Scherbatcheff in check, west of 



[i9i6] Russia's Last Real Offensive 189 

Tamopol. Bothmer was forced to retreat to the line 
up the Zlota-Lipa River. 

About the same time Scherbatcheff and Lechitsky 
turned Bothmer's southern flank. Joining forces on 
August 7th they pushed north-west toward Stanislau, 
which city was evacuated by the enemy on August loth. 
Lechitsky then cleared all the district between Stanislau 
and the Carpathians, while Scherbatcheff pushed north- 
west to Mariampol, which he occupied on August 13th. 
Up to that date he had captured 56,421 prisoners. 
In the first week of September he broke Bothmer's 
line on the Zlota-Lipa at Brzezany and almost reached 
HaHcz. Early in August Hindenburg was put in 
charge of the Eastern Front from Riga down to Tamo- 
pol. He borrowed several Turkish divisions and gave 
them to Bothmer. With these troops the latter began 
to counter-attack in Galicia. These counter-attacks 
marked the end of the last phase of the Brusiloff offen- 
sive. 

The results of the drive had exceeded the most 
sanguine AlHed expectations. The Teuton Eastern 
Front had been broken on a stretch of 310 miles, to 
a depth of from twenty to fifty miles. Bukowina and 
south-eastern Galicia had been reconquered. A con- 
nection with Rumania along the Carpathians had been 
established. Nearly four hundred thousand prisoners 
were taken and 405 guns. The Austro-Hungarian and 
German losses were probably in the neighbourhood of 
a million. 

But the Russian losses were also enormous. The 
offensive stopped because Russia had nearly exhausted 
her munitions stocks and had worn down her best 
armies. She would never be capable again of an 
effort like Brusiloff's. Her intervention had saved 



190 The Great War [1916] 

Italy. But it had disabled her from playing a similar 
role when Rumania entered the war in the fall of 1916 
and found herself facing a fate like Serbia's. Russia 
had established a satisfactory contact with Rumania. 
But when the time came to join the Rumanians in an 
invasion of Hungary, Russian power to break through 
the Carpathian barrier had vanished. 



CHAPTER XXI 

THE SOMME. JULY I, I916-NOVEMBER I8, I916 

France, Great Britain, and Russia had agreed to 
start a two-front offensive on July i, 1916. As has 
been noted, the opening date of the Russian offensive 
was advanced to June ist, in order to help out the 
Italians. Germany had sought to derange the Franco- 
British plans by striking for Verdun. Nevertheless, 
when July ist came, the French and British began 
their scheduled operation, which was to develop into 
the longest, stubbomest, and most sanguinary battle 
of the war. 

Probably it would have taken a more definite char- 
acter as an effort on a grand scale to break through 
and roll up the German positions in Northern France, 
if the French had not been obliged to commit them- 
selves so deeply at Verdun. Joffre used only one army 
in the first stages of the Battle of the Somme. That 
was FayoUe's, the westernmost of the group in the 
sector from Soissons to Amiens, now under the com- 
mand of General Foch. Micheler's army, formerly 
attached to the central group, was not employed until 
September. Humbert's did not take part in the battle, 
as it undoubtedly would have done, if the French effort 
had not been circumscribed by the drain of the long 
struggle on the Meuse. France needed to economize 

191 



192 The Great War 



[1916] 



on men and wisely adopted a policy of limited offensives 
in 1916 and 1917* 

The British "New Army" had, however, rounded 
into battle form. It was now to bear the brunt of the 
western offensive, testing its training and quality against 
seasoned German troops. A Fourth Army had been 
organized and put under the command of Sir Henry 
Rawlinson. It was stationed on the right of the Third 
Army, organized in the summer of 19 15. Its front 
extended south from Gommecourt nearly to the Somme. 
The arrival of the Third Army had enabled Joffre to 
transfer the Second French Army to Champagne, in 
September, 1915. The arrival of the Fourth had made 
possible the withdrawal from the northern sectors of 
many French divisions which were needed in the spring 
of 1916, at Verdun. For the Somme operation the 
strength of the Fourth Army was raised to five corps. 
Two of these were constituted a separate command 
under General Gough, operating on Rawlinson's left, 
Gough's left was supported by AUenby's Third Army. 

Although the Allied commanders disclaimed any large 
strategical objective (preferring to say that the bat- 
tle was fought for the purpose of wearing down the 
enemy and relieving his pressure at Verdun and on the 
Eastern fronts), it is evident that the underlying pur- 
pose of the Somme offensive was to compel the enemy 
to evacuate the huge Noyon salient, which he had held 
without serious molestation since the close of the First 
Marne campaign. The direction of the attack indi- 
cated such a purpose, however it might be disavowed. 
And the after-effect of the offensive was, in fact, to 
force such a withdrawal. The German positions in 
the salient, although still held in the main at the end 
of the battle, had become so exposed that Hindenburg 



[i9i6] The Somme 193 

thought it prudent to evacuate them early in 1917. 
The Somme operation, therefore, attained a strategic 
result which the Allied High Commands were too cau- 
tious to claim for it when it had ended in an apparent 
relapse into deadlock. 

The Noyon salient extended, roughly speaking, 
from Arras south and east to the neighbourhood of 
La Fere. The German line ran slightly south-west 
from Arras to Gommecourt, whence it turned south-east 
to Fricourt, a little east of Albert. Then it stretched 
directly east for about four miles and turned south 
again, crossing the Somme at Curlu. Thence it passed 
almost due south, west of Chaulnes and Roye, to a 
point near Lassigny, where it bent at a right angle 
east past Noyon, to the St. Gobain and Coucy forests, 
below La Fere. 

The point of attack chosen by the British and French 
was midway in the western face of the salient, on both 
sides of the Somme. A successful drive there would 
have the effect of breaking the western part of the 
German salient into two smaller salients. The Arras 
sector would be separated by a broad wedge from the 
Chaulnes-Roye sector, and each remnant would become 
subject to hostile pressure in two directions. Bapaume 
was the objective of the British attack. Peronne was 
the objective of the French attack. If Bapaume and 
Peronne both fell, the Noyon salient would be no 
longer defensible. 

iThe east-and-WEst portion of the German line just 
north of the Somme offered a tempting mark to an 
assailant. By changing their frontage from west to 
south the Germans had created a salient, east of Albert, 
which could be attacked simultaneously from the south 
and from the west. An opportunity was offered to the 
13 



194 The Great War [ipiej 

British to work north-east, cut the Peronne-Bapaume 
high road and approach Bapaume from the rear. 
Meanwhile a French drive straight east would take 
Peronne and put the Allies in the rear of the German 
positions covering Chaulnes and Roye. 

Artillery preparation began on June 24th and lasted 
a week. It was the heaviest "drum fire" the Allies 
had yet indulged in ; for they now had an ample supply 
of munitions and heavy guns. The infantry moved 
forward at 7.30 a.m., July ist. The main British 
front extended from Maricourt, about two miles north 
of the Somme, west to Fricourt, and then north along 
the west face of the salient to St. Pierre Divion, on the 
Ancre River. A subsidiary holding attack was made 
by the Third Army at Gommecourt. 

The German positions in the region north of the 
Somme, covering Bapaume, were unusually formidable. 
A ridge crossing this sector in a south-east-north-west 
direction, from the Ancre River to the Tortille River, 
formed the backbone of the Teuton defence. The first 
line trenches lay on the southern slopes of this cross 
ridge. Nearly two years had been spent by the Germans 
in elaborating their main lines and communicating 
systems. In spite of the powerful artillery preparation 
the British therefore met with vigorous resistance 
all along the line. In the section below the Ancre 
River hardly any progress was made. But on the rest 
of the front the whole of the enemy's first Hne was 
carried in fighting which lasted until July 5th. The 
Germans were driven back a mile on a six mile sector, 
losing 5818 prisoners. Sir Douglas Haig now called 
a halt to reorganize an attack on the second German 
defence line. 

The French attack on July ist was made on a front 



[i9i6] The Somme 195 

from Maricourt, north of the Somme, to a point west 
of Chaulnes. North of the river, Fayolle's army — the 
Sixth — took the villages of Curlu, Hem, and Harde- 
court. South of it they broke completely through the 
German first and second lines, advancing six miles 
on a front of ten and a half miles. On July 9th the 
French carried the village of Biaches, directly across the 
Somme from Peronne. Farther south they had reached 
Belloy-en-Santerre on July 4th. Chaulnes was threat- 
ened with envelopment from the north, and Peronne 
seemed on the point of falling. Up to July 14th the 
French took 12,235 prisoners. But from that date 
on the German counter-attacks became persistent. 
The impetus of the offensive south of the Somme was 
lost. The French effort was suspended and was not 
renewed until September. 

On July 14th Marshal Haig, having brought up his 
guns, delivered an assault on the second and main line 
of the German defences. It was made on a front of 
six thousand yards, from Longueval to Bazentin-le- 
Petit Wood. The British stole forward in the night 
to the foot of the southern crest of the cross-ridge and 
stormed the German trenches at early dawn. Four 
villages and three strongly fortified woods were cap- 
tured and the enemy was pushed back about a mile. 
Counter-attacks were repelled and advanced British 
units came into touch with the third German defence 
line, on the northern and lower crest of the cross-ridge. 
Two thousand additional prisoners were captured from 
July 14th to July 1 6th. 

This operation ended the first phase of the battle. 
The British were now established in the main German 
positions for a distance of more than three miles. But 
the centre had advanced much farther than the wings. 



196 The Great War [1916] 

The Germans continued to hold the Tortille-Ancre 
plateau, west of Bazentin-le-Petit, where the British 
line bent to the south-west. They also held the power- 
ful plateau positions, east and south-east of Delville 
Wood, extending beyond Combles. It was necessary 
to clear both flanks before the wedge in the centre 
could be driven farther in. 

The German High Command now awakened to the 
fact that the Somme front was crumbling. It rushed 
up reserves and began to counter-attack savagely. 
The British and the French — the latter operating on 
the right in the direction of Combles — found their 
progress practically blocked during the seven weeks 
from July i8th to September ist. On July i8th the 
Germans regained a part of Delville Wood and of the 
village of Longueval. On July 23d a general British 
assault from Guillemont, on the east, to Pozieres, on 
the west, failed to produce any gains. Delville Wood 
and Longueval were recovered on July 30th. Early 
in August attempts to take Guillemont failed. On 
August 1 6th a joint French and British attack in the 
Combles sector yielded insignificant results. 

The battle had not come to a standstill. But it had 
resumed the deadlock characteristics of the fixed posi- 
tional warfare of 191 5. It was immensely costly to both 
sides — more costly even than the fighting at Verdun had 
been, because the operating front on the Somme was 
wider and many more troops were constantly engaged. 

The third phase of the Somme began in September. 
Micheler's army was brought up to the support of 
FayoUe's and the French assumed a larger r61e in the 
drive for Bapaume. Their immediate objective was 
Combles, which they now sought to envelop from the 
south and east. 



[i9i6] The Somme 197 

South of the Somme Micheler opened a local offen- 
sive on September 4th, on a thirteen mile front, north 
and south of Chaulnes. South of that city Chilly- 
was captured, on September 4th; north of it, Soyecourt, 
on September 4th ; Bemy-en-Santerre, September 17th, 
and Vermandovillers, September 17th. The French 
took seven thousand prisoners and thirty-six guns. 
On October loth Micheler reached the outskirts of 
Ablaincourt. On November 7th Ablaincourt and 
Pressoire, two miles north-east of Chaulnes, were 
stormed. But the Germans clung successfully to 
Chaulnes, although it was nearly surrounded. 

The Allied offensive north of the Somme was renewed 
with violence on September 3d. The British carried 
Guillemont on that day and pushed north to Ginchy, 
two miles north-west of Combles. FayoUe's army broke 
the German line below Combles, from Le Forest, south, 
to the Somme. The final struggle for the cross-ridge, 
aU the way from Combles west to Thiepval, was now 
on. Tanks appeared in the fighting line for the first 
time on September 6th. The Germans put up a des- 
perate resistance, but were slowly crowded off the ridge. 
Martinpuich and Courcelette, on the British left 
centre, and Flers, on the British right centre, fell on 
September 15th; Les Boeufs and Morval, on the British 
right, on September 25th. Below Combles FayoUe 
took Bouchavesnes, September 12th, Le Priez Farm, 
September 14th, Rancourt and Fregicourt, September 
25th. 

Combles was now practically surrounded. It was 
evacuated by the Germans on September 26th. Thiep- 
val, at the opposite end of the line, was stormed by 
the British on the same day. On the right centre the 
British line was pushed north to Gueudecourt. In these 



1 98 The Great War [1916] 

attacks the Allied armies took ten thousand more 
prisoners. Heavy rains now set in and slowed down 
the fighting. But the driving power of the offensive 
was also nearly gone. In October FayoUe several times 
captured Sailly and Saillisel, north of Combles, only to 
lose them again . They were finally occupied on Novem- 
ber 1 2th, thus giving the Allies complete possession of 
the south-east-north-west ridge from the Tortille to 
Thiepval, for which they had been fighting for four 
months and a half . Between October 1st and 7th the 
British advanced their centre to within four miles of 
Bapaume by capturing Le Sars and Eaucourt I'Abbaye. 

But though the Germans had been thrust out of all 
their original lines and were now standing on open 
ground, the Allies were unequal to the task of expelling 
them from Bapaume, The German High Command, 
in one of the volumes issued under its direction for the 
guidance of opinion in Germany, designated September 
25th as the crisis of the battle. On that day it looked 
for a time as if the Allies were going to effect a real 
break-through on the Somme front. But the German 
lines steadied sufficiently to stave off that disaster. 

The Allied advance toward Bapaume in September 
and October left the Germans who were holding the 
Ancre Valley, in a dangerous salient. It was open to 
attack both from the east and the west. The sector 
south of the Ancre was pinched off on November 13th, 
by an operation from the east. The sector to the north 
held out until the i8th against an assault from the 
west. Beaumont-Ham el fell on the 13th, Beaucourt- 
sur- Ancre on the 14th and part of Grandcourt on the 
1 8th. The German loss in prisoners was 7200. This 
easily won success brought the Battle of the Somme to 
an end, although some supplementary operations were 



[i9i6] The Somme 199 

undertaken in January and February, 191 7, before the 
German retreat from the Noyon salient got fairly 
under way. 

The German General Staff professed to regard the 
battle as a draw. It had apparently failed to accom- 
plish anything in the larger strategical sense. There 
had been no break-through. And German operations 
on the Eastern Front had not been interfered with. 
While the Allies were advancing painfully toward 
Bapaume and Chaulnes, Mackensen and Falkenhayn 
were overrunning Rumania. 

Appearances seemed to justify the German conten- 
tion. But appearances were deceptive. Hindenburg 
had become chief of the German General Staff while 
the Battle of the Somme was in its intermediate 
stage. He produced the necessary reserves to check 
the critical attacks in September, without having to 
strip the Russian front or to halt the projected inva- 
sion of Rumania. But no one knew better than 
he in what precarious condition the German lines 
in France were left when the Battle of the Somme 
ended. 

Field Marshal Haig published his official report of 
the battle on December 23, 191 6. In it he modestly 
disclaimed having had any purpose of effecting a general 
readjustment of the Western Front. He said that the 
three objects he had in view were to relieve pressure 
on Verdun, to hold the main German forces in the 
West and to wear down the enemy's strength. If he 
had been less cautious, he might have suggested that 
the Somme operation was also intended to make the 
great Noyon salient untenable. For while he was 
giving his summary to the world Hindenburg was 
already preparing to acknowledge the dislocation of 



200 The Great War [1916] 

his positions in Picardy by drawing back his armies to 
the newly constructed Hindenburg Line. 

The Somme, terrible as it was as an experiment in 
attrition, marked the passing of the attrition theory. 
It opened the way to a return to the warfare of move- 
ment. It proved that the strongest fixed positions 
could be carried, with a reckless expenditure of man- 
power. But it also proved that man-power could be 
economized in carrying them. The increased power 
of the artillery now made it possible to do on a small 
scale in the West what had been done continuously 
in 191 5 and 191 6 in the East. The tank appeared at 
the Somme. So also in the last stages of the battle 
the defence was obliged to resort more and more to 
counter-attacks in order to maintain its positions. 

The losses at the Somme were staggering. The 
British alone had 450,000 casualties. The French 
losses were not published. But they probably were 
between 200,000 and 250,000. The German loss has 
been estimated as high as 700,000. It was perhaps 
about 600,000, including more than 65,000 prisoners. 
This was the high water mark of the warfare of usury. 
But there were to be no more Sommes. After 191 6 
the character of warfare on the Western Front changed 
rapidly. Infantry was used less and less to do line 
breaking work, which could be better and more econo- 
mically done by tanks and artillery. 



CHAPTER XXII 

THE TRENTINO AND GORIZIA. MAY 1 4, I916-NOVEMBER 

5, 1916 

The handicaps imposed on Italy by the lack of a 
true military frontier were disclosed to some extent 
by the Italian campaign of 1915 for Gorizia. They 
were strikingly emphasized by the Austro-Hungarian 
counter-offensive of 1916 on the Trentino front. The 
Trentino was a deep, rugged salient thrust into the 
northern Italian plain. An army moving out of it 
and crossing the shallow belt of Italian foothills would 
debouch only fifteen miles from Vicenza, on the main 
line of communications between the Italian forces on 
the Isonzo and their chief base at Milan. 

In order to prosecute his campaign for Trieste in 
safety General Cadorna was obliged to protect the 
whole mountain front from Udine west to Verona. 
A break-through anywhere on that line would leave the 
Isonzo armies in a closed alley. This weakness in the 
Italian position was obvious to the Austrian and German 
High Commands. They tried to take advantage of it 
in 191 6 and nearly succeeded. They took advantage 
of it in November, 191 7, when the Caporetto disaster 
nearly put Italy out of the war. 

The Austrian front in the Trentino was fed by the 
trunk railroad coming down the Adige Valley from 

201 



202 The Great War 



[1916] 



Bozen. Behind Trent the Austrian High Command 
could mass troops and guns entirely safe from observa- 
tion. While Falkenhayn was preparing in the winter 
of 191 5 to break the French line at Verdun, Hoetzen- 
dorff was also secretly planning an irruption toward 
Vicenza, Padua, and Venice. Owing to the snows he 
could not begin as early as February. But in March 
and April he assembled below Trent a powerful artillery 
park, greatly exceeding in calibre anything the Italians 
then had available. Among his 750 heavy pieces were 
12-inch Skoda howitzers, 15-inch naval guns, and 17- 
inch German howitzers. He also had some 1600 
lighter field guns. These 2350 cannon were massed 
on a front of about thirty miles, extending from Rove- 
reto, on the Adige, below Trent, north-east to Borgo, 
in the Val Sugana, an east-and-west valley which 
stretches from Trent to Cismon. 

An army of from 350,000 to 400,000 men was 
collected under the nominal command of the Heir 
Apparent, the Archduke Karl. Hoetzendorff, how- 
ever, was the real leader. Although Cadorna had 
inspected the Trentino front in April and made a change 
in the command of the First Army, replacing General 
Brusati with General Pecori-Giraldi, the Italians were 
poorly prepared to meet the exceedingly vigorous 
offensive which Hoetzendorff launched on May 14th. 

The main attack was made in the centre, the Austrian 
columns converging toward the mountain towns of 
Arsiero and Asiago, which lie in a valley running from 
south-west to north-east through the district known 
as the Sette Comuni. These towns are about ten 
miles from the Venetian Plain and are separated from 
it only by the Alpine foothills. 

The Austrian centre and left easily reached their 



[i9i6] The Trentino and Gorizia 203 

objectives. The centre moved down from its positions 
north-east of Rovereto, stormed Monte Maggio on 
May 1 8th, Monte Toraro and Col Santo on May 19th, 
and crossed into the upper Posina Valley, leading to 
Arsiero, The left wing, getting a start a little later, 
crossed the Val Sugana at Borgo, stormed Armentera 
Ridge, cleared the Italian frontier on May 26th, 
reached Monte Mosciagh, five miles south of the 
border, on May 27th, and captured Asiago on May 28th. 

Cadorna had hastened to the Trentino front on May 
20th and taken personal charge. He tried to hold up 
the Austro-Hungarian advance toward Arsiero. But 
the enemy pushed down the Posina Valley and took the 
little city. On May 29th Pria Fara, a commanding 
height two miles south of Arsiero, was abandoned 
by mistake and the Italian centre was obliged to make 
its final stand in the mountain section on a lower ridge, 
called Monte Ciove. 

Cadorna's situation was critical. It was saved in 
part by the failure of the Austrian right wing to keep 
progress with the centre and left. This wing started 
from Rovereto up the valley of the little Leogra River. 
It encountered a heroic resistance at Zugna, Buole 
Pass, and Monte Pasubio, being held up from May 
24th to May 30th. At Monte Pasubio the Austrians 
attacked again and again, but without results. The 
Leogra passage remained closed. If Hoetzendorff 
could have forced it, his right would have come out of 
the foothills at Schio, directly south of Arsiero, and 
taken Cadorna's line below Arsiero and Asiago in the 
rear. 

As it was, Cadorna was able to hold on to the Ciove 
Ridge through the first two weeks of June. By that 
time Brusilofl's sensational victories on the Eastern 



204 The Great War [1916] 

Front compelled Hoetzendorff to send guns and re- 
serves back to Galicia. Though in sight of the Vene- 
tian Plain and only twenty miles from Vicenza, he 
was obliged to break off an offensive which, from June 
1st to June 15th, seemed on the verge of a tremendous 
success. A local attack was made by the Austrian 
left wing on June i8th on the Italian positions south 
of Asiago. It failed with heavy losses. But even if 
it had succeeded, Hoetzendorff would hardly have 
been able to follow it up. 

He had won in Italy by depleting the armies in Vol- 
hynia, Galicia, and Bukowina. He had staked success 
on Russian inactivity. His miscalculation was costly, 
for Austria lost on the Eastern Front ten times the 
guns and prisoners she had made in the Trentino. She 
was also to lose a part of the territorial gains she had 
made at Italy's expense. Realizing that Hoetzendorff 's 
reserves were being rushed east, Cadorna himself 
assumed the offensive in the latter half of June. The 
Austro-Hungarians accordingly withdrew to a new line 
of defence. On June 26th the Italians reoccupied 
Asiago and, on June 27th, Arsiero and Posina. On 
July 23d they recaptured Monte Cimone. The enemy's 
positions extended from Rovereto south-east to a point 
just north of Arsiero, thence north-east, past Asiago, 
to the Italian frontier. The Italians never got as far 
north as Borgo again until the armistice was signed. 

Having temporarily secured his rear and flank, 
Cadorna renewed the Isonzo offensive. For more than 
a year he had been held up by the Austrian bridge^ 
head west of Gorizia. Now he was ready to storm it. 
On August 6th the entire Austro-Hungarian line was 
bombarded and an attack in the nature of a feint was 
made on the positions just east of Monfalcone, near 



Ii9i6] The Trentino and Gorizia 205 

the shore of the Adriatic. On the same day the main 
attack was deHvered on an eight-mile front west of 
Gorizia. Monte Podgora and Monte Calvario, on 
the west bank of the Isonzo, were carried on that day. 
So was Monte Sabotino, on the west bank, command- 
ing Gorizia from the north. South of the city, on the 
east bank, Monte San Michele, was stormed. On 
August 7th the ItaHans cleared up the entire bridge- 
head. On the 8th they threw pontoons across the 
Isonzo. The Austro-Hungarians rapidly evacuated 
Gorizia, King Victor Emmanuel entering it on August 
9th. From August 8th to August 15th Cadorna de- 
livered a series of attacks on the western rim of the 
Carso, taking five outlying spurs. In the period from 
August 4th to August 15th the Austro-Hungarians 
lost 18,758 prisoners and thirty guns. 

But the way was not open yet either to Trieste or 
Laibach. Boroevic, the Austro-Hungarian commander, 
drew back to the Carso and Bainsizza plateaus, which 
flanked the eastern passage-way out of Gorizia. There 
he held on, though occasionally hard pressed, until the 
Caporetto counter-offensive of 191 7. 

In September Cadorna made a four-day assault 
above and below Gorizia, using 150,000 men. His 
gains were slight. He got possession of Plava, on the 
east bank of the river, at the northern edge of the 
Bainsizza Plateau, and advanced his lines a little east 
of Gorizia and on the Carso. Seven thousand more 
prisoners were taken. Again, in November, a five-day 
offensive yielded nine thousand prisoners, but did not 
materially improve the Italian position. 

The Italian armies on the Isonzo had shown admirable 
courage and endurance. Between August 4th and 
November 4th they had taken forty thousand prisoners 



2o6 The Great War [1916] 

— as many as the British had taken at the Somme. 
The fall of Gorizia had raised high hopes. Italy was 
persuaded and was anxious to persuade her Western 
Allies that the most promising road to Berlin lay 
through Laibach and Vienna. But Italy's confidence 
and her theory were alike based on a military illusion. 
Whatever may have been the negative effects of the 
Isonzo campaign in the way of weakening Austria- 
Hungary, it could lead nowhere. It, too, was a costly 
experiment in attrition. Italy's strength was being 
employed lavishly and on the whole, unprofitably, in 
a strategically barren enterprise. 



CHAPTER XXIII 

THE SACRIFICE OF RUMANIA. AUGUST 28, I916- 
DECEMBER 3I, I916 

There is a striking analogy between Rumania's 
situation in 191 6 and Italy's in 19 15. Italy was a 
member of the Triple Alliance, although her interests 
clashed violently with those of Austria-Hungary. 
Rumania was long a satellite of the Teuton Powers, 
looking to Berlin for protection against Russia, although 
generally on uncomfortable terms with Vienna. 

Russia had taken Bessarabia away from Rumania 
after the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, thus shabbily 
requiting the valuable assistance which the Rumanians 
gave the Russians at Plevna. A breach was created 
between the two countries which lasted for a genera- 
tion. Rumania was thrown into an unnatural alliance 
through Russia's action — approved by Bismarck — just 
as Italy had been through the French occupation of 
Tunis, also promoted by the wily German Chancellor. 

The Italo-Turkish war uncovered the real antagon- 
isms existing between Italy and Austria-Hungary. 
The Balkan wars did the same service for Rumania. 
When the latter joined with Serbia and Greece to defeat 
Bulgaria in the Second Balkan War, she outraged 
Austro-Hungarian sensibilities and prejudices, for she 
was helping to create a stronger Serbia. Vienna 

207 



2o8 The Great War 



[1916] 



backed Bulgaria, and the Dual Monarchy was so 
chagrined when Bulgaria collapsed that it tried to 
get Italian consent in 1913 to attack Serbia. 

In Rumania, as in Italy, nationalistic sentiment 
had been aroused by a successful war. Rumania, too, 
had an Irredenta. Transylvania was largely Ruma- 
nian in speech and blood and Hungary had repressed 
the Transylvanian Rumanians as systematically as 
Austria had repressed the Italians of the Trentino and 
Istria. The same appeal was made in both cases to 
the sense of racial brotherhood and solidarity. 

Although King Carol was a HohenzoUem and strongly 
pro-German in sympathy, Rumania's participation in 
the war as an ally of Austria-Hungary was as com- 
pletely foreclosed as Italy's. Berlin and Vienna both 
recognized that fact from the beginning and both 
would have been satisfied to see Italy and Rumania 
remain neutral. 

Rumania had good reason to go slow in casting her 
lot with the Entente. Her whole northern border lay 
open to Teuton attacks. She was on friendly relations 
with Serbia and Greece. But she distrusted Bulgaria, 
from whom she had just taken the lower portion of the 
Dobrudja. Turkey and Bulgaria were possible enemies 
in her rear and Allied sea power was helpless to protect 
her, although it could readily protect Greece. 

Until the Balkan situation cleared it would have been 
folly for Rumania to go in. But the Allies were un- 
equal to mastering the Balkan situation. If the 
Gallipoli expedition had been successful, Greece and 
Bulgaria could have been brought into line in the sum- 
mer of 191 5 and Rumania's rear would have been 
secured. Then Greek, Bulgarian, Rumanian, Serbian, 
French, and British armies could have crossed the 



[iei6] The Sacrifice of Rumania 209 

Danube and connected up with the Russians in southern 
and eastern Hungary. 

But the Dardanelles were never forced and Allied 
military failures and diplomatic bungling allowed 
Bulgaria to gravitate into the Teuton alliance and 
Serbia and Montenegro to be conquered. After the 
Serbian tragedy and the great Russian retreat of 191 5, 
Rumania could easily have justified herself in sticking 
to a policy of neutrality. In 19 16 she was surrounded 
by enemies on three sides and the only Allied support 
which could surely reach her must come from Russia, 
already long past the peak of her military strength. 

As 1 91 6 wore on, however, the Rumanian Govern- 
ment and people became more and more eager to enter 
the war. The colossal German failure at Verdun 
impressed them. So did the Brusiloff's advance 
through Bukowina and Galicia to the Carpathians. 
Bukowina and Transylvania had been promised to the 
Rumanians. But if the Russians could conquer Buko- 
wina and, moving through the Carpathian passes, 
overrun Transylvania, the offer to Rumania might be- 
come outlawed. The Western Allies now came for- 
ward with a proposition to secure Rumania's rear by 
an offensive from Salonica, which would fully occupy 
Bulgaria. 

Hesitating and uneasy, more than half convinced 
that belligerency would be less costly than continued 
neutrality, and greatly overvaluing the possibilities 
of an Allied campaign from Salonica, the Rumanian 
Government decided in August, 1916, to risk a declara- 
tion of war against Austria-Hungary. On the 17th 
of that month a treaty was signed between Rumania, 
on the one hand, and France, Great Britain, Italy, and 

Russia, on the other. This defined the territorial 
14 " 



210 The Great War [1916] 

compensations to which Rumania should be entitled 
at the close of the war. They included Bukowina, 
Transylvania, the Banat, and some small portions of 
Hungary proper. Rumania was to attack Austria- 
Hungary on August 28th. The Allied offensive from 
Salonica was to begin on August 20th. Russia was 
to co-operate on the Bukowina front and to send one 
cavalry and two infantry divisions to the Dobrudja. 

Unaware of the provisions of this secret compact 
and at a loss to account for the disaster which so quickly 
overwhelmed Rumania, military writers have spread 
the impression that Rumania acted solely in her own 
interest and disregarded Allied advice in employing 
her main forces in a rash invasion of Hungary. This 
theory is imaginary and does Rumania a great injustice. 
The military convention annexed to the treaty pro- 
vided explicitly that "the principal object [objective?] 
oi Rumanian action will be in the direction of Buda- 
pest through Transylvania." The AUied staffs ap- 
proved the Transylvanian campaign, if they didn't 
originate it. Responsibility for the Rumanian fiasco 
rests with them rather than with the Rumanian High 
Command. 

Rumania's declaration of war on August 27 took the 
Teuton Powers somewhat by surprise. Austria-Hun- 
gary was not prepared to defend the Transylvanian 
border. Eastern Transylvania forms a salient project- 
ing between Wallachia and Moldavia, the two grand 
divisions of the Rumanian kingdom. It was, therefore, 
open to invasion on two sides — from the east out of 
Moldavia and from the south out of Wallachia. Ruma- 
nia had an army of about six hundred thousand men. 
Probably two thirds of her active forces were employed 
in the irruption into Transylvania. 



[I9I6J The Sacrifice of Rumania 211 

Rapid progress was made at all points during the 
first two weeks of September. From the Moldavian 
side Rumanian columns crossed the Carpathians 
through Tolgyes, Bekas, Gyimes, and Ojtoz passes. 
They reached the valley of the upper Maros, on the 
north, and the valley of the upper Alt, on the south. 
By the end of September they had penetrated Tran- 
sylvania to a depth of fifty miles. But this advance, 
made against inferior enemy forces, had little effect 
on the general strategical situation. The Rumanians 
in this region remained out of touch with the Russians 
farther north, although there was at one time the 
prospect of a real junction near Bistritz, in eastern 
Hungary. 

The armies marching north from Wallachia also met 
with little opposition. On the extreme left, one column, 
passing the "Iron Gates" of the Danube, captured 
Orsova and advanced to Mehadia, on the Orsova- 
Temesvar railroad. A second column, more to the 
east, crossed the Transylvanian Alps through the 
Vulcan and Szurduk passes, took Petroseny, a mining 
centre, and pushed on as far as Hatzeg, twenty-five 
miles north of the frontier. A third detachment, using 
the Red Tower Pass, seized the important town of 
Hermannstadt, about twenty miles from the border. 
A fourth detachment, operating farther east, captured 
Fogaras, and penetrated Transylvania to a distance 
of nearly fifty miles. Finally a fifth detachment took 
Kronstadt, seventy miles east of Hermannstadt. 

The Rumanians had now overrun about a quarter 
of the area of Transylvania. They had made a good 
start in the direction of Budapest. But their easy 
successes on the Hungarian front were neutralized by 
the failure of the Salonica offensive to make any head- 



212 The Great War [i9i6j 

way into Bulgaria. Rumania could not pursue an 
offensive in Hungary and at the same time defend 
herself on the Danube and in the Dobrudja, unless 
Sarrail kept the Bulgarians fully occupied. 

This he never did. Sarrail's strength was probably 
greatly exaggerated. He was credited in 191 6 with 
having at his disposal an army of 700,000 men. Gen- 
eral Zurlinden, formerly French Minister of War, says 
in his book. La Guerre de Liberation, that Sarrail had 
only 80,000 French, 80,000 British, 100,000 Serbs, and 
some Italian and Russian contingents — about 300,000 
men in all. Moreover, his rear was threatened by the 
Greek army, which Constantine had concentrated in 
Thessaly. He was in no condition to attempt a large- 
scale invasion of Bulgaria and, apparently, the Bulga- 
rians and Germans knew that as well as he did. 

The offensive of August 20th, promised by the Allies 
in the treaty of alliance with Rumania, was a military 
fiction. A French war office bulletin, issued on August 
2 1st, announced that on August 20th (according to 
schedule) "the Allied forces at Salonica took the 
offensive on the entire front." 

What happened was that the Bulgars anticipated 
Sarrail's attack and made one themselves. The Allied 
left wing was driven back at Fiorina, in northern 
Greece; at Kastoria, farther west, and at Koritza, 
just across the Albanian border. These actions oc- 
curred between August i8th and August 23d. On 
Sarrail's extreme right the Bulgarians advanced in the 
region of Drama and Seres, between August 20th and 
25th, and occupied the Greek port of Kavala on 
September 12th. 

The Sarrail offensive never got going at all on the 
right and central sections of the Salonica front. On 



[i9i6] The Sacrifice of Rumania 213 

the left, where the reorganized Serbian army was 
stationed, it did get under way about September 15th. 
Fiorina was outflanked on the east by the Serbians 
and was evacuated by the Bulgars on September i8th. 
Then the Serbs, supported on their left by French and 
Russian detachments, started on their two months 
drive for Monastir. But this was an operation de- 
signed primarily to recover a foothold on Serbian terri- 
tory and only incidentally to relieve Teuton pressure 
on Rumania. 

Having shown its contempt for the Salonica offensive, 
the Teuton High Command in Bulgaria turned north 
to attack Rumania on the Danube. Field Marshal 
Mackensen, who was in general charge in the Balkans, 
gathered together Bulgarian, German, and Turkish 
divisions and hurled them against the weak enemy 
line in the Dobrudja. Mackensen showed remarkable 
expedition and vigour. Bulgaria, Germany, and Turkey 
declared war on Rumania on August 29th. On Sep- 
tember 2d Mackensen invaded southern Dobrudja at 
three points. His easternmost column, operating near 
the Black Sea, took the fortress of Bajardjik, on the 
8th, and also occupied the seaports of Baltchik and 
Kavarna. Mangalia, another seaport, half-way up 
to Constanza, fell on September loth. 

The central column marched against the fortress of 
Silistria, on the right bank of the Danube, directly 
south of Bucharest. Silistria surrendered on Septem- 
ber 9th. The westernmost column, on September 
6th, took by storm the fortress of Turkutai, on the 
Danube, thirty miles west of Silistria. Twenty-five 
thousand Rumanians were captured. By September 
15th, Mackensen had cleared the Dobrudja to a depth 
of fifty miles — up to within ten miles of the Bucharest- 



214 The Great War [1916] 

Constanza railroad. The whole southern Rumanian 
front had begun to crumble. 

The Rumanian armies in Transylvania now foimd 
themselves in a dangerous position. Their offensive 
had been suddenly superseded by a Teuton offensive 
far more formidable, because it was to be conducted 
simultaneously on three fronts. Hindenburg's plan 
was to envelop Wallachia from the north, west, and 
south, and squeeze out a highly vulnerable salient. 
The northern and western operations were entrusted 
to Falkenhayn, who was, however, subordinated to 
Mackensen before the campaign was over. The two 
German commanders had about six hundred thousand 
seasoned troops and enjoyed a vast superiority in 
artillery. 

Falkenhayn began the counter-offensive about the 
middle of September. He struck first at the Rumanian 
column north of Vulcan Pass and drove it out of 
Petroseny and back into the mountains. This move- 
ment began on September 19th and ended on September 
23d. On September 26th-29th he enveloped the Ruma- 
nian forces at Hermannstadt and completely routed 
them. That reverse uncovered the flank of the Ruma- 
nian army in the Kronstadt region. It retreated hur- 
riedly on October 8th. The forces farther north, which 
had come from Moldavia through the Carpathian 
passes, were left "in the air" and also hastily retired. 
By October i6th Transylvania had been completely 
evacuated and the Rumanians on the northern front 
were trying to hold the passes into Wallachia. 

The jaws of the German trap were now beginning 
to close on Rumania. On the Danube side Mackensen 
had brought up his heavy guns and was ready to break 
the Rumanian-Russian line covering the Bucharest- 



[i9i6] The Sacrifice of Rumania 215 

Constanza railroad. Russia had sent three cavah*y 
divisions to the Dobrudja, instead of the one she pro- 
mised to send. But this reinforcement was insufficient. 
Between October 19th and October 22d Mackensen 
penetrated the Russo-Rumanian Hne at several points 
and won a decisive victory at Mejidia, half-way 
between Constanza and Chernavoda. The latter 
town, the southern terminus of the great Danube 
bridge, was abandoned. So was the port of Constanza, 
which the Bulgars entered on October 22 d. 

Mackensen had now accomplished his main strategic 
purpose south of the Danube. He had cleared the 
entire southern bank, east to Chernavoda, and penned 
the enemy on that bank into the angle just below the 
Danube Delta. He could now safely turn west and help 
Falkenhayn pinch out the Wallachian salient. The Rus- 
sian High Command sent General Sakharoff into the 
Dobrudja with fresh troops. But all they could do was 
to push Mackensen 's advanced guards back to within 
fifteen miles of the Chernavoda-Constanza railway. 

On the Transylvanian front Falkenhayn's Ninth 
German Army captured Vulcan Pass, on October 25th. 
Moving south, it won a two-day battle (November 
15-17) at Turgu-Jiu, twenty miles below the pass. 
The Rtimanian resistance in this sector was broken. 
Falkenhayn reached the Orsova-Craiova railroad, 
fifty miles south of the pass, on November 19th, and 
the city of Craiova, on November 21st. This city is 
the key to Western, or Little, Wallachia, being the 
junction point of all the railroads in that section. The 
Germans were now far in the rear of the Rumanian 
column which had entered Hungary at Orsova. This 
force was completely cut off, fled into the mountains, 
and presently surrendered. 



2i6 The Great War 



[1916] 



Avarescu, the Rumanian Commander-in-Chief, now 
tried to form a new north-and-south Hne along the 
Alt River, east of Craiova. But this line was exposed 
to turning movements at both ends. Another German 
force came south through the Rothenthurm and Torz- 
burg passes, and got in Avarescu's rear. Mackensen 
crossed the Danube at two points east of the mouth 
of the Alt and on November 25th reached Alexandria, 
about fifty miles south-west of Bucharest. 

The Rumanians retreated hurriedly to the Hne of 
the Argesu River, ten miles west of Bucharest. Fal- 
kenhayn struck north-east with his Ninth Army from 
Craiova and made a junction with the German columns 
which had marched through Rothenthurm and Torzburg 
passes, at Titu, north-east of Bucharest and in the 
rear of the Argesu line. Mackensen at the same time 
crossed the Argesu south of Buchare,st. There was 
nothing for Avarescu to do but to abandon the capital. 
If he had tried to defend it he would have lost his 
army as well as the city. 

Mackensen entered Bucharest on December 6th. 
On the same day the Germans captured Ploesti, an 
important railroad centre thirty miles north of Bucha- 
rest, commanding the line north through the mountains 
to Kronstadt. From this point the Ninth Army 
moved eastward to Mizil and thence to Buzeu. Buzeu 
was reached on December 15th. Ten thousand prison- 
ers were taken on the way. Bulgarian forces now 
crossed the Danube from the Dobrudja and cleared 
the northern bank of the river. Sakharoff evacuated 
the northern angle of the Dobrudja and joined the 
Rumanian and Russian forces holding the line from 
Braila, past Fokshani, across to the Transylvanian Alps. 
Operations slackened after Christmas, the Rumanians 



[i9i6] The Sacrifice of Rumania 217 

constructing positions which they were able to hold, 
in the main, through 191 7 and up to the time of the 
conclusion of the Treaty of Bucharest. 

Mackensen and Falkenhayn had fought a sensation- 
ally successful campaign. They had conquered for 
Germany a rich granary and another valuable centre of 
oil production. They had captured nearly ohe hundred 
thousand prisoners and almost put Rumania out of the 
war. They had opened new lines of communication 
with Constantinople and in four months had reduced 
the length of the Teuton eastern front by about seVen 
hundred miles. This, in itself, was a great gain, for 
Germany needed more troops in the West and could 
now afford to use units of inferior quality to guard her 
eastern lines. But, on the other hand, the German 
operation, brilliant as it was, had failed to produce the 
envelopment aimed at. It squeezed out the Rumanian 
salient. But the Rumanians had escaped through the 
open end. 

The Salonica offensive, which was to have joined up 
the Allied armies in Macedonia with those in the 
Dobrudja, ended just before Mackensen made his 
entry into Bucharest. French cavalry, supporting 
the Serbian army, occupied Monastir on November 
19th. A tiny strip of Serbian soil had been reclaimed 
while the Teuton allies were overrunning Wallachia. 
Italy reinforced her Albanian army in the summer and 
fall of 1916. Italian detachments occupied all of 
southern Albania and extended their lines east to the 
Greek border, completing a junction with Sarrail's 
forces on October 25th. This extension helped to 
secure Sarrail against hostilities on the part of Greece. 
But it came too late to put any real vitality into the 
Salonica offensive. 



2i8 The Great War [1916] 

Allied relations with Greece continued unsatisfactory 
through 1916. In May the Bulgars seized Fort 
Rupel and several other Greek posts north-east of 
Salonica, outside the Allied sphere of operations. But 
Constantine ignored this affront and made no protest 
against the transfer of the garrisons to Germany as 
"prisoners." He was equally indifferent when the 
Bulgars captured the port of Kavala in September. 
After the Fort Rupel incident the Allies imposed a 
blockade on Greece, seized Greek ships, and took other 
measures to root out pro-German activities and compel 
a demobilization of the Greek army. On June 21st the 
British, French, and Russian ministers presented a joint 
note to Constantine's government, demanding demobil- 
ization, dismissal of the Skouloudis Ministry, dissolution 
of the anti-Ally Chamber of Deputies, and the removal of 
pro-German police officials. Two days later Constantine 
promised compliance with these demands. He ap- 
pointed Zaimis as Premier and dissolved the Chamber; 
but he persistently delayed demobilization. Venizelos 
went to Crete and organized a rival provisional govern- 
ment, controlling the Greek Islands and a part of 
Macedonia. This government, with a seat at Salonica, 
was recognized by the Allies. It then declared war 
on Bulgaria. 

Lambros succeeded Zaimis as Premier in October. 
He surrendered the Greek navy to the Allies. British 
and French marines were landed at Piraeus and sent 
to Athens. Constantine was forced to transfer his 
still undemobilized forces to the Peloponnesus and to 
turn over a part of his artillery and munitions. 

On December ist and 2d small Allied detachments 
in Athens were attacked by partisans of Constantine. 
Three officers and twelve men were killed and these 



[i9i6] The Sacrifice of Rumania 219 

units would probably have been massacred, except for 
the fact that the Allied warships at Piraeus began to 
fire shells into the city. The Allies now made new 
demands for reparations and guarantees, which Con- 
stantine acceded to with reluctance; 

The Allied procedure in Greece was lamentably 
feeble and hesitating. Great Britain, France, and 
Russia, being the guardians of the Greek State, had the 
right, under the treaty of 1863, to intervene to prevent 
the overthrow of constitutional government. It was 
easy enough to make out a case against Constantine 
and dethrone him, as the Allies finally did in 191 7. 
Greece was at heart pro-Ally, but she had been allowed 
to drift toward pro-Germanism under Constantine's 
malign influence. Military as well as political consid- 
erations demanded his expulsion. But diplomatic inde- 
cision left him for two years in a post where he could 
do the Allied cause immense injury. The temporizing 
Greek policy of the Entente was one of the least 
pardonable political blunders of the war. 



CHAPTER XXIV 

ASIATIC AND COLONIAL CAMPAIGNS. JANUARY II, 
I916-DECEMBER 31, I916 

On the Asiatic front in 191 6 the outstanding events 
were the Russian conquest of Armenia and the British 
surrender at Kut-el-Amara. 

On being relieved of the command of the armies on 
the Russian west front (September 6, 191 5), the Grand 
Duke Nicholas was ordered to the Caucasus. His 
military talents soon began to make themselves felt 
in this region. The Turks had attempted a winter 
campaign west and north of Kars in December, 1914, 
and January, 191 5, and had suffered disaster. The 
Grand Duke decided to make one in January and 
February, 1916, with Erzerum as his objective. The 
Turks had reduced their forces in Armenia in order to 
defend the Gallipoli peninsula and were not prepared 
to resist a vigorous Russian offensive. They were also 
taken by surprise by Nicholas's daring tactics. 

A Russian army about 170,000 strong, under General 
Yudenitch, crossed the Turkish frontier west of Kars 
on January nth and made its way in three colimms 
across the snow-covered mountains. The northern 
column encountered a Turkish detachment north-east 
of Erzerum and pushed it off in the direction of the 
Olty valley. The southern column cut off the extreme 

220 



[i9i6] Asiatic and Colonial Campaigns 221 

Turkish right wing and drove it toward Kurdistan. 
The Russian centre met the main Turkish force at 
Kuprikeui, thirty-three miles east of Erzerum, on 
January i6,th, and defeated it in a three days' battle. 
The Turks retreated in disorder, losing many guns. 

Yudenitch advanced rapidly to the outer defences 
of Erzerum and stormed them without much difficulty. 
There was still an inner circle of forts to be battered 
down. But the Turks were cowed. They fled from 
the city before it had been actually invested. The 
Russians entered it on February i6th, capturing only 
a rear-guard of thirteen thousand men. More than 
three hundred heavy guns and large quantities of 
supplies were abandoned to the victors. 

Erzerum was the key to Armenia. Its loss compelled 
the Turks to retreat west to a new base at Erzingan 
and to relax their hold on the region between Erzerum 
and the Black Sea. Russian forces now cleared the coast 
line west to Trebizond, which fell on April i8th. Its 
capture gave the Grand Duke a coast base as well as 
an interior one, and enabled him to complete the 
occupation of Armenia. His right wing reached 
Platana on May nth. The left, or southern, wing 
had made rapid progress after the fall of Erzerum. 
It reached Mush on February i8th and Bitlis on March 
2d, the latter town lying to the west of Lake Van. 

There was an interruption of the offensive between 
May and July. In the latter month the Russian centre 
pushed the Turks back steadily from the neighbour- 
hood of Erzerum one hundred miles west to Erzingan, 
which was occupied on July 25th. Armenia was now 
practically cleared, except on the south. With the 
capture of Erzingan the Russian advance west toward 
Anatolia was suspended. Turkish reinforcements, re- 



^'^'2 The Great War [1916] 

leased by the evacuation of Gallipoli, began to arrive 
after April on the Armenian-Kurdistan front. But 
they were used mainly in protecting Turkish communi- 
cations with Bagdad. These communications the 
Russians were never able to disturb. 

In order to relieve Kut, Russia had sent an ex- 
pedition, early in the winter of 1915-16, against 
the Bagdad railway. It came through Persia and 
crossed the Turkish frontier about 150 miles north-east 
of Bagdad. There it halted until summer, when it 
was attacked by the reinforced Turks and driven 
back some distance into Persia, beyond Hama- 
dan. Another expedition, aiming at Mosul, crossed 
the frontier at Rewanduz, one hundred miles east of 
its objective. It was turned back in July. From 
Mush and Bitlis, in the Lake Van region, the Grand 
Duke Nicholas's left wing made a demonstration in 
August against Diarbekr, on the Bagdad railway, 
two hundred miles north-west of Mosul. This move- 
ment was halted by the Turks west of Bitlis. The 
Russians, retreating, evacuated both Bitlis and Mush, 
but regained Mush a little later. From the fall of 
191 6 on there was little fighting of importance on the 
Armenian and Kurdistan fronts. 

General Townshend's British army was surrounded 
in Kut-el-Amara on December 7, 191 5. Kut lies in a 
loop of the Tigris. The narrow neck of land on the 
north was strongly fortified. The Turks tried to 
storm it on December 23, 191 5, but failed. Then 
they sat down to starve the garrison out. The main 
body of the Turkish army occupied positions on both 
sides of the river several miles below Kut, where it was 
engaged in holding off a British expedition, under 
General Sir Percy Lake, sent to Townshend's relief. 



Ii9i6j Asiatic and Colonial Campaigns 223 

Lake had thirty thousand Indian troops, two mixed 
Anglo-Indian divisions, and the communications units 
of Townshend's army, about ninety thousand men in 
all. 

This force started north on January 6, 191 6, and 
defeated the Turkish advance guard at Sheik Saad 
on January 8th. It arrived on January 226. at Umm- 
el-Henneh and Felhaie, the strong Turkish positions 
east of Kut. Rains and floods interfered with the 
British operations. On March 7th an imsuccessful 
assault was made on the Dujailah Redoubt, on the 
enemy's right. On April 4th the Umm-el-Henneh 
position was taken. On April 8th an attack on Sanna- 
i-Yat failed. Another failed on April 20th-2ist. 

Townshend was only sixteen miles away. But his 
supplies were exhausted, and on April 28th he surren- 
dered. The siege had lasted 147 days. The Turks 
claimed thirteen thousand prisoners. According to 
the British statements, Townshend had left only 2970 
British and 6000 Indian troops. Lake lost 23,000 men 
attempting to raise the siege. 

The surrender of Kut, with a relief force pounding 
at its gates, was a painful blow to British prestige in 
the East. A parliamentary commission was appointed 
to inquire into the conditions which made Townshend's 
failure possible. It brought in a report, pubHshed on 
June 26, 1917, which described the Bagdad campaign 
as "an offensive movement based on political and 
military miscalculations and attempted with tired and 
insufficient forces and inadequate preparation." The 
chief responsibility was fixed on General Sir John 
Nixon, who was accused of "confident optimism." 
He was especially blamed for not providing adequate 
river transport and proper medical and hospital service. 



224 The Great War [1916] 

The Viceroy of India (Lord Hardinge) and other 
Indian military officials, the Secretary of State for 
India (Austen Chamberlain), and the War Committee 
of the British Cabinet were also censured. Mr. Cham- 
berlain resigned. Lord Hardinge resigned, but the 
government refused to accept his resignation, and that 
decision was approved by the House of Commons. 

Late in May the British captured the Dujailah 
Redoubt and approached nearer to Kut, which no 
longer had any particular value. In August, Lake was 
succeeded by General Sir Frederick Stanley Maude, 
who reorganized the Mesopotamian army and spent 
the rest of the year in preparing an advance on Bagdad 
which would have something more behind it than 
"confident optimism." 

In May a small detachment of Cossacks reached 
the British lines below Kut. This was the only junc- 
tion ever effected on the Asiatic front between the 
British and the Russians. 

German East Africa was conquered in large part by 
the Allies in 191 6. It was defended by a well-trained 
and organized negro army of thirty thousand men, 
under German officers. This force had practically 
held its own in 1914 and 1915. In the spring of 1916 
an army, furnished by the Union of South Africa, was 
transported to British East Africa and employed in 
an invasion of German East Africa from the north. 
General Smith- Dorrien had been sent from Europe 
to command this expedition. He fell sick and resigned 
in favour of General Jan C. Smuts, the former Boer 
leader. Smuts crossed the Kilimanjaro Mountains 
and seized the railway running up from Tanga, on 
the Indian Ocean coast. Then he worked his way 
south to within twenty-five miles of the main east- 



[ij>i6] Asiatic and Colonial Campaigns 225 

and-west railroad, running from Dar-Es-Salaam to 
Ujiji. 

Another British column, coming from the north, 
reached Kilimatinde, on the main cross line. A Belgian 
detachment, coming south-east from the Belgian 
Congo, captured Tabora, farther west on the main 
railroad. Ujiji was also occupied by the Belgians. 
A British column moved north into German East 
Africa from Nyassaland, and Portuguese troops crossed 
the border from Portuguese East Africa. Dar-es- 
Salaam was captured by naval forces on September 
3d and by the end of the year all the coast towns were 
in hands of the Allies. The German forces were driven 
into the mountainous sector south of the central east- 
and-west railroad, where they held out until late in 
1917. 

Portugal had nominally entered the war in 1914 
under the terms of her treaty of alliance with Great 
Britain. She was bound to furnish Great Britain 
with ten thousand troops, if called on. No call of 
any sort was made until February, 1916, when the 
British Government asked Portugal to commandeer 
forty German and Austro-Hungarian ships, interned 
in Portuguese harbours. This was done and on March 
9th Germany declared war on Portugal. Austro- 
Hungary issued a similar declaration on March 15th. 
Portugal had, however, previously engaged in hostilities 
with German troops on the Angola-German South- 
west Africa border. 

IS 



CHAPTER XXV 

THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND — OTHER NAVAL OPERATIONS 

OF I916 

The battle of Jutland (May 31-June i, 1916) was 
the only fleet engagement of the war. It was the first 
full test of the new modes and appliances of warfare at 
sea. The dreadnaught, the super-dreadnaught, the 
battle cruiser, the submarine, the enlarged destroyer, 
the long-range torpedo, the scouting seaplane, and the 
Zeppelin had all come in since the battle between 
the Russian and Japanese fleets in the Sea of Japan. 
In tonnage, armour, speed, and weight of broadside the 
two armadas which fought off Horn Reef were incom- 
parably the most formidable ever assembled. 

Yet Jutland will never rank as one of the crowning 
naval battles of history. It was indecisive. It ended 
in confusion. The superior British fleet drew off on 
June 1st, not knowing whether it had won a victory, 
fought a draw, or suffered a reverse. The inferior 
German fleet claimed a victory. But it never sought 
an action again. 

Possibly when it left its bases it did not expect to 
fight. The collision was accidental. While Admiral 
Scheer was cruising along the Danish coast, the British 
Grand Fleet happened to be making one of its periodi- 
cal sweeps through the North Sea. It had left Scapa 

226 



[i9i6] The Battle of Jutland 227 

Flow on May 30th and was coming south in the usual 
formation, with the battle cruiser squadron, accompanied 
by scouts, about fifty miles ahead of the battle fleet. 

Sir David Beatty was in command of this advanced 
force, to which was also attached the fifth battle 
squadron. He didn't anticipate meeting the enemy 
and had orders, when he reached latitude 56° 40', to 
turn north again and get into visual contact with the 
main fleet. At 2 p.m. on May 31st he had turned 
north. At 2.20 p.m. the light cruiser Galatea sighted 
to the east two enemy vessels, apparently holding up 
a neutral merchant steamer. Fifteen minutes later, 
smoke, indicating the presence of an enemy squadron, 
was observed in the same direction. Beatty steered 
east and at 3.31 p.m. made out five German battle 
cruisers, accompanied by destroyers and light cruisers. 

The first phase of the battle was a running fight 
between this German battle cruiser squadron, under 
Admiral Hipper, and the British battle cruiser squadron 
and fifth battle squadron. Beatty was much stronger 
than Hipper. He had six battle cruisers, four of the 
Lion class and two of the Indefatigable class. The 
former were rated at 28.5 knots, and carried eight 13.5- 
inch guns. The latter were rated at 25 knots and 
carried eight 12-inch guns. The fifth battle squadron 
consisted of four dreadnaughts of the Queen Elizabeth 
class, rated at 25 knots and carrying eight 15-inch guns. 

Hipper's squadron was composed of three ships of 
the Derfflinger class, of 27 knots' speed and carrying 
eight 12-inch guns, and two of the Moltke class, of 28 
knots' speed and carrying ten 11 -inch guns. 

The fighting began at 3.48 p.m., at a range of 18,500 
yards. The German squadron had turned south so 
as to draw the British toward the main High Sea Fleet. 



238 The Great War [1916] 

Shortly after 4 p.m. the Indefatigable was hit by a Ger- 
man salvo. Her magazine exploded and she sank in 
a few minutes. The range now increased and the 
fighting slackened. Both sides began to develop a 
torpedo attack. In this the British destroyers Nestor 
and Nomad were crippled and then lost. At 4.26 p.m. 
the Queen Mary was struck by a salvo and exploded as 
the Indefatigable had done. 

About ten minutes later the German battle fleet 
was sighted and Admiral Beatty swung his ships 
around and started back north. The German battle 
cruiser squadron turned and followed, the main German 
fleet bringing up the rear. 

The next phase of the battle was the running fight 
north toward the British main fleet. This lasted until 
6.15 P.M., when the German battle cruiser squadron 
was again in approximately the position in which it 
was when the fighting began. The British battle 
cruiser fleet was north of the German and the main 
British fleet, under Admiral Jellicoe, was approaching 
on a course which would carry it head on against the 
van of the enemy. During the northward run the 
weather thickened, the British battle cruisers ceasing 
firing for thirty minutes. The fifth battle squadron 
brought up the rear of the battle cruiser squadron and 
engaged the German battle fleet at long range. Little 
damage was done, however, on either side in this 
return movement. 

The crisis of the engagement was now at hand. 
Beatty had decoyed Scherr north into a position in 
which he would find it difiicult to avoid engaging 
the entire British fleet. It was a situation which he 
could not have relished, for he was at a great disad- 
vantage in speed, tonnage, and gun power. In the 



[i9i6i The Battle of Jutland 229 

main fleet, which was approaching him, were twenty- 
four modern battleships, nine older battleships, and 
three battle cruisers. He had himself only sixteen 
modern battleships and five battle cruisers. Of Beatty 's 
squadron four battle cruisers and four battleships re- 
mained available. 

In his admirable book, The British Navy in Battle, 
Mr. Arthur H. Pollen makes this succinct comparison 
between the German strength at Jutland and the 
British strength: 

Against sixteen modern battleships he himself 
[Admiral Jellicoe] commanded twenty-four, a superi- 
ority of three to two. His gun power, measured 
by the weight and striking energy of his broadsides, 
must have been nearly twice that of the enemy; 
measured by the striking energy and the destructive 
power of its heavier shells, it was greater still. Op- 
posed to the enemy's five battle cruisers there were 
four under the command of Sir David Beatty, and 
three led by Rear-Admiral Hood. Against the six 
l8-knot pre-dreadnaughts that formed the rear of 
the German fleet, with their twenty-four ii-inch 
guns, firing a 700-pound shell, there were Rear- 
Admiral Evan Thomas's four 25-knot ships, carrying 
thirty- two 15-inch guns, whose shells were three 
times as heavy and must have been nine times as 
destructive. This force, vastly superior, if it could 
be concentrated for its purpose, had to be deployed 
for a blow which, if simultaneously delivered at the 
range at which the guns would hit, must be final in 
a very brief period. 

Scherr had no guns of heavier calibre than 12-inch 
and the average speed of his fleet was three or four 



230 The Great War [19161 

knots less than that of the British fleet. He was 150 
miles from his mine fields and 200 miles from his bases. 
To turn and run precipitately would be to court a 
great disaster. To advance farther north would also 
be fatal, since the British would then envelop his 
van. Nothing apparently could save him but good 
luck and shrewd seamanship. 

Before he had learned of Jellicoe's approach he had 
begun to steer off to the east. After he discovered 
what was ahead of him he decided to seize the first 
opportunity to turn to the south-west and run toward 
home. 

The battle cruiser squadron under Beatty was rein- 
forced, about 6.10 P.M., by the Third Battle Cruiser 
Squadron, under Rear-Admiral Hood, which had 
been with the main fleet. It formed ahead of the Lion, 
Beatty's flagship, and closed in on the German battle 
cruisers to a range of 8600 yards. In this brief attack 
Hood's flagship, the Invincible, was hit by a shell which 
caused the explosion of her magazine. His other two 
battle cruisers, the Inflexible and Indomitable, then fell 
to the rear of Beatty's squadron, which was moving 
east-north-east and trying to get across the bow of 
the German battle cruiser squadron. 

The British Grand Fleet arrived from the north- 
west at a little after six o'clock. It came up in six 
columns and found the van of the German fleet on 
its starboard side. Admiral Jellicoe had now to 
decide whether to deploy to starboard or to port. 
Deploying to starboard would bring him into close 
quarters with the enemy, and subject him to the 
risk not only of damage during the deployment but 
also of torpedo attack. He says, in his book, The 
Grand Fleet, jQi4-igi6: 



[i9i6] The Battle of Jutland 231 

My first and natural impulse was to form on the 
starboard wing column in order to bring the fleet 
into action at the earliest possible moment, but it 
became increasingly apparent, both from the sound 
of gun-fire and the reports from the Lion and the 
Barham, that the High Sea Fleet was in such close 
proximity and on such a bearing as to create obvious 
disadvantages in such a movement. I assumed 
that the German destroyers would be ahead of their 
Battle Fleet, and it was clear that, owing to the mist, 
the operations of the destroyers attacking from such 
a commanding position in the van would be much 
facilitated; it would be suicidal to place the Battle 
Fleet in a position where it would be open to attack 
by destroyers during such a deployment, as such 
an event would throw the fleet into confusion at a 
critical moment. 

Jellicoe, therefore, ordered a deployment on the 
port column, farthest from the enemy. After deploy- 
ing, he laid a course to the east parallel to Beatty's, 
but some distance to the north. This manoeuvre 
gave Scherr his chance. He utilized smoke screens, 
as far as possible, to conceal his course and at 6.45 p.m. 
launched a torpedo attack. This had the effect of 
opening the range between himself and Jellicoe. 
Thereupon he turned his fleet from an easterly to a 
south-westerly course. 

The last phase of the battle now began. The Grand 
Fleet changed its course to the south at 7.33 P.M. 
The battle cruiser squadron, which had passed away to 
the north-east and out of touch with the enemy, 
hauled around and pursued, crossing the track of the 
main fleet. In the mist it was difficult to maintain 



232 The Great War [1916] 

contact with the enemy. There were several brief 
encounters, between isolated ships, but the Germans 
succeeded in evading a renewal of the battle. The 
Lion finally lost track of the enemy at 7.45 p.m. The 
last ship to report contact was the Falmouth, which 
sighted one German vessel at 8.38 p.m. 

Both fleets spent the night somewhere about eighty 
miles west of Horn Reef. There was a good deal of 
sniping by light craft in the darkness. At dawn there 
was a visibility of only four miles. The Grand Fleet 
remained in the vicinity of the field of battlq until 1 1 
A.M. on June ist, and then cruised north, collecting the 
scattered units. At 1.15 p.m. a course was laid for 
Scotland. 

The German fleet limped home unmolested. The 
German Admiralty claimed a victory on the basis of 
relative losses. The showing made by German reports 
was impressive. The British admitted the loss of 
three battle cruisers, the Indefatigable, the Queen Mary, 
and the Invincible; of three armoured cruisers, the 
Defence, the Black Prince, and the Warrior; and of 
eight destroyers, the Tipperary, Turbulent, Fortune, 
Sparrow Hawk, Ardent, Nomad, Nestor, and Shark. 

The Germans acknowledged the loss of one battle 
cruiser, the Liitzow; one pre-dreadnaught, the Pommern; 
four light cruisers, the Rostock, Frauenlob, Elbing, and 
Wiesbaden; and five destroyers. The tonnage lost 
was, according to these announcements: British, 
117,510; German, 60,720. The British lost 6105 men; 
the Germans, 2414. But the High Sea Fleet was badly 
battered up. The German vessels had heavier armour 
than the British had and many of them were thus 
enabled to make port, although seriously damaged. 
The battle cruiser Seydlitz was saved by beaching. 



[i9i6] The Battle of Jutland 233 

After the armistice Captain Persius, the foremost 
German naval critic, admitted in the Berliner Tagehlatt 
that the German fleet's losses were "severe." He 
also said: "On June i, 191 6, it was clear to every 
thinking person that this battle must be the last one." 

For Great Britain the result of the engagement was 
disappointing. Failure to crush the inferior German 
fleet deprived the Allies of the chance to enforce a 
close blockade of the German naval bases and thus 
reduce submarine warfare to a minimum. Another 
Trafalgar would probably have saved, within the fol- 
lowing two years, seven or eight million tons of Allied 
and neutral merchant shipping. But, on the other 
hand, a Trafalgar, in 1916, would have kept the United 
States out of the war. And it is an open question 
whether the Entente Powers could ever have won the 
war on land without the assistance of the United States. 
The escape of the German fleet was, therefore, in the 
end a dubious piece of luck for Germany. 

Admiral Jellicoe has been severely criticized for his 
failure to close in on the German fleet on the evening 
of May 31st. But he pursued a policy reflecting the 
fixed views of the British Admiralty. He says in his 
book, defending his own caution: 

A third consideration that was present in my mind 
was the necessity for not leaving anything to chance 
in a fleet action, because our fleet was the one and only 
factor that was vital to the existence of the Empire, 
as, indeed, to the Allied cause. We had no reserve 
outside the Battle Fleet which could in any way have 
taken its place, should disaster befall it, or even 
should its margin of superiority over the enemy be 
eliminated. 



234 The Great War [1916] 

This echoes the principle laid down by Lord Fisher 
in 1 91 5 in his memorandum on the Dardanelles expedi- 
tion, in which a protest was made against risking 
even obsolete pre-dreadnaughts. Lord Fisher wrote 
to Premier Asquith : 

As long as the German High Sea Fleet possesses 
its present strength and splendid gunnery efficiency, 
so long it is imperative that no operation be under- 
taken by the British Fleet calculated to impair its 
superiority, which is none too great, in view of the 
heavy losses already experienced in ships and men, 
which latter cannot be filled in the period of the war, 
in which the navy differs materially from the army. 
Even the older ships should not be risked, for they 
cannot be lost without losing men and they form the 
only reserve behind the Great Fleet. 

It is probable that a different policy, producing differ- 
ent results, would have been followed, if the aggressive 
Beatty had commanded at Jutland, instead of the 
conservative Jellicoe. 

On August 19th a part of the German fleet came out 
again. Its scouting forces encountered British scout- 
ing forces. In the fighting which followed the British 
cruisers Falmouth and Nottingham were sunk by tor- 
pedoes. The German battleship Westfalen, of 18,600 
tons, was damaged by a torpedo, but did not sink. 

The British battleship King Edward VII was sunk 
by a mine off the east coast of England on January 
9th. On February 26. the light cruiser Arethusa was 
lost in a similar manner. On April 23d-24th British 
monitors, cruisers, destroyers, and aircraft bombarded 
the German base at Zeebrugge and German batteries 



[i9i6] Other Naval Operations 235 

in its neighbourhood. On April 25th a German raiding 
squadron bombarded Lowestoft and Great Yarmouth, 
on the east coast of England. The British armoured 
cruiser Hampshire struck a mine near Scapa Flow on 
June 6th and sank in a few minutes. Earl Kitchener, 
who was on his way to Russia on a military mission, 
went down with the ship. 

In July the German merchant submarine Deutsch- 
land made a trip to the United States, arriving at the 
port of Baltimore. She returned in August. In Octo- 
ber the German U-53 entered the harbour of Newport, 
R, I. Leaving in haste, she cruised for a few days off 
Nantucket Island, destroying several merchant vessels, 
two of them neutrals. 

The disguised commerce destroyer Moewe escaped 
from a German port in January and returned safely 
on March 5th. On her cruise she destroyed one French, 
one Belgian, and twelve British merchantmen. The 
British battleship Russell was sunk in the Mediterranean 
on April 27th. 

The French lost by submarine attack or mines, 
during 191 6, the cruiser Admiral Charner (February 
13th), the transport Provence, with 3100 men (Febru- 
ary 27th), the destroyer Renaudin (March i8th), 
and the battleship Suffren, with 700 men (December 
8th). 

The Italian transport Principe Umberto was sunk 
on June 9th and the super-dreadnaught Leonardo da 
Vinci on August 2d. The Russian battleship Im- 
peratritsa Maria was destroyed, probably by an ex- 
plosion, on October 20th. The Allies reported the 
destruction by submarines of a German light cruiser 
of the Kolberg class and a battleship of the Nassau 
class. 



236 The Great War 



[1916] 



From August i, 19 14, to June 30, 191 6, German 
submarines sank about 690 enemy merchant ships, 
with a tonnage of about 1,600,000, and 218 neutrals, 
with a tonnage of about 370,000. 



CHAPTER XXVI 

AMERICA DRIFTS TOWARD WAR. JANUARY I, I916- 
DECEMBER 3I, I916 

Friction between the United States and Germany 
over the illegal use of the submarine continued through 
191 6. The Lusitania case passed into oblivion, un- 
settled. Other cases arose which challenged the 
sincerity of the pledge with regard to the treatment of 
"liners," which Germany and Austria-Hungary had 
given the United States after the sinking of the Arabic 
and the Ancona. 

The passenger steamer Persia was destroyed in the 
eastern Mediterranean on January 2d, one of the 
passengers lost being an American consul. No satis- 
factory evidence was obtained, however, that the vessel 
had been torpedoed by a submarine. But on March 
24th the passenger steamer Sussex was sunk in the 
English Channel. Twenty-five of the passengers were 
American citizens. Four other steamers on which 
Americans were travelling were torpedoed about the 
same time: the Englishman, the Manchester Engineer, 
the Berwindale, and the Eagle. Three of these four, the 
German Foreign Office said, had attempted to escape. 
About the other it professed a lack of information. 
It also flatly denied responsibility for the fate of the 
Sussex. A German submarine had sunk a vessel in 

237 



238 The Great War 



[1916] 



the English Channel on March 24th, it was admitted, 
but the commander was sure that it was a war vessel 
or a mine layer, and not the Sussex. 

The American Government easily determined the 
fact that the Sussex was sunk by a German U-boat, 
for pieces of a German torpedo were found in the wreck. 
The State Department, thereupon, on April i8th, 
sent a note to Berlin citing the frequent instances of 
Germany's disregard of her pledge not to attack ' liners ' ' 
(passenger vessels) without warning and without pro- 
viding for the safety of those on board. Secretary Lan- 
sing gave notice that the United States would sever 
diplomatic relations with Germany "unless the Imperial 
Government should now immediately declare and effect 
an abandonment of its present methods of submarine 
warfare against passenger and freight-carrying vessels." 

The note, in fact, demanded an extension of the 
German guarantee in the Arabic case so as to include 
freighters as well as "liners." 

Germany was reluctant, in the spring of 1916, to 
drive the United States into war, Jagow, therefore, 
began to hedge. He replied on May 4th that perhaps 
the German U-boat commander was mistaken about 
the Sussex. As to the other vessels the German Govern- 
ment had given no promise not to attack freighters. 
Nevertheless, Germany had no desire to raise an issue 
"threatening the maintenance of peace between the 
two nations." He accordingly renewed and enlarged 
the Arabic guarantee by informing the United States 
that the following orders had been given to the German 
naval forces: 

In accordance with the general principle of visit 
and search and destruction of merchant vessels, 



ri9i6] America Drifts Toward War 239 

recognized by international law, such vessels, both 
within and without the area declared as a naval 
war zone, shall not be sunk without warning and 
without saving human lives, unless those ships 
attempt to escape or offer resistance. 

The observance of this pledge was made conditional, 
however, on an insistence by the United States that 
Great Britain should forthwith observe the rules of 
international law as laid down in the American notes 
to Great Britain of December 28, 1914, and November 
5, 191 5, which had protested against the stringencies 
and irregularities of the Allied blockade. If this in- 
sistence produced no effect, Germany would reserve to 
herself "complete liberty of decision." The State De- 
partment replied, on May 8th, accepting the German 
assurance, but rejecting the theory that the settlement 
of questions in dispute between the United States and 
Germany could be made dependent on the outcome 
of negotiations between this country and other bel- 
ligerents. On the same day Jagow admitted German 
responsibility for the sinking of the Sussex and offered 
reparation. 

Another complication, with reverberations in domes- 
tic politics, occurred over the question of arming Allied 
merchantmen. On February loth the German and 
Austro-Hungarian representatives in Washington an- 
nounced that after February 29th their governments 
would treat armed merchantmen as auxiliary cruisers. 
Secretary Lansing had sent a note, on January i8th, to 
the Entente ambassadors, urging that their governments 
agree to disarm merchantmen. He ended by saying : 

I may add that my government is impressed with 
^ the reasonableness of the argument that a merchant 



240 The Great War [19161 

vessel carrying an armament of any sort, in view of 
the character of submarine warfare and the defensive 
character of under-sea craft, should be held to be 
an auxiliary cruiser, and so treated by a neutral as 
well as by a belligerent government, and is seriously 
considering instructing its officials accordingly. 

This came dangerously near accepting the German 
argument in favour of a modification of the rules of 
sea warfare, in order to lift the disabilities imposed on 
the submarine as a commerce destroyer. Was the 
United States suddenly going to weaken in its demand 
for a strict observance of the existing international 
code? But suddenly, on February 15th, the Adminis- 
tration reversed itself and announced that it would 
make no change in existing rules of warfare at sea 
without the consent of all the belligerents. 

The pacifist eilements in Congress now grew excited, 
fearing that a new cause of conflict with Germany had 
been found. They introduced resolutions forbidding 
Americans to travel on armed merchantmen and for- 
bidding such merchantmen the use of American ports. 

A sharp controversy ensued between the President 
and the pacifist leaders — most of them of his own party. 
But the President had public opinion behind him in 
his stand. The pacifist resolutions were shelved. Then 
on February 29th the President wrote a letter to Mr. 
Pou, of the House Committee on Rules, asking that 
the Committee report out the resolutions in question 
for the purpose of affording "full public discussion 
and action upon them." 

Both houses of Congress shrank from such a test. 
To avoid it they went through the barren parliamentary 
ceremony of laying on the table the propositions carry- 



fipiei America Drifts Toward War 241 

ing the names of Senator Gore and Representative 
McLemore, thus suppressing "full public discussion 
and action." The Senate, having little knowledge of 
what it was doing, actually laid on the table a resolu- 
tion upholding the President and saying that "the 
sinking by a German submarine, without notice or 
warning, of an armed merchant vessel of her public 
enemy, resulting in the death of a citizen of the United 
States, would constitute a just and sufficient cause of 
war between the United States and the German 
Empire." 

That is what, in the end, constituted the "just and 
sufficient cause" of our declaration of war against 
Germany. But neither the Administration nor Con- 
gress was as yet willing to visualize war as the inevi- 
table outcome of the American "war zone" note of 
February lo, 191 5. AH through 191 5 the President 
deprecated military preparation. Early in 19 16 he 
made some preparedness speeches. But no adequate 
preparedness measure appeared. The Naval Appro- 
priation act of 1 916 contained provisions for a material 
increase of the navy. But the Hay Army Reorganiza- 
tion act of 1 91 6 was a shabby makeshift. Secretary 
Garrison resigned from the Cabinet on February loth 
as a protest against the Administration's acquiescence 
in the anaemic military programme which finally took 
shape in the Hay law. 

The summer passed without any further diplomatic 
clashes with Germany. On the contrary, there were 
some differences with the Allies. The latter protested 
against the extension of merchantman rights to the 
submarine Deutschland, which had arrived at Baltimore 
with a cargo on July 8th. But our government re- 
fused to intern the U-boat or to admit that submarines 
16 



242 The Great War [1916] 

ought to be exempted from the rules applying to surface 
ships. 

On July 1 8th Great Britain published a blacklist 
of eighty-three firms and individuals of enemy nation- 
ality, or associations, resident in the United States. 
Some of the proscribed firms were American. The 
State Department made a vigorous protest at this 
novel extension of the right of blockade. Nothing 
came of the negotiations which followed except the 
removal of seven names from the British list. 

The German Government had its gaze fixed on the 
European battlefields. When the Russian offensive 
in Galicia and Bukowina died down, the Franco-British 
attack on the Somme was checked, and Rumania was 
invaded by Mackensen and Falkenhayn, the fit of 
caution which had inspired the Sussex note was over. 
The submarine commanders again grew reckless. The 
British steamer Marina was sunk off the coast of Ire- 
land on November ist, and six American passengers 
were drowned. A few days earlier the Rowanmore, 
with American passengers aboard, was torpedoed. 
Then the British steamer Arabia, with one American 
passenger, was sunk off Malta and the American steamer 
Columbian was destroyed off the Mediterranean coast 
of Spain. On December 4th the Italian steamer 
Palermo, with twenty-five Americans aboard, was tor- 
pedoed in the Mediterranean on her way from New 
York to Genoa. 

The German Government gave evasive excuses in 
all these cases. Feeling confident that the war was 
going Germany's way, Berlin on December 12th 
patronizingly invited the Allies to enter into peace 
negotiations. President Wilson was invited to transmit 
the offer to France and Great Britain. This he did. 



[i9i6] America Drifts Toward War 243 

He went farther. In a note addressed to all the bel- 
ligerents on December i8th he asked them to state the 
terms on which, in their view, the war could be brought 
to an end. 

In explaining his purpose in making this suggestion 
Mr. Wilson said: 

He [the President] takes the liberty of calling 
attention to the fact that the objects which the 
statesmen of the belligerents on both sides have in 
mind in this war are virtually the same, as stated in 
general terms to their own people and to the world. 
Each side desires to make the rights and privileges 
of weak peoples and small states as secure against 
aggression or denial in the future as the rights of the 
great and powerful states now at war. 

In a recent volume, The Peace President: a Brief 
Appreciation, Mr. WilHam Archer remarks: "Surely 
the irony of this passage ought to have been understood 
from the first." Irony is easily misunderstood in the 
heat of a great war. The country was greatly puzzled 
by the President's request for terms and at a loss to 
understand the motives for it. Secretary Lansing 
may have let out the truth in a blunt statement which 
he made about the note. He said : 

More and more our own rights are becoming in- 
volved by the belligerents on both sides, so that the 
situation is becoming critical. I mean by that that 
we are drawing nearer the verge of war ourselves, 
and, therefore, we are entitled to know exactly what 
each belligerent seeks in order that we may negotiate 
our conduct in the future. . . . The sending of 



244 The Great War 



[1916] 



this note will indicate the possibility of our being 
forced into war. . . . Neither the President nor 
myself regards the note as a peace note. 

This apparently indiscreet admission was recalled 
a few hours later. Mr. Lansing reversed himself by 
announcing that he "did not intend to intimate that 
the government was considering any change in its 
policy of neutrality." But the preservation of the 
poHcy of neutrality was no longer a matter within 
the control of the American Government. So long as 
the note of February 10, 191 5, remained uncancelled 
and the correspondence in the Sussex case remained 
unmodified, the power to draw the United States into 
war or keep her out of it rested with Germany. And 
Germany was about to make her decision. 



CHAPTER XXVII 

GERMANY DEFIES AMERICA. JANUARY 3I, I917- 
JUNE 30, 191 7 

The winter months of 191 7 marked the turning- 
point of the war. Mittel-Europa was a reality. On 
the face of the war map Germany had assured her 
continental position. She had defeated Russia, seized 
Poland, the Baltic Provinces, Lithuania, and parts of 
White Russia, conquered the Balkans and annexed 
Turkey in Asia. She held practically all of Belgium 
and a large area in Northern France. Russia was 
about to collapse and become a prey to revolution. 
All the Germans needed to do was to tire out the re- 
maining Allies by maintaining the deadlock on the 
Western Front. 

But German military policy remained emotional 
and confused. The old illusion of overseas and world 
power still haunted the Kaiser and the clique which 
controlled him. This clique now found in Ludendorff, 
a "plunger" in strategy and politics, the agent whom 
it needed. Hindenburg was too conservative and 
unimaginative to suit the Pan-German extremists. 
Besides, he was an Easterner by instinct and conviction. 
So they displaced him in the supreme command 
(though not outwardly) by his junior associate, who 
was willing to try to conquer France and bring Great 

245 



246 The Great War 



[1917J 



Britain to her knees, whatever risks might be involved 
in such an enterprise. 

Great Britain could be attacked only through the 
submarine. An unrestricted use of the U-boat would 
mean war with the United States. But Ludendorff, 
with the narrow vision imbued into the German General 
Staff by years of self -worship, held America's military 
power as cheaply as the Kaiser had held Great Britain's 
in 1 9 14. He therefore cheerfully paid the price of 
the military dictatorship offered him by supporting 
the demand for a withdrawal of the Sussex pledges and 
a renewal of indiscriminate submarine warfare. Once 
installed in the dictatorship, he forced the removal of 
Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, who was dispassionate 
enough to see that Germany had vastly more to lose 
than to gain by running amuck with her U-boats and 
thus forcing war with the United States. 

The German peace offer of December 12, 191 6, was 
probably intended in part as a flourish with which to 
cover the decision, already reached, to extend and 
intensify the U-boat "blockade." The Allied answer 
to the German proposal, delivered in Berlin on January 
4, 191 7, was what might have been expected. The 
Entente refused to consider the German offer because 
it was "empty and insincere." Germany and Austria- 
Hungary answered President Wilson's request for terms, 
made on December 18, 191 6, by again suggesting the 
calling of a peace conference. The Entente Powers 
replied on January 12th, giving a general outline of 
their war aims, which included restoration of con- 
quered Allied territory, reparation, the reorganization 
of Europe, the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary, 
and the partition of Turkey. 

On January i8th President Wilson delivered before 



[I9I7] Germany Defies America 247 

the Senate his "peace without victory" address. 
Taking the communications from the two sets of bel- 
Hgerents as a groundwork to build on, he outhned his 
own views of a proper peace and of the terms on which 
our government would enter any "Concert of Powers" 
or "League for Peace," to be established at the close 
of the war. Among the conditions which he empha- 
sized were the freedom of the seas, an independent 
Poland, reduction of armaments, equality of nations, 
and security of life, worship, and industrial develop- 
ment everywhere. But the peace must first of all be 
"a peace without victory," 

The purpose of this address was mystifying, since 
neither set of belligerents had asked the United States 
for a peace formula. If it was intended to mollify 
Germany and secure a postponement of the renewal 
of submarine warfare, now known to be imminent, it 
failed of its object. For on January 31st, Count 
Bernstorff presented a note announcing that from the 
following day all ships, enemy as well as neutral, would 
be sunk inside zones drawn about the British Isles and 
France, and in the Mediterranean, a narrow area east 
of Spain excepted. Germany added insult to injury 
by offering to guarantee the safety of one American 
passenger steamer a week each way from Falmouth, 
England, if the United States would give it highly dis- 
tinctive markings and forbid it to carry contraband. 

This cancellation of the Sussex pledges was defended 
on the ground that the Entente Powers had refused to 
entertain Germany's peace offer. Since the American 
Government, on April 19, 191 6, had threatened to 
break off diplomatic relations with Germany unless 
the latter should renounce illegal submarine warfare, 
the document transmitted through Bernstorff was 



248 The Great War [1917] 

a brusque notice that Berlin didn't care how soon 
relations were severed. 

The rupture came on February 3d, when passports 
were sent to Bernstorff. By greatly enlarging her war 
zones and threatening destruction to all vessels enter- 
ing them, Germany virtually established a partial block- 
ade of American ports. American merchantmen were 
not armed to resist illegal attack. The President on 
February 26th asked Congress for authority to arm 
them and "to employ other instrumentalities or meth- 
ods" necessary to protect Americans in their rightful 
pursuits on the sea. A bill granting this authority 
passed the House of Representatives on March ist, 
although it had encountered considerable opposition 
at first both from the pacifists and from those who 
thought the President's policy of "armed neutral- 
ity" a weak substitute for war. Its passage in the 
Senate was prevented by a pacifist filibuster which 
lasted until noon of March 4th. 

Meanwhile Germany continued to commit construc- 
tive acts of war. On February 25th the Cunard liner 
Laconia was torpedoed without warning in the Irish 
Sea. Three American passengers, two of them women, 
perished of exposure after taking to the boats. On 
March 17th an American ship, the City of Memphis, 
homeward bound from Cardiff, in ballast, was destroyed 
by a submarine. On March 19th the Illinois and the 
Vigilancia were sunk without warning in British waters. 
The overt challenge was unmistakable. It had to be 
met by the United States. 

The President had called an extra session of the new 
Congress for April i6th. On March 21st he advanced 
the date of assembling to April 2d. On the evening 
of that day the President delivered a message advising 



[I9I7] Germany Defies America 249 

Congress to declare war against Germany. War had 
come on the specific issue of Germany's invasion of 
American rights at sea by the illegitimate use of the 
submarine. But in the message the reasons for making 
war on Germany were greatly broadened. Said the 
President : 

We shall fight for the things which we have always 
carried nearest our hearts — for democracy, for the 
right of those who submit to authority to have a 
voice in their own government, for the rights and 
liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion 
of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall 
bring peace and safety to all nations and make the 
world itself at last free. 

These justifications and causes of war against Ger- 
many had existed since August, 1914, when Germany 
violated the neutrality of Belgium. They were equally 
justifications and causes of war against Austria-Hun- 
gary, Turkey, and Bulgaria. But the President did 
not recommend a declaration of war against Austria- 
Hungary until December, 19 17, and to the end he re- 
strained Congress from declaring war against Turkey 
or Bulgaria. 

A resolution declaring the existence of a state of 
war with Germany was passed by the Senate on April 
3d, and by the House of Representatives on the legis- 
lative day of April 5th, actually early in the morning 
of April 6th. It merely recited that recent acts of 
Germany were acts of war and that a state of war had 
been thrust by those acts upon the United States. 
No reference was made in it to the existence of other 
war aims and causes. Legally, and on the face of a 



250 The Great War 



[1917] 



record extending from the drafting of the "war zone" 
note of February 10, 191 5, to the sinking without 
warning of the Vigilancia on March 19, 1917, the 
United States went to war with Germany as a matter 
of self-defence and for the purpose of protecting national 
interests. The war arose out of a controversy over 
sea rights, paralleling the controversy with Great 
Britain which preceded the war of 18 12. When, in his 
oral message to Congress on April 2d, he came to deal 
with the allies of Germany, the President himself 
admitted the limited and nationalistic character of 
American war aims. He remarked : 

I have said nothing of the governments allied with 
the Imperial Government of Germany, because they 
have not made war upon us or challenged us to de- 
fend our right and our honour. , . . We enter this 
war only when we are clearly forced into it, because 
there are no other means of defending our rights. 

And when war was declared against Austria-Hungary, 
on December 7, 191 7, Congress again based its action ex- 
clusively on the fact that the Austro-Hungarian Gov- 
ernment had "committed repeated acts of war against 
the government and people of the United States." 

The existence of a state of war against Germany 
having been proclaimed by the President on April 6th, 
the country found itself compelled to take up hurriedly, 
in April, 191 7, the work of military preparation the 
necessity for which had been obvious from the day in 
May, 1915, when the Lusttania -was sunk. For those 
two years of neglect the United States and the world 
were now to pay an enormous penalty. Had America 
armed in 1915, she could either have kept out of the 



[I9I7] Germany Defies America 251 

war (Germany recognizing the folly of driving us in) 
or she could have begun to make war in 191 7 with an 
energy which would have minimized costs and losses. 
Had we been able to send a trained expeditionary force 
of 1,500,000 men to France in the spring and summer 
of 19 1 7, the war might easily have been brought to an 
end that year. 

Unready as they were, the American people entered 
the war with a sense of relief. They were clearer- 
sighted than their government. Under the pressure 
of public sentiment a conscription act, which the 
Secretary of War had refused to recommend or support 
up to March 4, 191 7, was passed by Congress and 
signed on May i8th. It was carried swiftly into 
effect by the volunteer labours of local boards. No 
war in which the United States had ever engaged so 
solidified the nation as did the war with Germany. The 
Great General Staff at Berlin had put the United States 
as a belligerent into the same class with Rumania, Ser- 
bia, Belgium, or Portugal. It conceded the ability of 
the Allies to draw upon America's economic resources, 
whether she became a belligerent or remained a neutral. 
But it smiled at the idea of American troops turning 
the scale on the battlefields of France. 

That was Germany's fatal error of judgment. She 
had practically disposed of the Russian colossus. But 
she had taken on a new enemy many times more dan- 
gerous than Russia. For America was in the war to 
stay and her military power, when developed, would 
overtop German military power. 

More than that, the entry of the United States into 
the war was certain to draw in other American nations. 
Brazil severed diplomatic relations with Germany on 
April nth and seized forty-six interned German ships. 



252 The Great War [1917] 

She declared war on October 26, 1917. Cuba and 
Panama declared war on April yth. Other Latin Amer- 
ican states severed diplomatic relations with Germany : 
Bolivia, on April 14th; Guatemala, on April 27th; Hon- 
duras, on May 17th; Nicaragua, on May i8th; Haiti, on 
June 17th; Costa Rica, on September 21st; Peru, on 
October 6th ; Uruguay, on October 7th. War was de- 
clared by Guatemala, on April 21, 1918; by Nicaragua, 
on May 6, 1918; by Costa Rica, on May 23, 1918; by 
Haiti, on July 12, 191 8,; and by Honduras, on July 
19, 191 8. Liberia declared war against Germany on 
August 4, 19 17. 

After the United States entered the struggle practi- 
cally all the shipping of the world passed under Allied 
control. The material resources of America, Asia, 
Africa, and the most of Europe were put at the disposal 
of the anti-Teuton Powers. 

In the latter part of April, British and French mis- 
sions visited the United States. The British mission was 
headed by Arthur J. Balfour, the British Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs. Heading the French mission 
were Marshal Joffre and former Prime Minister Viviani. 
Under Marshal Joffre' s urgings the military plans of 
the government were modified. It had not been in- 
tended to send American troops to France on any 
considerable scale before the end of 191 8. But Joffre 
advised training them in France, instead of at home. 
His suggestion was sound. It started that small but 
steady flow of American reinforcements to France 
which materially heartened the French in the period 
of depression which set in in the summer of 191 7. 
It also produced, eventually, the strategic reserve 
which enabled Foch to end the war in the autumn of 
1918. 



CHAPTER XXVIII 

RUSSIA IN REVOLUTION . MARCH II, 1 9 1 7-DECEMBER 3 1 , 

I917 

In two senses Russia took herself out of the war 
before the United States got in. The Russian Revolu- 
tion antedated our declaration of April 6th and the 
Russian armies ceased to fight long before our first 
troops reached the front lines in France. 

The revolution came suddenly, almost unpremed- 
itatedly. The body of Rasputin, the monk who had 
obtained a sort of hypnotic control over the Czarina 
and who was in league with the extreme reactionary 
and pro-German elements in the government, was found 
in the Neva River on New Year's Day, 191 7. His 
murder was a symptom of the general revulsion against 
the court and its policies. But the royal family and 
Protopopoff, its spokesman in the administration, re- 
mained blind to the signs of the times. In his book, 
Russian Revolution Aspects, Mr. Robert Crozier Long 
tells of an interview which he had with Protopopoff 
in March, 191 7, in the fortress of St. Peter and St. Paul. 
Protopopoff was a prisoner there, undergoing examina- 
tion by a revolutionary prosecutor. In the presence 
of the latter he said to his American visitor: "I am 
guilty of the most awful crime that a man can commit, 
the crime of failing to understand the spirit of my age." 

253 



254 The Great War 



[1917] 



He, the Czar, the Czarina, and the imperial coterie were 
all guilty of the same crime. 

Protopopoff wanted to make peace with Germany 
in order to save the dynasty and absolutism. He took 
little trouble to conceal his purpose to get rid of the 
Duma. He brought about a food shortage in Petrograd 
so as to incite riots and thus create an excuse for pro- 
roguing indefinitely the body which had come to stand 
in the public mind for a larger measure of popular gov- 
ernment. The assembling of the Duma was postponed 
from January 25th to February 27th. On the day 
the session opened, one hundred thousand working- 
men in Petrograd went on strike as a protest against 
the repressive measures of the government. Early in 
March, food riots began and the Duma tried to have 
the regulation of the food supply transferred to the 
city authorities. On March nth the Czar issued a 
ukase dissolving the Duma. 

But the Duma refused to dissolve. Finding itself 
backed up by the population of the capital and a large 
part of the garrison, the Dtima constituted itself a 
provisional government and sent representatives to 
meet the Czar, who was returning to Petrograd from 
general staff headquarters. They were to demand 
his abdication. At Pskov, on March 15th, he yielded 
to this ultimatum and signed a manifesto renouncing 
his rights and those of his son in favour of his brother, 
the Grand Duke Michael. The latter declined to 
accept the throne. The members of the imperial 
family and of the former government were then put 
under arrest. The provisional Duma revolutionary 
committee gave way to a coalition cabinet, elected 
jointly by the Duma and a newly formed committee 
representing the workmen and soldiers. Prince Lvoff 



[I9I7] Russia in Revolution 255 

was chosen head of the Cabinet. The workmen and 
soldiers were represented in it by Alexander Kerensky, 
the Minister of Justice. 

The major Allied Powers recognized the new govern- 
ment on March 23d. The United States had already 
recognized it on March 226.. But the new government 
was only a political fiction. It had no power of its 
own. Power in Petrograd had already passed into the 
hands of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' 
Delegates. Control of the army and navy was assumed 
by local councils of soldiers and sailors, loosely asso- 
ciated with the Petrograd Council. 

The Lvoff Cabinet was loyal to the Entente Alliance. 
But its foreign policy and war policy were both subject 
to reversal by the radical socialistic elements which 
were becoming more and more active in the Workmen's 
and Soldiers' organization. The latter favoured peace 
on the basis of "no annexations and no indemnities." 
They renounced the idea of acquiring Constantinople 
and were insistent that the Entente should revise the 
war aims to which Russia had subscribed in the answer 
to Germany's recent peace offer. They also favoured 
the calling of an international Socialist conference, at 
which the representatives of the proletariats of all the 
belligerent nations could get together and discuss peace 
terms. 

When the provisional government informed the other 
Allied nations, on May 2d, that Russia would continue 
the war to a complete victory, it obtained a vote of 
confidence from the Council of Workmen's and Sol- 
diers' Delegates. But when the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, M. Milyukoff, expressed himself on May 9th 
as still desirous of obtaining Constantinople, a crisis 
arose which ended with his ejection from the Cabinet 



256 The Great War [1917] 

and the transfer of Kerensky, the spokesman of the 
radicals, to the more important post of Minister of War. 

Kerensky was now the sole prop of the Lvoff regime. 
He was against a separate peace with Germany and 
wanted to continue the war and recover the Russian 
territory seized by Germany. Yet at the same time 
he wanted to make a peace which would not penalize 
Germany. He carried the Council of Workmen and 
Soldiers with him for a time in spite of the attacks of 
the Maximalist faction, headed by Lenine. But in 
order to hold his ground in the Council he was obliged 
to disembarrass himself of Lvoff and the other moder- 
ates, who had originally taken charge of the revolution. 
The Duma was abolished in June and on July 226. 
Lvoff resigned as Prime Minister of the provisional 
government. Kerensky took his place. 

The Kerensky government lasted until November 
7th. After September i6th it became a dictatorship, 
with all power lodged in Kerensky's hands. But the 
latter pursued a suicidal policy. Disorganization in 
the army, started by his own orders, destroying dis- 
cipHne, became more and more flagrant. It was im- 
possible to continue the war against Germany without 
a dependable army. Kerensky, essentially a talker and 
trimmer, vacillated between measures for restoring dis- 
cipline and order with a strong hand, and counter 
measures which quickly alienated the support of those 
elements in the army and the nation which might have 
enabled him to continue as a pro-war dictator. 

His most dangerous enemies were the Bolshevists, 
whose chief leaders were anti-war, anti-Nationalist, 
anti-Slav, and more or less openly pro-German. He 
could never compete with them in bidding for the 
support of the extremists who favoured class war and 



[I9I7] Russia in Revolution 257 

anarchy. Kerensky seemed, at one time, to be aiming 
at setting up a strong, nationalistic government with 
the aid of General Korniloff, who had some of the 
qualifications of a Carnot. But after encouraging 
Korniloff he quarrelled with him and precipitated the 
fiasco of the Korniloff revolt. 

Korniloff, Commander-in-Chief of the armies by 
Kerensky's appointment, marched on Petrograd, in- 
tending to oust the Kerensky government. His forces 
got to within thirty miles of the city and then disbanded. 
Korniloff surrendered to General Alexieff , his successor 
in the chief command. But Korniloff's failure cut 
the ground from under Kerensky's feet. He was left 
at the mercy of the Bolshevists, who accused him of 
having encouraged a military counter-revolution. 

Lenine and Trotzky organized a revolt of their own 
on November 7th, acting through the Military Coun- 
cil of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates. Kerensky 
fled for safety and his government vanished overnight. 
Lenine nominated himself Prime Minister and Trotzky 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

Russia now ceased to be either a belligerent or a 
nation. Lenine was determined to make a peace at 
any price with Germany. He didn't care what out- 
lying portions of the ancient Romanoff Empire the 
Germans might appropriate, so long as they left him 
the heart of it in which to set up his Soviet state and 
to work out his formulas of terrorism and absolutism. 
He besought Germany for a truce, which was granted 
by Ludendorff. An armistice was signed at Brest- 
Litovsk on December 14th and the ground was cleared 
for the dismemberment of Russia in the grotesque 
"peace negotiations" which were to follow. 

The revolution destroyed the Russian armies by 



258 The Great War [1917] 

Sovietizing them. The Petrograd Council of Workmen's 
and Soldiers' Delegates controlled the revolutionary 
government and was strong for introducing its own 
system of self-regulation everywhere. Kerensky was 
in favour of fighting Germany to the end. But one 
of his first acts as Minister of Justice under the Lvoff 
regime was to abolish capital punishment, the only 
means of maintaining discipline in the field. A little 
later, as minister of war, he issued a Declaration of 
Soldiers' Rights, by which the administration of regi- 
ments and warships was placed in the hands of elected 
committees, four fifths of the members of which were 
to belong to the rank and file. 

General Gourko relates many amusing incidents 
which occurred in the first weeks of the new military 
dispensation. The armies took their privileges of 
"self-determination" in a fairly sober spirit at the 
outset. But the position of the officers became ridicu- 
lous, and then tragic. Insubordination got the 
upper hand nearly everywhere. It could not be other- 
wise when the ultimate authority rested with the 
soldiers and their agents in the military Soviets. 

In January, 1917, the Russian General Staff ordered 
a second winter offensive on the Dvina front, south- 
west of Riga. It merely duplicated the unsuccessful 
effort made the year before by General Kuropatkin. 
The Russians gained ground at first along the Dvina 
in the neighbourhood of Dvinsk. But they were 
quickly thrown back to their original lines by a German 
counter-offensive. For some months after the revolu- 
tion, both sides remained inactive. The Russian 
armies were experimenting with their new liberties 
and were not in a mood to fight. The Germans looked 
to the revolution to do their work for them at little 



fipiyj Russia in Revolution 259 

cost. It was more economical to foment Bolshevism 
than to seize Riga and Petrograd by force. Moreover, 
a German offensive would have operated to keep alive 
that national feeling which the more radical revolu- 
tionists were eager to extinguish. 

The Duma Provisional Government advocated a 
continuation of the war, but lacked the power and 
energy to continue it. The generals in the field were 
also too much upset by the new conditions to recom- 
mend action. Afte'r Kerensky became Minister of War 
in Lvoff 's Cabinet he visited all the fronts, haranguing 
the troops and urging them to drive the enemy from 
Russian soil. At the same time he was unwilling to 
restore authority to the generals or to revive discipline. 

He committed himself, however, to a summer offen- 
sive on the easiest of the fronts — that held by the 
Austro-Hungarians in Galicia. General Brusiloff had 
been made Commander-in-Chief of the western armies. 
The offensive was entrusted to General Korniloff, 
noted before the war for his revolutionary sentiments. 
Under him were some Cossack and Siberian troops 
who had retained their military organization. It 
was thought that the other units would accept his 
leadership because he was a Cossack and a man who 
had made his way to the top by his own ability and 
exertions. 

Korniloff was well supplied with munitions, for it 
was only in 191 7, as General Gourko says, that "the 
different armies were made happy by being able to 
reckon on having several tens of thousands of shells 
for the 6-inch guns and about one hundred thousand 
4.8-inch trench mortar bombs." His attack opened 
auspiciously. He struck first in the upper valley of 
the Zlota Lipa River, at the enemy line guarding Lem- 



26o The Great War [1917] 

berg. On July ist he captured the village of Koniuchy 
and took ten thousand prisoners. Failing to break 
through the main lines farther back, he shifted the 
assault south to Brzezany and then south-west to the 
neighbourhood of Stanislau. Here the enemy front 
was broken and the town of Kalucz was occupied. The 
Russians then pushed west toward Stryj. Farther 
east, along the Dniester River, the city of Halicz was 
stormed. Up to this time Korniloff had taken fifty 
thousand prisoners and driven a wedge twenty miles 
wide and ten miles deep into the Austro-German 
positions. 

The weakened discipline of the revolutionary regime 
now began to tell. Many units refused to fight any 
longer and made for the rear. German reinforcements, 
coming from the north, had little trouble in regaining 
all the ground lost. After July 19th the whole Russian 
line was forced back in disorder. German and Austro- 
Hungarian troops recovered Stanislau, Kolomea, Czer- 
nowitz, and Tamopol. Galicia and Bukowina were 
cleared, and the Russians were thrust again beyond 
their own border. 

In August, Kerensky removed Brusiloff from the 
chief command because he failed to meet the dictator's 
car at the railroad station at grand headquarters. 
Korniloff succeeded and retained the post until his 
attempted coup d'etat, when AlexiefiE was nominated. 
But with the failure of the Korniloff revolt the possi- 
bility of saving the army from dissolution vanished. 

Meanwhile Ludendorff decided to occupy Riga and 
make a demonstration toward Petrograd. The advance 
began on August 22 d. On September 2d a crossing 
of the Dvina River was effected at Uxkul, ten miles 
south-east of Riga. General Lechitsky, commanding 



[I9I7] Russia in Revolution 261 

on the northern front, immediately withdrew toward 
the east and German outposts entered the city. Push- 
ing after the Russians, who made an unexpectedly 
stiff defence, the Germans captured Jacobstadt. 

In October the German navy, co-operating with a 
military expedition, seized the Oesel, Dago, and Moon 
islands, at the mouth of the Gulf of Riga. The Rus- 
sian garrisons fled to the mainland. The Russian 
Baltic fleet came near being trapped in Moon Sound 
but escaped north after losing the battleship Slava 
and several smaller units. 

Possession of the islands and a base opposite them 
on the mainland brought the Germans close to Reval, 
the Russian naval station on the south shore of the Gulf 
of Finland, and made a march to Petrograd practicable. 
But the Kerensky government fell early in November 
and the Germans saw no advantage in making war on 
Lenine. They drew in their lines to the east of Riga. 
Ludendorff needed troops elsewhere and transferred 
General Otto Below' s Fourteenth Army from the 
Baltic to Italy. 

On the central and southern fronts an informal truce 
had existed for several months. By asking for an armi- 
stice Lenine merely proclaimed in a formal way that 
Russia was out of the war. She had been practically 
out of it ever since the first weeks of the revolution. 

Finland declared her independence in the summer 
of 1 91 7. The Ukraine also set up a government of 
its own. After Lenine came into power, Siberia sepa- 
rated from Russia and General Kaledin, the Hetman 
of the Don Cossacks, declared war on the Bolshevist 
regime. By the end of the year what was left of Russia 
was ripe for reduction to the status of a German 
dependency. 



CHAPTER XXIX 

WEST FRONT OPERATIONS, I917. JANUARY 5, I917- 
DECEMBER 5, I917 

When Hindenburg displaced Falkenhayn, on August 
28, 1 91 6, he wisely elected to follow a strictly defensive 
policy on the Western Front. Results justified his 
judgment. The complete German defeat at Verdun 
was followed by a drawn battle on the Somme and a 
brilliant triumph in Rumania. Hindenburg fell into 
the background, however, in the winter of 191 7, when 
Ludendorff made his bargain with the U-boat extre- 
mists, challenged the United States to enter the war, 
and thus introduced a new and dangerously disturbing 
factor into Germany's military problem. 

If the U-boat failed and America sent to France the 
armies she was capable of raising, then Germany's 
greatest need might be to dispose of France and Great 
Britain before the American reinforcement arrived. 
But the German High Command shut its eyes to that 
contingency. It preferred to think that the U-boats 
would starve out Great Britain and that America 
could not make her power felt on the battlefield within 
three years — if ever. Ludendorff therefore decided to 
watch events on the Eastern Front, where Russia was 
in dissolution, and to continue Hindenburg's waiting 
policy in the West — at least through 191 7. Accept- 
ance of the defensive in France for a long period in- 

262 



[I9I7] West Front Operations, 191 7 263 

volved a rectification of the German position there, 
made insecure by the results of the Battle of the Somme. 
In the winter of 191 6-17 the German High Command 
made preparations for drawing out of the weakened 
Noyon salient and establishing the armies on the newly 
constructed Hindenburg Line. 

This retirement was planned for the early spring 
and was probably hastened a little by a reopening of 
the Battle of the Somme. When Field Marshal Haig 
broke off the Somme operations on November 18, 1916, 
he had forced the enemy into a pronounced salient in 
the area north of the Ancre River. The German posi- 
tions between Arras and Bapaume formed the base 
and one leg of an isosceles triangle, the other leg being 
the high road from Bapaume to Arras. The British 
had enveloped the triangle on its western and southern 
sides. If they should take Bapaume they would 
roll up its third side. 

The south-western corner of the triangle was open 
to converging attack and the British Commander-in- 
Chief determined to utilize the winter months in pinch- 
ing the Germans out of it. These operations, lasting 
from the first week of January to the second week in 
March, were entirely successful. The original German 
line to the west of Bapaume, running from the Ancre 
north-east to Arras, was gradually taken in the rear and 
had to be abandoned. By March 13th the whole area 
west of Bapaume was cleared, and the city was brought 
under short-range artillery fire from the west and north- 
west, as well as from the south-west and south. But 
by March 15th the German retirement was already 
under way. In its last stages the German defence west 
of Bapaume was only a cover for Hindenburg's "strate- 
gic" retreat. 



264 The Great War [1917] 

In the fighting on the Ancre the Germans used for 
the first time a new form of defensive tactics. This 
consisted in a marked thinning out of the front line 
and the substitution of scattered centres of resistance 
for the continuous, strongly held trench. In the 
later stages of the Battle of the Somme the enemy had 
suffered heavy losses in prisoners trapped in their dug- 
outs by artillery barrages. The German High Com- 
mand therefore developed the "pill-box" first line and 
established the main line of defence, or battle front, a 
mile or two farther back. 

The "pill boxes," small concrete forts level with the 
surface and holding garrisons armed with machine 
guns, were hardly worth a "drum fire" bombardment. 
As targets they were too tiny and too dispersed. Their 
function was to retard an attack and throw it into 
confusion. If the assailants penetrated toward the 
battle position, they were to be met with a vigorous 
counter-attack. This latter manoeuvre was not empha- 
sized in the British winter operation west of Bapaume, 
because Hindenburg had decided to yield all his ad- 
vanced positions in Picardy. But it became prominent 
in the battle of Arras and in all the succeeding battles 
on the Western Front during 191 7. It succeeded in 
preventing an Allied break-through on anything but 
a local scale. But it also imposed a new burden on 
the defensive and thus led rapidly to the equaHza- 
tion of the offensive and the defensive and constituted 
the first stage of a return to semi-open warfare. 

Early in the winter the British had extended their 
line south of the Somme as far as Roye. It fell to them, 
therefore, to occupy Bapaume, Peronne, and Chaulnes 
— the three objectives of the Somme battle — when 
Hindenburg drew back out of the Noyon salient. The 



[I9I7] West Front Operations, 191 7 265 

retirement began about March 15th. On March 17th 
Bapaume and Chaulnes were evacuated. Peronne 
was delivered on March i8th. On that day the French 
reached Noyon. Only rear-guard actions were fought 
while the Germans were retiring and settling into their 
new positions. The greatest depth of the retirement 
was about twenty-five miles, from Chaulnes and Roye 
east to the Oise Valley, between St. Quentin and La 
Fere. Above Peronne the Germans retreated about 
ten miles ; above Bapaume only about five or six miles. 

The Hindenburg Line or Zone joined the old German 
line, on the south, along the Ailette River. It ran 
north to La Fere and up the Oise Valley to Moy. 
Thence it turned north-west toward St. Quentin, which 
was enveloped on the south and south-east by the 
French. From St. Quentin it passed north and north- 
west, skirting Le Catelet, leaving Cambrai about five 
miles in the rear, and connecting with the old German 
line just below Arras. 

The territory evacuated contained about one thou- 
sand square miles and, before the war, had supported 
a population of about two hundred thousand. It was 
systematically and brutally devastated. Cities and 
towns were razed, roads and bridges destroyed, trees 
cut down, farms ruined, and houses pillaged. Hinden- 
burg made the salient he abandoned a desolate waste, 
not alone for military reasons but as a manifestation 
of the German policy of cold-blooded malice and 
terrorism. 

The German communiques described the retreat as 
a purely voluntary one, planned with a definite strategic 
object in view and conducted with masterly precision. 
It was voluntary, however, only in the sense of antici- 
pating the inevitable. Hindenburg could not have 



266 The Great War [1917] 

held the Noyon salient any longer, without running 
useless risks. It had become a trap. If he had not 
withdrawn from it without a fight in March, he would 
have been obliged to evacuate it in April as a conse- 
quence of the British advance east of Arras. 

The British offensive east of Arras was part of a 
joint operation, projected, in co-operation with the 
French, as far back as November, 191 6. Having 
shaken the hold of the Germans on the apex of the 
Noyon salient, it was agreed by the two high commands 
to attack next at the two extremities — at Arras, on the 
north, and on the Aisne, above Soissons and Rheims, 
on the south. The Hindenburg retreat did not inter- 
fere with Franco-British plans except in so far as it 
limited their strategic scope, their original object 
— that of compelling a German recoil on a large scale — 
having already been attained. 

The British opened the Arras offensive on April 9th. 
The battle line was forty-five miles long, extending 
from Lens down to St. Quentin. But the main effort 
was made at the northern end, on a thirteen-mile front 
from Henin-sur-Cojeul, south-east of Arras, to Givenchy- 
en-Gohelle, a short distance south-west of Lens. The 
artillery preparation had lasted four days and pulver- 
ized the old-style German front- trench system. On 
the first day the Canadian divisions of the First Army 
took Vimy Ridge, which had defied Foch in the two 
battles of Artois in 19 15. Vimy Ridge was the strong- 
est position in Northern France. Its possession was of 
enormous value to the British a year later, when Luden- 
dorff 's first great drive overran the Noyon salient once 
more and gravely threatened Amiens. Ludendorff 
would probably have reached Amiens if he had been 
able to batter down the British bastion about Arras. 



[I9I7] West Front Operations, 191 7 267 

But the British First Army held fast there, thus saving 
the day for the retreating Third and Fifth armies. 

On April 9th the British broke through the German 
positions in the Arras-Lens sector for a gain of between 
two and three miles, and took six thousand prisoners. 
On April loth they enlarged their gains east of Arras, 
reaching the edge of Monchy-le-Preux, and taking 
five thousand more prisoners. The next day they 
captured Monchy, and on April 12th Wan court and 
Heninel, north-east of Henin. On April 13th they 
struck on a twelve-mile front, north and south of Lens, 
and gained a mile. Lievin, a suburb of Lens to the 
south-west, was entered, as was Cite St. Pierre, to the 
north-west. But Lens remained unconquerable. Al- 
though pocketed for a year and a half, it was not 
abandoned by the Germans until the final retreat 
from France began. 

On the line from Queant down to St. Quentin little 
progress was made, although the British captured 
Fayet, just north of St. Quentin, which was now closely 
enveloped on three sides. Between April 9th and 15th 
Haig's armies took fifteen thousand prisoners and 
about two hundred guns. 

The battle now passed into the second stage. Hin- 
denburg brought up reserves and used them lavishly 
in counter-attacks. The old German trench line of 
1914-17 east of Arras had been broken. The northern- 
most sector of the new Hindenburg Line had also been 
shattered. But behind those lines others had been 
constructed. The Oppy line ran north and south 
behind the original German positions and still farther 
back was the Queant-Drocourt line, cutting north 
from the Hindenburg Line at Queant and ending south- 
east of Lens. 



268 The Great War [1917] 

Field-Marshal Haig made a desperate effort, after 
April 23d, to break through the Oppy line. In six 
days of extremely bloody fighting he did break it, the 
British taking Roeux, Oppy, and Arleux-en-Gohelle. 
Then the new German method of persistent counter- 
attack was employed to bring on a deadlock somewhat 
similar to the old deadlock of rigid positional warfare. 
From April 30th to June ist there was continuous semi- 
open fighting on the Oppy front — between Queant and 
Fresnoy. Gradually the fierceness of the German 
counter-assaults wore down the British offensive. 
The Germans retook all the villages on the Oppy line 
— Fresnoy, Oppy, Roeux, Pelves, and Cherisy. The 
British retained BuUecourt, west of Queant. 

The battle ended in a stajid-off. Haig had had a 
brilliant initial success, but was unable to exploit it. 
He had been turned back on the Oppy line. Both 
sides suffered enormous losses. But the German losses 
were probably greater, because of the costly burden of 
local counter-attacks which had now been thrust on 
armies maintaining the defensive. Haig had, more- 
over, made territorial gains of considerable value. 
And to the Germans, the loss of Vimy Ridge was a 
genuine disaster. The British now turned away from 
Artois and Picardy to experiment with a series of local 
offensives in Flanders. 

The French operation on the Aisne sector began on 
April 1 6th, a week later than Haig's east and north 
of Arras. The battle line ran for twenty-five miles 
from a point north of Soissons to a point north of 
Rheims. In this region there had been no fighting on 
a large scale since the fall of 19 14. The attack, carried 
out under the direction of General Nivelle, opened 
vigorously. All the German first hne and a part of 



[I9I7] West Front Operations, 191 7 269 

the second line were carried. Ten thousand Germans 
were captured on the first day. 

Hindenburg pursued here also his new policy of 
tremendous counter-attacks. These held the French 
up after a time. But, on April 17th, a new gain was 
made east of Rheims, where the village of Auberive 
was captured, with 2500 prisoners. On the i8th an 
attack was launched on the whole line from Soissons 
to Auberive. Vailly, on the Aisne, was taken, with 
several other villages. Hindenburg countered again 
with violence, but could only stop the French momen- 
tarily. By the end of" April, Nivelle had captured 
175 guns and 21,000 prisoners. 

The French were now approaching the famous 
Chemin des Dames, the highway built by Louis XV 
as a promenade for his daughters. On May 4th they 
stormed Craonne, at the eastern end of the highway. 
The next day they made progress at its western end 
and also seized the eastern portion of the ridge along 
which the Chemin des Dames runs, giving them com- 
mand of the part of the Ailette Valley extending to- 
ward Laon. Five thousand more prisoners were taken. 
But at this moment Nivelle's offensive was broken off. 
It had been much too costly. M. Painleve, Minister 
of War at the time, admitted in 191 9 that the French 
loss in killed, up to April 26, was 34,000. 

In order to quiet unpleasant criticism. General Petain 
had been named on April 29th Chief of Staff and 
attached to the Ministry of War. His appointment 
foreshadowed Nivelle's retirement, which was accom- 
plished, on May 15th, by the nomination of Petain 
to the command of the armies in Northern France and 
of Foch as Petain 's successor as Chief of Staff and 
adviser to the War Ministry. 



270 The Great War 



[1917] 



The period following Nivelle's offensive on the Aisne 
was one of singular depression in France, both in the 
armies and among the civilian population. There was 
a marked reaction from the fervour of 1914, 1915, and 
1916. Verdun and the Somme had imposed terrible 
sacrifices, the extent of which was just beginning to 
be felt. The reaction was psychological, in the main. 
It was not based on the economic or the military situa- 
tion, for, now that Germany had forced the United States 
into the war, France's financial worries were banished 
and a military victory for the Entente seemed assured. 
Whatever the reasons, French morale suffered a decline. 
General Zurlinden, in his La Guerre de Liberation, 
speaking of the situation after Petain's appointment, 
says: 

Unfortunately General Petain had to face at once 
serious difficulties in the way of discipline. Some 
of our troops — though a very small number — 
showed weariness, discouragement, and even insub- 
ordination. At Soissons, toward the end of May, two 
regiments, displaying the red flag, marched on the 
railroad station, with the intention of seizing trains 
and going to Paris to make a protest to the Chamber 
of Deputies. The manifestation was stopped in 
time. The leaders were arrested and received exem- 
plary punishment. The regiments were disbanded, 
and the men scattered throughout the army. Good 
order was rapidly established, thanks to the excellent 
measures, displaying both tact and authority, which 
were taken by General Petain, who knew how to 
talk to the men in a language full of cordiality, viril- 
ity, and clarity, and to reawaken in their hearts 
confidence, enthusiasm, and the will to conquer. 



[I9I7] West Front Operations, 191 7 271 

The year 19 17 was one of instability in government 
in France and of injurious defeatist intrigues. On 
March 14th, General Lyautey, the Minister of War, 
came into collision with the Chamber of Deputies by 
declaring that answers to interpellations were a source 
of danger to the national defence, even when they 
were made in secret session. As a result of violent 
protest from the Deputies he offered his resignation. 
The Briand Ministry thereupon fell. Alexandre 
Ribot formed a new ministry on March 19th. This 
ministry succumbed on September loth, after many 
of its members had indicated their unwillingness to 
serve longer under M. Ribot. M. Painleve, the Min- 
ister of War, then assumed the Premiership, retaining 
Ribot as Minister of Foreign Affairs. But dissatisfac- 
tion and factionalism continued. The defeatist scandal 
had become flagrant and M. Painleve showed weakness 
in dealing with it. His ministry fell on November 
13th. Clemenceau then came forward with a pro- 
gramme of drastic punishment for all pacifist, defeatist, 
and pro-German propagandists. He became Premier 
on November 1 6th. His virile personality put new force 
into the government and reiinited the country. His 
poHcy was condensed into a single sentence: "I make 
war." 

The defeatist agitation, which aimed at a peace of 
surrender with Germany, was conducted, on the one 
side, by the extreme Socialists, who wished to restore 
the power of the Socialist international organization 
by working in harmony with the Russian and German 
groups, and, on the other, by politicians who expected 
to come into control in a "peace-without-victory" 
government. 

M. Malvy, who had been Minister of the Interior 



272 The Great War 



[19171 



in the Ribot and preceding ministries, was charged 
with having tolerated and encouraged commerce with 
the enemy, and with having had relations with the 
managers of the Bonnet Rouge, a defeatist newspaper, 
supposed to have been supported by German funds. 
Malvy's subordinate, M. Leymarie, was implicated in 
an attempt to hush up the fact that Duval, the manager 
of the Bonnet Rouge, had been caught returning from 
Switzerland with a check for 125,000 francs in his 
possession. Almereyda, the editor of the paper, was 
arrested and either committed suicide or was murdered 
in prison. 

The most unblushing trafficker with Germany was 
Bolo Pasha. He received large sums from the German 
Government to be used in getting control of the French 
press. He furnished Senator Humbert with part of 
the money with which the latter bought Le Journal. 
But behind Malvy and behind the group which ex- 
pected to turn defeat to political account was the sinister 
figure of Joseph Caillaux. He had long been recognized 
as friendly to Germany and opposed to the alliance 
with Great Britain, and he apparently held himself 
in reserve as the one man available to form a ministry 
when France should again, as in 1871, seek terms from 
a victorious enemy. 

Caillaux had great influence in the Chamber of 
Deputies. But when Clemenceau came into power the 
government resolutely uncovered all the defeatist 
scandals and prosecuted those involved in them. 
France cleaned house and turned with fresh energy 
to the prosecution of the war. 

The German High Command was, of course, fully 
aware of the propaganda carried on to break down 
the French fighting spirit. It began, early in May, a 



[I9I7] West Front Operations, 191 7 273 

series of violent counter-attacks on the French posi- 
tions north-east of Soissons, and continued them 
through June, July, and August. But all of these 
broke down with insignificant gains. Germany chal- 
lenged France once more to a duel of attrition, some- 
thing like that at Verdun in 191 6. The result was 
the same. According to French figures Ludendorff used 
up forty-nine divisions on the Chemin des Dames front 
alone. But at the end of August the lines on that front 
were practically unchanged. 

On August 20th Petain launched an offensive at 
Verdun, on both sides of the Meuse. In four days the 
French recovered all the ground they had lost on the 
west bank the year before. They re-took Dead Man's 
Hill, Corbeaux, and Cumieres Woods, Goose Hill, Re- 
gnecourt, and Hill 304, and reached Forges Brook. On 
the east side of the river Talou Hill, Champneuville, 
Hills 344 and 240, and Samogneux were stormed. 
Early in September Caurieres Wood was retaken and 
the line of February 21, 191 6, on the east bank was 
nearly re-established. More than ten thousand pris- 
oners were captured. 

Petain, who was wisely building up the armies under 
him for the critical tests of 191 8, ended the campaign 
of 191 7 with one more brilliant but carefully limited 
offensive. This began on October 23d, on a six-mile 
front north-east of Soissons. It was preceded by a 
heavy four-day bombardment and achieved its objec- 
tives with surprising ease. The attack, made by the 
army of General Maitre, extended from Laffaux, near 
Vauxaillon, to Fort de la Malmaison. The German 
fore positions were penetrated all along the line and 
Fort de la Malmaison was captured. The enemy's 
hold on the Chemin des Dames now became precarious 
18 



274 The Great War [19171 

and he withdrew to the north side of the Ailette 
River. In this operation the French captured nearly 
twelve thousand prisoners and two hundred guns, their 
own losses being very moderate. About forty square 
miles of French territory were liberated. 

After the battle of Arras and until November the 
British High Command devoted itself to an ambitious 
and stubborn effort to shatter the German line in Flan- 
ders and compel a German retirement from the Belgian 
coast. Field-Marshal Haig carried through a number 
of carefully prepared attacks, with limited objectives. 
But the larger aim behind all of them was to reach 
Menin and Roulers and turn the German positions 
from Dixmude to Nieuport, which covered the enemy's 
sea bases at Ostend and Zeebrugge. 

As a preliminary step it was necessary to eject the 
Germans from Messines Ridge, south of Ypres. This 
ridge commanded the city and a large part of the Ypres 
salient, as reduced after the successful German attack 
of April, 191 5. The Flanders sector was held by the 
British Second Army, under General Sir Herbert C. O. 
Plumer. He had been planning an attack on Messines 
Ridge for many months and his sappers had mined the 
range at many points. On the morning of June 7, 
191 7, the mines were set off. The German defences 
were blown to pieces and the British infantry swept 
forward in a few minutes over the wreckage of the 
first line. Within three hours the top of the ridge was 
cleared and later in the afternoon the German rear 
lines along the southern base were stormed. The 
battle lasted only one day, and was a clean-cut British 
victory. Seven thousand prisoners were captured. 
The German casualties were about thirty thousand. 
Plumer 's were about ten thousand. 



[I9I7] West Front Operations, 191 7 275 

On June nth the Germans attacked some exposed 
British front positions east of the Yser River, near the 
Belgian coast. The bridges across the river were 
destroyed by artillery fire and the trenches were rushed. 
The British lost about three thousand men, twelve 
hundred of whom were taken prisoners. 

The capture of Messines Ridge opened the way for 
a vigorous Allied offensive in the Ypres sector. The 
immediate objective was the Passchendaele Ridge, the 
name given to a series of heights stretching north-east 
and south-west, at a distance of two or three miles east 
of Ypres. The ultimate objectives were Menin and 
Roulers and the railroad lines from Lille north to Bruges. 

Three armies were concentrated on an eighteen- 
mile front from Dixmude down to the neighbourhood 
of Warneton. On the left was a French army, under 
General Antoine; in the centre, the British Second 
Army, under Plumer; on the right, the newly created 
British Fifth Army, under Gough. In a part of this 
operation the Belgian army, north of Antoine's, was 
also engaged. 

The attack began on July 31st, after a tremendous 
artillery preparation. The British and French infantry 
carried the first and second German lines, and, in some 
cases, the third line. An average advance of about two 
miles was made and five thousand prisoners were cap- 
tured. A two-day rain intervened. When the ground 
had dried out the assault was resumed. On August 
loth the British took Westhoek village, three miles 
east of Ypres, and the French stormed Bixschoote. 
On the 17th the British entered Langemarck, on the 
extreme left of their line, and the French seized the 
bridgehead of Drie Grachten. More heavy rains now 
turned Flanders into a marsh. 



276 The Great War 



[1917] 



Between September 20th and October i4tli the Allied 
armies delivered five successive assaults east and 
north-east of Ypres. That of September 20th was made 
on an eight-mile front, north and south of the Ypres- 
Menin highroad. It resulted in the capture of Glen- 
course Wood, Inverness Cope, Nonne Boshen, Gallipoli, 
Iberian Farm, and Potsdam Vampire, names invented 
by the British "Tommies" and unknown to the maps. 
In the centre Veldhoek, on the Ypres-Menin road, 
was taken, with part of Polygon Wood. In the second 
drive, on September 6th, Tower Hamlet crest, the rest 
of Polygon Wood, and Zonnebeke, near the Ypres- 
Roulers railroad, fell to the British. 

On October 4th the attack shifted farther to the 
north. The Broodseinde crest of Passchendaele Ridge 
was occupied. Forty-five hundred Germans were 
made prisoners. On the 9th Plumer and Antoine con- 
ducted a joint operation still farther north. The Brit- 
ish took Poelcapelle and advanced toward Passchen- 
daele village and the Forest of Houthhulst. The French 
carried several villages and brought up on the southern 
edge of the forest. 

Without giving the enemy a breathing space, Plumer 
struck again on the 12th, in a driving rain, on a six- 
mile line between the Ypres-Roulers railroad and 
Houthhulst. He got to within five hundred yards of 
Passchendaele. On the 22d the French occupied the 
southern part of Houthhulst Forest, the British gained 
ground toward Passchendaele, and the Belgian army 
captured the Merckem peninsula, south of Dixmude. 
The British got into Passchendaele village on October 
30th, but were driven out again. A Canadian division, 
however, recaptured it on November 7th and stormed 
the German defences eight hundred yards east of it. 



[I9I7] West Front Operations, 191 7 277 

With that brilliant success the second battle of Flanders 
ended. 

It, too, like the battle of Arras, had degenerated 
into a deadlock of attrition. The losses on both sides 
were severe, the Germans suffering more than the 
Allies. But the strategical results of the Allied offensive 
were disappointing. Haig had failed to reach the 
plain east of the Passchendaele heights, although his 
guns now commanded Roulers and Menin. He had 
not broken the German grip on the Belgian coast, or 
on Lille. 

The positions he had won were of some local value, 
but they were dearly bought. They had all to be aban- 
doned, without a fight, in the spring of 1918, when 
Ludendorff's second great drive — up the Lys Valley — 
threatened the envelopment of Ypres from the south 
and south-west. Even Me'^sines Ridge could not hold 
out, as Vimy Ridge had lield out against the first 
Ludendorff drive. Yet the Flanders operation had 
shown that the offensive, under the changed conditions 
of warfare, had got beyond the capacity of the defence 
to stop it dead within certain limits. The only ques- 
tion now was to develop an offensive which would 
eventually become unstoppable. 

The battle of Cambrai proved that such an offensive 
was already taking form. It resulted in the first com- 
plete break-through of a deep trench system effected 
on the Western Front. It was notable for two things 
— a complete absence of artillery preparation and the 
use of tanks on a large scale and as the principal arm 
of attack. With Cambrai the era of rigid positional 
warfare vanished and the era of semi-open and nearly 
open warfare arrived. 

Cambrai was in every sense a surprise operation. 



278 The Great War [1917] 

It took the Germans unawares. On the other hand, 
its success was so far beyond reasonable anticipations 
that no adequate provision had been made for following 
it up. 

The task of breaking the formidable Hindenburg 
Line in one of its vital sectors was entrusted by Field- 
Marshal Haig to the British Third Army, in command 
of which General AUenby had been replaced by General 
Sir Julian H. G. Byng. Allenby was sent to Palestine, 
where he was to win later one of the completest victo- 
ries of the war. Byng's objective was Cambrai, one of 
the principal anchors of the German defence system in 
Northern France. The British got to within two miles 
of that important railroad centre and military base. 
But lack of reserves prevented them from advancing 
farther, or even holding the ground they had gained. 

The battle line extended for thirty-five miles, from 
the Scarpe River, on the north-west, to St. Quentin, 
on the south-east. But the main and successful thrust 
occurred on a front of about six miles, south-west of 
Cambrai, between the Cambrai-Bapaume and Cam- 
brai-Peronne highroads. The north-western end of 
this front was at Hermies and the south-eastern at 
Gonnelieu. 

The engagement began at sunrise on November 20th, 
when four hundred tanks crawled forward in the haze 
towards the front positions of the Hindenburg Zone. 
The British also used screening smoke clouds. But they 
were hardly needed, since the visibility was extremely 
low Within a few minutes the tanks, followed by 
infantry, were through the obstructions and over the 
first line, the troops holding it surrendering without 
a fight. The tanks pushed on for the German second 
and third lines and crossed them both. The German 



[I9I7] West Front Operations, IQI 7 ^79 

front was lightly held, owing to the diversion of many 
troops to Flanders. The defenders hastily retired 
toward Cambrai and the valley of the Scheldt River. 
The maximum British advance on November 20th 
was five miles. Ten thousand prisoners were taken. 

The British left pushed north-east to the Cambrai- 
Bapaume highroad and reached the neighbourhood of 
Moeuvres and Bourlon Wood, the latter overlooking 
Cambrai. The centre crossed the Scheldt Canal at 
Marcoing and Masnieres. The right drove still farther 
east toward Crevecoeur, on the Scheldt, due south of 
Cambrai, from which side Field-Marshal Haig had 
hoped to strike at the German railroad connections 
centring in the city. 

On November 21st the advance was resumed. The 
British left wing took Moeuvres, to the north of the 
Cambrai-Bapaume road, and progressed to the south- 
ern edge of Bourlon Wood. Farther east, Cantaing, 
two miles south-west of Cambrai, was captured. 
Between Bourlon Wood and Cantaing, the village of 
Fontaine-Notre Dame was stormed. South of Cam- 
brai and south-east of Marcoing the offensive was 
held up a short distance east of Crevecoeur, the apex 
of the salient which Byng had driven through and 
behind the Hindenburg Line. 

The idea of getting across the Scheldt and turning 
Cambrai from the south was now abandoned in favour 
of an attempt to seize and hold Bourlon Wood. On 
November 23d Welsh troops, who had been specially 
trained in wood fighting, carried the whole of the wood, 
about six hundred acres in extent, and also reached the 
western edge of Bourlon village. For the next four 
or five days the British were violently counter-attacked 
on this front and hardly held their own, losing a part 



280 The Great War [1917] 

of Bourlon Wood and the village of Fontaine-N6tre 
Dame. 

Ludendorff had gathered reserves from all directions. 
Since the British attack seemed spent, he decided 
to take the offensive himself. Byng's forces had not 
been materially strengthened and now held a vulner- 
able salient, which they were unable to widen out. On 
November 30th six German divisions tried to break 
the northern side of the British triangle and six more 
the eastern side. The attempt failed on the north. 
But on the east and south-east, where fighting had died 
away for a week, the British were taken by surprise 
and their whole line was pierced and crumpled up. 

The southern attack was made on a ten-mile line 
from Masnieres down to Vendhuille. Within a couple 
of hours the storming columns were three miles inside 
the British positions. At the extreme south they 
reached Gouzeaucourt, on the line from which Byng's 
offensive had started on November 20th. They were 
now on the flank and rear of the British in the apex of 
the salient towards Crevecceur and Masnieres. At 
Gouzeaucourt they nearly captured General de Lisle, 
commanding the 29th Division, and his staff; at Gon- 
nelieu they just missed taking General Vincent, of 
the 37th Brigade of the 29th Division, who found 
himself cut off from his troops, fighting farther east. 

The British right wing was badly smashed and 
retreated in disorder. But the centre about Masnieres 
held on desperately. Masnieres and Marcoing were 
not evacuated until December 2d, when the British 
withdrew out of the Masnieres-Crevecoeur salient. On 
the north the British left wing lost a Httle groimd, 
but administered a severe check to the enemy. 

The southern line was re-established by December 3d, 



[I9I7] West Front Operations, 191 7 281 

following the surrender of about half the territory 
originally gained. The Germans captured one hundred 
guns and six thousand prisoners. But they had lost 
145 guns and eleven thousand prisoners. They occu- 
pied a small sector of the original British line, between 
Vendhuille and Gonnelieu. On the other hand, the 
British retained a firm grip on eleven thousand yards 
of the original Hindenburg Line, and were still within 
striking distance of Cambrai. 

Byng's offensive was not supported properly because 
Field-Marshal Haig's army was worn down by the long 
and bloody fighting in Flanders and because, in addi- 
tion, Haig had been obliged to send several divisions to 
Italy to help stabilize the Piave front. But the Cam- 
brai experiment was worth while. It showed that the 
Hindenburg Line could be broken and that infantry 
and tanks could go through the zones on which the 
defensive was now obliged to rely. It prefigured the 
new mode of warfare which was to play so dramatic 
a role in the decisive campaigns of 191 8. 



CHAPTER XXX 

THE ISONZO-CAPORETTO. MAY 12, I917-DECEMBER 

The Italian High Command continued through 
191 7 its patient and unavailing effort to break through 
the Isonzo barrier and reach Laibach and Trieste. 
A continuation of the Isonzo campaign was made more 
hazardous by the fact that Russia had virtually drawn 
out of the war and thus released large Austro-Hungarian 
farces from the GaHcian and Bukowinan front. But 
Italy still aimed at the recovery of her unredeemed 
districts, apd it was only a choice of evils whether she 
should renew the offensive towards Trieste or engage in 
an equally unpromising offensive up the Adige or down 
the Val Sugano for Trent. 

General Cadoma expected another Austro-Hungarian 
attack out of the Trentino in the early spring of 191 7. 
He prepared to meet it; but it didn't come. So in 
May and June the Second and Third Italian armies 
renewed the exhausting warfare of the rigid positional 
type which they had been carrying on for two years 
past in the mountain strongholds about Gorizia. 

The first operation began on May 12th, with a heavy 
artillery preparation, lasting two days. On May 14th 
the infantry advanced from Gorizia and Plava to estab- 
lish a foothold on the rim of the Bainsizza Plateau, on 

282 



[I9I7] The Isonzo-Caporetto 383 

the east bank of the Isonzo. North of Gorizia, Monte 
Cucco and a part of Monte Santo, on the south-western 
side of the plateau, were stormed on the 14th and 15th. 
The ItaHans took 71 13 prisoners. 

On May 23d the Third Army attacked on the Carso 
front, the battle continuing until May 27th. Many 
local gains were made and 16,568 prisoners and twenty 
gun,s were captured. But on June ist the Austro- 
Hungarians, strongly reinforced, started a counter- 
offensive on the sector from Gorizia to the Adriatic. 
It was partially successful and brought Cadorna's 
effort to an end. 

From May 19th to May 22d the Austro-Hungarians 
made a feint at an offensive in the Adige sector. 
Cadorna retorted in June with minor attacks in the 
neighbourhood of Asiago. But this front remained 
tranquil, for the most part, until after Caporetto. 

Cadorna made his final Isonzo campaign in the period 
between August and October. It was as spirited and 
stubborn as the others. But, like the others, it pro- 
duced nothing substantial. The Austrians called this 
last effort somewhat derogatively "the Eleventh Battle 
of the Isonzo"; and in the same vein the German 
General Staff issued, after Caporetto, a pamphlet 
describing the great Italian defeat as "the Twelfth 
Battle of the Isonzo. " 

The Italian operation began on August 19th with 
great promise. After five days of bitter fighting the 
Second Army, under General Capello, cleared the north- 
em part of the Bainsizza Plateau. On the 24th the 
rest of Monte Santo was stormed and the Austro-Hun- 
garians retired to the eastern edge of the Bainsizza 
stronghold. At last the way toward Laibach seemed 
about to be opened. 



284 The Great War [1917] 

By September, Capello had penetrated the plateau 
to a depth of seven and a half miles, on a front of eleven 
miles. On September 14th he occupied Monte San 
Gabriele, which dominated Monte San Daniele, still 
held by the Austrians, in the south-eastern section of 
Bainsizza. Beyond Bainsizza lay the Chiapovano 
Valley and beyond the valley the Temovano Plateau, 
in many respects a duplicate of the Bainsizza and the 
Carso. But this plateau could be turned by way of 
the Chiapovano Valley on the north and the road to 
Laibach on the south. 

Below Gorizia, however, the Duke of Aosta, com- 
manding the Third Army, was less successful in the 
final thrust at the Carso. He tried to take Mount 
Hermada and to penetrate into the Vippaco Valley. 
But he made little progress, meeting powerful counter- 
attacks. By October the situation on the Russian 
front, disturbed in July by the Korniloff offensive, 
had simmered down to an informal truce, which freed 
Austria-Hungary of all apprehension. She now rushed 
eastern troops to the west and began to plan, with 
German aid, to put an end to the Italian menace to 
Trieste. 

It was time. The defence of the Gorizia front had 
been arduous and costly. In the last battle of the 
Isonzo Austria had lost thirty thousand prisoners. 
Her total losses were well over one hundred thousand. 

The German General Staff assumed direction of 
the great counter-stroke against Italy. Otto Below's 
Fourteenth Army was transferred from the Riga front 
and was used as the battering-ram with which to break 
through the Italian line on the upper Isonzo. The 
Teuton forces were grouped in this order, from west 
to east, on the Italian front: Hoetzendorff, with one 



[I9I7] The Isonzo-Caporetto 285 

army, in the Trentino ; Krobatin, with one, in the Car- 
nic Alps; then Below, above the Bainsizza Plateau; 
then the Archduke Eugene, with two armies, from 
Bainsizza down to Trieste. 

Below had chosen the weakest spot in Cadorna's 
defence. From Tolmino north the Isonzo Valley 
makes a sharp bend to the north-west, so that a passage 
of the river in the neighbourhood of Caporetto would 
bring the enemy directly on the flank and rear of the 
Italian armies which were fighting in the mountains 
east of Gorizia. From Caporetto it was only a short 
march south-west to the Natisone Valley, which emerges 
from the Friuli foothills at Cividale, an important 
military base, only ten miles east of Italian Grand 
Headquarters at Udine. 

The Tolmino-Plezzo line, on the east bank of the 
upper Isonzo, was held by the left wing of Capello's 
Second Army. But as there had been no active fight- 
ing on it since the beginning of the war, its defence 
was naturally assigned to the second class divisions. 
There were many charges after Caporetto that certain 
Italian units had become demoralized through com- 
munications with the enemy and pacifist propaganda 
conducted by Teuton agents. General Cadorna, in 
one of his communiques, explicitly charged a part of 
the Second Army with cowardice. But this accusa- 
tion was afterwards softened. 

It was not necessary to offer excuses of that sort for 
the Italian defeat. Better troops would probably 
have been equally unable to stop Below's veterans. 
The true cause of the disaster was Cadorna's willing- 
ness to risk an offensive beyond the Isonzo while his 
flank was insufficiently protected against attacks com- 
ing out of the upper Julian Alps, the Camic Alps, or 



286 The Great War 



[1917] 



the Trentino. Below simply did what Hoetzendorff 
came near doing in 191 6, when his Trentino offensive 
was cut short by Brusiloff's sensational successes in 
Volhynia, Bukowina, and Galicia. 

Below's troops were secretly deployed on the Tol- 
mino-Plezzo front. The offensive was set in advance 
for October 24th and began promptly on that day 
with a violent bombardment. This included the use 
of gas waves and liquid fire, which made a powerful 
impression on troops quite unaccustomed to them. 
The Italian line yielded at many points. German 
infantry crossed the Isonzo at Tolmino and also at 
Plezzo and converged toward Caporetto, thus isolating 
the Italians holding Monte Nero and other advanced 
points in the centre, to the east of the Isonzo. 

By October 26th Below had reached the upper 
Natisone Valley. From Tolmino also he had pushed 
south-west beyond Ronzina, on the Isonzo, capturing 
many thousands of non-combatants attached to the 
services in the Italian rear. On the 27th the Fourteenth 
German Army took Monte Matajur, the chief defence 
of the upper Natisone Valley. The next day it reached 
Cividale. On October 30th it occupied Udine. 

The break-through at Tolmino imperilled the centre 
and right of the Second Italian army, occupying the 
Bainsizza Plateau and the region east of Gorizia, It 
retreated in disorder, pressed by the Archduke Eugene. 
A temporary stand by its rear guards on Vippaco 
Ridge enabled it to get clear. The Third Army had 
ample time to retreat west in the coast region. It 
suffered relatively small losses. 

But the rout of the Second Army had uncovered the 
right flank of the Fourth Army, guarding the line in 
the Carnic Alps. Krobatin pushed down the upper 



[I9I7] The Isonzo-Caporetto 287 

valley of the Tagliamento River to Gemona and, 
farther west, down the little valleys of the streams 
which enter the Piave. Three Italian armies were 
thus retreating south and west toward a new defensive 
line, which should stretch north across the Venetian 
Plain and then bend west to link up with the First 
Army's positions facing the Trentino. 

The first halting place was the Tagliamento River. 
By the time they got to it the Italians had lost 180,000 
prisoners and 1500 guns. A line along the Tagliamento 
— at least along its middle course — had been partially 
prepared to cover a retreat. But it had the disad- 
vantage of being open to a turning movement from the 
north. The much shorter line of the Livenza River 
was then chosen as a barrier. In the retreat to it, 
ending November 8th, the Italian loss in prisoners 
had mounted to 250,000 and in guns to 2300. 

The Livenza line was also untenable on the north. 
It was occupied for a few days only while the Piave 
line, twenty miles farther back, was being prepared. 
Here the broken Italian armies rallied effectively in 
the middle of November. General Cadoma was trans- 
ferred from the supreme command to a place on the 
new Inter-AlHed War Council, and General Diaz was 
nominated as his successor. Diaz wisely decided to 
fight it out with the invaders on the Piave. 

The Piave line was not inherently strong. It was 
not as well secured against a turning movement as 
was the line of the Adige. But a retreat to the Adige 
would have involved the surrender of Venice, Padua, 
and Vicenza and practically all of the province of 
Venetia. It would have been an exaggerated confes- 
sion of Italian weakness. If Venetia was to be defended, 
the defence would have to be made on the Piave. 



288 The Great War [19171 

And the Piave line possessed certain obvious advan- 
tages. It could be flooded for a considerable distance 
in the Adriatic sector, thus sheltering Venice. It 
ran north-west to the mountains, instead of north, 
and from its upper course the Italian front could be 
easily extended west to the headwaters of the Brenta, 
thence to the Asiago-Arsiero region and on to the 
Adige. Such a readjustment compelled a retirement 
of the right wing of the First Army, which had been 
holding the district west of the Piave. It left the 
Italians clinging precariously to the last ridges of the 
Alps above the Venetian Plain. And it also trans- 
ferred the shock of the Teuton attack from the east 
to the north. 

From the middle of November till the end of De- 
cember the Austro-German effort centred on the 
mountain line between the Piave and the Brenta and 
thence west across the Asiago Plateau. Hoetzendorff 
and Krobatin threw masses of troops against the 
Italian positions from Monte Tomba, near the Piave, 
across to Monte Grappa and the Brenta, and from 
the Brenta west to the Astico. The Italian armies on 
this front were reinforced by three British divisions 
and a small French army under General FayoUe. It 
was able to hold its own, though pressed back close to 
the plain in the region west of the Brenta. 

In an offensive lasting from December 5th to Decem- 
ber 8th Hoetzendorff captured fifteen thousand prison- 
ers west of the Brenta. On December 15th Col Caprille 
was stormed and, on December 19th, Monte Assolone. 
Five thousand prisoners were taken in these two opera- 
tions. The Austrians were now within four miles of 
the plain. But the Italians made a timely counter- 
attack and retook Monte Assolone. 



[I9I7] The Isonzo-Caporetto 289 

In the last week of December, Hoetzendorff captured 
Col del Rosso and Monte Valbella, at the head of the 
Frenzela Valley, running north-west from the Brenta. 
Nine thousand prisoners were taken. But at last the 
winter snows intervened and operations ceased. Just 
before New Year's the French had a brilliant local 
success at Monte Tomba. 

The Teuton offensive yielded in all 2700 guns and 
nearly 300,000 prisoners. About four thousand square 
miles of Italian territory were overrun. The Caporetto 
campaign was another terrific indictment of the feeble- 
ness of Allied strategy. An immediate outcome was 
the Rapallo Conference, at which the French, British, 
and Italian governments agreed to create an Inter- 
Allied General Staff, consisting of General Foch, General 
Wilson, and General Cadorna. This staff was to act 
as advisers to a supreme war council, composed of the 
Prime Minister and one other member of the govern- 
ment of each of the three Powers. 

This was a step — but only a halting one — toward 
unity of military control. The Supreme War Council 
functioned without effect so far as introducing a cen- 
tralized direction of the war was concerned. Another 
great Allied disaster — the defeat of the British Fifth 
Army west of St. Quentin — was needed to prod the 
Allied governments into selecting a generalissimo and 
entrusting him with command on all the fronts. 



CHAPTER XXXI 

BALKA.N AND ASIATIC CAMPAIGNS OF I917. JANUARY 
I, I917-DECEMBER 31, I917 

On the Balkan front the war languished all through 
191 7. Early in the year the Germans completed their 
operations in Eastern Wallachia. The Dobrudja was 
cleared entirely and the Russian-Rumanian line from 
Braila to Fokshani was forced. Braila was captured 
on January 5th, the defenders retiring toward Galatz. 
After February 15th the Teuton line ran north-west 
from Braila across to the Carpathians. It became 
practically stationary. The Germans pursued the 
same policy toward Rumania as they did toward Russia. 
It wasn't necessary to fight, because the Russian revolu- 
tion was steadily dragging both countries toward the 
brink of a peace at any price. 

On the Macedonian front a long period of inaction 
set in after the capture of Monastir by the Allies in 
November, 19 16. Only petty local operations were 
indulged in up to the fall of 191 8. The Allied garrison 
in the Salonica entrenched camp constituted a threat 
against Bulgaria and Turkey and protected Greece. 
Otherwise it served no strategic purpose. In December, 
191 7, General Sarrail was recalled to France. General 
Guillaumat succeeded him in command of the Allied 
annies on the Salonica front. 

290 



[I9I7] Balkan and Asiatic Campaigns 291 

The situation was greatly improved, however, by 
the tardy deposition of Constantine. What the Allies 
should have done in 191 5 — certainly in 19 16 — they 
plucked up courage to do on June 12, 191 7. M. Jon- 
nart, former Governor General of Algeria, was sent to 
Athens by the governments of France and Great 
Britain (Italy also giving her approval), to demand 
Constantine's abdication. The latter capitulated at 
once. He designated his second son, Prince Alexander, 
as his successor, and retired to Switzerland. 

The new king summoned Venizelos to form a ministry. 
The Venizelos Assembly, which Constantine had ille- 
gally dissolved, was again called into being. Greece 
broke off diplomatic relations with Germany and pre- 
pared to enter the war on the side of the Allies. Her 
accession strengthened the army on the Macedonian 
front and made possible the success of the final attack 
on Bulgaria a year later. 

The British Government had long hesitated to 
participate in the dethronement of Constantine, balk- 
ing at coercion on the part of the three guardian Powers 
— France, Great Britain, and Russia. But coercion 
had at last to be resorted to, and by that time the 
Russian Government (Kerensky's), having fallen out 
of sympathy with the Western Powers, refused to 
concur in the intervention and even protested against 
it. Down to the day of his ejection, Constantine had 
never ceased to act as an enemy of the Entente and a 
friend of Germany. 

British prestige on the Asiatic front was restored by 
the capture of Bagdad in May and of Jerusalem in 
December. 

The Bagdad expedition, under General Sir Stanley 
Maude, was organized in the latter half of 1916. The 



292 The Great War [1917] 

Turks were still defending Kut-el-Amara, whose forti- 
fied lines had proved too strong for the army under 
Lake, which had tried to relieve Townshend. General 
Maude began operations on January 6, 191 7. It took 
him nearly two months to reduce the Turkish positions 
east of Kut . B ut late in February he cleared the south- 
ern bank of the Tigris and threw a bridge across the 
river to the northern bank, near Kut. At the same 
time he forced the formidable Sannaiyat lines, on the 
northern bank. The Turks retreated north on Febru- 
ary 24th, pursued by the British cavalry on land and 
by the British flotilla in the river. The latter recap- 
tured the vessels lost in the Townshend surrender and 
destroyed all the other Turkish river craft. 

The pursuit was halted at Azizyeh, fifty miles from 
Kut and half way to Bagdad, in order to reorganize 
the communication lines. It was resumed on March 
5th. The infantry advanced to Zeur, eighteen miles 
up the river, the cavalry going seven miles farther. 
On March 7th the British head columns came in contact 
with the Turks, who had abandoned Ctesiphon, on 
the line of the Diala River, eight miles below Bagdad. 
British troops were now transferred to the west bank 
of the river, to take the Diala positions in flank. They 
made rapid progress north and on March loth engaged 
the Turks two or three miles south and west of Bagdad. 
The city was entered on March nth. On the loth 
the Diala lines, on the east bank, were forced. The 
next day General Marshall, commanding on that side, 
moved up to Bagdad, completing its occupation. 

The Turks retired twenty miles up the Tigris Valley 
and entrenched themselves at Mushaidie Station, on 
the Bagdad-Mosul railroad. General Cobbe's column 
stormed these positions on March 14th. The Turks 



[I9I7] Balkan and Asiatic Campaigns 293 

then fled another twenty-five miles north toward Mosul. 
On March 14th, also, a British post was established on 
the Diala, thirty miles north-east of Bagdad. Five 
days later General Maude sent troops thirty-five miles 
west of the city to the Euphrates River, where they 
drove the Turkish garrison out of Feluja. This opera- 
tion gave the British control of both the Euphrates 
and the Tigris and established their position securely 
in Upper Mesopotamia. From December 13, 191 6, 
to March 31, 1917, General Maude's army took 7921 
Turkish prisoners. 

Operations were suspended for a time, awaiting the 
result of a Russian offensive out of Persia. This drove 
the Turks from Hamadan and across the Turkish fron- 
tier. But the Russian revolution intervened and ended 
all serious plans for military co-operation. The best 
the Russians could do was to capture Nereman in 
October. This town lies fifty miles north of Mosul. 
But Maude's army didn't reach Mosul until the closing 
days of the war. He was left therefore to depend on 
his own resources, in his campaign beyond Bagdad. 
On April 23d he took Samara, securing control of the 
railroad to that point. Then the summer heats inter- 
rupted active operations. 

On September 30th the British, pushing up the 
Euphrates, captured Ramadie, with the whole of Ahmed 
Bey's small army in that sector. In the Tigris Valley 
they advanced to Tekrit, fifteen miles north of Samara. 
But dubious conditions on the Russian front made 
it advisable to limit progress toward Mosul. General 
Maude died on November i8th, and was succeeded 
in command of the Mesopotamian army by General 
Marshall. 

General Allenby had been sent to Egypt in the 



294 The Great War [19171 

summer of 191 7 to organize an advance into Palestine. 
The British had crossed the Sinai Peninsula in January 
and February, heading for Gaza and Beersheba. They 
were held up south of those two points all summer. 
In October AUenby took charge. He captured Beer- 
sheba on October 31st and Gaza on November 6th. 
He then advanced north, against unexpectedly feeble 
resistance, and cut the Jerusalem- Jopp a (Jaffa) railroad 
at Ludd and El Ramie, a short distance from the 
Mediterranean coast. Joppa was then evacuated by 
the Turks. 

AUenby now began an encircling movement directed 
at Jerusalem. He moved south-east along the rail- 
road from Joppa and north along the railroad from 
Beersheba. The Turkish positions west, north, and 
south of the Holy City were carried. The Turks 
avoided envelopment by hurriedly retiring east toward 
the Jordan River. Jerusalem fell on December loth 
— its redemption from Turkish rule sending a thrill 
through Christendom, Teuton Christendom excepted. 

The British then extended their positions east of the 
city and secured their hold on Joppa by occupying 
high ground four miles to the north of that port. The 
Turks held the northern half of Palestine and also 
retained their grip on the Jordan Valley and the Hedjaz 
railroad, to the west of it, connecting Damascus with 
Medina. 

The conquest of German East Africa was completed 
in 191 7. The German forces were gradually broken 
up into small guerilla bands. On December 3d the 
British War Office announced that the last of the Ger- 
man colonies had passed into the possession of the 
Allies. 



CHAPTER XXXII 

SUBMARINE AND NAVAL OPERATIONS, I917 

Germany staked everything she had on the success 
of her U-boat campaign against Allied and neutral 
shipping. She forced the United States into the war 
by her reversion to the policy of unrestricted submarine 
warfare. If she couldn't blockade Great Britain and 
France and couldn't prevent the transportation of 
American troops to Europe, the man-power of America 
would eventually overwhelm her. 

The submarine was a powerful weapon. But Ger- 
many never came near doing with it what she expected 
to do. Tirpitz's dream of German sea power could not 
be realized by German U-boats any more than it could 
be by German battle-ships and battle cruisers. 

The German Government didn't proclaim its policy 
of unrestricted attack until February, 191 7. But it 
had already begun to speed up its campaign against 
merchant shipping in the last months of 191 6. In 
the fourth quarter of 191 6 the tonnage sunk amounted 
to 1,159,343, which was nearly twice the total for the 
third quarter of 1916. Possibly this startling increase 
in destruction, generally under the restrictions laid 
down in the Sussex note, misled Tirpitz and Ludendorff 
into thinking that the rate could be easily tripled or 
quadrupled by warfare freed from such restrictions. 

295 



296 The Great War 



[1917] 



At the beginning of the war the world's ocean-going 
merchant tonnage (German and Austro-Hungarian 
excluded) was about 45,000,000. The Germans sank 
or interned in 1914 681,363 tons, according to British 
Admiralty figures. In 1915, they sank 1,724,720 tons, 
and in 1916 2,797,866 tons. All these deductions were 
practically neutralized by new construction. Ger- 
many's task in 191 7 was therefore not only to offset 
new building, but to cut into the outstanding total at 
a rate which would soon drive shipping from the seas. 

The German Admiralty seems to have set for the 
destructive activities of its U-boats a mark of some- 
thing like 1,000,000 tons of shipping a month. That 
was a minimum, if Germany expected to make substan- 
tial inroads into the world's merchant fleet. For after 
the United States entered the war the world's capacity 
for new construction would be pretty certain to be 
increased to at least 5,000,000 tons annually. Accord- 
ing to British figures, the Germans destroyed in 191 7 
shipping aggregating 7,613,623 tons. That was the 
maximum accomplishment of the U-boats. But it 
was not enough. Including the disastrous year 191 7, 
when the submarine was at the peak of its destructive 
power, the world's loss in tonnage since August I, 1 914, 
was 1 1 ,827,572. But in those four years new construc- 
tion had amounted to 6,606,275 tons and German ton- 
nage of 2,589,000 had been taken into Allied service. 
The net loss for the four years was only 2,632,297 tons. 

The unrestricted U-boat campaign, in fact, petered 
out quickly. It reached the height of its effectiveness 
in April, 191 7. In February the tonnage sunk was 
540,000; in March, 600,000; in April, 875,000. But 
in May it fell below 600,000. In June it was 690,000; 
in July 540,000; in August, 500,000. In September 



[I9I7] Submarine and Naval Operations 297 

it declined to 320,000. In October it was 450,000; 
in November, 300,000; in December, 390,000 and in 
January, 191 8, 300,000. 

By July, 19 1 7, it was evident that the submarine 
had failed. The introduction of the depth bomb, the 
large increase in the force of destroyers and other sub- 
marine chasers, the arming of merchant vessels, and the 
use of convoys greatly restricted U-boat operations. 
More and more the submarine commanders were limited 
to the pursuit of smaller and slower vessels. They 
seldom ventured to attack convoyed ships. They let 
most of the American transports severely alone. Only 
one large steamer carrying American soldiers to Europe 
was torpedoed. And if the submarines could not 
interrupt the flow of American reinforcements to 
Europe, what were they really worth to Germany, in 
the broad military sense? 

The naval operations of 19 17 were of minor impor- 
tance. There were no engagements between major 
vessels except in the Gulf of Riga, at the time of the 
German occupation of Oesel Island. (See Chapter 
XXVIII, "Russia in Revolution.") On January 9th 
the British battle-ship Cornwallis (14,000 tons) was 
torpedoed in the Mediterranean. In February the 
French dreadnaught Danton (18,000 tons) was torpe- 
doed in the Mediterranean. Other major vessels lost 
by the Allies were the French armoured cruiser Kleber, 
sunk by a mine in the Atlantic ; the British dreadnaught 
Vanguard, destroyed by an explosion while at anchor; 
and the French armoured cruiser Chateau Renault, 
torpedoed in the Ionian Sea. 

The German raiding cruiser Moewe made another 
excursion in 191 7, sinking twenty- two steamers and 
five sailing vessels, with a total tonnage of 123,000. 



298 The Great War [1917] 

Another raider, the Seeadler, ran the blockade and 
operated in the South Atlantic and South Pacific. 
She sank sixteen vessels and was then wrecked on one 
of the Society Islands. On April 20th British and 
German destroyer squadrons had an engagement in 
the North Sea. Two German destroyers were sunk. 
On December 6th the American destroyer, Jacob Jones, 
was torpedoed in the Atlantic by a submarine and sixty 
lives were lost. On November 20th the American 
destroyer Chauncey was accidentally rammed and sunk 
by a merchantman which she was convoying. Twenty- 
one lives were lost. 

The enforced inactivity of the German navy led to 
two mutinies — one at Kiel and one at Wilhelmshaven. 
They were suppressed, however, without great difficulty. 
Bad food, socialistic propaganda, and opposition to 
being drafted for submarine service were given as the 
causes of these outbreaks. 

After the United States came into the war the naval 
strength of the Allies was so materially increased as 
to make further use of the German High Sea Fleet 
hopeless. American destroyers were sent to British 
waters in May and later an American battle-ship squad- 
ron joined the British Grand Fleet at Scapa Flow. 

The American naval forces in European waters were 
under the command of Admiral WilHam S. Sims. 



CHAPTER XXXIII 

THE DISMEMBERMENT OF RUSSIA. JANUARY I, I918- 
DECEMBER 3I, I918 

The revolutionary government of Russia entered 
into peace negotiations with the Central Powers in 
the winter of 19 17-18. The latter had announced 
through Count Czernin, the Austro-Hungarian Prime 
Minister, that peace would be made on the basis of 
"no annexations and no indemnities." The Ger- 
man Reichstag had also passed a resolution in the 
summer of 191 7, favouring a peace "with no forcible 
annexations." 

The peace conference met at Brest-Litovsk on De- 
cember 23, 191 7. Czernin had artfully suggested that 
the other Entente Powers participate in it along with 
Russia. When they declined to do so, he announced 
that the Teuton principle of "no annexations and no 
indemnities " was meant to apply only in case a general 
peace conference assembled. He had also commended 
the theory of "self-determination" of peoples, which 
at that time was popular with the Bolshevist regime. 
But he and the German conferees (all acting under in- 
structions from Ludendorff through General Hoffmann) 
cynically interpreted this theory so as to detach from 
Russia all her western provinces, on the plea that the 
latter were entitled to seek "self-determination" under 
Teuton guardianship. 

299 



300 The Great War 



[1918] 



The negotiations were a travesty in which the tragic 
mingled with the grotesque. The Soviet delegates 
counted on the influence of the socialistic proletariats 
of Germany and Austria-Hungary to temper the con- 
ditions of peace. So far as Russian nationalistic and 
territorial claims were concerned, Lenine and Trotzky 
were disposed to make liberal concessions. They had 
recognized the independence of Finland. They were 
not opposed in principle to recognizing the independ- 
ence of Poland, Lithuania, Courland, and the Ukraine. 
Under Bolshevist rule Russia had ceased to be a nation. 
Lenine and Trotzky were willing to squander the Rus- 
sian patrimony for the sake of obtaining a free hand 
in working out, within narrower limits, their sinis- 
ter experiment with Marxianism and terroism. But 
they expected the German diplomats to manifest a 
certain amount of gratitude for the service which the 
Bolshevists had done the Teuton Allies by taking Russia 
out of the war. 

The Soviet delegates were, therefore, deeply chagrined 
when Kiihlmann and Hoffmann abandoned their origi- 
nal attitude of friendly patronage and insisted on 
treating Russia as a conquered foe. The German 
demands amounted to practical annexation of Finland, 
the Baltic provinces, Poland, Lithuania, and the Uk- 
raine, and economic control of what was left of Russia 
in Europe. Wrangling over these exorbitant terms 
continued until February loth, when the Bolshevist re- 
presentatives left Brest- Litovsk in disgust. With char- 
acteristic naivete Lenine and Trotzky refused to sign 
a treaty of dismemberment. But at the same time 
they declared the war ended and issued orders de- 
mobilizing the Russian armies still in existence. 

With a military power like Germany comedy of this 



[iQis] The Dismemberment of Russia 301 

sort wouldn't work. Berlin terminated the truce and 
on February i8th German armies began an advance 
toward Petrograd. Trotzky favoured unorganized 
resistance. But Lenine overruled him. The latter 
held rightly that there was no fight left in the Russian 
Revolution, except against the bourgeoisie and the 
counter-revolutionists. He advocated unconditional 
surrender. He had his way. 

The Soviet delegates returned to Brest-Litovsk and 
signed there, on March 3d, a treaty which Germany 
dictated. Kuhlmann and Hoffmann had already con- 
cluded a treaty with Ukrania, establishing a Teuton 
protectorate over that still undefined state. 

By the convention of March 3d Russia surrendered 
Courland, Poland, Finland, the territory which might 
hereafter be converted into a kingdom of Lithuania, 
the western halves of Livonia and Esthonia, and the 
Ukraine, the eastern boundary of which was left un- 
drawn. She also ceded three Russian trans-Caucasian 
districts — Erivan, Batum, and Kars — to the Turks. 

But the dismemberment didn't end with the stipu- 
lations written into the treaty. Under it Germany 
was also to occupy and police the eastern halves of 
Livonia and Esthonia. But without any warrant except 
that of force, her troops overran the Crimea and the 
northern shores of the Black Sea, as far east as the 
mouth of the Don. She seized the Russian Black Sea 
fleet, she compelled Lenine to cede Carelia to the Finns, 
and assumed authority to turn Bessarabia over to 
the Rumanians, as compensation for the loss of the 
Dobrudja. She set up a satrapy in Ukrania and estab- 
lished an ambassador in Moscow with almost pro- 
consular powers. 

As a result of these aggressions the Lenine govern- 



302 The Great War [1918] 

ment was coerced into signing early in August, three 
supplementary agreements with Germany. These pro- 
vided for the payment to Germany of an indemnity 
of 6,000,000,000 marks ($1,500,000,000); the renun- 
ciation of Russian rights in eastern Esthonia and 
Livonia; free trade with Germany; the recognition 
of the independence of the Georgian republic and the 
retention by Germany of the Black Sea fleet until the 
end of the war with the Entente. Maxim Gorky has 
calculated that by seeking and accepting peace from 
Germany Russia lost four per cent, of her area, twenty- 
six per cent, of her population, thirty-seven per cent, 
of her foodstuffs production, twenty-seven per cent, of 
her land normally cultivated, twenty-six per cent, of 
her railways, thirty-three per cent, of her manufacturing 
industries, seventy-five per cent, of her coal, and seventy 
three per cent, of her iron. 

After Brest-Litovsk and up to the time of Luden- 
dorff's reverses on the Western Front it looked as if 
Germany had entered upon a receivership of the former 
Muscovite Empire. She assumed a protectorate over 
the sounder parts. Finland was converted into an 
active ally and induced to elect a Hessian Grand Duke 
as king. Another German ruler was picked out for 
Lithuania, which Ludendorff intended to consolidate 
eventually with Courland, Esthonia, and Livonia. 
Berlin and Vienna were in deadlock for many months 
over the selection of a monarch for Poland, and the 
war ended before a choice was made. 

In the Ukraine the situation was more unsatisfactory. 
Ukrania lacked a sense of national unity. Its people 
were only the raw materials of a state. Germany and 
Austria-Hungary promised to give them independence. 
But that independence was a shadowy fiction. The 



[i9i8] The Dismemberment of Russia 303 

Teuton Allies needed the Ukraine's food supplies and 
proceeded to seize them. This spoliation led to revolts 
against the patrons and liberators of the new state. 
General Eichhorn, the German military governor, 
ousted the government which had signed the Brest- 
Litovsk treaty and substituted military rule. He was 
assassinated in the summer of 191 8. But long before 
that it was evident that German policy had failed to 
create in the Ukraine the groundwork for a relation 
of dependency such as had been created in Finland, 
Poland, and Lithuania. 

In March and April, 191 8, Germany had reached 
the height of her empire-building venture. She had 
completely consolidated her position in continental 
Europe and extended her power toward Central Asia. 
What was left of Russia west of the Urals had become 
economically as well as politically a helpless tributary 
state. The Black Sea was hers. Rumania was com- 
pelled to sue for peace when Russia sued for it. And 
the terms of the treaty of Bucharest were as harsh as 
those .of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Rumania sur- 
rendered the Dobrudja. She also yielded up her eco- 
nomic independence. Germany took over her railroads, 
her oil and grain, and her port of Constanza. 

At the opposite end of the Black Sea Batum had 
been awarded nominally to Turkey. But the Batum- 
Baku oil district lay open to German exploitation. And 
by way of the Caspian Germany could hope to pene- 
trate into Turkestan, Persia, and Afghanistan. German 
eyes were now fixed on Bokhara, Teheran, and Herat. 

Yet these enormous vistas of expansion opened too 
late. The Russia which survived, having ceased to 
be a nation, also ceased to be exploitable as a depend- 
ency, in either the economic or military sense. On 



304 The Great War [1918] 

January loth the Cossacks had seceded and proclaimed 
an anti-Bolshevist Republic of the Don, with General 
Kaledin, their hetman, as president. The Russian 
Constituent Assembly, elected in 191 7, met in Petro- 
grad on January 18, 191 8. It was the only link left 
between the Russia of Lvoff and Kerensky and the 
Russia of Lenine and Trotzky. Lenine dissolved it 
by violence before it had a chance to organize. On 
March 9th the seat of the Soviet government was 
transferred to Moscow. It was there that a packed 
Congress of Soviets ratified the Brest-Litovsk treaty 
on March 14th. 

But the Soviet regime was not powerful enough to 
impose its authority on the remnant of the empire. 
It had broken up the army and proscribed the officer 
class. One part of the army which had retained its 
discipline was the body of Czecho-Slovak prisoners of 
war, who had enlisted to fight Austria-Hungary. This 
numbered between 80,000 and 100,000 men. Lenine 
could not force it to return under the Brest-Litovsk 
convention, which bound Russia to surrender Teuton 
prisoners of war, while allowing Germany to keep 
Russian prisoners. The Czecho-Slovaks were anx- 
ious to go to France and report to the provisional 
government of Czecho-Slovakia established there. 
Since they were a menace to the weak Soviet power, 
Lenine readily agreed to give them transportation to 
Vladivostok. 

The advance guard reached the Pacific unmolested. 
But German influence was exerted to hold up this 
Allied reinforcement. By Lenine's instructions Czecho- 
slovak troop trains in Western Siberia were attacked 
by Red guards. The Czecho-Slovaks, who had nothing 
but rifles, were obliged to detrain and fight for their 



[i9i8] The Dismemberment of Russia 305 

Kves. They disarmed the Red guards, seized the 
machine guns and artillery used against them, and 
quickly took possession of long stretches of the Siberian 
railroad. The Bolshevists, whose main strength was 
in Eastern Siberia, where many released criminals and 
German, Austrian, and Hungarian ex-prisoners joined 
their ranks, held Irkutsk and the Lake Baikal region. 
The Czecho-Slovaks found themselves marooned in 
Western Siberia, where they had to improvise their 
own subsistence and war material. 

Thus began the most romantic adventure of the war 
— the occupation of Siberia by an Allied force dropped 
down there, as if from the clouds. Western Siberia 
was, fortunately, little inclined to Bolshevism, having 
no industrial centres and no organized proletariat. 
The Czecho-Slovaks introduced order and refrained 
from interfering in the local concerns of the Siberians. 
They furnished, however, a powerful support to a 
Siberian anti-Bolshevist government, which was formed 
at Omsk and which declared Siberian independence. 
The Czecho-Slovak commands moved west as well as 
east along the railroad. They cleared the trans-conti- 
nental line to the Urals and beyond them. They also 
worked east toward Irkutsk. Other republics, which 
repudiated the Moscow regime, were proclaimed in 
Turkestan and in the Caucasus. By the middle of 
the summer the Czecho-Slovaks had recrossed the 
Urals and constituted a front along the Volga River, 
well inside Great Russia. 

The Allied Powers now recognized the state of Czecho- 
slovakia as a co-belligerent. An expedition to relieve 
the forces cut off in Western Siberia was organized, 
after many hesitations and delays. Japan agreed to 
furnish the bulk of the Siberian force, which was to 



306 The Great War 



[I9i8] 



land at Vladivostok. There were also small American, 
Canadian, British, French, and Italian detachments. 
The difficulties of a relief expedition had been greatly 
exaggerated. The Allied troops, about twenty-five 
thousand strong, landed in Vladivostok in August. 
Their task was to clear the Siberian railroad west to 
the Chinese border, and then to move north along the 
branch line following the Ussuri River to Khabarovsk, 
where a junction is made with the Amur River branch 
line, coming north-east through Blagoveschensk, the 
capital of the Amur Province. The Japanese con- 
tingent undertook the Amur operation. It reached 
Khabarovsk on September 6th and Blagoveschensk a 
few weeks later, extinguishing the Red government 
there and capturing many former Teuton and Hun- 
garian prisoners. 

Another Allied force, supported by anti-Bolshevist 
Russians, moved from the western border of Manchuria 
along the line of the Siberian railroad, toward Chita, 
east of Lake Baikal, where the Amur branch separates 
from the main stem. But before it reached its object- 
ive, Chita had been captured by the Czecho-Slovaks. 
After seizing Irkutsk, they had moved around the 
southern end of Lake Baikal, routed the Red guards, 
and passed beyond Chita. By the middle of November 
Siberia had been freed of Bolshevism and the Siberian 
railroad opened from Vladivostok to the Volga region. 

In the course of the summer a small British expedition 
reached Bokhara, coming from India through Balu- 
chistan and Persia. Another expeditionary force ar- 
rived at Baku, on the western shore of the Caspian 
Sea, which Turkish forces were trying to seize. This 
force was withdrawn, however, shortly before the end 
of the war and Baku was abandoned to the Turks. 



[i9i8] The Dismemberment of Russia 307 

Germany had aided the anti-Bolshevist forces in 
Finland to defeat and expel the Red Guards, who, with 
aid from Lenine, were trying to seize the government. 
In return for this service Berlin urged the conservative 
leaders to participate in a campaign for the capture of 
Kola, the Allied military base on the ice-free Arctic. 
Finland hesitated, however, to engage in war with the 
Allies. She passively supported the German project, 
which, however, came to nothing. After LudendorflE's 
defeat in the Marne salient the Finns lost all interest 
in the recovery of Lapland and the annexation of the 
Murman peninsula. 

On August 2d, the danger of an attack on Kola 
having passed, Allied troops landed at Archangel, 
where a provisional anti-Bolshevist government was 
organized. These forces then moved south in two 
columns, one following the Dwina River, the other 
along the Archangel- Vologda railroad. The ultimate 
purpose of this expedition was to form a junction with 
the Omsk government armies coming west from the 
Volga. Its numbers were too small, however, to make 
headway against the Soviet forces in Northern Russia. 
It was held up a hundred miles or more south of Arch- 
angel and was forced to retreat by a Soviet offensive 
in the winter of 191 8-19. 

Germany extorted some partial payments on the 
6,000,000, 000-mark indemnity from the Lenine govern- 
ment and received numerous trade concessions. But 
under Lenine 's savage and vindictive rule Russian 
industry was prostrated and German relations with 
Moscow became more and more profitless. Coimt 
Mirbach, the German Ambassador, was assassinated 
on July 6th, and his place was never filled. 

By August 1st the whole structure of German 



308 The Great War 



[1918] 



empire in Central and Eastern Europe had begiin to 
totter. The Russian front was stripped of troops. 
All the newly acquired dependencies assumed an atti- 
tude of passive insubordination and commenced to 
plan for independent national existence. The Pan- 
German dream was over. Germany had sacrificed her 
grandiose conquests in the East by running amuck with 
the U-boat and thus throwing two million Americans 
into the balance against her on the Western Front. 



CHAPTER XXXIV 

LUDENDORFF's channel port offensives — ST. 
QUENTIN, MARCH 21, I918; LYS VALLEY, 
APRIL 9, I918 

Caporetto was a warning to the Allies that Ger- 
many would try to make a finish campaign in 191 8 on 
the Franco-Belgian front. Ludendorff's only chance 
to win the war lay in crushing the British and French 
armies before the main body of the American reinforce- 
ment arrived. 

There was an alternative policy. That was to try 
for a draw in the West, ending the war in a stalemate 
of exhaustion. If Ludendorff had stood on the defen- 
sive through 191 8, the French and British armies 
would probably have continued to operate under sepa- 
rate and independent commands. Foch would not 
have been chosen generalissimo in 191 8. The Ameri- 
can troop movement would not have been speeded up. 
The war in the West would probably have lagged in 
1 91 8, as it did in 191 7, and Germany could have entered 
1 919 with her reserves unimpaired. This respite of a 
year would have allowed Ludendorff to experiment 
with any schemes he may have had in view for a mili- 
tary organization of the new Eastern dependencies 
— Finland, the Baltic provinces, Lithuania, Poland, 
and the Ukraine. 

But Ludendorff had the gambler's temperament. 

309 



310 The Great War [1918] 

He wanted to push his luck. He preferred risking 
everything on a single throw. So he overbore the 
counsels of caution and the hesitations attributed 
(though, perhaps, mistakenly) to Hindenburg and the 
Kaiser, but undoubtedly advanced by a certain element 
in the General Staff. 

The Allied leaders in France sensed the situation and 
prepared to shift from the offensive to the defensive. 
Field Marshal Haig says that these preparations began 
early in December, 191 7. But they were far from 
adequate. The Inter-Allied Military Council had 
been organized. But no steps were taken to secure 
unity of command. 

The British armies had suffered very heavy losses in 
1 9 1 7 . Those losses were not made good. To cover the 
deficit the Army Council in London ordered the British 
divisions to be reduced in strength from thirteen bat- 
talions to ten battalions. Field Marshal Haig naturally 
opposed this change. He says that, apart from the 
reduction in fighting strength involved, the fighting 
efficiency of the units was reduced by new groupings 
and altered tactical methods. 

Weakened as they were, the British armies were 
also required to extend their front. Negotiations for 
this extension had been under way since September, 
191 7. It was agreed finally that Haig should prolong 
his lines twenty-eight miles to the south, from the 
neighbourhood of St. Quentin to the village of Barisis. 
This village lies on the edge of the Forest of St. Gobain, 
a few miles south of La Fere. 

The French thought that Ludendorff's primary 
objective would be Paris and that he would try to reach 
the capital by striking between Rhdms and Soissons 
and pushing down to the Marne and the Ourcq. Most 



iiQis] The Channel Port Offensives 311 

of the French reserves were concentrated behind this 
front. 

Ludendorff's original objective, however, was not 
Paris. It was Amiens. His idea was to break the 
connection between the British and French armies. 
If he could put the broad estuary of the lower Somme 
between the two Allied contingents, he could roll up 
the British right wing and drive Haig's forces back on 
the Channel ports. His attack was wisely directed 
at the we^est point of any Allied defence — that at 
which the jurisdiction of one command ends and the 
jurisdiction of another begins. 

Reinforcements from the Eastern Front had brought 
Ludendorff's strength up to about 3,000,000 men. 
He is generally credited with having at the end of 
March 210 divisions of infantry, no in the front line 
and 100 in reserve, the latter forming what are known 
as masses of manoeuvre. Field Marshal Haig, however, 
estimated the German strength at only 192 divisions. 

Under Ludendorff's regime the armies on the active 
front — from the North Sea to Verdun — were separated 
into two main groups. 

The northern one, extending as far down as the Oise, 
was under the command of the Crown Prince of Bavaria. 
The southern one, from the Oise to the Meuse, was 
commanded (nominally) by the Crown Prince of 
Prussia. As military dictator Ludendorff thus shel- 
tered himself behind the heirs apparent of the two 
largest German states. East of Verdun General Gall- 
witz commanded a holding army. The Grand Duke 
of Wiirttemberg commanded a similar force in southern 
Lorraine and Alsace. 

To meet the German offensive the Allies had about 
2,500,000 men — 2,000,000 in the front line and 500,000 



312 The Great War [1918] 

in reserve, as General Zurlinden states in his La Guerre 
de Liberation. Field Marshal Haig had, on his front, 
from north to south, the Second, First, Third, and Fifth 
British armies. They were commanded by Plumer, 
Home, Byng, and Gough, respectively. The French 
armies were disposed in three groups — under de Castel- 
nau, Franchet d'Esperey, and FayoUe. Petain was in 
supreme command, with General Antoine as his 
assistant. 

The extension of the British lines was to have occurred 
in December, 191 7. It was delayed, however, and the 
operation was not completed until the end of January, 
1918. The British had adopted the German zone sys- 
tem of defence. On the front of the Third and Fifth 
armies three defensive belts were constructed, corre- 
sponding to the German fore zones, intermediate zones, 
and battle zones. Behind the Fifth Army a bridgehead, 
on the east bank of the Somme, was prepared against 
the eventuality of a forced retreat west of that river. 

The German offensive west of St. Quentin on March 
2 1st was a surprise only in the manner in which it 
was conducted. Its probability had been taken into 
account. And the Fifth Army front was held more 
lightly than the other parts of the British line, because, 
from the strategical point of view, Haig felt that he 
could better afford to lose ground there than elsewhere. 
Between St. Quentin and La Fere the British were 
farther east than on any other sector and more in 
advance of the positions in which they would have to 
stand in order to protect their main bases and the 
Channel ports. Behind them was the waste made by 
Hindenburg in the German "strategic retirement" 
of 191 7. Haig would not have been greatly disturbed 
if the Germans had pushed him back to the Somme 



[igisi The Channel Port Offensives 313 

line. The situation became dangerous only when the 
Somme line was lost and the enemy pressed on twenty 
miles farther to within easy gun range of Amiens. 

The relative depletion of the Fifth Army front was 
therefore intentional. For ten miles, between Amigny- 
Rouy and Alaincourt, the marshes of the Oise offered 
a natural protection. The lines there were very thinly 
held. But it happened, unfortunately, that an excep- 
tionally dry winter had made the marshes passable. 
So the enemy was enabled to employ large forces — at 
least six divisions — to break through the weak British 
positions north and south of La Fere. 

The British Fifth Army consisted of fourteen in- 
fantry and three cavalry divisions. The three cavalry 
divisions and three of the infantry divisions were in 
reserve. This army occupied a front of forty-two miles 
from Barisis north to Gouzeaucourt. That made one 
division to 6750 yards of front. The Third Army, 
adjoining the Fifth on the left, consisted of fifteen 
divisions, eight in the first line and seven in reserve. 
It occupied a twenty-seven-mile stretch from Gouzeau- 
court north-WQSt to Gavrelle. One division was 
assigned to every 4700 yards of front. 

The total British force available in the positions 
attacked on March 21st was therefore twenty-nine 
infantry divisions and three cavalry divisions. But 
Ludendorff employed on that day sixty-four divisions, 
giving him a superiority of two to one. In the follow- 
ing days, when the battle extended north and involved 
the right wing of the British First Army, seventy-three 
German divisions were engaged against thirty-seven 
British divisions. 

On March 21st, at 5 a.m., a violent artillery fire broke 
out on the entire front held by the Fifth and Third 



314 The Great War 



[1918] 



British armies; also on the French sector north-east 
of Rheims and on the British sectors from Lens north 
to Ypres. The infantry attack began about four hours 
later. By 9.45 A.M. it had developed on a battle front 
of fifty-four miles, from below the Oise River north to 
the valley of the Sensee. 

Ludendorff had made some innovations in offensive 
tactics. He depended now, more than ever, on highly 
specialized shock formations trained in a wave method 
of assault, with which General Hutier had experimented 
in the fall of 191 7 in the Riga campaign. By the wave 
method one series of units made a definite advance. 
It then halted and was passed through or over by 
a closely succeeding second series, so that fresh troops 
continually renewed the impetus of the attack. Provi- 
sion was also made for the rapid movement of light 
guns to the fighting front. The Germans had few 
tanks. Almost until the end of the war they remained 
sceptical of the value of the tank, preferring to depend, 
for breaking an enemy line, on gas waves and shells 
and new variants of the old mass attack. 

For his first offensive Ludendorff had created three 
picked armies. The northernmost, operating between 
Cambrai and the Sensee River, was under Otto Below, 
the victor of Caporetto. The central one, stationed 
between Cambrai and St. Quentin, was commanded by 
Marwitz, transferred from the Lorraine front. The 
southern one, between St. Quentin and La Fere, was 
under Hutier, who, like Below, had been a successful 
Eastern Front leader. 

Ludendorff was favoured on March 21st by a thick 
fog which limited visibility to about fifty yards. The 
British front line was thus practically cut off from the 
supporting second line. Signals from the outposts 



[i9i8] The Channel Port Offensives 315 

were not seen, and the machine guns and field guns, 
which had been disposed so as to cover the first zone 
with their fire, after its penetration by the Germans, 
had to be trained on an invisible enemy. German 
numbers were so enormous that the attacking mass 
Qouldn't well lose direction. So the British second 
zone was soon put in as great peril as the forezone by 
conditions which made infiltration unusually easy. 

The fog didn't thin out until after i p.m. By that 
time the Germans had penetrated the second British 
defensive zone at various points. But both the Fifth 
and Third armies were holding, in the main, their 
battle positions, with units here and there still in ad- 
vance of these. On the extreme left of the Fifth Army 
the most serious breach made was at Ronssoy, which 
the Germans captured about noon. But they were 
held in the rear of the battle positions by counter- 
attacks on the flanks, especially on the northern flank 
at Epehy, the enemy being driven out of that village. 

The more dangerous penetrations were made farther 
south, on the right centre and right of the Fifth Army's 
lines. Quessy, north-west of La Fere, was taken late 
in the afternoon. Benay, west of Moy, was also cap- 
tured by evening and the Germans made considerable 
progress toward Savy and Roupy, south-west of St. 
Quentin, on the northern side of the St. Quentin-Ham 
highroad. Maissemy, north of St. Quentin, in the 
battle zone, was occupied by the enemy early on the 

2 1 St. 

The most threatening wedge driven into the front 
of the Third Army, holding the line from Gouzeaucourt 
north-west to the Sensee River, was in the sector 
about Queant. Here the Germans broke into the 
British battle positions, taking Lagnicourt, south of 



3i6 The Great War [1918] 

Qu6ant, and, to the west, reaching the neighbourhood 
of Mory, St. L6ger, and Croisilles. At this end, however, 
the British lines were more strongly held and reinforce- 
ments could easily be drawn from the First and Second 
armies. In the south, along the Oise, the right wing 
of the Fifth Army was far away from the British bases 
and the local reserves were insufficient. 

General Gough drew back his right wing, on the night 
of the 2ist, behind the Crozat and Somme canals. 
The bridges over these waterways were not completely 
destroyed, however. On the morning of the 226. the 
enemy made a crossing opposite Quessy and in the 
evening captured Tergnier, an important communica- 
tions centre, four miles south-west of La Fere. 

The real break-through, however, was effected on 
Gough's left, west and north-west of St. Quentin. 
Here Ludendorif exploited the substantial gains made 
on the 2 1 St. The Germans took Le Verguier at 10 
A.M. and threatened to roll up the British line north 
through Roisel to Epehy. These towns were evacuated 
in the afternoon. A new line was formed in this sector, 
running north and south from Bemes to Boucly, about 
five miles east of Peronne, and thence to Nurlu and 
Equancourt. 

The right of the Third Army was affected by the 
retirement of the left wing of the Fifth Army. It was 
now drawn back two or three miles, in order to preserve 
a junction with Gough's army at Equancourt. The 
Flesqui^res salient, south-west of Cambrai, created 
by Byng's Cambrai drive of November, 191 7, had 
been evacuated in part on the 21st. It was now 
entirely abandoned. Farther west, the British were 
forced to retire on both sides of the Cambrai-Ba- 
paume highroad. Above the Sensee River Byng's 



[i9i8] The Channel Port Offensives 3^7 

left was thrust back to the road between Croisilles 
and Henin-sur-Cojeul. 

These losses of territory were not especially damaging. 
The disaster came on the left centre and centre of the 
Fifth Army, west of St. Quentin. Here the British 
were expelled from all their battle positions. Late in 
the afternoon, while fighting in the last defensive zone, 
the British Fiftieth Division, about Pceuilly, lost touch 
with the Sixty-first and Twentieth divisions, on its 
right. A gap was opened and the Germans poured 
through in dense masses, penetrating the British rear 
zone. 

Gough had no reserves left with which to close the 
gap. He, therefore, on the night of the 22d, ordered a 
retreat to the line of the Somme. But once in retreat, 
with his line shattered, he was unable to stop at the 
Somme. His army was exhausted. The Somme 
bridgehead positions, east of Peronne, were only half 
constructed. And Gough saw that to try to hold them 
would involve him in another general engagement, to 
which his weakened divisions were not equal. 

It was apparently a sound decision, made in con- 
formity with Haig's general policy of defence. But it 
represented merely a choice of evils. To continue the 
retreat would necessarily increase the disorganization 
of the Fifth Army, compel a parallel retirement of the 
Third Army, and impose extraordinary burdens on the 
Allied High Commands, which were not prepared to 
organize a new defence line west of the Somme. 

On the morning of March 23d Gough ordered the 
abandonment of the Peronne bridgehead. The retire- 
ment was made without serious interference in the 
Peronne sector. But on the evening of the 22d another 
gap had developed in the British line near Ham. 



31 8 The Great War [1918] 

Taking advantage of it, the Germans entered Ham 
early on March 23d and crossed the Somme on both 
sides of that city, thus threatening the British still 
fighting, to the south-east, on the line of the Crozat 
Canal. 

The Third Army held the enemy in check all through 
the 23d. But at the junction point of the Third and 
Fifth armies another gap in the line was opened — this 
time by a confusion of orders. The Fifth Corps of 
the Third Army, on Byng's right, had fallen back to 
the third British defence positions, about Ytres. The 
Seventh Corps of the Fifth Army, on Gough's left, 
had been directed to retire more in a south-westerly 
direction toward Moislains. The two corps lost con- 
tact and the Germans again took quick advantage of 
the opening offered them. The Fifth Corps was thrust 
off toward the north-west and the Seventh toward the 
south-west, across the Tortille River to Bouchavesnes. 
This additional mishap ended all chance of a stabiliza- 
tion of the British lines in the region south and west 
of the Somme. 

Field Marshal Haig had made plans for checking 
a German drive west from the Gise to the Somme. 
But he had anticipated no such disaster as had over- 
taken the Fifth Army. He called on the French for 
assistance. At an interview with General Petain, on 
March 23d, it was decided that the French should 
take over, as rapidly as possible, the whole front south 
of Peronne. French cavalry had already covered the 
retirement to the south of the British divisions west of 
La Fere. Now Petain sent in the French Third Army 
— first under General Pelle, and then under General 
Humbert — to take over the southern side of the big 
wedge which the Germans were driving west toward 



[I9I8J The Channel Port Offensives 319 

Montdidier and Amiens. This army was near at hand. 
But another army was needed in order to prolong the 
line around the apex of the new salient. The First 
Army, under General Debeney, was recalled from 
Lorraine and ordered to extend Humbert's left far 
enough to make a junction with what remained of the 
British Fifth Army, and with the British Third Army, 
in the region south-east of Amiens. 

It would take several days for Debeney 's reinforce- 
ment to arrive. Meanwhile Haig called on the British 
First and Second armies to supply reserves for the 
Somme front. Ten divisions were contributed by 
Generals Home and Plumer, the majority of them by 
the latter, who received in return some of the broken 
divisions of the Fifth Army when they could be drawn 
out of the battle. 

On March 24th, as a result of the snapping of the 
British line at the junction of the Third and Fifth 
armies, the Third Army's right and centre were forced 
westward to a line running north and south across 
the old Somme battlefield of 1916. Bapaume fell to 
the Germans, who had also passed to the west of 
Combles. Farther south, the wearied Fifth Army 
tried to prevent the enemy from crossing the Somme 
between Peronne and Ham. The Germans got over 
to the west bank at Pargny, about nine miles east of 
Chaulnes. In the Oise sector the British lost Chauny, 
retiring south on the French Third Army. 

On March 25th the British Third Army lost ground 
very rapidly. The line it was trying to hold, west of 
Bapaume, was broken and a gap was widened out 
between the Fourth and Fifth corps. The Germans 
reached Courcellete in the afternoon and were close 
up to the Ancre River by evening. West of Bapaume 



320 The Great War [igis] 

the British were almost on the line which they had 
occupied in 191 6 before the battle of the Somme. 

The Third Army was now farther west than the 
Fifth Army, whose position south of the Somme had 
become critical. General Byng took over the command 
of all the remnants of the Fifth Army north of the 
Somme. The other corps were directed to retreat west 
until they could be relieved by the French, who now 
assumed control of all the forces in the region south 
of the Somme. The situation of the British troops 
here was aggravated by the fact that no reserves were 
yet available. The only support Gough had for 
several days was an improvised force under General 
Grant, afterwards under General Carey, consisting of 
stragglers, details, school personnel, tunnelling com- 
panies, field-survey companies, and Canadian and 
American engineers. This was organized on the line 
of the old eastern defences of Amiens. 

The chief enemy advance south of the Somme on 
March 26th was made by Hutier's army west of Nesle. 
Here the right of Gough's southernmost division was 
separated from the left of Humbert's supporting army 
and a gap was opened about Roye. That evening, 
however, contact was re-established with the French 
west of Roye and the worst of the retreat was over. 

March 26th marked in another way the turn of the 
tide for the Allies. On that day Foch was appointed 
Allied generalissimo. In the shadow of another great 
German victory the Allies at last took that step which 
for nearly four years they had refused to take, thus 
defying the fundamental axioms of military science 
and prudence. An enormous handicap on the proper 
employment of Allied military strength was lifted. 
Ludendorff had tried to disjoin and sever the two 



[i9i8] The Channel Port Offensives 321 

Allied armies in France. The net result of his effort 
was to unify them. 

Assured of a free hand, Foch could stop the first 
Ludendorff offensive or any succeeding Ludendorff of- 
fensive. But he could not be certain of stopping any 
of them unless he had as complete control of the Allied 
forces in the field as his opponent had of the German. 

Between March 26th and March 28th the British 
south of the Somme retired under pressure to and 
beyond the old line of the defences of Amiens. Gough 
had been ordered to hold, if possible, a line farther 
east, north and south through Rosi^res. From this 
front Amiens could not have been bombarded by the 
enemy. But the Third Army had retired four miles 
to the west of Bray, on the north side of the Somme, 
through which point the Rosieres line would have run, 
if carried farther north. The Germans were, therefore, 
able to cross to the south side of the river and take 
the Rosieres-Proyart positions in the rear. There was 
nothing to do but to extricate the troops on this line, 
bringing them back to the front covered by Carey's 
"scratch" division. 

The enemy had now entered Montdidier, extending 
some ten miles to the west the apex of the old Noyon 
salient. He was hardly ten miles east of Amiens and, 
north of the Somme, had occupied Albert. But he 
needed more elbow room on the north, in the neighbour- 
hood of Arras, where the British First Army had made 
only a very slight retirement in order to conform its 
right wing to the left wing of the Third Army. 

Ludendorff therefore shifted his attack on March 
28th to the Arras front. He expected to carry Vimy 
Ridge, Arras, and the strong positions to the west of 
that city. Eleven German divisions were engaged in 



322 The Great War [1918] 

a battle which lasted all through the day. But no 
impression was made anywhere on the British lines. 
The assault, conducted with the same methods as were 
used on March 21st, was a complete failure. There 
was no covering fog, and the Hutier wave attacks 
broke down with enormous losses. 

The first stage of the Amiens or St. Quentin offensive 
ended with this repulse. The German advance did 
not stop entirely until April 5th. Local gains were 
made after March 28th, in the Avre-Luce sector and 
about Moreuil. But the operation as a whole was 
terminated when General FayoUe, commanding the 
western French sector, got Debeney's First Army into 
position on this front and Haig's reinforcements from 
the Second and First armies prolonged the Allied line 
north across the Somme to the Ancre. 

The results of the German offensive were imposing. 
Ludendorff had carried his front forward about thirty- 
seven miles — from Moy, on the Oise, to the junction 
of the Avre and Luce rivers. He had recovered more 
than all the territory lost in the battle of the Somme, 
in 1916, and the Hindenburg strategic retirement, in 
1 91 7. He was within easy gun range of Amiens, the 
chief anchor of the Allied positions in Northern France. 
He had nearly destroyed the British Fifth Army, cap- 
turing 1300 guns and nearly 100,000 prisoners. 

Having fallen short of success in his drive for Amiens, 
Ludendorff decided to deliver an alternative blow far- 
ther north, with Dunkirk and Calais as his obiectives. 
This second offensive was launched on a narrower 
front, not exceeding twenty miles. Its immediate 
purpose was to drive a wedge up the Lys Valley toward 
Hazebrouck. Ypres could then be enveloped from the 
south and west and an advance to the coast would 



[i9i8] The Channel Port Offensives 323 

follow from Hazebrouck and Poperinghe. By widening 
out the salient on the south side, Bethune, an impor- 
tant coal-mining centre, would be enveloped and the 
British line south to Lens and Arras would be taken 
in reverse. 

The offensive began on April 9th on a front extend- 
ing north from La Bassee to a point east of Armentieres. 
It was prolonged on the loth to the Ypres-Comines 
Canal. Fortune again favoured the Germans. Two 
Portuguese divisions were stationed on the lower part 
of this line. They had been at the front for a long 
time and were to be relieved on April loth. The line 
to the north of the Portuguese sector was held by five 
British divisions which had been withdrawn from the 
battle in Picardy and whose ranks had been refilled 
with drafts from England. The most southerly stretch 
of the front was defended by the left wing of Home's 
First Army. 

The attack was made in a dense fog, like that in the 
St. Quentin area on March 21st. The enemy's masses 
got almost unobserved into the first lines of the Second 
Portuguese Division. The onset was so powerful that 
it penetrated through the entire Portuguese zone. 
British reinforcements could not be rushed up in time 
to contest the rear positions. The enemy drove north- 
west to the Lawe and Lys rivers and crossed the Lys 
at two points south-west of Armentieres. Fortunately, 
on the extreme right the Fifty-fifth Division of the First 
Army held fast about Festubert and extended its line 
north-west covering the approaches to Bethune. 

On April loth the Germans broadened their attack 
northward to the neighbourhood of Messines, occupy- 
ing that village for a time and getting a hold on Ploeg- 
steert Wood. They also pushed north of the Lys to 



324 The Great War f'^'^i 

Steenwerck, thus almost isolating Armentieres, which 
was evacuated by the British. On the nth the German 
advance west reached Merville, about four miles west 
of Estaires. On the north side of the growing salient 
the British abandoned Nieppe and drew back to Wul- 
verghem and Neuve Eglise. 

The southern side of the salient was now sufficiently 
reinforced and the lines north of Bethune were stabilized. 
The main German effort was directed thereafter to 
extending the Lys Valley wedge to the north behind 
Ypres. On the 12th the Germans pushed as far toward 
Hazebrouck as Vieux Berquin. But the First Austra- 
lian Division appeared in the afternoon and, taking 
position east of the Forest of Nieppe, ended all progress 
in that direction. 

From the 12th to the 15th Arnim's army steadily 
enlarged the northern side of the salient. Neuve 
Eglise and Bailleul were taken. It was on the 12th 
that Field Marshal Haig issued the famous "backs to 
the wall" appeal to his tired troops in Flanders. A 
few days later General Maurice, then Director of Mili- 
tary Information, posed his famous query: "What is 
happening to Bliicher?" 

But aid arrived on April i6th, a French army corps, 
under General de Mitry, coming into line on the Mount 
Kemmel sector, the whole of which was taken over by 
the French on April 21st. Field Marshal Haig had 
also ordered the evacuation of the eastern part of the 
saHent east of Ypres in order to shorten his Hnes. 

Mount Kemmel now became Arnim's chief local 
objective. General Bernhardi, commanding on the 
south side, had failed completely on April i8th in an 
attack extending from Givenchy to Merville. This 
was the end of the German effort to reach Bethune. 



H9i8] The Channel Port Offensives 325 

Arnim had tried to envelop Kemmel on April i6th and 
17th. He renewed his operation on April 25th, using 
nine divisions on a front extending from Kemmel Hill 
east to the Ypres-Comines Canal. Kemmel was sur- 
rounded and taken, and a French regiment, holding 
the summit, was cut off. Wytschaete was captured 
and the Allied line was pushed back a mile or more. 
Thereupon Haig evacuated another section of the 
salient east of Ypres, in order to facilitate the extrication 
of his forces, if Ypres should fall. 

Ypres was gravely threatened. But it didn't fall. 
On April 29th Arnim made a general assault on the line 
south-west of the city and met with a bloody repulse. 
That reverse practically ended the second German 
offensive. Arnim and Bernhardi had driven a salient 
about nine miles deep up the Lys Valley. They had 
re- won all the ground lost in the summer of 191 7 and 
had cleared a broad though uncomfortably exposed 
expanse of territory in the Lys Valley. But they had 
not taken Bethune, or Hazebrouck, or Ypres. They 
had not opened a road to the Channel ports. The 
gains of the operation hardly balanced its losses. 

The British front had yielded, but it had not been 
dislocated. And the British, with the aid of the two 
French divisions under de Mitry, had fought against 
great odds. Ludendorff employed in the Lys Valley 
up to April 30th forty-two divisions, of which thirty- 
three were fresh and onl}'' nine had been used in the 
Picardy drive. Against these Haig had twenty-five divi- 
sions, of which eight were fresh and seventeen had fought 
in Picardy. According to the British Field Marshal's 
figures 109 German divisions had been engaged, between 
March 21st and April 30th, against fifty-five British 
infantry and three British cavalry divisions. 



326 The Great War [19181 

On April 23d a heavy attack was made on the British 
positions east of Amiens. Four German divisions 
participated in it. The village of Villers-Bretonneux 
was taken and the British front thrown back. That 
night, however, a counter-attack was made by one 
British and two Australian brigades. They recovered 
Villers-Bretonneux, and captured one thousand prison- 
ers. This and Arnim's futile attack south-west of 
Ypres were the last flare-ups in the German effort 
to reach the Channel ports. 

In his book. My Thoughts and Actions, published in 
the summer of 191 9, Ludendorff indicates that he 
originally planned to make the more northern of his 
two Channel Port offensives the principal one. He 
intended, he says, to effect a break-through well to 
the north of the Somme, so that he could operate 
against the British armies in the imravaged territory 
west of the lines held by the Germans in 191 6. In the 
first offensive the Seventeenth Army was expected to 
smash Byng's left centre and left, and then drive 
north-westward behind Arras. The Seventeenth Army 
failed signally, on March 21st, against the northern end 
of Byng's line, and failed again, on March 28th, opposite 
Arras, against Byng's left and Home's right. Luden- 
dorff attributes the defeat of March 21st to defective 
artillery preparation and bad tactics. Yet it is note- 
worthy that he used his best artillery expert. Colonel 
Bruchmiiller, on Hutier's front, between St. Quentin 
and La Fere, where the real break-through was ac- 
complished. And this break-through determined the 
line of the German advance toward Amiens, instead of 
Arras. 



CHAPTER XXXV 

LUDENDORFF'S PARIS OFFENSIVES. AISNE-MARNE, MAY 
2^], 191 8. LASSIGNY, JUNE 9, I918 

Having failed to break the liaison between the Brit- 
ish and French armies by seizing Amiens, and having 
failed again to turn the British left wing by capturing 
Dunkirk and Calais, Ludendorff decided to shift his 
objectives. His Third, Fourth, and Fifth offensives 
were directed at Paris. General Foch was apparently 
persuaded that Ludendorff would make another try 
for Amiens, since that was the chief danger spot from 
the Allied point of view. Most of the French reserves 
were massed toward the Picardy front, and extraordinary 
efforts were made to stop a third German effort on the 
general line of Arras-Amiens-Montdidier. Alarmed 
by the experiences of March and April, the British 
Government sent to France about 300,000 troops, 
which had been held in England since the beginning 
of the year. Arrangements were also made to speed 
up the transportation of American troops. The 
monthly average of American arrivals in France had 
been under fifty thousand. It was raised to two hun- 
dred thousand. 

Ludendorff turned away, however, from Amiens. 
He chose an easier front, which Foch had left scantily 
defended. The third drive was prepared with great 

327 



328 The Great War 



[1918] 



secrecy. It came as a complete surprise. For it was 
directed at a sector — that north of the Aisne River, 
between Soissons and Rheims — on which Foch could 
still yield a good deal of ground without strategical 
embarrassment. 

The line along the Ailette River, just north of the 
Chemin des Dames, had been held by the French 
Sixth Army. Early in May, General Foch transferred 
a large part of this army to the Amiens sector. By 
way of replacements he borrowed five British divisions, 
which were waiting for an assignment to some inactive 
section. Of these divisions three had taken part in 
both the St. Quentin battle and the Lys Valley battle. 
One had fought in the former operation, but not in 
the latter. All four had been badly battered up. Their 
depleted ranks were filled up with new levies. Two of 
them, the Twenty-first and Eighth, with the Fiftieth, 
which was fresh, were put in position on a fifteen-mile 
front north-west of Rheims. The rest of the Ailette 
line, west to Pinon Forest, was held by a single corps of 
the French Sixth Army. 

These troops had no warning, until May 26th, of 
the imminence of a German attack. The next morning 
it broke with extraordinary violence on a thirty-five- 
mile line, from Pinon Forest, on the west, nearly to 
Bermericourt. Twenty-eight German divisions over- 
powered the five Allied divisions opposed to them. A 
gap was made in the centre and the Germans poured 
across the Chemin des Dames plateau, converging on 
the crossings of the Aisne. This river was crossed by 
the enemy at Vailly before nightfall. The British 
divisions, holding on their right, swung back on their 
left and centre to a position facing west and north- 
west between the Aisne and the Vesle. The French 



iiQiS] Ludendorff's Paris Offensives 329 

Sixth Army Corps fell back to the Aisne, facing north- 
east and covering Soissons. 

On May 28th the Germans pushed rapidly south, 
crossing the Vesle at Fismes, and also widening out 
their salient on both sides. On the west Soissons 
was captured. On the east the British withdrew 
across the Vesle and were then pressed back in a south- 
easterly direction in the region between the Vesle and 
the Ardre rivers. The two reserve divisions, the 
Twenty-fifth and Nineteenth, were brought up, and 
the German advance in the neighbourhood of Rheims 
slackened. Ludendorff preferred, for the moment, to 
develop his attack to the south and west, threatening 
Paris by working down to the Mame and the Ourcq, 
and then following the valleys of those rivers west and 
south-west, around the southern edge of the great 
bastion of the Forest of Villers-Cotterets. 

Foch had no reserves at hand with which to stop the 
German advance south to the Marne. Nor was he 
particularly eager to stop it. For if the Germans were 
held on the west side of the Aisne-Marne salient which 
they were developing, they would find themselves in- 
side a deep pocket, difficult to hold and uncomfortable 
to draw out of. Only a cavalry screen opposed the 
march of the enemy across the territory separating the 
Vesle from the Marne. Fere-en-Tardenois and Ville- 
en-Tardenois were abandoned, and on May 31st the 
German advance guards reached the borders of the 
latter river at Le Charmel, two miles north-west of 
Dormans. 

The nominal character of the French defence between 
the Aisne and the Marne was emphasized by the rapid 
head-on progress of the Third Ludendorff drive. On 
May 27th a gain of five miles was made; on May 28th, 



330 The Great War [1918] 

one of seven miles; on May 29th, one of seven miles; 
on May 30th, one of three miles; on May 31st, one of 
nine miles. On June ist the enemy occupied the north 
bank of the Marne for a distance of fifteen miles, from 
Chateau-Thierry east to Verneuil. On this sector the 
French were reinforced by the Third and Twenty- 
eighth American divisions — the former of regulars, the 
latter of Pennsylvania National Guard troops. The 
Second Division, regulars, with a marine corps brigade, 
was thrown in on the line north-west of Chateau- 
Thierry. 

Foch's reserves, coming from the west, were used 
sparingly to check the German advance on the west 
side of the salient, between Chateau-Thierry and the 
Aisne. Here the true direction of the Third offensive, 
now reaching its last stage, was made manifest. Violent 
German attacks were launched on June ist and 2d all 
along the front north and south of the Ourcq River, 
the Germans trying to push down the Ourcq Valley 
to the rear of Villers-Cotterets Forest, and to infil- 
trate into the region along its northern border. Above 
Soissons equally violent attempts were made to break 
the French lines north and south of the Aisne, and to 
flatten out the apex of the French re-entrant angle with 
its apex above Carlepont Wood. In the Ourcq Valley 
region the Germans made an advance on June ist and 
2d of about six miles. 

On June 3d the enemy again gained ground on the 
southern end of the western side of the Aisne-Mame 
salient, just north-west of Chateau-Thierry. Here 
they reached Bouresches and a line running north- 
west, below Torcy and Belleau Wood, to Bussieres. On 
this line the American Second Division co-operated, on 
June 6th, in a brilliant counter-attack. It broke through 



[i9i8] Ludendorff's Paris Offensives 331 

the German positions on a two-and-a-half-mile front 
for a gain of two miles. On the right, Bouresches was 
taken. On the left, Bussieres and Torcy were stormed 
and Belleau Village was reached. In a subsequent 
operation the Second Division cleared out Belleau 
Wood. The Germans were thrown completely on the 
defensive in this region. 

In fact, by June 6th the Aisne-Marne offensive was 
over. The lines were stabilized all the way round the 
elliptical salient from behind Soissons to a point just 
north-west of Rheims. Rheims lay at the apex of a 
small loop, almost encircled, but strongly defended 
on all sides. The east side of the salient had been 
slightly enlarged. But the Allied forces held all the 
approaches to the Forest of the Mountain of Rheims, 
the main bastion in the region south of the city. The 
five British divisions in this sector were now attached 
to the French Fifth Army. 

The Germans had achieved a spectacular success 
south of the Aisne. It was of greater moral than 
material value, however. The German bulletins an- 
nounced the capture of 45,000 prisoners and 400 guns. 
An area of 650 square miles was overrun. But from a 
broad strategical point of view Ludendorff had weak- 
ened rather than strengthened his position by commit- 
ting himself to holding and exploiting the dangerous 
Aisne-Marne pocket. 

It was now necessary for the Germans to reduce the 
inconvenient Allied re-entrant angle which projected 
northward, west of Soissons, almost to the Oise, in the 
neighbourhood of Noyon. In this angle were the 
great forests which protect Paris on the north-east 
■ — Compiegne, Villers-Cotterets, Laigue, and Ourscamp. 
Ludendorff had enveloped them on the east by pushing 



332 The Great War [1918] 

down to the Ourcq and Marne valleys. Now he sought 
to envelop them on the west by driving down the west 
side of the Oise, with the city of Compi^gne and the 
Oise crossings south of it as his objectives. 

The Fourth German offensive of 191 8 (the second 
against Paris) began on June 9th on a front of twenty- 
two or twenty-three miles, from a point just south of 
Noyon west to a point south of Montdidier. The 
armies under Hutier were engaged in it. It was the 
least successful test, up to that time, of the new Hutier 
offensive tactics. 

The brunt of the attack fell on the French positions 
in the centre, south of Lassigny. The first line yielded 
and the Germans pushed through for two miles in a 
south-westerly direction. Following the Matz River 
valley they reached the town of Ressons-sur-Matz. 
A little farther east they reached Mareuil. The French 
right and left wings were driven in about a mile. 

On the night of the 9th and on the loth further pro- 
gress was made in the centre. Hutier realized a three- 
mile gain to the south-west of Ressons-sur-Matz, and a 
two-mile gain to the south and south-east of that town. 
The following day the drive in the centre collapsed 
prematurely. The Germans in the morning advanced 
two more miles south, to the valley of the Aronde. 
But Foch was now ready to counter-attack. The 
German centre was thrust back and at the same time 
a counter-blow on the west side of the Matz salient 
threw the German right wing into disorder. This 
brilliant operation was directed by General Mangin. 
The German right wing retreated a mile or more and 
lost one thousand prisoners. On his left, however, 
below Noyon, Hutier gained a little more ground along 
the Oise. 



[i9i8] Ludendorff s Paris Offensives 333 

The drive had been smothered in three days. That 
was because Foch had ample reserves in the section 
between Montdidier and the Oise, and had used a 
violent counter-offensive at the psychological moment 
as a stopper for the Hutier tactics. The French were 
obliged, however, to yield some territory east of the 
Oise as a result of the German penetration down the 
west bank of that river as far as Ribecourt and Bethan- 
court. In the night of June nth they abandoned the 
tip of their salient pointing toward Noyon. Carlepont 
Wood was evacuated. So was Ourscamp Forest. The 
new French line ran east from the Oise River, in the 
space between the Ourscamp Forest and the Laigue 
Forest to Tracy-le-Val, and then joined the old line 
north-west of Soissons at Nampoel. 

The close connection between the Lassigny drive 
and the Aisne-Marne drive was emphasized by a re- 
newal on June nth of the German effort on the west 
side of the Aisne-Marne salient. This effort lasted 
three days and was directed at the French positions 
south-west of Soissons, covering the approaches to 
Villers-Cotterets Forest. The German front was 
pushed forward two miles in the region north of the 
forest, the Germans reaching Laversine, Coeuvres, and 
St. Pierre Aigle. The last named town is on the 
north-eastern edge of the big forest barrier. To the 
east and south of that barrier the gains made were 
inconsequential. 

Ludendorff's fourth attempt to rupture the Allied 
front had resulted in slight local advances. But in 
any larger sense, it had been a conspicuous failure. 



CHAPTER XXXVI 

THE TURN OF THE TIDE. LUDENDORFF'S FIFTH 
OFFENSIVE, JULY 5, I918. FOCH'S COUNTER- 
OFFENSIVE, JULY 18, I918 

Committed, as he was, to a finish offensive, there 
was nothing for Ludendorff to do but to go ahead. 
Though his reserves were shrinking and AUied reserves 
were mounting with the arrival of every American troop- 
ship, he was bound to carry his gamble through. So 
he laboriously collected his strength for his Fifth and 
final offensive, consuming thirty-three precious days 
in doing so. 

Foch had little difficulty in guessing where that 
offensive would break. The drive from Lassigny had 
shown where the French forces were concentrated. 
They were defending Paris and Amiens. Ludendorff 's 
natural inclination would therefore be to attack farther 
east with the idea of breaking the connection between 
the French armies east of the Aisne-Marne salient and 
those west of it. Possession of the salient offered 
advantages for such an attack. Offensively it was an 
asset. Defensively it was a liability. 

Foch made preparations both for meeting an attack 
east and west of Rheims and for attacking himself on 
that front, if Ludendorff should hold off beyond the 
middle of July. He withdrew the French forces in 
Flanders — eight divisions in all — for use in Champagne. 

334 



[i9i8] The Turn of the Tide 335 

He requested Field Marshal Haig to send four British 
divisions to the Somme sector, so as to enable him to 
move four French divisions from that front to the 
sector east of Rheims. On July 13th he asked that 
these four replacement divisions on the Somme be put 
unreservedly at his disposal. Two of them were sent 
eventually to the east side of the Aisne-Marne salient, 
participating in the fighting there on and after July 
20th. The other two were employed on the west side 
of the salient on and after July 23d. Two Italian divi- 
sions were put in line in the Rheims sector. The 
First American Division was brought down from Can- 
tigny, on the Montdidier front, where it had distin- 
guished itself, and was stationed on the west side of 
the salient. The American forces which had been in 
training in France were called on without stint. Alto- 
gether nine American divisions — the First, Second, 
Third, Fourth, Twenty-sixth, Twenty-eighth, Thirty- 
second, Forty-second, and Seventy-seventh — were en- 
gaged in repelling the Fifth Ludendorff offensive and 
in the Foch counter-offensive which merged into it. 

In the interval between the Fourth and Fifth Ger- 
man offensives, Foch had conducted a succession of 
local operations on the front between Soissons and 
Chateau-Thierry. These should have awakened Lu- 
dendorff's suspicions. The French lines there were 
advanced at many points and the way was cleared for 
a general attack on the west side of the Aisne-Marne 
salient. 

But Ludendorff remained absorbed in his own gran- 
diose designs. He still thought that the Allies were 
too weak and too discouraged to strike back. His own 
plans involved an enlargement of the salient to the 
south and the east, and a drive on the front east of 



336 The Great War [1918] 

Rheims, which would push the French there back to 
and beyond ChMons-sur-Marne, pinch out the Rheims 
loop, envelop the Forest of the Mountain of Rheims, 
clear the Marne Valley east through Epernay, and 
compel a general Allied withdrawal on the line east 
from ChMons to Verdun. Once the French front was 
bent back below the Marne, Ludendorff expected to 
turn west and envelop Paris, already under the fire of 
his "Big Bertha" super-guns. 

The Fifth offensive began on the morning of July 
15th on a winding front of fifty-five miles, running from 
Chateau-Thierry around the southern and eastern sides 
of the Aisne-Marne salient, encircling Rheims, and then 
stretching east through "Dusty" Champagne to the 
Main de Massiges, on the edge of the Argonne. Every- 
where the Allies were ready for it. The main attack 
was east of Rheims. Here General Gouraud had 
drawn back his forces a couple of miles to battle-posi- 
tions, drenching his outpost lines with gas after aban- 
doning them. The Hutier wave system broke down 
before it got fairly started. The German impact made 
practically no impression. 

On this front the offensive was smothered on the 
first day. West of Rheims and down to the Marne 
the Germans made a gain averaging about two miles 
on July 15th and continued to progress irregularly 
until July 1 8th, especially in the region near the Marne. 
Foch was willing to yield ground there and also below 
the Marne, since a German advance south of the river 
played into his hands. It would make the Aisne-Marne 
salient more difficult to draw out of in case its west 
side were broken through by a counter-offensive such 
as he had already organized. 

General de Mitry commanded the French forces 



[i9i8] The Turn of the Tide 337 

south of the Marne — mostly divisions transferred from 
Flanders — with the Third American Division on his 
left. On July 15th he retired in the centre, between 
Dormans and Fossoy, the Germans crossing the Marne 
and pushing up the east side of the little Surmelin 
River about four miles, almost to Conde. The Ameri- 
can Third Division, however, held fast on the river to 
the east of Chateau-Thierry. On the i6th and 17th 
General Boehn, who was in command of the German 
forces in the southern end of the salient, widened out 
the wedge below the Marne toward the east,, crossing 
the river at Mareuil and working up the Marne Valley 
toward Epernay. In the meantime the Germans near 
Conde were pushed back toward the river. 

On the east side of the Aisne-Marne salient, held by 
the Fourth French Army, under General Berthelot, 
reinforced by British, Italian, and American divisions, 
the German attack was intensified on July i6th and 
17th. The pressure was strongest on the southern 
sector, between the Marne and Ardre. Here the Ger- 
mans gained about two miles, approaching the Forest 
of the Mountain of Rheims on the east and south-east. 
They also gained a little ground on both sides of the 
Marne, toward Epernay. But the Allied positions 
remained practically intact after three days of fighting. 
The German offensive was dying away to a mere local 
advance in the south-eastern corner of the Aisne- 
Marne pocket. It would probably have stopped of 
itself, if Foch hadn't paralyzed it with his counter- 
offensive of July 1 8th. 

The Allied commander-in-chief had brought two 
armies into line on the west side of the salient. General 
Mangin's — the Tenth — had been transferred from the 
Lassigny sector to the front opposite Soissons . Mangin 



338 The Great War [igisj 

took position between the Aisne and the Ourcq. An- 
other army, under Degoutte, occupied the front from 
the Ourcq down to Chateau-Thierry. The First and 
Second American divisions were with Mangin. The 
Twenty-sixth was with Degoutte. Twelve French 
divisions and three American — the latter equivalent 
to six French divisions — were lined up against nine 
German divisions. 

Foch's concentration had been effected under the 
cover of the forests between the Soissons-Chateau- 
Thierry line and the Oise. The Germans were com- 
pletely unaware of it. Their armies on the west side of 
the salient, also under Boehn's command, were caught 
off their guard when the Allied offense developed on the 
morning of July i8th. With almost no artillery pre- 
paration Mangin and Degoutte attacked on a thirty- 
mile front, north and south, from the Aisne to the 
Marne. The German lines broke everywhere at the 
first shock. The Allied forces advanced from three 
to nine miles, the greatest progress being made in the 
region west and north-west of Soissons. On July i8th 
and 19th the highroad from Soissons to Chateau- 
Thierry was reached and the railroad between those 
two cities was cut. Mangin and Degoutte, between 
them, captured 360 guns and seventeen thousand 
prisoners. 

In the days following Boehn persistently counter- 
attacked on the upper half of the west side of the 
salient, holding the Allies away from Soissons. But 
he yielded ground in the southern half and in the 
south-western corner of the salient. Ludendorff had, 
in fact, begun to draw out of the sack. The German 
divisions below the Marne recrossed that river on July 
19th and 20th. On July 21st, the Americans and 



[ipis] The Turn of the Tide 339 

French, under de Mitry, followed them, entering 
Chateau-Thierry and occupying bridgeheads farther 
east. In the Ourcq sector the Allied forces advanced 
four miles, reaching the neighbourhood of Oulchy-le- 
Chateau, on the north bank of the Ourcq, two miles 
north-west of Nanteuil-N6tre Dame. This town is 
the junction point of a railroad coming down from 
Fismes, on the Vesle, with the Soissons-Chateau- 
Thierry railroad. 

Ludendorff's problem now was to extricate his 
armies from the quadrilateral, whose west side had been 
broken in, and whose east side was also under strong 
pressure. The salient he had driven to the Marne 
was no longer of any use to him. It had become a 
trap. But he was reluctant to confess defeat. For 
political and personal reasons he tried to camouflage 
the situation. The German communiques of this pe- 
riod stoutly repudiated any intention of withdraw- 
ing, announced German victories, and said that Boehn 
would hold fast on a "new line" running across the 
lower half of the salient and based on the Ourcq River. 
The quadrangle was full of German troops and Boehn 
used them lavishly in counter-attacking on the Soissons 
front, on the Ourcq front, and even in the sector north 
of the Marne Valley. 

From a strategical point of view, however, it was 
folly to think of making a real stand either in the lower 
half of the salient or across the middle of it. To do 
this successfully Fere-en-Tardenois would have to be 
held; and Fere-en-Tardenois was already in danger. 
It was the highroad centre for the middle and western 
sections of the quadrilateral. If it should fall, the 
German retreat would have to be made up the eastern 
side, where communications would be uncomfortably 



340 The Great War 119181 

congested. But Ludendorff tried to hold Fere-en- 
Tardenois and refused for many days to evacuate the 
south-eastern corner of the salient. 

Stubborn fighting continued on the west front above 
the Ourcq, though the Germans gradually relaxed 
their grip on the district between the Ourcq and 
the Marne, north-east of Chateau-Thierry. Degoutte 
took Oulchy-le-Ville on July 23d. On July 24th he 
reached Armentieres, a little over a mile west of Nan- 
teuil-N6tre Dame, and only seven and a half miles 
west of Fere-en-Tardenois. On July 25th, the Franco- 
American forces, under de Mitry, moving north from 
the Marne, arrived within six miles of Fere-en-Tarde- 
nois. On the 26th Oulchy-le-Chateau fell. Three 
days later F^re-en-Tardenois fell. French and Ameri- 
can troops crossed the Ourcq* from the south and the 
Ourcq line was a memory. 

On the east side of the salient Berthelot's army had 
been gradually pushing the Germans back beyond the 
lines which they held prior to July 15th. This move- 
ment was accentuated when the western line yielded. 
Ville-en-Tardenois was occupied on August ist, and 
more than half of the Vesle-Marne salient of July i8th 
was cleared of the enemy. 

The German bulletins of the first days of August 
again assured the German public that Ludendorff 
would hold "new positions" to which he had vol- 
untarily withdrawn, north of the Ourcq. But on 
August 1st and 2d Mangin's army began a new drive 
for Soissons. Strong positions which Boehn had 
organized in the angle south-west of Soissons were 
stormed. French and American forces crossed the 
Crise River on August 2d, enveloping Soissons from 
the south and south-east. Soissons was then evacu- 



[I9i8] 



The Turn of the Tide 341 



ated. On August 4th Fismes, on the Vesle, was taken 
by American troops and the German armies withdrew 
behind that river, except on a small sector east of 
Fismes. 

Thereafter, the front became more or less stabilized. 
The Allied armies crossed the Vesle at many points 
and also crossed the Aisne to the north-east of Soissons. 
But the German retreat out of the Aisne-Marne salient 
and Foch's first counter-offensive were over. Luden- 
dorff held most of the enclave between the Aisne and 
the Vesle until October. Foch now turned his atten- 
tion to the elimination of the salients created by the 
other German offensives. In his first counter-blow 
he had taken forty thousand prisoners and several 
hundred guns. More than that, he had wrecked 
Ludendorff's over-blown reputation, and permanently 
recovered the offensive on the Western Front. 



CHAPTER XXXVII 

THE DECISION IN THE WEST. AUGUST 8, I918- 
NOVEMBER II, I918 

FocH was made a Marshal of France on August 6th. 
No French soldier had better deserved that honour. 
Yet Foch's Victory Offensive was just beginning. His 
next task was to pinch out the big Montdidier salient. 
This operation had been foreshadowed by a series of 
local "nibbles" on the west side of the Avre River. 
Debeney's army had made advances there similar to 
the advances made in the Villers-Cotterets region in 
the weeks preceding July iSth. Hutier had seemed 
to take alarm at these, for he voluntarily withdrew 
across the Avre, after having lost considerable ground 
on the west bank and nearly two thousand prisoners. 

Yet the Allied offensive against the salient he was 
holding found him asleep. It began with a joint attack 
by Debeney's French First Army and Rawlinson's 
British Fourth Army (both under the command of 
Field Marshal Haig) on a front of twenty miles from 
Morlancourt, just north of the Somme, south to 
Braches, below Moreuil. North of the Somme and 
south of Moreuil the operation was of a holding char- 
acter. The main lines of penetration were along the 
south bank of the Somme, up the Luce River valley, 
and north-eastward from Moreuil. In this area, 
where the Australian and the Canadian corps were 

342 



[i9i8] The Decision in the West 343 

employed, there was a maximum advance on the first 
day of eight and a half miles — from the Villers-Bretton- 
eux plateau east to Framerville, which lies about two 
miles north-northeast of the important railroad junction 
of Rosieres-en-Santerre. 

The German lines crumpled up. Their defenders 
took to flight. One hundred guns and seven thousand 
prisoners were captured. Ludendorff said after the 
war that he lost hope of a military victory after the 
first day's fighting in the Montdidier salient, not 
because the German lines were broken (which was 
unavoidable), but because they were broken so easily. 
Yet his own policy of organizing shock divisions on a 
large scale for special offensive uses had greatly weak- 
ened the other divisions from which shock material 
had been sifted out. 

The Allied advance continued on August 9th. The 
British progressed four miles east from Caix to a point 
beyond Rosieres and only three miles west of Chaulnes. 
The French progressed the same distance along the 
highroad from Amiens to Roye. In these two days 
two hundred guns and seventeen thousand prisoners 
were taken. The Allies had already cut the railroad 
coming down from Albert through Bray to Montdidier. 
They were close up to the railroad coming down from 
Peronne to Chaulnes Junction and thence to Roye. 
North of the Somme, on August 9th, the American 
Thirty-third Division co-operated with British troops 
in an advance to the east of Chipilly and Morlancourt. 

The wedge driven toward Roye put the Germans 
about Montdidier in a dangerous position. Hutier 
hurriedly evacuated that city on August loth. On 
the same day the Allied attack was extended to the 
south-east, on a front of fifteen miles. The French 



344 The Great War [1918] 

Third Army, under Humbert, advanced north-east, 
toward Roye, for a gain of six miles. The total of 
prisoners taken rose on August nth to forty thousand, 
and the total of guns to three hundred. Humbert's 
army held the front around the bend of the Montdidier 
salient, east to the Oise River. Its task was to wipe 
out the small Lassigny salient, created by Ludendorff 's 
fourth drive. To do so Humbert pushed forward 
his left wing so as to threaten Roye and to envelop 
Lassigny from the west, while reducing the difficult 
Lassigny massif with his centre, and working up the 
valley of the Oise toward Noyon, with his right. By 
August 14th he had recaptured Ribecourt, on the 
Oise, and had made considerable progress across the 
massif. 

On August 1 2th and 13th the British Fourth Army 
and the French First Army reached, south of the 
Somme, the defences of the main line of the old Noyon 
salient, occupied by the Germans from the fall of 1914 
until the Hindenburg retreat in the spring of 191 7. 
These positions covered Chaulnes and Roye. The 
Germans had managed to keep them intact all through 
the Somme battle of 191 6. Ludendorff decided to 
make a fight in them now, concentrating reserves 
behind them and holding up Allied progress by violent 
counter-attacks. In so doing he showed poor judg- 
ment, for his only real hope of maintaining a successful 
defensive lay in reaching the strongest defence line 
available — the Hindenburg Line — without involving 
his reserves too deeply. He needed all his reserves to 
maintain himself behind the great Hindenburg barrier. 

As soon as the German defence on the Chaulnes- 
Roye front stiffened, Foch carried his attack elsewhere. 
His purpose was to spread the attack, not to concentrate 



[i9i8] The Decision in the West 345 

it. For by applying pressure on all parts of the line 
he could most easily wear down Ludendorff 's resources, 
compelling the latter to shift his reserves again and 
again and always to fight at a disadvantage. About 
August 15th all the German armies in the Montdidier 
salient were put under the command of General Boehn. 

On August 1 8th Foch began an offensive in the 
sector between the Gise River and Soissons. That 
evening, and on August 19th, 20th, and 21st, General 
Mangin's Tenth Army broke through the German 
lines on a front of sixteen miles, gaining about nine 
miles and bringing up on the Oise River, east of Noyon. 
Still farther east, it advanced to the neighbourhood of 
Coucy-le-Chateau. From this latter position Mangin 
threatened the flank of the Germans in the region south 
of the Chemin des Dames and in the strip between the 
Aisne and the Vesle. At the other end of the line he 
enveloped Noyon from the east and south-east, while 
Humbert threatened it from the south. Mangin cap- 
tured two hundred guns and ten thousand prisoners. 
Humbert took Lassigny on the 21st, thus demolishing 
the southern anchor-hold of the Chaulnes-Roye line. 

On the 2 1st, too, Haig began an attack north of the 
Somme, using Byng's Third Army. This blow was 
delivered on a nine-mile front, against Below's Seven- 
teenth German Army, from Miraumont, on the Ancre 
River, north to Moyenville, about nine miles south of 
Arras. The objective vras the railroad line from Arras 
to Albert. This was reached. Achiet-le-Grand, about 
three and a half miles north-west of Bapaume, was 
captured. The next day the left wing of the Fourth 
Army took Albert and advanced to the east of that 
city. Forty-five hundred prisoners were made in 
these two preliminary operations. 



346 The Great War 



[1918] 



The main drive began on August 23d. It covered a 
front of thirty- three miles, from Lihons, west of Chaulnes, 
where the British and French lines joined, up to Mer- 
catel, a few miles south-east of Arras. This offensive, 
which lasted about ten days, was everywhere successful. 
Twenty-three British divisions, by obstinate fighting, 
drove about thirty-five" German divisions from one 
side of the old Somme battlefield to the other. Ba- 
paume and Combles fell on August 29th ; Peronne, on 
September ist. The line of the Somme, south of 
Peronne, was turned. The Germans evacuated Roye 
on August 26th, Chaulnes on August 28th, and Noyon 
on August 29th. In the south Ludendorff was in full 
retreat toward the Hindenburg Line. He had lost 
to the British Fourth and Third armies, in the battle 
of Bapaume, 270 guns and 34,000 prisoners. 

By August 25th conditions were ripe for an attack 
by the British First Army, east of Arras. This offen- 
sive lasted from August 26th to September 3d. It 
carried the right wing of the First Army forward, 
below the Scarpe River to the Queant-Drocourt line. 
That line was broken on September 2d, about Queant 
(where it joined the Hindenburg system), by two 
Canadian and four British divisions, three of the lat- 
ter belonging to the Third Army. Farther north the 
First Army pushed forward three miles along the 
Arras-Cambrai highroad, bringing the troops well to 
the rear of the Queant-Drocourt belt. 

This great victory forced a general German retreat 
north of the Somme. By September 8th Ludendorff 's 
armies in this section were back to a line running north 
from Vermand, through Epehy, to Havrincourt, and 
thence north along the Canal du Nord toward Douai. 
Ten British divisions had defeated thirteen German 



[i9i8] The Decision in the West 347 

divisions in the battle of the Scarpa, taking two hundred 
guns and sixteen thousand prisoners. This result re- 
emphasized the failing morale of the German rank 
and file. 

The battle of the Scarpe was followed on September 
I2th-I7th by the battle of Havrincourt-Epehy, in 
which the Germans were thrust back between those 
points to the edge of the Hindenburg zone. On Septem- 
ber 1 8th and 19th an attack was made on a seventeen- 
mile front, from Holnon, west of St. Quentin, to 
Gouzeaucourt, above Epehy. The Third and Fourth 
British armies and the French First Army took part in 
it. The Germans were pressed back into the Hinden- 
burg positions. In this joint operation sixty guns and 
ten thousand prisoners were taken. The French en- 
veloped St. Quentin on the south and reached the 
Gise Valley, occupying Vendeuil, about four miles north 
of La Fere. In the operations from September 12th 
to September 19th the British captured one hundred 
guns and twelve thousand prisoners. 

The Aisne-Marne, Montdidier, and Lassigny salients 
had now been completely eliminated, except for a 
small area between the Vesle and the Chemin des Dames. 
Ludendorff meanwhile had chosen to abandon the Lys 
Valley salient without a fight. Its evacuation, carried 
on with little interference from the British, was com- 
pleted on September 6th. 

One ancient salient was left on the Meuse front — 
that of St. Mihiel, created in the fall of 1914. Foch 
now decided to reduce it. The operation was entrusted 
to an American force, under the direct command of 
General Pershing, a French force, under General 
Hirschauer, co-operating. The First American Army 
was organized on August lOth and on August 30th 



348 The Great War 



[1918] 



took over a line stretching from Pont sur Seille, in 
the Nancy sector, west to St. Mihiel and then north to 
a point east of Verdun. This Hne was subsequently- 
extended west across the Meuse to the western edge 
of the Argonne. 

The two sides of the St. Mihiel salient — from Les 
Eparges south to the town of St. Mihiel and thence 
east across to the Moselle — constituted a front of about 
forty miles. The German positions were strongly for- 
tified. The main attack was made on the southern 
face of the salient, with an auxiliary holding attack on 
the western face. Between the Moselle and Xivray 
the First and Fourth American Corps were massed 
on September loth and nth. They comprised the 
Second, Fifth, Eighty-second, and Ninetieth divisions 
(in the First Corps) and the First, Forty-second, and 
Eighty-ninth (in the Fourth). Major General Hunter 
Liggett commanded the First Corps and Major General 
Joseph T. Dickman the Fourth. The centre, on both 
sides of the apex of the salient, was held by the French 
Second Colonial Corps. On the western side the Ameri- 
can Fifth Corps, under Major General George H. 
Cameron, reinforced by a French division and the 
American Twenty-sixth Division, was to take the three 
difficult positions of Les Eparges, Combres, and 
Amaranthe. Six American divisions — the Third, the 
Seventy-eighth, the Thirty-fifth, the Ninety-first, the 
Thirty-third, and the Eightieth — were in reserve. 

After a four-hour artillery preparation the seven 
American divisions on the south face of the salient 
advanced at 5 A.M., September 12th. They were 
helped by a fog. The whole enemy front yielded. 
The First Corps, to the east, progressed to Thiaucourt. 
The Fourth Corps, on the left, pushed north-west 



[i9i8] The Decision in the West 349 

toward VigneuUes, in the middle of the salient. There 
it joined up on the morning of September 13th with 
units of the Fifth Corps, which had broken through 
the western side of the salient the day before. St. 
Mihiel was occupied by the French Colonials on Sep- 
tember 1 2th. In twenty-four hours the pocket had 
been emptied. The American loss was seven thousand. 
But sixteen thousand Germans and Austro-Hungarians 
had been captured, with 443 guns. 

A new line was formed running straight across from 
the Moselle through Thiaucourt and VigneuUes to 
Fresnes-en-Woevre. Metz was brought under the 
fire of the Allied guns. The moral effect of this Ameri- 
can victory was enormous. It proved that the new 
American armies were already fit to undertake large- 
scale offensives under American leadership. 

With St. Mihiel gone, the Germans were back on 
their primary lines of defence in France and Belgium. 
Foch's problem was to oust them from these in such a 
manner as would make a retreat to the Rhine hazardous, 
if not impossible. He decided that immediately fol- 
lowing the St. Mihiel operation these four offensives 
should be undertaken simultaneously by the Allied 
forces : 

(i) By the Americans, west of the Meuse, in the 
direction of Mezieres; 

(2) By the French, west of the Argonne, in co-opera- 
tion with the American attack and with the same 
general objective; 

(3) By the British, on the St. Quentin-Cambrai 
front, in the direction of Maubeuge, 

(4) By the Belgian and Alhed forces in Flanders, in 
the direction of Ghent. 

The purpose of the first three of these operations was 



350 The Great War [1918] 

to push the German forces in the Argonne and in Cham- 
pagne back upon the Ardennes, meanwhile cutting 
their direct lateral communications with the German 
forces in Flanders. The Flanders offensive aimed at 
clearing the Belgian seacoast. 

German resources had been cut into severely by the 
fighting since July 15th. At the end of August the 
number of prisoners lost to the Allies was 128,302. 
The number of guns lost was 2069. By the end of 
September the toll of prisoners was 254,012 and of 
guns about 3700. 

The Belgian operation, in charge of King Albert, 
was conducted by the Belgian army, a French army 
under General Degoutte, and portions of the British 
Second Army, under General Plumer. The front of 
the attack, which began on September 28th, ran from 
Dixmude to a point south-east of Ypres. The German 
forces on this line had been reduced to five or six di- 
visions. They gave way rapidly. By the evening of 
October ist, Plumer's army had cleared the left bank 
of the Lys River as far down as Comines and was 
close up to Menin. The Belgians had advanced to 
the neighbourhood of Roulers and the French, on their 
left, had taken Staden. The direct railroad route 
from Lille north to Ostend and Bruges was brought 
under Allied fire. Three hundred and fifty guns and 
10,500 prisoners were captured. This advance to the 
east menaced the German positions in the Lens sector. 
Armentieres and Lens were evacuated and the reor- 
ganized British Fifth Army, under General Birdwood, 
which had been interposed between the Second and 
First armies, advanced on this sector to within striking 
distance of Lille. 

Field Marshal Haig's final assault on the Hindenburg 



[i9i8] The Decision in the West 351 

positions began on September 27th and ended on 
October 5th. The First, Third, and Fourth armies 
took part in it, striking on a front from the Sensee 
River south to St. Quentin. Below St. Quentin the 
French First Army was also drawn in. Two American 
divisions — the Twenty-seventh and Thirtieth, consti- 
tuting the Second Army Corps, under Major General 
G. W. Read — were attached to the Fourth Army and 
helped to break the Hindenburg Line in the sector 
about Le Catelet. 

The First and Third armies opened the offensive. 
The Canal du Nord was crossed that day in the neigh- 
bourhood of Moeuvres and then cleared for several 
miles to the north. The British advance by September 
28th had passed the limits of Byng's movement in 
November, 191 7, and was close in to Cambrai, on the 
west, south, and north. Two hundred guns and ten 
thousand prisoners were captured. On September 
29th the Fourth Army assaulted the powerful sector 
of the Hindenburg zone below Cambrai. The line 
of battle extended twelve miles, from Holnon, just 
west of St. Quentin, on the south, to Vendhuille, above 
Le Catelet, on the north. 

The Hindenburg zone was completely perforated, 
the Thirtieth American Division reaching Nauroy, 
well to its rear. On September 30th the gap ' was 
widened out. Directly back of the Hindenburg zone, 
about Le Catelet, lay the subsidiary Beaurevoir Hne. 
This was shattered between October ist and October 
5th and the British grip on Cambrai was tightened. 
Debeney's First Army entered St. Quentin on October 
1st, the enemy retiring in the direction of Guise. In 
the operations above St. Quentin, in which thirty 
British and two American divisions were engaged with 



352 The Great War [1918] 

thirty-nine German divisions, 36,000 prisoners and 
380 guns were captured. 

The Champagne and the Argonne offensives were 
launched on September 26th. Gouraud made an attack 
on a front of twenty-three miles, between Rheims 
and the Argonne. He advanced, up to September 
29th, three and a half miles and took 16,000 prisoners. 
From October 2d to October 9th Berthelot's right 
wing and Gouraud 's left wing, reinforced by the Second 
and Thirty-sixth American divisions, carried through a 
forward movement on both sides of Rheims. Here the 
Germans were still in positions which they had occu- 
pied since September, 1914. The troops holding them 
were swept north on a thirty-mile front, retiring to the 
Suippe and Arnes rivers and losing Berry-au-Bac and 
Conde-sur-Aisne. Mangin's Tenth Army continued 
all through September to make progress in the region 
of the Chemin des Dames. 

The American offensive west of the Meuse opened 
on September 26th. Its first phase lasted until October 
4th. The front from the Meuse west was organized as 
follows: Third Corps, from the river to Malancourt, 
made famous in the battle of Verdun; Fifth Corps, 
from Malancourt to Vauquois; First Corps, from 
Vauquois to Vienne-le-Chateau. The Third Corps 
comprised the Fourth, Thirty-third, and Eightieth 
divisions, in the line, with the Third Division in 
reserve. The Fifth Corps included the Seventy-ninth, 
Eighty-seventh, and Ninety-first divisions, in the line, 
with the Thirty-second in reserve. The First Corps 
included the Twenty-eighth, Thirty -fifth, and Seventy - 
seventh divisions, in the line, with the Ninety-second 
in reserve. The general reserve consisted of the First, 
Twenty-ninth, and Eighty-second divisions. These 



[i9i8] The Decision in the West 353 

fifteen divisions had a strength of about 450,000 men. 

The attack caught the enemy napping. In the first 
three days an advance was made ranging from three to 
seven miles. The country north-west of Verdun was 
the roughest on the entire fighting line, embracing the 
Argonne Forest and the wooded ridges west of the 
Meuse. After Pershing's drive started the German 
High Command rushed its best troops to this sector, 
since an advance north here to Sedan and Mezieres 
would practically break the German line into two 
parts. Up to September 28th the American forces 
took ten thousand prisoners. Then for five days they 
consolidated their lines in preparation for a further 
advance. 

The second stage of Foch's final offensive was entered 
on early in October. It consisted of a continuation of 
the attacks in the four principal sectors. 

In the north the British operation against Maubeuge 
was renewed first. On October 8th the British Third 
and Fourth armies began the second battle of Le 
Cateau. Field Marshal Haig's object was to envelop 
Cambrai by advancing to the east and south-east of it, 
and at the same time, in conjunction with the French 
First Army, to envelop Guise from the north. The 
attack was made on a front stretching from Sequehart 
south to St. Quentin. On the first day a gain of from 
three to four miles was made, and on the evening of 
October 9th the British were within two miles of Le 
Cateau. Cambrai was entered on the same day. On 
the loth the British brought up against new German 
positions on the line of the Selle River. 

In this fighting twenty British divisions and one 
American division (the Thirtieth) defeated twenty- 
four German divisions, capturing twelve thousand 



354 The Great War [igisi 

prisoners and 250 guns. Farther north, the British 
First Army pressed forward toward Douai, reaching its 
western suburbs on October 13th, the day on which 
Laon fell. 

The Belgian offensive was revived on October 14th, 
on the front from Comines north to Dixmude. Menin 
and Roulers were taken on the first day and Thourout 
on the second. Ostend fell on the 17th and by the 
20th the left flank of the Allied armies rested on the 
Dutch frontier, the enemy hastily evacuating Zeebrugge 
and Bruges. 

The advance to Menin and toward Courtrai threat- 
ened to cut off Lille from the north-east. The Germans 
abandoned Lille on the i8th. Douai had been given 
up on the 17th. The British Second, Fifth, and First 
armies pushed east after the retreating Germans and by 
the evening of October 22d reached the general line 
of the Scheldt River from Valenciennes north to a 
point east of Roubaix and Tourcoing. Two American 
divisions — the Thirty-seventh and the Ninety-first — 
were sent north from the Meuse, near the end of Octo- 
ber, to assist in the Flanders offensive. They joined 
the French forces under Degoutte and engaged in the 
advance made by the Belgian and French forces, from 
October 31st to November 4th, to the Scheldt line 
about Audenarde. In the Belgian operations of October 
1 4th- 1 7th, twelve thousand prisoners and one hundred 
guns were captured. 

After the fall of Lille and Douai Ludendorff tried 
to hold the line of the Scheldt from Ghent to below 
Valenciennes, and a line cutting across from the Scheldt 
to the Sambre, to the west of the Forest of Mormal. 
Haig's attack on these positions began with the battle 
of the Selle River. This lasted from October 17th to 



Ii9i8] The Decision in the West 355 

October 25th. The life line of the German front in 
Northern France and Belgium was the railroad running 
from Valenciennes south-east to Hirson. It passed 
through the Forest of Mormal and intersected, at Aul- 
noye, the railroad running north-east from Le Ga- 
teau to Maubeuge. The Selle positions were stormed 
in four days, two American divisions — the Thirtieth 
and the Twenty-seventh — fighting with the British 
Fourth Army on the southern end of the line. In 
the next five days Haig succeeded in reaching the edge 
of Mormal Forest and enveloping Valenciennes from 
the south-east. In this battle twenty-four British 
and two American divisions worsted thirty-one Ger- 
man divisions and captured twenty thousand prison- 
ers and 475 guns. German morale was running low 
and many units avoided fighting either by surrender- 
ing or by hurrying to the rear. 

The final struggle on this front goes by the name of 
the battle of the Sambre. It covered the period from 
November ist to November nth. On November 
ist-2d the British First and Third armies defeated the 
Germans to the south of Valenciennes. This city was 
captured on November 2d, by Canadian troops. 
Ludendorff drew back, pivoting on Le Quesnoy, about 
fifteen miles south-east of Valenciennes. 

The decisive attack was now delivered on November 
4th, on a thirty-mile front from the Sambre River 
north. In one day the German armies were routed. 
They lost to the British nineteen thousand prisoners 
and 450 guns, and to the French First Army, operat- 
ing south of the Sambre, five thousand prisoners and 
sixty guns. Guise was captured on November 5th. 
On that day a German retreat began which ended only 
with the signing of the armistice. Bavai was reached 



35^ The Great War [1918] 

on November 7th; Maubeuge, on November 9th. On 
the morning of November nth the Third Canadian 
Division stormed Mons. 

Between August 8th and November nth the British 
armies in France and Belgium captured 187,000 prison- 
ers and 2850 guns. Fifty-nine divisions in all were 
engaged in these operations. 

On the Aisne front Debeney and Mangin, aided by 
Berthelot, succeeded, about the middle of October, in 
reducing the great La Fere-Laon bastion. La Fere 
and Laon fell on October 13th. Farther east, Berthe- 
lot 's army reached Sissonne and Gouraud captured 
Vouziers and got across the line of the Aisne at nearly 
every point except Rethel. In this sector the Germans 
next made a stand on the so-called Hunding Line. 
This was not broken until November 5th, Debeney, 
Mangin, and Guillaumat (the last-named having 
succeeded Berthelot) all contributing to the result. 

Gouraud's army advanced meanwhile to west of the 
Argonne, in touch with the American offensive. This 
entered its second phase on October 4th. By the 
hardest kind of fighting, the three American corps 
forced their way through the Argonne and the woods 
on the west bank of the Meuse. By October loth the 
Argonne was cleared of the enemy up to the neighbour- 
hood of Grand Pre. 

On October 9th the command of the American First 
Army was given to Major General Hunter Liggett. 
An American Second Army was created, under Major 
General Robert L. Bullard. The First Army had 
now reached the Kriemhilde Line, on which Ludendorff 
hoped to make a successful stand. A most trying 
period of warfare ensued. The enemy had to be worn 
down by constant pressure. On October 17th Grand 



[i9i8] The Decision in the West 357 

Pre was taken. On October 23d the Third and Fifth 
corps reached a line running east and west through 
Bantheville. 

A week was now allowed for reorganization. On 
November ist the First Army started on the last 
stage of its progress toward Sedan, On the 2d Busancy 
was taken. By the 3d an advance of twelve miles 
had been accomplished and the enemy was in headlong 
retreat. On November 6th a divison of the First Corps 
reached a point on the Meuse opposite Sedan, twenty- 
five miles from the starting line. Between the 8th 
and the nth American troops fought a final engagement 
on the east side of the Meuse. 

Summarizing the Meuse offensive General Pershing 
said in his report of November 20, 1918: 

In all forty enemy divisions had been used against 
us in the Meuse- Argonne battle. Between September 
26th and November 6th we took 26,059 prisoners 
and 468 guns on this front. Our divisions engaged 
were the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Twenty- 
sixth, Twenty-eighth, Twenty-ninth, Thirty-second, 
Thirty-third, Thirty-fifth, Thirty-seventh, Forty- 
second, Seventy-seventh, Seventy-eighth, Seventy- 
ninth, Eightieth, Eighty-second, Eighty-ninth, Nine- 
tieth, and Ninety-first. Many of our divisions re- 
mained in line for a length of time that required 
nerves of steel, while others were sent in again 
after only a few days of rest. The First, Fifth, 
Twenty-sixth, Forty-second, Seventy-seventh, Eighti- 
eth, Eighty-ninth, and Ninetieth were in the line 
twice. Although some of the divisions were fighting 
their first battle, they soon became equal to the 
best. 



358 The Great War 



[19181 



Ludendorff and the German General Staff knew in 
September that the war was lost. They compelled 
the civil government to ask for terms and they fomented 
the German revolution, when it became necessary to 
stage an apparent repudiation of the autocracy and of 
HohenzoUemism. Prince Max of Baden was Luden- 
dorff 's decoy. The appeal to the United States, which 
resulted in Germany's offer to surrender and the Allied 
promise to make peace on the basis of President Wilson's 
Fourteen Points, only camouflaged the admission of 
complete defeat by the German High Command. By 
November i, 191 8, Germany was on the edge of a 
great military disaster. Her armies avoided it only by 
throwing down their arms. 



CHAPTER XXXVIII 

Italy's inspiring recovery, june 15, 1918- 
november 5, i918 

Italy's fortunes were at their lowest point after 
Caporetto. Up to the time the winter snows ended 
active campaigning Diaz's armies had held on with 
the greatest difficulty to the Piave-Brenta line, covering 
Venetia. For a while it seemed probable that they 
would have to fall back to the line of the Adige. 

But Italy rallied with splendid energy in the winter 
and spring of 191 8. The armies were reorganized and 
refitted. The insidious defeatist propaganda of 191 7 
was checked. The northern defences were strength- 
ened. All thought of a further retirement was put 
aside. 

The reorganization involved the creation of two 
new armies — the Sixth and the Eighth — to take the 
place of the Second, practically disrupted after Capo- 
retto. The First Army occupied the extreme left of 
the active Italian line, defending the Adige sector 
below Rovereto, from the Val d'Assa, on the east, to 
Lake Garda, on the west. The Sixth Army took posi- 
tion on the right of the First, its front running from 
Val d'Assa east to the Brenta. The Fourth Army held 
the line between the Brenta and the Piave. The Eighth 
covered the upper course of the Piave and the Third 
the lower coursa The Seventh Army was stationed 

359 



36o The Great War [1918] 

along the western face of the Trentino salient. This 
army, however, took no share in the grand scale fight- 
ing in Northern Italy. Its function was almost ex- 
clusively one of observation. 

The Italian High Command had planned in March 
an offensive which was to begin late in May. Its 
objective was to clear the Asiago Plateau and secure 
a hold on the Val Sugana, the enemy's main east and 
west line of communication between Trent and Feltre, 
the two chief Austro-Hungarian bases in the mountain 
region. But toward the end of May there were un- 
mistakable signs of a renewal of the Austro-Hungarian 
offensive. Diaz therefore decided to wait and meet 
this threat. The preparations which he had made to 
attack stood him in good stead; for he was able to 
use his accumulations of reserves, guns, and material 
in a series of counter-attacks which quickly broke 
down the final Austro-Hungarian drive. 

Austria-Hungary, in 191 8, was becoming war- weary. 
There is little likelihood that the Emperor Karl would 
have risked another offensive in Italy, if he had been 
able to control the Empire's military policy. But 
Ludendorff now controlled it. He insisted that Austria 
should send him reinforcements for use in France, in 
case her armies in Italy remained inactive. As a choice 
of evils Vienna decided to make one more effort to break 
through into the northern Italian plain. 

The Austro-Hungarian offensive was sandwiched in 
between Ludendorff's Fourth and Fifth offensives. 
It was conducted by Field Marshal Boroevic, a Croatian 
general, who had succeeded Hoetzendorff in supreme 
command. Boroevic used three armies — the Eleventh, 
under Scheuchenstuel, which formed the left wing of 
the Trentino group, under Hoetzendorff; and the 



[i9i8] Italy^s Inspiring Recovery 361 

Sixth and the Fifth, both belonging to the Isonzo group, 
the former under General Wurm, and the latter under 
the Archduke Joseph. According to the Vienna bul- 
letins, General Kuchbach commanded the six divisions 
of the Sixth Army which tried to break through the 
Upper Piave front by storming the massif of Montello. 
The Italian official reports credit Boroevic with em- 
ploying seventy- three divisions in his offensive — fifty- 
four in the front line and nineteen in reserve. They 
say that the Italian and Allied forces were somewhat 
below seventy-three divisions. Hoetzendorff had an- 
other army — the Tenth — in the western Trent sector, 
but it did not come into action. 

The Austro-Hungarian offensive started on June 
15th. It was badly conceived in that the attack was 
not concentrated. Boroevic's operative front was 
nearly one hundred miles in length, from the Astico to 
the Adriatic. The energy of the assault was necessarily 
dispersed and dissipated. The Austro-Hungarian 
armies were fighting on exterior lines, with insufficient 
lateral communications in their rear. The Italians 
were fighting on interior lines, with ample cross- 
communications. In such a situation an intensive 
attack should have been made on a short front, as at 
Caporetto. If Boroevic could break through at a 
single point— -either in the mountains or in the Piave 
Valley — his object would be attained; for the whole 
Italian position would have collapsed. But he pursued 
the unpromising policy of diffused pressure at all 
points on a vastly over-extended front. 

The Austro-Hungarians made practically no gains 
in the mountain sector, where their effort was completely 
checked after two days. On the Upper and Lower 
Piave the gains were more considerable. The Lower 



362 The Great War [1918] 

Piave was crossed by the Austro-Hungarian Fifth 
Army, and an advance of from four to six miles was 
effected in the coast region toward Venice. This did 
not seriously threaten the Italian positions. The 
danger point on that side was the elbow on the Upper 
Piave, where the Italian front turned west toward the 
Brenta. There a formidable plateau on the west bank 
of the river, called the Montello, was seized by Kuch- 
bach's six divisions. If they could clear it, they would 
drive a wedge in behind the Italian positions from the 
Piave to the Brenta, and also break the Italian connec- 
tions between Treviso and the northern front. 

The severest fighting of the Piave campaign took 
place on the Montello. Kuchbach occupied the eastern 
and middle sections, but couldn't drive the Italians 
off the western slopes. By June i8th the Austrian 
offensive had reached its climax. The Italians now 
began to counter-attack fiercely on the Montello, in 
the Piave section, east of Treviso, where four and a half 
divisions of the Austro-Hungarian Sixth Army were 
operating, and in the lower Capo Sile sector. By June 
20th the initiative had passed out of Boroevic's hands 
and into Diaz's. In the first phase of the battle Vienna 
had claimed thirty thousand prisoners. By June 20th 
the Italian toll of prisoners had risen to eleven thousand. 

Kuchbach 's position on the Montello now became 
difficult. He couldn't advance ; and a rise in the Piave, 
which swept away many pontoon bridges, prevented 
him from retreating. Pushed back to the river bank, 
the Austro-Hungarian forces struggled to maintain 
their bridgeheads. A hurried retirement began on 
June 23d. It ended on June 25th, when the whole 
west bank was cleared of the enemy. In the operations 
from June 15th to July 6th, Italian and other Allied 



[iQiS] Italy's Inspiring Recovery 363 

troops captured 24,500 prisoners and seventy guns. 
The total Italian losses were about ninety thousand. 
The enemy, according to the Italian official reports, 
lost more than eighty thousand in killed and prisoners 
alone. 

On July 2d General Diaz conducted a local operation 
intended to drive the enemy out of the irregular quad- 
rangle between the old Piave and the new Piave, from 
Santa Dona de Piave south to the sea. It lasted four 
days and was completely successful. But the Italian 
counter-attack was not carried beyond the line of the 
Piave. 

The battle of the Piave was Italy's Gettysburg. It 
ended for ever the Austrian threat against Venetia. 
Diaz had destroyed the offensive power of the Austro- 
Hungarian armies. It was only a question of time 
when he would himself turn and overwhelm an enemy 
becoming, through internal demoralization, more and 
more incapable of resistance. The Italian Victory 
Offensive was delayed until October 24th, when the 
Dual Monarchy was in its death throes. Vienna was 
keen at that time for peace at any price and the Austro- 
Hungarian armies had no longer anything to fight for. 
They merely defended themselves with a certain stub- 
bornness as they recoiled out of Italy. 

Diaz had again reorganized his line. Three more 
armies were constituted — the Ninth, the Tenth, and 
the Twelfth. The Twelfth, put under the command 
of the French General Graziani, was interposed between 
the Fourth and the Eighth armies. It occupied a front 
from Pederobba, on the east, to Monte Grappa, on 
the west, in the sector between the Piave and the 
Brenta. The Tenth Army, commanded by a British 
General, the Earl of Cavan, was posted between the 



364 The Great War [19181 

Eighth and the Third armies, on the Piave front. The 
Ninth Army and the cavalry corps were stationed, in 
reserve, in the rear of the Fourth and Twelfth armies. 

General Diaz employed in his main offensive the 

Fourth, Twelfth, Eighth, and Tenth armies. The 

Fourth was commanded by Lieutenant General Giar- 

dino, the Eighth by Lieutenant General Caviglia. 

These four armies comprised twenty-two infantry 

divisions — one French, two British, and nineteen Italian. 

(The Italian army was represented on the front in 

[ France by three divisions, totalling 48,000 men.) Diaz 

I had altogether fifty-one Italian, one Czecho-Slovak, 

i two French, and three British divisions, and the 332d 

\;i American infantry regiment. According to Italian 

figures, the Allied combatant forces in the Victory 

Offensive in Northern Italy numbered 912,000, with 

8929 guns. The Italian General Staff estimated Bo- 

roevic's strength at sixty-three divisions and a half, 

with 1,070,000 combatants and 7000 guns. 

Italian strategy aimed at breaking the enemy's line 
at the junction point of the Austro-Hungarian Fifth 
and Sixth armies, east of the Piave. The Sixth Army's 
lines of communications ran back along its left flank 
to Vittorio and Sacile. If Diaz could reach Vittorio, 
he would cut off the northern half of the Sixth Army, 
which stretched west from the Piave to the Alano basin, 
and disrupt the Austro-Hungarian forces in eastern 
Venetia. 

He first attacked, on the morning of October 24th, 
in the Monte Grappa sector, thus misleading the 
enemy into thinking that the main blow would fall 
there. The Fourth Army and the left wing of the 
Twelfth Army fought through the 24th and 25th with- 
out making material gains. Another feint was made 



[iQis] Italy's Inspiring Recovery 365 

by the Sixth Army, in the Asiago region. The decisive 
operation began on the 27th. The Eighth and the 
Tenth armies crossed the Piave, driving east-north-east 
at the communications of the Austro-Hungarian Sixth 
Army. The Twelfth Army, on the left wing, attacked 
in a northerly direction astride the Piave. 

The enemy resisted stoutly. The Allied forces were 
unable to get a firm hold on the eastern bank of the 
Piave until the evening of the 28th. But on the 29th 
the break-through was completed. Italian advance 
guards entered Vittorio late that afternoon. The 
Eighth Army, swinging north and north-west, pushed 
toward Belluno, well in the rear of the Austro-Hungarian 
forces west of the Piave. The Twelfth Army, working 
north, enveloped from the east the Feltre basin positions, 
attacked from the south by the Fourth Army. 

The Grappa front now collapsed, as well as the 
Piave front. The Third Army advanced along the 
coast and the Sixth Army in the Asiago region. By 
October 30th Boroevic's forces were in full retreat all 
along the line from the Adige to the sea. The Italian 
pursuit quickened. The Livenza River was crossed 
on October 30th and the Tagliamento on November 2d. 
Udine and Trieste were occupied on November 3d. 
The same day the Italian First Army reached Trent. 

Vienna had already sought an armistice, practically 
equivalent to unconditional surrender. It was granted 
on November 3d, and took effect on November 4th. 

Revolutions broke out in Austria and Hungary. 
The latter state became an independent republic. 
Emperor Karl fled from the former. The Dual Mon- 
archy was dissolved. Italy had fought in the last 
days against armies without a country. 

Between October 25th and November 4th the Allied 



366 The Great War [ipisi 

forces in Italy took more than one hundred thousand 
prisoners and about twenty-five hundred guns. The 
Austro-Hungarian armies ceased to exist. Caporetto 
was avenged. Italy's century-long score against the 
Austrian oppressor was settled in full. 



CHAPTER XXXIX 

THE END IN THE BALKANS. JULY 7, I918-SEPTEMBER 

30, I918 

After long delays and bitter disappointments the 
Allied policy of maintaining an army in the entrenched 
camp of Salonica vindicated itself. In September, 
191 8, this army came into play in Foch's general 
strategic scheme. Within two weeks thereafter Bulga- 
ria was pleading for an armistice. 

General Sarrail was recalled from Macedonia, in 
December, 191 7. General Guillaumat succeeded him 
in command of the Allied forces there — called by the 
French the Army of the Orient, Guillaumat remained 
in charge until June 8, 191 8, when he was summoned 
home and made Military Governor of Paris. Foch 
now selected Franchet d'Esperey, who had fought 
alongside him in the First Battle of the Mame and as 
a leader had survived all the tests of subsequent cam- 
paigns in France, to prepare a finishing blow at Bulgaria. 
The Allies had promised to deliver such a blow in the 
summer of 191 6, when Rumania entered the war. But 
in 191 6 the Army of the Orient was unequal to anything 
like a real offensive. 

D'Esperey's campaign against the Bulgars was 
preceded by a demonstration on the Albanian front. 
Early in July Italian troops, supported on their right 
by French units, cleared the region north-east of 

367 



368 The Great War [1918] 

Valona. They were aiming at El Basan, on the Via 
Egnatia, the key to southern Albania. The drive 
started on July 7th. The Italians made rapid progress 
along the seacoast, reaching the Semeni River on July 
loth. Farther east, they enveloped the mountain 
town of Berat, which the Austro-Hungarians evacuated 
on July nth. Still farther east, French and Alban- 
ian troops advanced down the valley of the Devoli 
River, which empties into the Semeni. By July 
15th, however, the offensive had come nearly to 
a halt. El Basan was not reached. The Austro- 
Hungarians organized a counter-offensive in August, 
recovered Berat, and drove the Allies back to their old 
lines. 

General d'Esperey started in the last week in Jtdy 
to organize his operation in Macedonia. After mature 
consideration he had decided to attack on one of the 
most difficult of all the sectors there — that in the area 
between the Cerna and Vardar rivers. In the region 
east of Monastir the Cerna changes its course and flows 
north-east to join the Vardar at a point just south of 
Veles. The triangle between the two streams contains 
the rugged massif of Dobropolje. Its southern base 
was strongly fortified by the Bulgarians, who con- 
sidered their mountain positions impregnable. Yet a 
break-through on this sector would yield decisive results, 
since an Allied army, emerging at the apex of the tri- 
angle, would cut the Bulgarian forces in two, severing 
the connection between the Second Bulgarian Army, 
east of the Vardar, and the First Bulgarian Army, 
west of the Cerna. 

D'Esperey had on the Dobropolje front the reor- 
ganized Serbian army, reinforced by Jugo-Slav units. 
He also used for the initial assault two French divi- 



[i9i8] The End in the Balkans 369 

sions, the One Hundred Twenty-second regular and 
the Seventeenth colonial. These troops were all under 
the command of Voivode Michitch, one of the Serbian 
field marshals. On September 15th the offensive open- 
ed with an assault on the Bulgarian positions fi om Sokol 
to Vetrenik. By evening a breach seven and a half 
miles wide had been made in the Bulgaiian lines. This 
was widened out on the following day to sixteen 
miles. 

The Allied troops now crossed to the left bank of the 
Cerna, threatening Prilep, to the north of Monastir. 
They also pushed rapidly north across the Dobropolje 
massif to the confluence of the Cerna and the Vardar. 
At Grodsko (fifteen miles south of Veles), which they 
reached on September 21st, they cut the Salonica-Nish 
railroad and also the branch railroad running south- 
west to Prilep. The retreat of the Second Bulgarian 
Army up the Vardar from the Lake Doiran region was 
now blocked. The First Army was also isolated, 
having no recourse but to try to retire over rough 
mountain roads north to Uskub. 

The whole Bulgarian front immediately collapsed. 
Veles was captured on September 25th. Prilep was 
abandoned by the First Army. This army was thrust 
west toward the Albanian border by Italian forces, which 
had advanced north from Monastir. East of Veles 
Ishtip was occupied, cutting the highroad north from 
Strumnitza, over which the Second Army might have 
retreated. 

The Allied front directly east and west of the Vardar 
was held by Greek, French, and British troops, under 
General Sir George Milne. General Milne had at 
least four British divisions — the Twenty-second, Twenty- 
sixth, Twenty-seventh, and Twenty-eighth. The at- 



370 The Great War [1918] 

tack in this sector — a holding demonstration at first — 
was begun on September i8th, on both sides of Lake 
Doiran. Here, too, the Bulgarian positions were im- 
mensely strong. The assaults on the i8th and 19th 
won considerable ground, but did not break the enemy- 
line. On the 2 1st, however, the Bulgarian Second 
Army began a precipitate retirement, its communica- 
tions down the Vardar Valley having been cut at 
Grodsko. 

Milne's forces followed, passing the Bulgarian border 
on September 25th. The next day Bulgaria asked for 
an armistice. Two days later plenipotentiaries came 
through the British lines on their way to treat with 
General d'Esperey at Salonica. Operations were sus- 
pended on September 30th by the signing of an armis- 
tice, which amounted to unconditional surrender on 
Bulgaria's part. Meanwhile the Allied forces under 
Milne had captured Strumnitza and, turning to the 
east, were on the point of seizing the Rupel Pass, in 
the Struma Valley, closing the main line of retreat for 
the Bulgarian troops still left on the eastern Macedonian 
front. 

Before the armistice went into effect the Allied ar- 
mies in the Vardar section had reached Uskub and 
regained complete control of southern Serbia. 

Bulgaria took herself completely out of the war. 
The armies west of the Vardar surrendered. Those 
east of it were disarmed and demobilized. Czar Fer- 
dinand abdicated. A new government, under Allied 
control, was established. 

Only a few Austro-Hungarian divisions were left 
to contest the redemption of Serbia. Within a few 
weeks the Allied armies were on the Danube. Bel- 
grade was reoccupied and Albania was evacuated by 



[1918] The End in the Balkans 371 

the enemy. The southern Slav provinces rose in 
rebellion against Austria-Hungary. 

D'Esperey's armies took one hundred thousand 
prisoners and two thousand guns in the final Balkan 
offensive. 



CHAPTER XL 

TURKEY GOES TO THE WALL. FEBRUARY 28, I918- 
OCTOBER 31, I918 

General Allenby took Jerusalem in December, 
19 1 7. In the following months he extended his front 
north of the city and east into the Jordan region. On 
February 28, 191 8, Jericho was captured, and the Turks 
in that sector were forced to retire to the east bank of 
the Jordan. On May ist an Anglo-Egyptian force 
raided Es Salt, about twenty miles north-east of Jericho 
and about the same distance north-west of Amman, 
the latter an important Turkish base on the Hedjaz 
Railroad. The British found it difficult, however, to 
operate against the railroad — the vital artery between 
Damascus and Medina — so long as the Turks controlled 
the upper crossings of the Jordan and could shift 
troops from the west bank to the east bank to harass 
the flank and rear of British columns advancing through 
the hills of the Land of Moab. 

General Allenby, therefore, turned his attention 
early in the summer to another plan for breaking the 
Hedjaz line, rolling up the Turkish front, and opening 
the way to Damascus. In March he had attacked the 
enemy's positions directly north of Jerusalem, on both 
sides of the Jerusalem-Nablus highroad, and had found 
the terrain unsuited to a quick break-through. He de- 
cided eventually to try to efiEect his break-through 

372 



[19181 Turkey Goes to the Wall 373 

in the sector above Joppa, between the hills and the 
coast. 

Practically all the Turkish forces west of the Jordan 
were concentrated in a rectangle forty-five miles wide 
and only about twelve miles deep. The southern side 
of it ran east from a point a little north of Joppa, 
passing Jerusalem on the north, to a point on the Jordan, 
north of Jericho. The northern side ran from Jisr 
ed Damieh, on the Jordan, west, through Nablus, to 
Tul Keram and thence to the Mediterranean. The 
Tiirkish communications from this rectangle to Da- 
mascus converged on El Afule and Beisan, twenty-five 
miles to the north, which were connected by a rail- 
road with Deraa, east of the Jordan, on the Hedjaz 
Railroad. Allenby's plan — a bold and sound one — 
was to smash the enemy's line near the coast, rush 
cavalry north and cut the Turkish communications 
with El Afule and Beisan. Then by pushing with his 
centre north from Jerusalem and with his right up the 
Jordan Valley, he would completely envelop the Turk- 
ish armies west of the Jordan. 

The Allied armies in Palestine largely outnumbered 
the Turkish armies. Allenby estimated that the Turks 
had on both sides the river, including the garrison of 
Maan, 104,000 men of all services — only 36,000 (4000 
cavalry and 32,000 infantry), however, in the fighting 
line. He himself had 57,000 infantry and 12,000 
cavalry, with a total strength in all services of about 
200,000. He had 540 guns. The Turks had 400. 

Allenby's marked superiority in cavalry contributed 
decisively to the success of his envelopment movement. 
He had two cavalry divisions and two mounted in- 
fantry divisions, while the Turks had only a single 
cavalry division. General Liman Sanders, the Teuton 



374 The Great War 



[1918I 



Commander-in-Chief in Palestine and Syria, was in 
charge of three armies. The Fourth held the Jordan 
Valley, north of Jericho. It consisted of 6000 infantry 
and 2000 cavalry, with 74 guns. The Seventh held 
a twenty-mile line north of Jerusalem, on both sides of 
the Jerusalem-Nablus highroad. It mustered 7000 
infantry, with iii guns. The Eighth, with 10,000 
infantry and 157 guns, occupied a front of about twenty- 
five miles, from Furkah to the coast. 

AUenby commanded a variegated force, including 
seven infantry divisions, in addition to the four 
mounted divisions mentioned above, two separate 
brigades, and four separate battalions. In his army 
were Australians and New Zealanders, British, Egyp- 
tians, the Lahore and Meerut East Indian divisions, 
two British West Indian battalions, a French colonial 
brigade, two Jewish battalions, and an Armenian unit. 
Co-operating with him to the east of the Hedjaz Rail- 
road was an Arab army from the new kingdom of 
Hedjaz. 

The attack on the Turkish coast front was made by 
a force under Lieutenant General Sir Edward Bulfin. 
He had at his disposal five divisions, the French brigade, 
and an Australian light horse brigade. The Desert 
Mounted Corps, under Lieutenant General Sir Harry 
Chauvel, was concentrated in Bulfin's rear, ready to 
dash north through the first opening in the Turkish 
lines. 

The infantry assault on the morning of September 
19th (preceded by a fifteen-minute bombardment) 
was a complete success. The Turkish Eighth Army 
was taken unawares, and overwhelmed. Its remnants 
were driven east and north-east to the Samarian hills. 
A clear path along the coast was offered to the Allied 



[I9I8] Turkey Goes to the Wall 375 

horsemen. The Desert Mounted Corps rushed at full 
speed up the coastal plain. Before dark on September 
19th it had reached El Afule, on the lateral railroad 
from Haifa to Deraa. A detachment swooped down 
on Liman Sanders's headquarters at Nazareth, still 
farther north. Sanders barely escaped; but some 
members of his staff were captured, together with 
two thousand other prisoners. The cavalry then 
pushed east from El Afule to Beisan, closing all the 
Turkish lines of retreat on the west side of the Jordan. 
A forced march of eighty miles had been accomplished 
in thirty-four hours. 

The Seventh Turkish Army and the remains of the 
Eighth Army were now in a trap. They were sur- 
rounded on three sides. AUenby's right wing in the 
Jordan Valley pressed north to bar the lower crossing 
of the Jordan at Jisr ed Damieh. The cavalry, turn- 
ing south from Beisan, barred the upper crossings. 
The AUied centre and left, converging on Nablus, 
drove the disorganized Turks into the arms of the 
cavalry divisions, waiting in their rear. All organized 
resistance ended on September 21st. By that time the 
Eighth and Seventh Turkish armies had ceased to 
exist. 

The Fourth Army, east of the Jordan, and the garri- 
son of Maan, east of the Dead Sea, remained to be 
dealt with. On September 23d the Fourth Army 
retreated toward Es Salt and Amman, pursued by the 
Australian c.nd New Zealand Mounted Division, which 
was operating with AUenby's right wing. Amman 
was captured on September 25th. Then the enemy 
retreated north along the Hedjaz Railroad, after losing 
five thousand men and twenty-eight guns. A part of 
AUenby's right wing remained at Amman to intercept 



376 The Great War [1918] 

the Second Turkish Army Corps which was retreating 
from Arabia. Maan had been evacuated on Septem- 
ber 23d. The Turkish forces which abandoned it sur- 
rendered south of Amman, on September 29th. 

Meanwhile, on the coastal sector, the Desert Mounted 
Corps had occupied Haifa, thus giving AUenby a new 
sea base and a railroad running east from it to Lake 
Tiberias and Deraa. Acre was captured along with 
Haifa. 

Palestine was now freed. The next Allied objective 
was Damascus. Three cavalry divisions were on their 
way toward it by September 28th. The Arab army 
east of the Hedjaz Railroad had raided Deraa, Sep- 
tember i6th-i8th. It then lay in wait for the retreat- 
ing Fourth Turkish Army. The Turkish columns 
were broken up north of Deraa and the Arabs then 
seized that important railroad centre and made a junc- 
tion with the eastern wing of the Desert Mounted 
Corps. The Mounted Corps and the Arabs reached the 
outskirts of Damascus on September 30th and entered 
the city on October ist. In this operation twenty 
thousand prisoners were taken. After that the Turkish 
forces left in Syria amounted to only seventeen thousand 
men, of whom only four thousand were effectives. 

There was nothing to hinder a further advance to 
Aleppo. Beirut was occupied by the Allies on October 
8th, thus opening another port and a lateral railroad 
line leading east to Damascus. The Desert Mounted 
Corps started from Damascus for Aleppo on October 
5th. It reached Homs, on the Damascus-Aleppo 
railroad, on October 12th, and was joined there by a 
cavalry division coming from Beirut. This latter 
division, reinforced by armoured cars, continued on 
alone. But near Aleppo it was joined by another 



[i9i8] Turkey Goes to the Wall 377 

cavalry brigade and by units of the Arab army. The 
city was entered by the Arabs on October 25th. North 
of Aleppo the British advance halted. On October 
31st the armistice which Turkey, following Bulgaria's 
example, had solicited, went into effect. 

Between September 19th and October 26th AUenby 
had driven the enemy back more than three hundred 
miles. His fifth cavalry division had covered five 
hundred miles and taken 1 1 ,000 prisoners and fifty-two 
guns. In all 75,000 prisoners were captured. Of these 
200 officers and 3500 of other ranks were Germans or 
Austrians. The Turks lost 360 guns and the transport 
and equipment of three armies. AUenby 's was the 
most completely successful envelopment operation of 
the war. 

On the Mesopotamian front General Marshall made 
a spring campaign up the Euphrates, taking Hit on 
March loth and Khan-Bagdadi on March 26th. He 
also continued to make progress up the Tigris toward 
Mosul. A final offensive against that city was begun 
in October. It was on the point of succeeding when, 
on October 30th, the Turkish army on the Tigris — 
seven thousand strong — capitulated. 

The Turkish Government survived the armistice. 
There was no revolution against the Sultan, who had, 
in fact, never been much in sympathy with the Young 
Turk triumvirate. Enver Pasha, Talaat Pasha, and 
Djemal Pasha fled and the Sultan, restored to a sem- 
blance of authority, threw himself and his people on 
the mercy of the Allies. 



CHAPTER XLI 

NAVAL OPERATIONS, I918. GERMAN NAVAL LOSSES 

The most striking naval operation of 191 8 was the 
attempt of a British raiding party to block the exits 
of the ship canals at Zeebrugge and Ostend. These 
two ports were connected by waterways with Bruges, 
the chief base of German U-boat operations in the 
English Channel region. 

The expedition was in charge of Vice-Admiral Sir 
Roger Keyes. On the night of April 26th, six obsolete 
British cruisers approached the mole at Zeebrugge. 
One of them, the Vindictive, carried storming parties 
directed to land on the mole. The other five — the 
Brilliant, Iphigenia, Sirius, Intrepid, and Thetis — 
were filled with concrete and were to be sunk across 
the channel inside the mole. Monitors and fast small 
craft accompanied the cruisers. 

The storming parties on the Vindictive made a land- 
ing on the mole, but found it deserted. The Germans 
had withdrawn to the shore end and put up only a 
machine gun and artillery defence. In the confusion 
the Iphigenia and the Intrepid were sunk across the 
mouth of the canal, in a V-position. It was a daring and 
successful exploit, accomplished at relatively small cost. 

The attempt on Ostend was a failure. But on the 
night of May 9th the Vindictive was sunk near the mouth 
of the Ostend canal, partially obstructing it. 

378 



[iQis] Naval Operations 379 

The German submarine campaign against merchant 
shipping decreased in effectiveness during 191 8. A 
mine barrage across the North Sea, from the Orkneys 
to Norway, was established by the Allied fleets (June 
8th-0ctober 26th). An American flotilla under Rear 
Admiral Joseph Strauss laid 56,611 mines. The 
British navy laid 13,652. By October the U-boat had 
ceased to be a serious military menace. 

In the quarter ending March 31, 191 8, German sub- 
marines destroyed 1,143,336 tons of Allied and neutral 
shipping. In the next quarter the tonnage sunk de- 
clined to 962,007. In the third quarter the total was 
915.513- In October, 1918, only 177,534 tons were 
destroyed. 

The complete failure of the German submarine cam- 
paign as the decisive offensive factor in the war (and 
German military policy after January, 191 7, was based 
on the assumption that it could be made such a factor) 
is demonstrated by a comparison of the world's steam 
ocean-going tonnage in existence on August i, 1914, 
and the world's steam ocean-going tonnage in existence 
on November 11, 191 8. Tonnage at the beginning of 
the war was 42,146,000. Losses amounted to 18,286,- 
000. Replacements, including interned German tonnage 
taken over by the Allies, amounted to 15,049,000 tons. 
The net loss was 3,237,000 tons. Great Britain was 
the greatest sufferer. Her gross loss was 8,785,000 and 
her net loss 3,885,000. The United States made a net 
gain in tonnage of 3,400,000. 

The former German cruiser Breslau, under the Turk- 
ish flag, was sunk by a mine, at the entrance to the 
Dardanelles, on January 20th. The former German 
battle cruiser Goeben was beached on the same day, 
after an engagement with British warships. On May 



3^0 The Great War [1918] 

14th Italian submarines entered Pola harbour and 
sank an Austro-Hungarian super-dreadnaught of the 
Viribus Unitis class. The Austro-Hungarian dread- 
naught Szent Istvan was destroyed by Italian torpedo 
boats off the Dalmatian coast on June loth. The 
Viribus Unitis was sunk by an Italian monitor on 
November ist. 

The American armoured cruiser San Diego struck a 
mine off Fire Island on July 19th and sank. There 
was no loss of life. Between May and October, German 
submarines operated off the Atlantic coast of the 
United States, sinking sailing vessels, fishing boats, and 
some passenger steamers. Submarines sank three 
British transports carrying American troops to Europe 
— the Tuscania, the Moldavia, and the Persic. Only 
215 soldiers were lost. The American auxiliaries 
Tampa and Ticonderoga were torpedoed in September. 
All the men on the Tampa were drowned. On the 
Ticonderoga 102 enlisted men were lost. 

German naval losses were fairly well concealed during 
the war. A statement published in the Berlin Vossische 
Zeitung in July, 1919, disclosed their extent. One 
hundred and seventy-eight U-boats were destroyed, 
eighty-two in the North Sea and the Atlantic, seventy- 
two off the coast of Flanders, sixteen in the Mediter- 
ranean, five in the Black Sea, and three in the Baltic 
Sea. In addition fourteen were blown up by their 
crews and seven were interned in neutral harbours. 
Altogether 199 were put out of service. 

The destroyers lost numbered forty-nine. One 
battleship, the Pommern, and one battle cruiser, the 
Liitzow, were sunk in the battle of Jutland. Other 
losses included six armoured cruisers, eight modem 
and ten older cruisers, nine auxiliary cruisers, and sixty- 



[i9i8] German Naval Losses 381 

one torpedo boats. The number of war vessels of all 
sorts destroyed was 490. 

The German naval casualties totalled 29,685, in- 
cluding 10,625 marines. Probably a considerable 
portion of the marine losses occurred in the military 
service. 



CHAPTER XLII 

AMERICA'S PART IN THE WAR 

The United States entered the war lamentably un- 
prepared. In his address to Congress when it assembled 
on December 8, 1914, President Wilson said: 

More than this [a suggestion of voluntary militia 
training], proposed at this time, permit me to say, 
would mean merely that we had lost our self-posses- 
sion, that we had been thrown off our balance by a 
war with which we have nothing to do, whose causes 
cannot touch us, whose very existence affords us 
opportunities of friendship and disinterested service 
which should make us ashamed of any thought of 
hostility or fearful preparation for trouble. 

This was an extraordinary misjudgment. The Ger- 
man Admiralty's "war zone" proclamation, issued on 
February 4, 191 5, soon proved that the causes of the 
war could touch us and that we could not hope to avoid 
entanglement in the European conflict, if we intended 
to uphold our rights and interests as a neutral. The 
sinking of the Lusitania, on May 7, 191 5, was a clear 
notice to the United States to prepare for the contin- 
gency — not to say the certainty — of war. But, unfor- 
tunately, the theory of the address of December 8, 
1914, was lived up to by the administration for nearly 
two years longer, except for a brief series of preparedness 

382 



America's Part in the War 383 

speeches made by the President in the winter of 
1916. 

In April, 191 7, there were only 200,000 men in the 
military establishment. Of these 133,000 were regu- 
lars and 67,000 national guardsmen, called into the 
Federal service in 1916 because of troubles on the 
Mexican border. Congress had passed the farcical 
Hay army reorganization act in 191 6. It was reluctant 
in 19 1 7 to resort to conscription. But the country 
knew that the war could not be won without conscrip- 
tion, and demanded an immediate trial of the principle 
of selective compulsory service. 

The enthusiasm with which the public supported 
and executed the draft system was one of the revela- 
tions of the war. Under the Selective Service law of 
May 19, 1917 — ^broadened in scope in 1918 to include 
all able-bodied men between eighteen and forty-five — 
24,234,021 conscripts were registered and more than 
3,091,000 became members of the new National Army. 
When the war ended 4,000,000 men had served. The 
Regular Army was expanded to 527,000 and the Na- 
tional Guard to 382,000. But the National Army con- 
stituted seventy-seven per cent, of our military forces. 

The enlisted strength of the navy on April 6, 191 7, 
was 65,777. By November 11, 1918, it had risen 
to 497,030. The Marine Corps was enlarged from 
15,627 to 78,017. The total number of men serving 
in the armed forces of the United States was 4,800,000 
— ^4,000,000 in the army and 800,000 in other branches. 
The army had less than 9000 officers in April, 19 17. 
By the end of the war the strength of the officers' 
corps had been increased to 200,000. 

What America could contribute to winning the war 
in the field was man power. We could not have car- 



384 The Great War 

ried a sufficient reinforcement to Europe in our own 
ships. Nor could we have supplied our forces there 
adequately with guns, machine guns, tanks, or airplanes. 
The Entente Powers were able to furnish aid in trans- 
portation and to lend artillery and other equipment. 
American man power did arrive on the battle line in 
time, and guaranteed Foch his strategical reserve for 
the Victory Offensive of 191 8. 

Two million and eighty-four thousand American 
soldiers were carried to Europe. American vessels — 
chiefly the interned German liners taken over at the 
beginning of the war — transported 927,000. British 
and British-controlled vessels transported 1,047,000. 
French ships carried 47,000, and Italian ships 65,000. 
Only half a million soldiers were delivered from April, 
191 7, to May, 1 91 8. In the last six months of the 
war 1,500,000 were delivered. On November 11, 1918, 
the United States was represented on the Western 
Front by 1,950,000 men. France had 2,559,000 and 
Great Britain 1,718,000. Up to the signing of the 
armistice 1,390,000 American troops had appeared on 
the firing line. 

The transportation of troops naturally outran the 
capacity of the United States to supply them with 
field and heavy guns. The American forces in France 
had, in round numbers, 3500 pieces of artillery, of 
which nearly 500 were made in this country. They 
used on the firing line 2250 pieces, of which over 100 
were made here. But, on the other hand, the United 
States manufactured large quantities of smokeless 
powder and high explosives which were sold to the 
French and British. 

For tanks the American armies had to depend almost 
entirely on the French and British, the former con- 



America's Part in the War 385 

tributing 227 of the light variety and the latter 64 of 
the heavier model. 

The war also ended too soon for American airplane 
production to show results. Of the 2698 planes sent 
to the advance zone for the use of American aviators 
667 were of American manufacture. 

The American Expeditionary Force did not get into 
active front line service until April 25, 1918. But 
thereafter it saw much hard service and greatly dis- 
tinguished itself. The infantry was composed of 
forty-two divisions, twenty-nine of which were combat 
units. In the last week of October, 191 8, when these 
twenty-nine were in action, they held loi miles of 
front, or twenty-three per cent, of the Allied line. 
They advanced in battle 485 miles, and captured 
63,079 prisoners and 1378 guns. 

The part taken by the American Expeditionary Force 
in the fighting on the Western Front has been noted 
in preceding chapters, dealing with Ludendorff's five 
offensives and Foch's Victory Offensive (Chapters 
XXXV, XXXVI, and XXXVII). A brief recapitula- 
tion may be appropriate here. 

The First Division captured Cantigny, in the Amiens 
sector, on May 28th. The Second Division, with 
elements of the Third and the Twenty-eighth, helped 
to stop the German advance in the neighbourhood of 
Chateau-Thierry. The Second Division (June 5th- 1 ith) 
took Bouresches, Torcy, and BeUeau Wood — a brilliant 
operation. Eighty-five thousand American troops co- 
operated in the repulse of Ludendorff's Fifth Offensive — 
the Forty-second Division fighting with Gouraud, 
in Champagne, east of Rheims, and the Third and 
Twenty-eighth fighting with de Mitry south of the 
Marne. 

25 



386 The Great War 

Eight divisions — the First, Second, Third, Fourth 
Twenty-sixth, Twenty-eighth, Thirty-second, and 
Forty-second — were employed in Foch's attack against 
the Aisne-Marne salient, beginning July i8th. Ele- 
ments of the Thirty-third Division took part in Haig's 
offensive against the Montdidier salient, beginning 
August 8th. They helped the Australians to storm 
Chipilly Ridge, on the north side of the Somme. The 
Twenty-seventh and Thirtieth divisions were used in 
conjunction with the Australians to break the Hinden- 
burg Line about Le Catelet and in the subsequent 
advance toward Maubeuge. 

The Twenty-eighth, Thirty-second, and Seventy- 
seventh divisions participated in the first stages of 
General Mangin's Oise-Aisne offensive, beginning 
August 1 8th. The Twenty-seventh and Thirtieth 
divisions, before storming the Hindenburg Line, had 
helped to recapture Mount Kemmel. On October 31st 
two other American divisions — the Thirty-seventh and 
Ninety-first — were sent to Flanders from the Meuse. 
They took part in the last stages of the Ypres-Lys 
offensive, reaching the line of the Scheldt. 

The First American Army was organized on August 
loth. In co-operation with a small French force it 
squeezed out the St. Mihiel salient (September 12th- 
i6th). Then it fought the great battle of the Meuse- 
Argonne (September 26th-November nth). About 
550,000 American soldiers were engaged in the battle 
of St. Mihiel. One million two hundred thousand 
fought in the Meuse- Argonne campaign. The strategi- 
cal effect of the successful American drive for Sedan was 
to break into two groups the German armies operating 
in France and Belgium and to precipitate Ludendorff 's 
request for an armistice. Two American divisions — 



America's Part in the War 387 

the Second and the Thirty-sixth — also assisted the 
French in their advance in October east of Rheims. 

The American armies were often handicapped by 
the lack of field and heavy guns of their own. They 
were also inexperienced in warfare and may not have 
been used as economically as the French armies were 
used in the later periods of the war. But they fought 
surprisingly well. The twenty-nine combat divisions 
had 46,739 men killed in battle. But they took 63,079 
prisoners, and lost only 4434 prisoners. An army 
with a record like that shows military quality of the 
highest type. The American casualties are given in 
detail in Appendix II. 

The United States fought a successful war in spite 
of the enormous disabilities imposed by the failure of 
our government to prepare for war. It also, through 
President Wilson's activities, played a leading r61e in 
formulating the conditions on which peace was nego- 
tiated. During 191 8 Mr. Wilson laid down various 
formulae of settlement to be applied in concluding 
peace. The most definite of these were the ' ' Fourteen 
Points," incorporated in his address to Congress on 
January 8th. They read as follows: 

1. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, 
after which there shall be no private international 
understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall 
proceed always frankly and in the public view. 

2. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, 
outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, 
except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part 
by international action for the enforcement of inter- 
national covenants. 

3. The removal, so tar as possible, of all economic 



388 The Great War 

barriers and the establishment of an equality of 
trade conditions among all the nations consenting to 
the peace and associating themselves for its main- 
tenance. 

4. Adequate guarantees given and taken that 
national armaments will be reduced to the lowest 
points consistent with domestic safety. 

5. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial 
adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict 
observance of the principle that in determining all 
such questions of sovereignty the interests of the 
populations concerned must have equal weight with 
the equitable claims of the government whose title 
is to be determined. 

6. The evacuation of all Russian territory and 
such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as 
will secure the best and freest co-operation of the 
other nations of the world in obtaining for her an 
unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the 
independent determination of her own political de- 
velopment and national policy and assure her of a 
sincere welcome into the society of free nations under 
institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a 
welcome, assistance also of every kind she may need 
and may herself desire. The treatment accorded 
Russia by her sister nations in the months to come 
will be the acid test of their good will, of their com- 
prehension of her needs as distinguished from their 
own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish 
sympathy. 

7. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be 
evacuated and restored without any attempt to 
limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common 
with all other free nations. No other single act will 



America's Part in the War 389 

serve as this will serve to restore confidence among 
the nations in the laws which they have themselves 
set and determined for the government of their rela- 
tions with one another. Without this healing act 
the whole structure and validity of international law 
is forever impaired. 

8. All French territory should be freed and the 
invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to 
France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace- 
Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world 
for nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that 
peace may once more be made secure in the interest 
of all. 

9. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy 
should be effected along clearly recognizable lines 
of nationality. 

10. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose 
place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded 
and assured, should be accorded the freest oppor- 
tunity of autonomous development. 

11. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be 
evacuated, occupied territories restored, Serbia ac- 
corded free and secure access to the sea; and the 
relations of the several Balkan States to one another 
determined by friendly counsel along historically 
estabhshed lines of allegiance and nationality; and 
international guarantees of the political and economic 
independence and territorial integrity of the several 
Balkan States should be entered into. 

12. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman 
Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but 
the other nationalities which are now under Turkish 
rule should be assured an undoubted security of life 
and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of au- 



390 The Great War 

i tonomous development, and the Dardanelles should 
be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships 
and commerce of all nations under international 
guarantees. 

/ 13. An independent Polish state should be erected 
which should include the territories inhabited by 
indisputably Polish populations, which should be as- 
sured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose 
political and economic independence and territorial 
integrity should be guaranteed by international 
covenant. 

14. A general association of nations must be 
formed under specific covenants for the purpose of 
affording mutual guarantees of political independence 
and territorial integrity to great and small states alike. 

The "Fourteen Points" were supplemented, on 
February nth, by four principles; on July 4th, by 
four more principles; on September 27th, by five addi- 
tional principles. All the principles were abstract in 
character and envisaged a peace of renunciation and 
conciliation, rather than a peace of surrender. The 
most striking of the thirteen principles was the first one 
of the third set, which r^ad: 

f The impartial justice meted out must involve no 
discrimination between those to whom we wish to 
be just and those to whom we do not wish to be 
just. It must be a justice which plays no favourites 
and knows no standard but the equal rights of the 
peoples concerned. 

When, in September, 191 8, the Central Powers lost 
all hope of victory, Austria-Hungary made an appeal 



America's Part in the War 391 

for a conference with the Allies. This was rejected. 
In October Hertling resigned as the German Imperial 
Chancellor and was replaced by Prince Max of Baden. 
The latter made a pretence of acting as the mouthpiece 
of the Reichstag, rather than of the Emperor. In his 
newly acquired representative capacity he began sound- 
ing out the government of the United States. He 
announced that Germany was ready to accept the 
peace terms laid down by President Wilson in the 
"Fourteen Points" and in the later principles, particu- 
larly in the principles enunciated on September 27th. 

Secretary Lansing demanded assurances that the 
new government represented the people of Germany, 
not the old autocracy. These were formally given. 
President Wilson then transmitted the correspondence 
to the Allied governments and asked them if they were 
disposed to accept peace on the terms and principles 
indicated by Germany. They assented, reserving the 
question of the freedom of the seas and stipulating 
that Germany should make compensation "for all 
damage done to the civilian population of the Allied 
states and their property by the aggression of Germany 
by land, by sea, and from the air." 

The German Government was informed on Novem- 
ber 5th of these reservations, and also that Marshal 
Foch had been authorized to receive German armistice 
commissioners. While armistice negotiations were in 
progress the Kaiser abdicated and fled to Holland. 
The Reichstag organized a government, which later 
became a mildly socialist republic. 

Peace with Germany was made, at least in form, on 
the basis of the ' ' Fourteen Points. ' ' Clause X, regard- 
ing Austria-Hungary, had been nullified by the recogni- 
tion of the belligerent status of Czecho-Slovakia and 



392 The Great War 

Jugo-Slavia. Clause II had been annulled by the 
Allied reservations as to the freedom of the seas. 
Clause VI, regarding Russia, became inapplicable, 
because of the continuance of war between the Lenine 
government and the AlUes. Clause I was more hon- 
oured in the breach than in the observance in the 
proceedings at Paris. Clauses XI and XII applied to 
conditions of peace, not with Germany, but with 
Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey. 

To what extent the other clauses (except VII and 
VIII, about which there was no dispute) served as 
the framework of the peace will probably be disputed 
for generations. No compact was ever made to observe 
them in the arrangement of peace terms with Austria- 
Hungary, Bulgaria, or Turkey. But they will remain 
of permanent historical significance as the criteria of 
the German settlement. 



The peace conference met in Paris in January, 1919. 
A treaty with Germany was signed, at Versailles, on 
June 28, 1919. It went into effect on January 10, 
1920, for the various powers which had ratified it prior 
to that date. Ratification by the United States was 
held up by a dispute between President Wilson and the 
Senate over the question of reservations. 

A treaty with German Austria was signed, at St. 
Germain, on September 10, 1919. One with Bulgaria 
was signed, at Neuilly, on November 27, 1919. These 
treaties, and America's part in them, form an episode 
of extraordinary historical interest, with which the 
author hopes to deal in a separate volume. 



APPENDIX I 

DECLARATIONS OF WAR AND SEVERANCES OF DIPLOMATIC 

RELATIONS 

Declarations of War 

Austria against Belgium, August 28, 1914. 
Austria against Japan, August 27, 1914. 
Austria against Montenegro, August 9, 1914. 
Austria against Russia, August 6, 1914. 
Austria against Serbia, July 28, 1914. 
Brazil against Germany, October 26, 191 7. 
Bulgaria against Serbia, October 14, 1915. 
China against Austria, August 14, 191 7. 
China against Germany, August 14, 191 7. 
Costa Rica against Germany, May 23, 1918. 
Cuba against Germany, April 7, 19 17. 
France against Austria, August 13, 1914. 
France against Bulgaria, October 16, 1915. - 
France against Germany, August 3, 1914. 
France against Turkey, November 5, 1914. 
Germany against Belgium, August 4, 1914. 
Germany against France, August 3, 1914. 
Germany against Portugal, March 9, 1916. 
Germany against Rumania, September 14, 1916. 
Germany against Russia, August i, 1914. 
Great Britain against Austria, August 13, 1914. 
Great Britain against Bulgaria, October 15, 1915. 
Great Britain against Germany, August 4, 1914. 
Great Britain against Turkey, November 5, 1914. 

393 



394 Appendix I 

Greece against Bulgaria, November 28, 191 6 (Provisional 
Government). 

Greece against Bulgaria, July 2, 191 7 (Government of 
Alexander). 

Greece against Germany, November 28, 1916 (Provi- 
sional Government). 

Greece against Germany, July 2, 1917 (Government of 
Alexander). 

Guatemala against Germany, April 21, 1918. 

Haiti against Germany, July 12, 191 8. 

Honduras against Germany, July 19, 1918, 

Italy against Austria, May 24, 191 5. 

Italy against Bulgaria, October 19, 1915. 

Italy against Germany, August 28, 1916. 

Italy against Turkey, August 21, 191 5. 

Japan against Germany; August 23, 1914. 

Liberia against Germany, August 4, 191 7. 

Montenegro against Austria, August 8, 19 14. 

Montenegro against Germany, August 9, 1914. 

Nicaragua against Germany, May 6, 1918. 

Panama against Germany, April 7, 191 7. 

Panama against Austria, December 10, 1917. 

Portugal against Germany, November 23, 1914 (resolu- 
tions passed authorizing military intervention as ally of 
England) . 

Portugal against Germany, May 19, 1915 (military aid 
granted). 

Rumania against Austria, August 27, 191 6 (allies of 
Austria also consider it a declaration). 

Russia against Bulgaria, October 19, 191 5. 

Russia against Turkey, November 3, 19 14. 

San Marino against Austria, May 24, 191 5. 

Serbia against Bulgaria, October 16, 1915. 

Serbia against Germany, August 6, 1914. 

Serbia against Turkey, December 2, 1914. 

Siam against Austria, July 22, 191 7. 

Siam against Germany, July 22, 1917. 



Appendix I 395 

Turkey against Allies, November 23, 1914. 
Turkey against Rumania, August 29, 191 6. 
United States against Germany, April 6, 191 7. 
United States against Austria-Hungary, December 7, 
1917. 

Severances of Diplomatic Relations 

Austria against Japan, August 26, 1914. 

Austria against Portugal, March 16, 1916. 

Austria against Serbia, July 26, 1914. 

Austria against United States, April 8, 1917. 

Bolivia against Germany, April 14, 1917. 

Brazil against Germany, April 11, 1917. 

China against Germany, March 14, 1917. 

Costa Rica against Germany, September 21, 191 7. 

Ecuador against Germany, December 7, 1917. 

Egypt against Germany, August 13, 19 14. 

France against Austria, August 10, 1914. 

Greece against Turkey, July 2, 191 7 (Government of 
Alexander) . 

Greece against Austria, July 2, 1917 (Government of 
Alexander) . 

Guatemala against Germany, April 27, 1917. 

Haiti against Germany, June 17, 191 7. 

Honduras against Germany, May 17, 191 7. 

Nicaragua against Germany, May 18, 1917. 

Peru against Germany, October 6, 1917. 

Turkey against United States, April 20, 191 7. 

United States against Germany, February 3, 1917. 

Uruguay against Germany, October 7, 1917. 



APPENDIX II 

MILITARY LOSSES OF THE PRINCIPAL POWERS 

Tabulations of the military losses of the war are in- 
complete and often confusing, because of the inclusion or 
exclusion of soldiers dying of disease or other causes than 
wounds. 

The Statistical Branch of the General Staff of the United 
States Army has furnished this statement, corrected to 
May 31, 1919, of the battle deaths in the armies of the 
various belligerents: 

The Allies and the United States 

Russia , . 1,700,000 

France 1,385.300 

Great Britain 900,000 

Italy 330,000 

Serbia and Montenegro 125,000 

Belgium 102,000 

Rumania 100,000 

United States 48,900 

Greece 7,000 

Portugal 2,000 

Total 4,700,000 

The Teutonic Allies 

Germany i ,600,000 

Austria-Hungary 800,000 

Turkey 250,000 

Bulgaria 100,000 

Total 2,750,000 

396 



Appendix II 397 

The losses figures, as given out, officially or non-officially, 
for the various belligerents are : 

France — Army: 1,089,700 killed; 265,800 missing; total 
i>355.500 — 16.2 per cent, of mobilization of 8,410,000. 
Navy: 5,521 killed; 5,214 missing; total, 10,735 — ^4.19 
per cent, of forces mobilized. The French High Commis- 
sion in Washington on January 8, 1919, estimated the 
French wounded at 3,000,000 and the prisoners at 435,000. 
It put the total French losses, excluding native Colonials, 
at 4,762,800. Colonial killed and missing are included in 
the figures for killed and missing given above. Colonial 
wounded numbered 44,000 and prisoners 3500. 

Great Britain — Army: killed, 706,726; missing or prison- 
ers, 359,145; wounded 2,032,142; total, 3,098,113. Navy: 
killed, 33,361; missing, prisoners, and wounded, 6,405; 
total, 39,766. 

Australia (included in British) — Killed, 58,035; wounded 
166,606; mivssing, 193; prisoners, 438. 

Canada (included in British) — Killed, in action or died 
of wounds, 48,121; diedof disease, 4057; wounded, 155,839; 
missing, 5080; prisoners, 3049; deaths in Canada, 2287; 
total 2 1 8,433. 

Italy — Killed or died of wounds, 460,000; wounded, 
947,000; prisoners or missing, 500,000. 

Russia — (estimated) Killed, 1,700,000; wounded, 5,000,- 
000; prisoners, 2,500,000. 

Serbia — Killed, or died of wounds or disease, 292,342. 

United States — ^Army (final revision); killed in action, 
34,248 ; died of wounas, 13,700 ; died of disease, 23,430 ; died 
of other causes, 5740; wounded, 221,050; missing and pris- 
oners, 4435; total, 302,612. Marine Corps (up to July 5, 
19 19): killed or died from wounds and other causes, 2716; 
wounded, 3252; missing, 143; total, 61 11. Navy: deaths 
from war causes, 1233. 

Germany — Killed or died of wounds and other causes, 
2,050,460; wounded, 4,207,028; prisoners and missing, 
615,922; total, 6,873,410. 



398 Appendix II 

Austria-Hungary — (estimated), Killed 800,000; other 
casualties, 3,200,000; total, 4,000,000. 

Bulgaria — (estimated) Killed and missing, 101,224; 
wounded, 1,152,399 (?) 

Turkey — (estimated) Killed and died of wounds and 
disease, 436,974; wounded 407,772; prisoners and missing, 
103,731; total, 948,477. 



APPENDIX III 

WHAT GERMANY DOES UNDER THE PEACE TREATY 

(Summary prepared by the author and published in the 
New York Tribune of June 21, 191 9.) 

Restores Alsace-Lorraine to France. 

Accepts the internationalization of the Saar Basin for 
fifteen years and of Danzig permanently. The people of 
the Saar Basin are to decide by a plebiscite, taken by 
districts, whether they wish to be annexed to Germany or 
to France or to accept control by the League of Nations. 

Recognizes the full sovereignty of Belgium over neutral 
Moresnet and cedes to Belgium Prussian Moresnet and the 
districts of Eupen and Malmddy. 

Cedes a small strip of upper Silesia to Czecho-Slovakia. 
Cedes the rest of upper Silesia to Poland, but, except in 
certain districts in the north-eastern corner, ceded uncondi- 
tionally to Poland, a plebiscite to determine nationality 
is to be held between the sixth and eighteenth month 
after the signing of the treaty. 

Cedes to the principal Allied and Associated Powers the 
district of Memel. 

Cedes to Poland without plebiscite most of Posen and 
portions of West Prussia and Pomerania west of the Vistula 
and of West Prussia east of the Vistula. Parts of East 
Prussia are to decide by vote whether they wish to belong 
to Prussia 01 Poland. 

Agrees to the creation of three zones in Schleswig in 
which the inhabitants are to decide, by districts, whether 
they are to belong to Prussia or Denmark. 

399 



400 Appendix III 

Recognizes the independence of Austria and agrees that 
this independence shall be inalienable except with the 
consent of the council of the League of Nations. 

Renounces all territorial and political rights outside 
Europe as to her own or her allies' territories, and especially 
to Morocco, Egypt, Siam, Liberia and Shantung. 

Reduces her army within three months to 200,000 men, 
with reductions, determined by the Allies, every three 
months thereafter, reaching a minimum of 100,000 by March 
31, 1920. 

Abolishes conscription within her territories. 

Agrees to dismantle all forts fifty kilometres east of the 
Rhine within six months. 

Must stop all importation, exportation, and nearly all 
production of war material. 

Agrees to Allied occupation of parts of Germany for fifteen 
years, or until reparation is made, with the understanding 
that the army of occupation will be reduced at the end of 
each of three five-year periods, if Germany is fulfilling her 
obligations. 

Agrees that any violation by her of the conditions as to 
the zone fifty kilometres east of the Rhine shall be regarded 
as an act of war. 

Reduces her navy to six battleships, six light cruisers, 
twelve destroyers and twelve torpedo boats, without sub- 
marines, and a personnel of not over 15,000. 

Must surrender or destroy all other war vessels. 

Is forbidden to build forts controlling the Baltic. 

Must demolish the fortifications of Heligoland. The 
fishing harbour is not to be destroyed. 

Must open the Kiel Canal to merchant and war vessels 
of all nations at peace with her and surrender her fourteen 
submarine cables. 

May have no military or naval air forces, except 100 
unarmed seaplanes until October ist to detect mines, and 
may not manufacture or import aviation material for six 
months. 



Appendix III 401 

Accepts full responsibility for all damages caused to the 
Allied and Associated governments and nationals. 

Agrees specifically to reimburse all civilian damages, 
beginning with an initial payment of the equivalent of 
20,000,000,000 marks, subsequent payments to be secured 
by bonds to be issued at the discretion of the reparation 
commission. Within four months Germany may make 
proposals regarding the manner of the payment of her 
reparation obligations. Within two months thi'eafter 
the Allied Reparation Commission will answer such pro- 
posals. The commission is directed to make a final deter- 
mination of the total due from Germany before May i , 192 1 . 



INDEX 



Aerenthal, 2 

Aisne, battle of the, 19 14, 39; 

battleof, 1917, 268, 269 
Aisne-Mameoffensives,i9i8, 327- 

* 341 

Albanian campaign, 1918, 368 
Albert of Belgium, 20, 22, 41, 350 
Albrecht of Wurttemberg, 23, 34, 

135, 137, 138, 139,311 
Alexander of Greece, 291 
Alexieff, 81, 84, 183, 257, 260 
Allenby, 41, 43, '44, 141, 192, 278, 

293, 294, 372, 373, 374, 375, 377 
Alsace, French invasion of, 1914, 

24 
American Expeditionary Forces, 

3847387 
American losses, 397 
America's part in the war, 382-392 
Ancona case, 166, 237 
Antoine, 275, 276, 312 
Antwerp, siege of, 40, 41 
Anzacs at GallipoU, 96-99 
Aosta, Duke of, 284 
Arabic case, 165, 166, 237, 238 
Archduke Joseph, 361 
Archer, 243 
Ardahan, battle of, 67 
Ardennes, battle of, 1914, 26- 

28 
Argonne oflEensive, American, 1 9 1 8, 

352, 353, 356, 357, 386 
"Armed neutrality," American 

poUcy of, 248 
Armenia, campaigns in. See 

Asiatic campaigns 
Armistice preliminaries, 387-392 
Amim, 324, 325, 326 
Arras, battle of, 1917, 266-268 
Artois, battle of, 1915, 139, 140, 

142 



Asiatic campaigns of 1914, 66-67; 
of 1915, 145-150; of 1916, 220- 
224; of 1917, 291-294; of 1918, 

372-377 
Asquith, 234 
Auffenberg, 54, 55 
Australian losses, 397 
Austro-Hungarian losses, 397 
Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to 

Serbia, 2-8 
Avarescu, 216 



B 



Bagdad expedition, 148-150, 291- 

293. 

Baldwin, 98 

Balfour, 252 

Balkan campaigns of 1914, 60-62; 
of 1915, 121-132; of 1916, 207- 
219; of 1917, 290-291; of 1918, 

367-371 
Baltic Provinces, relations with 
Germany, no, 245, 301, 302, 

303, 309 
Bapaume, battleof, 19 18, 346 
Beatty, 74, 152, 153, 154, 227, 228, 

229, 230, 231, 234 
Beginnings of the war, 1-12 
Belgium, invasion of, 19-22; Ger- 
man policy in, 48, 49 
Belleau-Bouresches, battle of, 

1918, 330, 331 
Belligerents, strength of, I3~i6; 

losses, 396, 397 
Below, 81, 82, 104, 107, 109, 261, 

284, 285, 286, 314, 345 
Berchtold, 5 
Bernhardi, 324, 325 
Bemstorff, 247, 248 
Berthelot, 337, 340, 352, 356 
Bethmann-HoUweg, 13, 17, 19. 

246 



403 



404 



Index 



Birdwood, 98, 350 

Bismarck, 207 

Bissing, 48 

Blockade, Allied, of Germany, 

156-158 
Boehm-ErmoUi, 84, 104 
Boehn, 337, 338, 339, 340, 345 
Bojadeff, 128 
Bolo Pasha, 272 
Boroevic, 81, 104, 105, 205, 360, 

361, 365 
Botha, 71, 150 
Bothmer, 186, 188, 189 
Brazil enters the war, 251, 252 
Brest-Litovsk, treaty of, 299-302, 

304 

Brialmont, 21 

Briand, 271 

British losses, 396, 397 

BruchmuUer, 326 

Brusati, 202 

BrusiloflF, 54, 81, 105, 181, 183, 

184, 185, 187, 189, 203, 209, 259, 

260 
Bryan, 158, 163 
Bulfin, 374 

Bulgaria enters the war, 124, 125 
Bulgarian losses, 397 
BuUard, 356 
Bulow, General, 22, 23, 29, 31, 

33, 35, 36, 39, 40, 135 
Bulow, Prince, 113, 116, 117 
Byers, 71 
Byng, 140, 278, 279, 280, 281, 312, 

316,318,320,345,351 



Cadorna, 118, 119, 201, 202, 203, 
204, 205, 282, 283, 285, 287, 289 

Caillaux, 7, 272 

Cambrai, battle of, 277-281 

Cameron, 348 

Canadian losses, 397 

Cantigny, battle of, 335, 385 

Capello, 283, 284, 285 

Caporetto, battle of, 284-^287 

Garden, 88, 91 

Carey, 320, 321 

Carol of Rumania, 208 

Carpathians, battle of the, 84, 85, 
86 

Castehiau, de, 23, 25, 37, 40, 134, 
142, 170, 174, 312 



Casualties of belligerents, 396- 

398 
Caucasus operations, 1914, 66, 67; 

1915, 147, 148; 1916, 220-222; 

1917, 293 
Cavan, Earl of, 363 
Caviglia, 364 
Chamberlain, 224 
Champagne, French offensive in, 

1915, 135, 136, 141, 142; 1918, 

352, 356 
Channel ports offensive, Luden- 

dorff's, 1918, 309-326 
Charleroi, battle of, 29 
Ch§,teau-Thierry, battle of, 330, 

331 

Chauvel, 374 

China enters the war, 393 

Churchill, 41 

Clemenceau, 271, 272 

Cobbe, 292 

Colonial campaigns of 1914, 68- 

71; of 1915, 150, 151; of 1916, 

224, 225; of 1917, 294 
Conneau, 43 
Constantine of Greece, 122, 123, 

125, 126, 218, 219, 291 
Coronel, battle of, 75, 76 
Costa Rica enters the war, 252 
Cox, 97 

Craddock, 75, 76 
Crimea, 301 
Crown Prince of Prussia, 23, 24, 

34, 135,311 
Ctesiphon, battle of, 149-150 
Cuba enters the war, 252 
Gushing and Gulflight cases, 160, 

161, 162 
Czarina of Russia, 182, 253, 254 
Czecho-Slovakia, recognition of, 

305, 391 
Czecho-Slovaks in Siberia, 304- 

306 
Czernin, 299 



D 



D'Amade, 26, 32, 91 
Dankl, 54, 55, 81, 104, 107 
Dardanelles-Gallipoli campaign, 

87-102 
Debeney, 319, 322, 342, 351, 356 
Declarations of War, dates of, 

249, 251, 252, 393-395 



Index 



405 



Defeatist intrigues in France, 271, 

272 
Degoutte, 338, 340, 350, 354 
Deimling, 24 
Delcass^, 127 
De Lisle, loi, 280 
Demange, 171 
De Mitry, 44, 324, 325, 336, 339, 

340, 385 
D6prez, 171 
D'Esperey, 34, 36, 131, 134, 171, 

312, 367, 368, 370, 371 
Deutschland, submarine, 241, 242 
De Wet, 70, 71 

Diaz, 287, 359, 360, 362, 363, 364 
Dickman, 348 

Dimitrieff, 81, 104, 105, 168 
Djemal Pasha, 145, 146, 147, 377 
Dogger Bank, battle of, 152-154 
D'Oissel, 170 

Dubail, 23, 25, 37, 134, 171 
Dunajec, battle of the, 104, 105 
D'Urbal, 134 
Duval, 272 



E 



Egypt, British protectorate de- 
clared, 65, 147; Turkish in- 
vasion of, 145-147 

Eichhom, 81, 82, 83, 303 

Einem, 135 

Emden, exploits of, 78 

Entente Alliance, strength of, 13- 

17 

Enver Pasha, 63, 64, 66, 67, 377 
Erzerum, Russian capture of, 

220, 221 
Erzingan, Russian capture of, 221 
Eugene of Austria, 81, 84, 104, 

285, 286 
Evert, 183, 184 



Falaba, sinking of, 160, 163 
Falkenhausen, 48, 135 
Falkenhayn, 109, 168, 169, 170, 

171, 172, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 

199, 202, 214, 215, 216, 217, 

242, 262 
Falkland Islands, battle of, 77, 78 
FayoUe, 170, 195, 196, 197, 198, 

288, 312, 322 



Ferdinand of Bulgaria, 122, 123, 

124, 370 
Festubert, battle of, 19 15, 140 
Finland, 261, 300, 301, 302, 303, 

307, 309 

Fisher, 88, 234 

Fitz-Clarence, 46 

Flanders, battle of, 1914, 43-48; 
1917, 274-277; Allied offensive 
in, 1918, 350, 354 

Foch, 29, 34, 36, 41, 46, 47, 139, 
170, 266, 269, 289, 309, 320, 321, 
327, 328, 329, 330, 332, 333, 334, 
335, 337, 338, 341. 342, 344, 345, 
347, 349, 353, 385, 386, 391 

Foch's victory offensive, 337-358 

"Fourteen Points," President 
Wilson's, 358, 387-392 

Francis Ferdinand, i, 2 

Francis Joseph, i 

Frederick, of Austria, no 

French casualties, 396, 397 

French, Viscount, 30, 41, 45, 46, 
134, 136, 140, 143 



G 



Gaede, 135 

Gallipoli campaign, 93-102 

Gallwitz, 128, 129, 311 

Garrison, 241 

Gerard, 164 

Gerard, 171 

German casualties, 396, 397 

German colonies, loss of, 68-71, 

150-151 

German East Africa, conquest of, 
151, 224, 225, 294 

German peace offer, 19 16, 246 

German Southwest Africa, con- 
quest of , 70-71, 150 

German strategy, development of, 
17, 18 

Giardino, 364 

Giesl, 8 

Giolitti, 117 

Godley, 97 

Goeben and Breslau, 64, 73, 74 

Golz, 92 

Gore resolution, 241 

Goringe, 149 

Gcwizia, fight for, 118, 204-206 

Gorky, 302 

Goschen, Sir Edward, 13 



4o6 



Index 



Gough, 192, 275, 312, 316, 317, 

318, 320, 321 
Gouraud, 171, 336, 352, 356, 385 
Gourko, 85, 103, 183, 258, 259 
Grand Duke Michael, 254 
Grand Duke Nicholas, 56, 83, 85, 

109, 181, 220, 222 
Grand Duke of Wurttemberg, 23, 

34. 135. 137, 138, 139,311 
Grant, 320 
Graziani, 363 
Great Britain's casualties, 396, 

^397 „ 

Greece, Entente relations with, 
1915, 125-127; 1916, 218-219; 

1917, 291; losses, 396 
Grey, Sir Edward, 9, 1 1 
Grodek Lakes, battle of, 106 
Guatemala enters the war, 252 
Gu^prette, 91 •' 
Guillaumat, 174, 290, 356, 366 
Gulflight and Gushing cases, 160, 

161, 162 
Gumbinnen, battle of, 52 

H 

Haig, 31, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 47, 
134, 143, 194, 195, 199, 263, 
268, 274, 277, 278, 279, 281, 
310, 311, 312, 317, 318, 319, 
324. 325, 335. 342, 345, 350, 
353, 354, 355, 386 

Haiti enters the war, 252 

Hamilton, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 
96, 98, 100, loi, 102 

Hardinge, 224 

Hausen, 23, 29, 34, 35, 36 

Havrincourt-Ep^hy, battle of, 

1918, 347 
Hay, 241 

Hedjaz, Arabian kingdom pro- 
claimed, 147 
Heeringen, 24, 135 
Heligoland, naval engagement 

off, 74 

Herr, 171, 172 

Hertling, 391 

Hindenburg, 53, 56, 57, 58, 81, 
82, 83, 107, 109, no, 180, 183, 
188, 189, 192, 199, 214, 245, 
262, 263, 264, 265, 269, 310, 344 

Hindenburg Line, 200, 263, 265, 
268, 278, 280, 281, 344, 346, 
347. 350, 351, 386 



Hindenburg retreat, 1917, 262- 

266 
Hipper, 153, 154, 227 
Hirschauer, 347 
HoetzendorflF, 56, 57, 119, 202, 

203, 204, 284, 286, 288, 289, 

360, 361 
Hoffmann, 108, 299, 300, 301 
Holy War, declared by Sheik-ul- 

Islam, 65 
Honduras enters the war, 252 
Hood, 229, 230 
Home, 312, 319, 323 
Hoyos, 5 
Humbert, French General, 135, 

141, 171, 191, 318, 319, 320, 

344, 345 
Humbert, French Senator, 272 
Hunding Line, 356 
Hutier, 314, 320, 322, 332, 333, 

336, 342 



Isonzo, battles of the, 282-284 
ItaUan campaign of 19 15, 118- 
120; of 1916, 201-206; of 1917, 
282-289; of 1918, 359-366 
Italian casualties, 396, 397 
Italy enters the war, 112-118 
Ivanoff, 54, 55 



Jadar, battle of the, 19 14, 61 
Jagow, 6, 163, 164, 238, 239 
Japanese campaign in Kiao-chau, 

68, 69 
Jellicoe, 228, 229, 230, 231, 233, 

234 
Jerusalem, fall of, 294 
Joffre, 24, 26, 27, 29, 30, 32, 34, 

36, 37, 39, 40, 134, 135, 139, 143, 

191, 192, 252 
Johnston, 97 
Jonnart, 291 
Joseph Ferdinand, of Austria, 8i, 

104, 105, 107, 183, 185, 186 
Jugo-Slavia, recognition of, 392 
Jutland, battle of, 226-234 

K 

Kabil Bey, 147 

Kaledin, 185, i86, 188, 261, 304 



Index 



407 



Kamerun, conquest of, 70, 150, 

151 

Kara-Ourgan, battle of, 67 
Karl, of Austria, 202, 360, 365 
Kerensky, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 

260,261,291, 304 
Kitchener, 89, 91, 102, 235 
Kluck, 22, 23, 29, 31, 32, 33. 34. 35. 

36, 37. 39. 40. 135 
Koevess, 128 

Komiloff, 105, 257, 259, 260 
Krasnik, battle of, 54 
Krasnotow, battle of, 107 
Kriemhilde Line, 356 
Krithia, battle of, 95, 96 
Krobatin, 285. 286, 288 
Kuchbach, 361, 362 
Kuhlmann, 300 
Kuprikeui, battle of, 221 
Kuropatkin, 183, 184, 258 
Kusmanek, 81, 85 
Kut-el-Amara, capture of, by 
British, 149; siege of, by Turks, 
150; recapture of, by Bntish, 
222-224, 292 



Lake, 222, 223, 224 

Lambros, 218 

Langle de Gary, de, 23, 34, i34, 

170, 173. 177 

Lanrezac, 23, 26, 28, 29 

Lansing, 239, 243, 244, 39 1 

Lassigny drive, 19 18, 332, 333 

Le Cateau, battle of, 1914. 30. 3i ; 
battle of, 19 1 8, 353 

Lechitsky, 183, 185, 186, 187, 189, 
260 

Leelanau) case, 164 

Leman, 21 

Lemberg, battle of, 54. 55; recap- 
ture by Mackensen, 106 

Lenine, 256, 257, 261, 300, 301. 
304, 307 

Leopold of Bavaria, 107, 108, no, 

183 
Lerchenfeld, 5 
Lesh, 184, 185, 188 
Leymarie, 272 
Liberia enters the war, 252 
Lichnowsky, 4, 5, 9 
Li^ge, siege of, 20-22 
Liggett, 348 
Linsingen, 84, 104, 105, 107, no 



Lithuania, 300, 301, 302, 303. 309 

Lodz, battle of, 57 

Long, 253 

Loos, battle of, 1915. 142, I43 

Lorraine, French invasion of, 
1914, 24, 25 

Ludendorff, 108, 118, 170, 245, 
246, 257, 260, 261, 262, 266, 
273, 277, 280, 295, 299, 302, 
309, 310, 311, 313. 314. 316, 
320, 321, 322, 325, 326. 327, 329, 
331. 333, 334, 335, 336, 338, 339, 
340, 341, 343. 344, 345, 346. 347, 
354, 355. 356, 358. 360, 385, 386 

Ludendorfi's West Front offen- 
sives, 1918, for the Channel 
ports, 309-326; for Paris, 327- 

337 
Lusitania case, 161-166, 237, 382 
Lvoff, 254, 255, 256, 258, 259, 304 
Lyautey, 271 j /r, 

Lys Valley offensive, Ludendorff s, 

1918, 322-326 



M 



Mackensen, 57, 81, 82, 103, 104, 
105, 106, 107, 108, no, 124, 
127, 128, 129, 213, 214, 215, 216, 

217,242 , . 
McLemore resolution, 241 

Maitre, 273 

Mallterre, 133 

Malvy, 271, 272 

Mangin, 179. 332, 337, 338, 340, 

345. 352. 356, 386 
Maritz, 70, 71 

Mame, battle of the, 1914, 33-37 
Marshall, 292, 293, 377 
Marwitz, 35, 37. I04, 3^4 
Maubeuge, siege of, 30 
Maude, 224, 291, 292, 293 
Maud'huy, 40, 41, 134. 141 
Maunoury, 27, 29, 33. 34. 35. 39. 

134 

Maurice, 31, 324 

Max of Baden, 358, 391 

Mazurian Lakes, battle of, 82 

Mertens, 93 

Mesopotamian campaigns, 1914. 
67; 1915, 148-150; 1916, 222- 
224; 1917. 291-293; 1918, 377 

Meuse-Argonne campaign, Amer- 
ican, 1918, 352, 353, 356, 357 

Micheler, 170, 191, 196, 197 



4o8 



Index 



Michitch, 129, 369 

Military losses of belligerents, 

396-398 
Milne, 369, 370 
Milyukoff, 255 
Mirbach, 307 
Mittel-Europa, no, in, 132, 302, 

303, 307. 308 
Moltke, the Elder, 19 
Moltke, the Younger, 6, 30, 33, 

38, 41, 44, 47, 170 
Monro, 102 
Mons, battle of, 29 
Morgenthau, 5, 93, 145 
Morhange, battle of, 25 
Mount Kemmel, battles of, 324, 

325. 386 
Muhlon, 5, 7 



N 



Namur, siege of, 22, 29 
Naval losses, German, 380, 381 
Naval operations, 1914, 72-79; 
1915. 152-155; 1916, 226-236; 
1917. 295-298; 1918, 378-381 
Naval "war zone" correspon- 
dence between Germany and 
United States, 157-160 
Nebraskan case, 162, 164 
Neutral rights at sea, 156-167, 

237-244 
Neuve Chapelle, battle of, 1915, 

136, 137 
Nevinson, 98 
"Nibbling," Joffre's policy of, 

133-144 
Nicaragua enters the war, 252 
Nicholas II, 50, 109, 182, 183,254 
Nivelle, 177, 178, 179, 268, 269, 

270 
Nixon, 223 
Numbers in the war, 13-17 



O 



Oppy Line, 267, 268 
Orduna case, 164 



Painlev6, 269, 271 

Palestine campaign of 191 7, 294; 

of 1918, 372-377 
Panama enters the war, 252 



Pau, 24 

Peace treaty with Germany, ab- 
stract of, 399-401 
Pecori-Giraldi, 202 
Pell6, 318 

Pershing, 347, 353, 357 
Persius, 233 
P6tain, 139, 140, 141, 171, 174, 

176, 177, 269, 270, 273, 312, 318 
Pfianzer, 104, 107 
Piave, first battle of the, 1917, 

287-289; second battle of the, 

1918, 361-363 
Plumer, 274, 275, 276, 312, 319, 

350 
Poincar6, 7 
Poland, relations with Germany, 

no. III, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 

308, 309 
Pollen, 229 
Portugal's entry into the war, 225; 

losses, 396 
Pou, 240 
Pourtales, 9 
Prasnyz, battle of, 83 
Protopopoff, 182, 253, 254 
Przemysl, siege of, 55, 56, 57, 84, 

85; recapture of, 105 
Pulteney, 43 
Putnik, 61, 62 
Putz, 135 

Q 

Qu^ant-Drocourt Line, 267 

R 

"Race for the Sea, " 1914, 38-49 

Radoslavov, 124 

Rasputin, 182, 253 

Rawa River, battle of, 82 

Rawa-Russka, battle of, 1914, 55 

Rawlinson, 41, 42, 44, 192, 342 

Read, 351 

Rennenkampf, 52, 53 

Ribot, 271 

Riga, capture of, 260, 261; naval 

battle of, 154 
Robeck, de, 91, 92, 93 
Roques, 135 
Ruflfey, 23 
Rumania, entersthe war, 207-210: 

conquest of, 210-217; treaty 

with Entente, 209, 210; with the 

Teuton powers, 303 



Index 



409 



Rumanian casualties, 396 
Rupprecht of Bavaria, 24, 40, 135, 

Russia, dismemberment of, 299- 

308 
Russian casualties, 396, 397 
Russian offensive of 19 14, 50-59; 

of 1916, 181-190; of 1917, 259, 

260 
Russian retreat of 1915, 103-111 
Russian Revolution, 253-261 
Russian winter campaign, I9i5i 

80-86 
Russky, 54, 55, 81, 82 



St. Mihiel, German capture of, 
1914, 39; battle of, 1918, 347- 
349.386 , , ^ 

St. Quentm, battle of, 1918, 311- 
321 

Sakharoff, 185, 186, 188, 215, 216 

Salandra, 115, 117 

Salonica expedition, 126 

Sambre, battle of the, 1918, 355, 

Samsonoff, 52, 53 

Sanders, 373, 375 

San Giuliano, 115 

Sari-Bahr, battle of, 97-99 

Sarrail, 33, 34, 102, 130, 131, 134. 
141, 212, 217, 290 

Sarrebourg, battle of, 25 

Sarykamitch, battle of, 67 

Sazonoff, 8, 9 

Scarpe, battle of the, 346, 347 

Scherbatcheff, 185, 186, 188, 189 

Scherr, 226, 228, 229, 231 

Scheuchenstuel, 360 

Schlieffen, 22, 36, 37, 106 

Scholz, 81, 83 

Schreiner, 93 . 

Selective Service Act, United 
States, 251, 383 

SeUvanoff, 81 

Selle River, battle of the, 354, 355 

Serajevo, assassinations at, 1-4 

Serbia, Austro-Hungarian inva- 
sion of, 1914, 60-62; conquest 
of, 1915, 121-132; losses, 396 

Severances of diplomatic rela- 
tions, 395 , . u 
Shipping losses through sub- 
marines, 236, 295-297, 379 



Siberia, Allied occupation of, 305, 

306 
Sievers, 82 
Sims, 298 
Skouloudis, 218 

Smith- Dorrien, 30, 31, 43> I34. 224 
Smuts, 224 

Soissons, battle of, 19 15, I35 
Somme, battle of the, 1916, 191- 

200 ;supplementary battle of the, 

191 7, 263-265 
Sonnino, 115 
Sordet, 32 

South African rebellion, 70, 71 
Spec, 75. 76 
Stegemann, 38 
Stopford, 99, 100, loi 
Stranz, 135 

Strategy of Entente Powers, 18; 
• of Teuton Powers, 17, 18 
Strauss, 379 
Sturdee, 77 
Sturm er, 182 
Submarine operations, 79, 236, 

295-297. 379 
Submarine pohcy, German, 156- 

167, 237-243, 245-251 
Suez Canal, Turkish attack on, 

146-147 ^ 

Sussex case, 237-239, 242, 246, 

247. 295 
Suvla Bay, battle of, 97. 99-ioi 
Szapary, 8 



Taalat Pasha, 63, 64, 377 
Tannenberg, battle of, 53 
Teuton Alliance, strength of, 13, 

17 

Theodoroff, 128, 129 
Thomas, 229 
Tirpitz, 72, 295 
Togo, capture of, 70 
Townshend, 148, 149. 150, 222, 

223, 293 
Treaty of London, 116, 117 
Treaty of Versailles, summary of, 

399-401 
Trench warfare, cycle 01, 143-144 
Triple Alliance treaty, 3,112,1 14, 

115 

Trotzky, 257, 300, 301, 304 
Tsingtau, siege of, 69 



410 



Index 



Turkey, entry into the war, 63-67 ; 

losses, 396 
Turkish campaigns. See Dar- 

danelles-GallipoH and Asiatic 

Campaigns 



U 



Ukraine, the, 261, 300, 301, 302, 
3.03. 309 

United States, declares war on 
Germany, 249-252 ; military 
and naval losses, 397; part in 
the war, 382-392; relations 
with Germany, 1915, 156-167; 
I916, 237-244; 1917, 235-252; 
strength of military and naval 
forces, 383 



V 



Venizelos, 122, 123, 125, 126, 218, 
291 

Verdun, battle of, 1916, 168-180; 

1917,273 
Victor Emmanuel, 117, 205 
Villaret, 171 
Vincent, 280 
Virton, battle of, 27 
Vittorio-Veneto, battle of, 364- 

366 
Viviani, 7, 127, 252 



W 

Wangenheim, 5, 63, 73, 92 

Warsaw, fall of, 108 

Weddigen, 79 

Western Front operations, 1915, 
133-144; 1916, 168-180, 191- 
200; 1917, 262-281; 1918, 309- 

William P. Frye case, 165 

William II, 5, 6, 50, 72, 122, 173, 
245, 246, 310, 391 

Wilson, General, 289 

Wilson, President, 240, 241, 242, 
243, 244, 246, 247, 248, 249, 
250, 358, 382, 383, 387, 391 

Woyrsch, 104, 107 

Wurm, 361 



Ypres, battle of, 1914, 45-47; 

battle of, 19 15, 137-139 
Yser, battle of the, 44, 45 
Yudenitch, 220, 221 



Zaimis, 125, 126, 218 
Zurlinden, 212, 270, 312 



A Selection from the 
Catalogue of 

O. P. PUTNAM'S SONS 



C«mpl«t« Catalogue* «•»! 
- on Application 



The World War 

And Its Consequences 

By 

William Herbert Hobbs 

With an Introduction by 

Theodore Roosevelt 



Theodore Roosevelt said, after a 
careful reading of the Manuscript: "It 
is the literal truth, that if I could choose 
only one book to be put in the hand of 
every man and woman in the United 
States, I would choose the book of 
Professor Hobbs." 



G. P. Putnam's Sons 

New York London 



The Yankee in the 
British Zone 

By 

Captain Ewen C. MacVeagh 

and 

Lieutenant Lee D. Brown 

How old Tommy Atkins and the Yank 
get on? How did they impress each 
other? What did they learn about each 
other? 

That is what this book answers. It is 
not a war book; it is rather a study in 
the psychology of the average man, Brit- 
ish and American; and it is the first 
intimate story of the Anglo-American 
relations. 

Written by two trained observers it 
sets forth a wealth of anecdotes, many 
grotesquely funny, and illustrative "hu- 
man interest" stories and incidents. 



"Wade in, Sanitary!" 

The Story of a Division Surgeon 
in Fraince 



By 
Richard Derby 

Lt.-Col. M. C, U. S. A., Division Surgeon, Second Division 

This is a surgeon's story of the war — 
of that life and death humanly dramatic 
portion of the war in which the doctors 
in khaki played their great part. 

The book is far more than a mere ac- 
coimt of war experiences. It is the first 
complete and authoritative picture of the 
struggle from the surgeon's side. Though 
non-technical in style and thoroughly 
popular, it points out many of the lessons 
of the war from the medical standpoint 
of interest to every physician and every 
thinking citizen. 

To after the war literature the book is 
a liighly valuable addition of absorbing 
interest. 



Average Americans 

Theodore Roosevelt 

LieutenauDt Colonel, U. S. A. 

12° Photogravure Froatis. 10 Other Illustrations 

Colonel Roosevelt was with the first di- 
vision abroad, fought in the first battle after 
America's entry, was wounded, promoted, 
and was with the first troops across the 
bridgehead. He saw " the big show " from 
first to last, and he pictures it with clear-cut, 
graphic force. 

At the outset is given an intimate picture 
of the Roosevelt home life. "My Father 
and Mother believed in robust righteous- 
ness," says the present Colonel, and the 
meaning and need of it was inbred in all the 
family. The part played by the elder Colonel 
Roosevelt in awakening tiie coimtry to the 
need of preparedness and the reactions of 
the war upon him, as expressed in letters to 
his sons, is developed. 

Colonel Roosevelt paints a vivid picture, 
and not a pleasant one, of the needless cost 
to America of unpreparedness and incom- 
petency — a cost chiefly paid by the men who 
fought in France. 

The lessons of the war, the author treats 
with refreshingly robust candor. His views 
are those of a clear thinking patriot — ^views 
of vital interest to every real American. 





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